[The deposition was called to order at 1342, 18 July 2004.]

LA: Let's get started. It is July 18th, 2004, at 1342, and present today are:

PERSONS PRESENT

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, DEPOSITION OFFICER (DO);

[redacted] **RECORDER (RC);**

[redacted] **LEGAL ADVISOR (LA);**

[redacted] **DEFENSE COUNSEL (DC);**

BRIGADIER GENERAL JANIS L. KARPINSKI, DEPONENT (WIT); and

[redacted] **COURT REPORTER (CR), who has previously been sworn.**

[The deponent was sworn.]

Questions by the deposition officer:

Q. For the record, General, could you please give me your full name, your rank, and your social security number?

A. Janis Leigh Karpinski, [redacted], Brigadier General, U.S. Army Reserve Component, [redacted]

Q. What is your current unit of assignment?

A. I'm attached to the Readiness Command at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Q. At some point in time, you assumed command of the 800th MP Brigade. Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Could you tell me when you assumed command of the MP
2 Brigade?
3 A. On the 29th of June 2003. I had been in theater for
4 about 10 days, maybe two weeks, at that point, and took command
5 of the 800th MP Brigade from Brigadier General Paul Hill.
6 Q. And when you took command, who was your rater and who
7 was your senior rater?
8 A. Nobody knew, and I asked Major General Kretzer at that
9 time----
10 Q. I'm sorry. Who is Major General Kretzer?
11 A. Major General Kretzer was the commander of the 377th
12 Theater Support Command. I believe his first name was David.
13 Before the change of command, I went in to ask him because
14 General Hill was rated by General Kretzer. I asked General
15 Kretzer if he was going to remain as my rater. He said, "No.
16 You'll move up to Baghdad and you'll be rated by," and this is
17 exactly how he said it, sir, "You'll be rated by, I guess, the
18 DCG and the commander."
19 I said, "Okay. Does it make any difference that we're
20 just attached to them, we're not assigned to CJTF7?"
21 He said, "No. It shouldn't make any difference at all.
22 You're working in their backyard."

1 And actually the question had come up before that when
2 we were in Baghdad--General Hill and I, before I took command,
3 we made a loop through all of our facilities, and it was when we
4 were up in Baghdad, and I met General Wodjakowski and General
5 Sanchez. General Hill actually brought up the question with the
6 operations officer, which at that time was a Brigadier General
7 Davis, and asked him who was rating the separate unit
8 commanders. He said, "It varies. Ask 'Wodjo,'" meaning
9 Wodjakowski. We did, and Wodjakowski said "We can work all of
10 the details out once you get up here to Baghdad." So that was
11 one of the reasons why asked General Kretzer about the rating
12 scheme, and he seemed to be in agreement with that.
13 When the headquarters actually moved up to Baghdad--we
14 arrived in Baghdad on the 1st of July. It was at least five days
15 later when I had the time to sit down and talk to General
16 Wodjakowski, about the direction we were going, some of my
17 concerns, because we had had several conversations at that point
18 with the people at the coalition provisional authority, and they
19 had a different understanding of how we were going to work and
20 how much we were going to be involved in the prison operations--
21 the civilian prison operations, so I needed some clarification,
22 and he said to me, "Well, I don't know. Maybe you'll be rated
23 by Ambassador Bremer."

1 So I said, "Well, I don't want to be rated by
2 Ambassador [redacted] because we have a military function, here."
3 He said, "Well, just give me your support form."
4 My aid took my support form over to him, it had to be--
5 I.
6 Q. Now, this was to General [redacted]
7 A. To General [redacted] at the CJTF7. He took the
8 support form over the objectives listed on it and the data
9 filled out. The next day, General [redacted]s aid called and
10 said General [redacted]s not rating General [redacted] So I
11 talked to him at the update, two nights later, over at the
12 CJTF7, and he said, "Yeah, just give me the support form and I
13 can initial it. Whatever works best is what we'll do."
14 It was more along the lines of a generic conversation
15 than it was, you know, "this is why I'm not going to rate you."
16 And I said, "My aid got the support form back from your
17 aid."
18 He said, "No. I think you had the wrong information.
19 Just get it back to me."
20 I said, "Okay."
21 Q. Approximately what date was that--the second
22 conversation, we're referring to now? The one where it had

1 already been returned by the aid and now you're speaking with
2 him a second time saying----
3 A. This had to be towards the end of July.
4 Q. And you had taken over command?
5 A. At the end of June.
6 Q. So we already have a month lapse, here, between the
7 time that you arrived in country, you did your initial tour, you
8 had you initial conversations before you even moved out to
9 Bagndad, and now it's a month later, and we still haven't
10 resolved the issue of who your rater is. Is that correct?
11 A. That's correct.
12 And I knew that there was conversations about it,
13 because I saw Colonel [redacted] down in the CPA.
14 Q. Colonel [redacted] is the JAG----
15 A. He is the SJA for the CJTF7, but he, at that time, he
16 was playing a major role down at the CPA. His office was down
17 there, that's where we could usually find him, and he was always
18 in the--above--in the update areas, and he had a regular desk
19 there and everything. General Sanchez was down in the CPA
20 building at least fifty percent of his time, so Colonel [redacted]
21 just kept his office down there. I think that that's what the
22 focus of his legal actions were. That's where I always found

1 him. He said to me, "I think there's a legal problem with
2 General Wodjakowski rating you."
3 I stopped in the hallway, literally, and I said to him,
4 "Look, this is ridiculous. I feel like a commander without a
5 home. We can't get office space down here. Nobody wants to
6 give us quarters over at CJTF7 over at Victory, and now you're
7 telling me there's a legal limitation that Wodjakowski can't
8 rate me."
9 He said, "I think we're working it out, but what's the
10 problem with General Diamond rating you and General Kretzer
11 senior rating you?"
12 I said, "They're in Kuwait. I don't see them."
13 Because I had one unit--and he promised me that he
14 would work it out.
15 Q. This is Colonel [redacted]
16 A. This is Colonel [redacted] He said, "I'll get
17 clarification. I think we'll be able to work through the legal
18 limitations."
19 We had a unit down at Bucca--Camp Bucca was the first
20 prisoner of war camp, and we continued to maintain that unit.
21 So every time I was going down to visit that unit, it was so
22 close to the Kuwait border, I would try and go over to see the
23 people that I had working down there in the rear element, the

1 rear detachment, and I would usually see General--General
2 Diamond took over, then, for General Kretzer, and I believe that
3 that was in August or September. I really don't have a clear
4 recollection, but I saw him. I asked General Diamond
5 specifically, the first time I saw him down in Kuwait, when he
6 took over----
7 Q. Which was about August?
8 A. Which was about August. I asked him specifically if he
9 had heard anything. We were trying to work out whatever the
10 legal limitations were to be rated by General Wodjakowski and
11 senior rated by Sanchez. He said, "That's my understanding.
12 You're not down here. You don't work for me. And General
13 McKiernan isn't even in the theater now, so it would be hard for
14 you to be rated the same way that General Hill was." He said,
15 "We hear you guys are doing great things up there. I know you
16 have an enormous mission." We went over to Bucca and back up to
17 Baghdad.
18 We were having prisons meetings at least three times a
19 week.----
20 Q. We can get to the operations, and we will, but if we
21 could just get to the point where when was it that someone

1 actually accepted your OER support form and signed off as your
2 rater and agreed that those were good goals?
3 A. General Wodjakowski had my support form, I gave it to
4 him myself. He said he wasn't going to be bothered with all of
5 the details of the initials and everything else, that he knew
6 when I got there and he knew when he accepted responsibility for
7 me. The aid furnished a copy of the rating scheme that had me
8 being rated by General [redacted] and senior rated by General
9 Sanchez.
10 Q. Do you have a copy of that rating scheme?
11 A. I'm sure they do in the 800th. I don't have a personal
12 copy of it, because all of the files were shipped back in the
13 connex to the 800th. I'm sure--I'm positive they have a copy of
14 the rating scheme.
15 Q. So did General [redacted] or General [redacted] or anyone
16 actually ever sign the form, initial the form, and give it back
17 to you?
18 A. No, sir.
19 Q. While you were operating there as the 800th MP
20 commander, who did you believe your----
21 A. General Wodjakowski.
22 Q. Was your rater?
23 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Who did you believe your senior rater was?

2 A. General Sanchez. That was on the rating scheme. I

3 responded to his requests for information. I responded----

4 Q. Now, who's rating scheme are you referring to?

5 A. CJTF7, sir.

6 Q. And you actually saw that?

7 A. Yes, sir. I did.

8 Q. So, somewhere, there is a copy of that, be that at the

9 800th or at the CJTF7 level?

10 A. Yes, sir. And, Major [redacted] who was my S-1,

11 received many phone calls about getting the support form over to

12 General Wodjakowski because they wanted to publish this rating

13 scheme and they wanted to make sure that they had at least on

14 file a support form for everybody.

15 Q. Well, I'm a little confused now. If you had given it

16 to them, why were they calling so frequently asking for it?

17 A. I don't know, and I didn't ask.

18 Q. Do you send it to them every time they asked for it--or

19 did your S-1 send it to them every time they asked for it?

20 A. Not every time. He said, "General Wodjakowski has the

21 support form," and then the admin officer, I think it was a

22 colonel who called the last time, said, "I don't know what the

1 disconnect was," or words to that effect, "but he does have it,
2 we have it, everything is in order now."
3 DC: You didn't realize it was that complicated of a
4 question, did you?
5 DO: I didn't. And my next question will explain why. I
6 actually, along with interviewing a great number of people,
7 General Wodjakowski is one of those that I've already
8 interviewed, and when I asked him the question, he told me,
9 point blank, that your rater was General Diamond. That, indeed,
10 he wasn't your rater.
11 WIT: Not true. However, sir, I will tell you that when
12 all of this--because what--probably from November, when units
13 knew they were getting ready to leave in the December, January
14 timeframe because they had completed their year or were getting
15 ready to relocate to Kuwait for their redeployment, they put out
16 at every SJU, every Separate Unit Update, that I attended, and
17 they put it out more often than that, "Do not send your OER
18 shells over to General Wodjakowski. He doesn't want to be
19 inundated with these, and he'll ask for them when your unit is--
20 it will be a part of the transition process." So, we got that
21 notification because I was on the rating scheme, with General
22 Wodjakowski as my rater and General Sanchez as my senior rater.

1 DC: As a point of clarification, sir, General Diamond is
2 the one who actually rated her.
3 WIT: Because when we got down to Kuwait, I dropped off my
4 support form as part of the transition. My colleague, the
5 commander of another MP brigade, General Geoghan, Dennis
6 Geoghan--he was in Kuwait from July when he arrived and took
7 command of the 220th MP Brigade, and he remained in Kuwait until
8 the beginning of November. So when he came up into Baghdad, I
9 said, "Dennis, what are you trying to do? Get two OERs from
10 this deployment?"
11 He said, "No. I'm just going to ask 'Wodjo' to rate
12 me."
13 I said, "He wasn't your rater while you were in
14 Kuwait. You had more than 90 days."
15 He said, "Ahh, it doesn't make any difference."
16 I said, "General Diamond should be your rater."
17 He looked me straight in the eye, sir, and he said,
18 "Do you want General Diamond to rate you?"
19 I said, "But you were down there for four months.
20 This is a distortion of the truth. It's a lie."
21 He said, "'Wodjo' said he'll do it. Nobody's going
22 to pay any attention to it."

1 So, he was, in fact, rated--or should have been rated
2 by General Diamond for four months, and then rated by--there
3 wouldn't have been enough time for him to be rated by General
4 Wodjakowski. So he said, "What does your support form look
5 like?" That's how that conversation came up.
6 I said, "I have my support form, but our missions are
7 completely different, Dennis," and I said, "And you're not
8 supposed to give it Wodjakowski until the transitions of
9 authority is complete."
10 That night, he came back over to my TOC and said, "I
11 don't think General Wodjakowski's going to rate you."
12 I said, "What do you mean?"
13 He said, "He says he's rating me as an MP brigade
14 commander and Spain, the Corps MP brigade commander."
15 I said, "You know, we've gone back and forth over
16 this. General Wodjakowski is listed on the rating scheme as my
17 rater, so." I didn't run right over to the CJTF7 Headquarters
18 and ask him, because I didn't want to put General Geoghan, you
19 know, as the courier.
20 So when I was at the SUU the next time, which I
21 believe was the next night, the update, I asked General
22 Wodjakowski, and he said, "Don't give me support form until the
23 transition, Karpinski. You're no different than anybody else."

1 I said, "Are you rating me, sir?"

2 He said, "Is my name on the rating scheme as your

3 rater?"

4 I said, "Yes, sir. But there's been some confusion

5 and I just wanted to make sure it was right."

6 So when we got down to Kuwait after the transition of

7 authority of the 800th----

8 Q. When did that conversation occur? The one where you

9 had asked, again, about the rating scheme and about him rating

10 you and him saying, "Do not give it to me until after SUU"?

11 When did that occur?

12 A. Until after the--or during the transition of authority-

13 -there was a lot of acronyms that they used: TOA, SUU, BUA, all

14 those things. But this was after the transition--it was

15 supposed to be part of the transition packet. It's my

16 recollection that it was after--I hadn't seen the photographs

17 yet, but this was after the transition--it was supposed to be a

18 part of the transition packet. It's my recollection that it was

19 after--I hadn't seen the photographs yet, but I had known--I

20 already knew that there were allegations.

1 Q. This is January?

2 A. January. Mid-January.

3 So when the transfer of authority was under way, we

4 briefed General Wodjakowski--all of the MP brigades briefed him

5 at the same time with the replacement brigades in the briefing.

6 General Wodjakowski was there. He said, "Fine. Okay, guys.

7 Just give me the rest of the stuff you're supposed to turn over

8 to me." So we did. I believe everybody did. I know I did.

9 Q. This was in January?

10 A. This was the last week of January.

11 And then when we did the TOA--we did the transfer of

12 authority on the 1st of February and on the 2nd of February we

13 flew down to Kuwait. Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] phonetic], who

14 was the senior person in the rear detachment down there for me,

15 the 800th, and she said to me, "Diamond says you have to give him

16 a support form because Wodjakowski's not going to rate you."

17 And I can't say I remember it verbatim, but I remember

18 saying, "Well, sure. Why not? Everything else has changed.

19 You know I left my support form up there. Do you think he said

20 anything to me?"

21 She said, "Ma'am, I don't know, but General Diamond

22 said General Wodjakowski's not going to rate you."

1 Q. So did you actually give a support form, then, to
2 General Diamond?
3 A. I did.
4 Q. And that would have been in Jan----
5 A. February.
6 Q. And did you have any conversations with General Diamond
7 in February after you gave him that support form?
8 A. No. What I did was take it over. I asked his aid if
9 General Diamond was available, and he said, "No, ma'am. He's
10 really not."
11 I said, "I have support form."----
12 Q. In the whole time that you were there, it would have
13 been from June, as I recall, through February, now?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Did you have any conversations with General Diamond
16 about performance or issues or the operations of the 800th MPs or
17 what was going on? The normal conversations that you would have
18 with someone that would be your rater?
19 A. No, sir. I did talk to him several times, and, like I
20 said, every time I was down in Kuwait, I went over--and I really
21 went over to drop in and see him. One time I visited him
22 because I knew that General Helmeley [phonetic] was coming over,
23 and I wanted to know if they had the details of his schedule so

1 I could make arrangements, if it was possible, to see him up at
2 Baghdad. They didn't have them at the time----
3 Q. So, in your mind, there wasn't this usual command
4 relationship between you and General Diamond?
5 A. Absolutely not, sir.
6 Q. You believed that you were working for General
7 Wodjakowski, then, correct?
8 A. And General Sanchez.
9 Q. Did you accept an OER from General Diamond?
10 A. I did not.
11 Q. You did not?
12 A. I did not. He told me he was not going to rate me.
13 Q. General Diamond wasn't going to rate you?
14 A. Yes. That's exactly what he told me.
15 Q. Why was General Diamond, now, not going to rate you if
16 he was going to be your rater?
17 A. I dropped my support form off with the aid, with a note
18 attached to it, "sticky" note, that said, "I've heard you're
19 supposed to be my rater," next line, "News to me. Just in case,
20 this is my support form." Left it there. For not being
21 available, 30 minutes later, Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]
22 [phonetic] was in receipt of that support form, from General

1 Diamond, who said to her, "Would you please tell your boss that
2 I'm not going to rate her. I don't need this."
3 She brought it over to me. I said, "Thank you very
4 much." I took it back over. I said, "I need to see General
5 Diamond."
6 "Ma'am, you just missed him." That's what the aid told
7 me.
8 I said, "Would you please leave this for him," and
9 there's a note on the front, now, that says, "Please, call me."
10 So he didn't call. So I called him. It must have been
11 about 10 o'clock at night when I spoke to him, and he said----
12 Q. And you were still in country in February at this
13 point?
14 A. Yes, sir. I was.
15 Q. In Kuwait?
16 A. In Kuwait.
17 I said--and we had not--at that point, we didn't know
18 that General Taguba was conducting an investigation.--That's not
19 true. We had heard rumors that General Taguba was conducting a
20 15-6 investigation, but we did not know what it was involving or
21 anything at that point. When I talked to General Diamond on the
22 phone at about 10 o'clock that night, I said to him, "I was told
23 that General Wodjakowski's not going to rate me because we're

1 not assigned. I thought that that legal problem had been fixed
2 according to Colonel [redacted] back months ago."
3 And he said, "Well, I'm not going to rate you either.
4 I didn't see you up in Iraq. I don't know what you did, and
5 General Wodjakowski's your rater."
6 Two days later, that changed. He said, "I called
7 General Wodjakowski. General Wodjakowski said he's not going to
8 rate you."
9 I said, "Well, who do I work for?"
10 And he said, "Well, right now, I guess you work for
11 me."
12 And I said--his first name is Mike. I said to him,
13 "Mike, you never came up and saw me in Baghdad. The half a
14 dozen times that I was in Kuwait in your office, you spoke about
15 all of the great news you heard about the 800th and you were
16 sorry that you couldn't support us more with the requirements we
17 had at the prisons, but you were not funded or your budget would
18 not allow you to provide all of the support that we needed for
19 refurbishing and supplying the prisons.
20 He said, "I know. I know. I know. But, apparently,
21 General Wodjakowski's not going to rate you, so I'm your rater,
22 or so they tell me."

1 Q. Did he rate you?

2 A. He did.

3 Q. So you accepted an OER from him?

4 DC: Received. We don't like the word "accepted."

5 Q. Did you sign the OER?

6 A. I did not.

7 Q. So do you have an official position relative to that

8 OER?

9 A. He wasn't my ra--I have to appeal it. I have to file

10 a----

11 DC: Okay. I've got it. Thank you.

12 You're right. I wasn't expecting that much

13 information from the first question.

14 DC: I wouldn't have either, but I knew the background so I

15 knew what was going to be coming as soon as you said it.

16 Q. Going back to when you first took over command, you

17 took over command from General Hill, as I recall you saying, and

18 you did an initial tour. Can you tell me what your initial

19 impressions were, coming in to command the 800th?

20 WIT: From that tour?

21 Q. Yeah. What was in your mind when you first showed up

22 and you're a newly assigned commander, you meet General Hill,

23 you find out what the mission is, you're new in country, you go

1 on a tour--tell me what your initial impressions were of the
2 unit?
3 A. Just very quickly, I'll tell you that I commanded a
4 battalion under the 800th, so I knew what the missions were of
5 the battalions that were assigned, but looking at the lay down
6 from the units that were in theater, I knew that they had some
7 combat support units there. They had units that they'd never
8 worked with before assigned to the 800th, and coming from the 81st
9 RSC, I was well aware of all of the problems that units were
10 having--not just the military police units, but all of the
11 problems that the units were having at the mobilization
12 stations. Cross leveling was a nightmare and equipment was a
13 nightmare. I was well aware of that. So I was prepared for
14 getting into the theater, but there was a delay, because they
15 were planning to send the 800th MP Brigade back to the states,
16 and then the decision was made through SENTCOM [phonetic] that
17 it would be a great idea for me to even have five or six weeks
18 with the brigade in theater. So I had a couple of conversations
19 with General Hill before I got there. He was talking about how
20 the units were since the end of major hostilities had been
21 declared in May, they were really winding down as far as the EPW
22 mission went, that I would have some time with the soldiers, and

1 that would be a good thing. And I was in full agreement with
2 that.
3 I said, "Well, where are you, now, sir?"
4 And he said, "We're in Kuwait, but the EPW camp is just
5 across the border at Bucca, and we have two other locations, and
6 they've been tossing around the idea of some of the units going
7 to Baghdad."
8 So I said, "EPW operations?"
9 And he said, "No. This is a theater-wide shortage of
10 MPs. So some of the units that got here late, they're just
11 talking about the possibility of moving them up to do regular
12 military police operations."
13 So when I got into the theater, I arrived at about 2
14 o'clock in the morning, I think I got about four or five hours
15 of sleep, and then the next day, I went in, and I was briefed by
16 the staff and what they had been doing and their contingency
17 plan for shifting units forward, but they were no longer calling
18 it a contingency plan because the FRAGO had been cut to send the
19 units forward to Baghdad, and I said, "Combat support units?"
20 And she said, "No, ma'am. We're going to be doing
21 detention operations in Iraq."
22 "Can I see the FRAGO?" The FRAGO says rebuild,
23 restore, and operate Iraqi correctional institutes and secure

1 the MEK and continue your mission at Bucca, the Corps holding
2 area, which will be transferred over to you and the mission for
3 the HVD, the high value detainees, the deck of cards.
4 Q. Okay. You're getting into what your missions were, but
5 if you could just give me what your impressions were, relative
6 to the units that were assigned to the 800th? If you could tell
7 me what you believed to be the conditions of the unit.
8 A. Okay. On this quick whirlwind tour, which was the next
9 day, we went on it--so I had this idea that we're going to do
10 this new operation, cross the border into Iraq and go to Bucca
11 first. It was a fairly typical EPW operation. Wires, receipt
12 prisoners out locally around the camp doing the work projects
13 that they can send EPW's out on. The population was probably
14 between five and seven hundred at Bucca. They had closed a lot
15 of the compounds, because they were releasing a lot of the
16 prisoners. But they were--Bucca was not a very good location.
17 There was a tremendous population of flies. The soldiers seemed
18 to be happy, but their morale was good because they believed
19 that they were going home. We left there, we went to Tawil
20 [phonetic], where the conditions were really terrible for the
21 soldiers, but once again, I asked the commander, and he said,
22 "The morale of the soldiers is much better, now, because our
23 population of prisoners is now about three."

1 I said, "About three hundred?"

2 He said, "No, ma'am. Three. We're really just the

3 transfer point, a mid-way point between Bucca and the Corps

4 holding area, so we have no population right now." And he said

5 the soldiers didn't have mess hall and they'd like to have a

6 mess hall.

7 And everywhere in Iraq it was austere, but if you

8 talked to the soldiers, they wanted to know when they were going

9 home. It just so happened that when we were at Tawil

10 [phonetic],----

11 Q. Was their performance good up to that point according

12 to what General Hill had told you? Were there any problem

13 performers, specifically by unit, or any problems that General

14 Hill passed on to you as he was leaving command?

15 A. As he was leaving command, but at that point, he didn't

16 share. He said, "There's been some problems, but we can talk

17 about them when we get to Baghdad."

18 Q. You have significant background as a soldier and also

19 in military police. Anything far out of the ordinary relative

20 to the 800th MPs that struck you when you first took over

21 command?

22 A. They--not--not--I guess from that trip, yes.

1 Q. What was it?

2 A. Well, I came to find out that Colonel [redacted] who was the

3 deputy, was really running the whole brigade. He had taken

4 charge at Bucca with General Hill's blessing and concurrence,

5 and he was not letting the battalion commanders do their job

6 there. He wanted to be in charge. I talked to each of the

7 battalion commanders at Bucca. I talked to the battalion

8 commander at Tawil (phonetic), and when we got to Baghdad, I

9 talked to the battalion commanders up there and it was the same

10 sentiment.

11 Q. How many battalions were assigned to the 800th when you

12 took over?

13 A. Nine. But some of them were smaller in configuration

14 than a normal sized battalion. They're the liaison battalions

15 and they're much smaller. But there were great companies

16 assigned: National Guard and Reserve. Unfortunately, there

17 were losses for primarily medical reasons at that point, and

18 when I asked the S-1 to just give me a snapshot of what the unit

19 strength was, it was not a good thing.

20 Q. What was the unit strength when you took over?

21 A. Well, each--say a battalion was supposed to deploy with

22 ninety percent, some of the battalions were down to seventy-

23 eight or seventy-six percent.

1 Q. Now, you had nine battalions. How many of them were
2 down that low?
3 A. All of them were down to at least eighty percent. Some
4 of them were lower than that.
5 Q. And can you tell me about the personnel issues relative
6 to replacements?
7 A. There was no replacements, sir. We couldn't get MP
8 companies transferred from even Kuwait to the 800th. They were
9 using MPs to do entry control security. Not that MPs can't do
10 that, they can, but any soldier can do that. When you have a
11 requirement for MP specific work, like we did at the detention
12 facilities, you can't take a marine or a field artilleryman and
13 put him in there because you say, "here's a soldier," but you
14 can put them on entry control points and pass the MPs along, and
15 they refused to do it. One of the reasons that we remain--I
16 don't want to forget to make that point, because there was a
17 valid reason--CFLIC's determination, not mine, of us remaining
18 assigned to CFLIC as opposed to being assigned to CJTF7. I was
19 told that that decision was actually an arguing point between
20 General Wallace, first, who was the Fifth Corps commander before
21 General Sanchez. I don't know if he was the CJTF7 commander,
22 but----
23 DO: He was not.

1 A. ----but they disagreed over how the--there was some
2 concern from General McKiernan that the MP brigade would be
3 assigned to CJTF7 and then they would be broken up to use to
4 supplement the Fifth Corps MP Brigade, the Corps--the CJTF7
5 Brigade, and to do other MP type missions other than detention.
6 So that was a conscious decision on General McKiernan's part,
7 CFLIC's part, to keep the 800th MP Brigade assigned to CFLIC as
8 opposed to assigning them to CJTF7.
9 DO: I know that training is an issue and has been issue
10 relative to the 800th MPs in the prior discussions that have
11 occurred in some of your discussions with General Taguba and
12 some of the statements you made relative to training. You had
13 nine battalions assigned.
14 Q. The 800th was an EPW--that was the mission of the 800th?
15 A. [The deponent indicated an affirmative response.]
16 Q. Of those nine battalions, could you tell me how many of
17 those were actually trained as EPW battalions and which ones had
18 only limited EPW training?
19 A. The ones that were at Bucca, the 724th, the 530th----
20 Q. It might be better if you could go----
21 WIT: Give you numbers?
22 DO: Well, the numbers are fine. I just have to absorb
23 them.

1 Q. So, at Bucca, there was?

2 A. Well, there was four battalions at Bucca. They were

3 all trained in EPW operations.

4 Q. They all were?

5 A. Every one of them. The battalion that was at Tawil

6 [phonetic] was trained in EPW. The battalion that was up in

7 Baghdad, the 400th, knew EPW and they were trained in EPW, but

8 they're AT's for previous years had been combat support, not EPW

9 missions. The companies that were assigned to the battalions,

10 and then the VLDs--I'm sorry, the other battalions, the liaison

11 battalions, they were all EPW. They had plenty of training in

12 EPW. They didn't necessarily have formal training in detention

13 operations before they deployed, because detention operations

14 are vastly different than EPW operations. Therein lies one of

15 the problems from the start. People didn't get that

16 clarification, and I know they didn't get that clarification

17 when the decision was made, because when I went to General

18 Kretzer and said, you know, detention is not really our mission

19 and it is not a heavily trained mission for the military police,

20 whether it's active component or not. He said, well, maybe, but

21 your brigade has the mission closest to detention operation.

22 Q. Did you disagree with that?

23 A. I did.

1 Q. What did you believe the alternative to be?

2 A. There was no alternative.

3 Q. Alright. If there was no alternative, I'm somewhat

4 confused. Because if we have all of these people to be detained

5 and they need to have a detention unit be assigned to them, who

6 would you have suggested be used for that if not your unit?

7 A. Well, I actually went in there asking for a delay in

8 our relocation to Baghdad, because----

9 Q. And who were you speaking to, again?

10 A. General Kretzer. Major General Kretzer, the 377th--we

11 were a theater asset, so during the initial----

12 Q. This is the initial, before you moved up to Baghdad?

13 A. It was when we came back from the whirlwind tour.

14 Q. You asked for a delay, and what was the----

15 A. I went in and I said, "This is not really our mission."

16 He said, "I know, but your brigade is your closest to

17 detention."

18 I said, "Sir, is there any possibility that--we have a

19 lot of soldiers that are wardens and jailors in their civilian

20 jobs and we're going to rely heavily on their expertise, but EPW

21 operations are different from EPW operations. Is there any

22 chance we can delay moving to Baghdad--"

1 "No. They needed you there last week. There won't be
2 a delay." And he said, "Go up there and do the best you can."
3 Before I even took command of the brigade, some of the
4 units had already gone up to Baghdad. We had the 400th up there,
5 and they had the 72nd MP Company, which is National Guard--it has
6 to be one of the finest military police companies I've ever
7 worked with. They had people that were, like all of our Reserve
8 units thankfully do--we have a lot of police officers, fire
9 fighters, and everything, but they were--they were running Abu
10 Ghraib. They were on the grounds of Abu Ghraid. The 400th and
11 their subordinate companies were, at that time, up until the
12 FRAGO and the transfer of responsibility, were assigned to the
13 Fifth Corps MP Brigade--that was Colonel [redacted].
14 When I got to Baghdad and went out to see Abu Ghraib
15 and the 72nd MP Company, those soldiers, 183 of them and their
16 leadership element, gathered around us, the command sergeant
17 major and myself, and told us that they hadn't seen the
18 commander since they'd been there----
19 Q. This is the 400th MP Brigade?
20 A. This is the--there's the 72nd MP Company, subordinate
21 unit of the 400th MP Battalion.
22 Q. Who were they referring to?
23 A. They were referring to Colonel [redacted]

1 Q. Which would have been 400th MP Battalion commander?

2 A. No. It was the Corps----

3 DO: Okay. The brigade commander.

4 A. I said to the Battalion Commander, Colonel [redacted]

5 "Why hasn't he been out here?

6 He said, "Colonel [redacted] doesn't even treat us well, and

7 we're co-located with him." He said, "I've been out here as

8 often as possible, but the one time that the unit saw the

9 command sergeant major, he stopped a soldier and told him his

10 sleeves were too short on his DCUs."

11 They hadn't seen anybody--because with the FRAGO and

12 the 800th MP Brigade moving to Baghdad, we were taking over the

13 responsibility for those units--all of the Reserve and National

14 Guard units that were under one of my battalions, but they

15 hadn't received any support, they hadn't received any logistics,

16 they hadn't received any encouragement from the Corps, from the

17 COTF, who was their headquarters at the time. They told me,

18 [redacted] who was the company commander, and his first

19 sergeant told me then. I said, "Can you do the detention

20 mission?"

21 He said, "Ma'am, as long as you're here and as long as

22 we have support, we can do this mission."

23 I said, "How are you going to do it?"

1 He said, "First, we have to rebuild this place and
2 there's some discussion about whether we're even going to be
3 able to use it or not, but we can do it."
4 And, sir, we walked through that prison knee-deep----
5 Q. If we can, we'll get to the arrivals at Abu Ghraib, but
6 I'm still interested in the training issues.
7 A. Well, I think--I know that every one of the units I
8 spoke to, sir, including the unit that was over doing the HVD
9 mission and near the airport, another MP battalion, Colonel
10 [redacted] was their commander. Everywhere I--whenever I
11 went, I talked to the leadership and spoke to the soldiers.
12 They were confident that they could do the mission. The
13 unfortunate timing was that they also heard--when we got to the
14 unit that was doing the Tas Ferat jail complex, the civilian
15 jail complex, in downtown Baghdad, they heard from somebody in
16 CPA that they were going to be extended, that they were not
17 going home, that they were going to be in theater for ten months
18 and eight days.
19 Q. So you have--now you're bringing in a factor relative
20 to morale and the impact of the morale. I still want to get at
21 this issue relative to the training. So, going back to when the
22 original decision was made. They had to move the 800th up for
23 whatever reasons existed at the time, and you believe that your

1 unit was not adequately trained at that point, and you brought
2 that to the attention of Major General Kretzer. He said, "They
3 need you up there now." So you moved the units up there at that
4 point?
5 A. Some of them had already been moved up there.
6 Q. So, in your mind, now, as I hear it, there was a gap
7 between what they know, what they've been trained to do, and
8 what their mission is now asking them to do. What did you do to
9 fill in that gap?
10 A. My perception: This is not what they deployed to do
11 and now they're being given this mission, but I talked to
12 soldiers and I talked to battalion commanders, and they felt
13 that they were ready to do this mission.
14 Q. So did you make a determination at that point that the
15 training was therefor adequate?
16 A. Yes, I did. I knew that the soldiers were trained and
17 ready to do the mission. They'd been on site, they were working
18 the mission, and in talking to them and to their battalion
19 commanders and the company commanders, first sergeants--they all
20 felt that they were ready to do it. So I changed my----
21 DC: Just to clarify something that she said earlier and
22 make sure--these units had people in there that had done
23 detention operations from the civilian world, and she believed

1 that those people could train the other people internally. And
2 I just want to make sure that's clear on the record.
3 Q. Is that accurate?
4 A. Yes.
5 DO: Yes. I understand that.
6 DC: Okay.
7 WIT: And in addition to that, sir, the SJA, not only from
8 the brigade, my JAG officers for the brigade, from the
9 battalions, were giving refresher training on Geneva/Hague, they
10 were explaining to them the differences, and this was a legal
11 question, not necessarily a training question, but they wanted
12 to make sure that the MPs understood and they got clarification
13 from Colonel [redacted] would Iraqi prisoners be afforded the same
14 rights.
15 DO: I understand. It's an important area that I believe
16 needed to be cleared up because perceptions have been created
17 that in fact these MP units had been placed with inadequate
18 training and that, in fact, the training was not up to what the
19 mission was calling for, and based on other parts of the
20 investigation that I have conducted, other than incidents that
21 occurred at Abu Ghraib, that there was a significantly favorable
22 impression of many of the units and soldiers of the 800th, and,
23 in fact, it doesn't seem to be indications of inadequate

1 training on the part of the 800th for these detention operations.
2 And what I believe I just heard you say is that you made your
3 command judgment that there may have been a shortfall, but after
4 doing a command review and checking with the soldiers and
5 understanding that a number of them had civilian personnel
6 skills that they were going to bring to the table, that you
7 judged that it was an adequate situation, given the
8 circumstances, for this mission to go forward. Is that
9 accurate?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. Because that is not the impression that I believe the
12 general population currently has.
13 A. Sir, I do want to tell you that I was not at mobe
14 [phonetic] stations when these units deployed. Many of them
15 talked about what a bad experience they had at the mobilization
16 stations, that it was a good thing that they were trained
17 otherwise by their units or while they were at Bucca or at Tawil
18 [phonetic].
19 DC: I want to put it out, sir, that a lot of the general
20 populous perception of what occurred over there is based upon
21 what happened at Abu Ghraib in cell blocks 1A and 1B, but also
22 on the summary of the Taguba Report with outing of the annexes,

1 which somebody leaked it to the press and put it on the
2 websites.
3 DO: Okay. However they got them, I just wanted to make
4 sure that in this forum, at least here, that we are clear.
5 WIT: And you might get to this question later, so if you
6 plan to, then I'll stop short now, but it doesn't mean that they
7 were equipped appropriately,----
8 DO: No. We haven't gotten to equipment yet.
9 WIT: ----and does not mean that when the situation changed
10 and they were in the middle of the worst hostile fire zone in
11 the theater, that they were prepared with the necessary
12 equipment or platforms to do force protection.
13 DO: Yeah. And I believe that you're referring, now, to
14 Abu Ghraib specifically with those comments. I'm really not
15 familiar with what the situation was in all of your other
16 assignments that you had over there. I believe that you had
17 like fourteen or fifteen----
18 WIT: Seventeen.
19 DO: ----Seventeen. I really--the extent of most of my
20 knowledge is Abu Ghraib.
21 DO: Again, just to point out, even MPs that are trained in
22 detention operations aren't trained to take hostile fire. So
23 this is a unique mission. I mean, if your running Fort Knox

1 Correctional Facility, you just detain prisoners. You're not
2 worried about somebody attacking you from the outside at the
3 same time.
4 DO: Okay, Major. We can go off on that tangent. I don't
5 choose to. Soldiers are trained to take fire, but we won't go
6 into that right now. It's not an area for this investigation,
7 which is military intelligence oriented, but I find your last
8 statement debatable, but I choose this as to not to be the forum
9 for it.
10 DO: Well, I was just trying to explain that they were
11 doing two different things that are not supposed to be done at
12 the same time.
13 DO: Alright. Noted, and we'll move on.
14 Q. When you were given your order to move up, I believe
15 you said that there were seventeen sites or facilities that you
16 had responsibilities for?
17 A. We did not have seventeen at the time.
18 Q. Okay. Could you just tell me when you first took over
19 command and then you moved up and then eventually got seventeen,
20 if you could just briefly go through that scenario, how it got
21 to be from when you first arrived in country and were told to

1 move forward and then there were seventeen? How did that come
2 about?
3 A. Well, they had--and I can tell you very quickly--they
4 were operating Bucca, they had five battalions there, and that
5 includes one of the liaison battalions. They had, at the
6 fullest, I think they had about eight-thousand EPWs if I recall
7 the stats correctly. The majority of them had been released
8 when the end of major hostilities were declared. But the
9 battalions that were stuck at the mobe (phonetic) station,
10 primarily Fort Dix, up until April and May timeframe, and some
11 of them were EPW battalions. they moved them to--one to Tawil
12 (phonetic) and one to Ad Diwaniaah in support of the marines
13 that were there, the MEF. And they had two battalions north
14 already in Baghdad supporting, which became mine. So when I
15 came into the theater, we had primarily Bucca, where most of the
16 battalions were, and then we had one battalion at Ad Diwaniaah
17 in support of the MEF, and one battalion at Tawil (phonetic), at
18 the air base, that was a stopping point. I had two battalions
19 north when the FRAGO was published, when I took command, they
20 were also aligned under me, but they had been aligned under the
21 Corps. So, they had moved, "they" being my ops center--they got
22 the FRAGO and they moved two battalions north. Another one to
23 the HVD facility in Baghdad and to do the local jails, and one

1 battalion up to the MEK, to secure the MEK compound. So we had
2 three facilities: a large one in Bucca and two other ones, up
3 until we moved to Baghdad. Then we kept those three and also
4 took responsibility for the HVD facility and another battalion
5 that was doing the local Baghdad jails. A liaison battalion up
6 in Mosul, one up in the MEK securing the Iranians, and then
7 liaison battalion at CPA.
8 Q. Quite a number of diverse locations throughout the
9 entire country?
10 A. Yes, sir. The entire country. A large AOR.
11 Q. How did that actually work? A few times you said,
12 "they." Was CJTF7 directing where you would place your
13 battalions or did they just turn the mission over to you and you
14 decided where the battalions would go and which units would
15 deploy in which locations? How did that actually work?
16 A. Sir, I don't think they care, but that's just my
17 opinion, except for they wanted us to keep a battalion----
18 Q. The "they" is CJTF7?
19 A. The CJTF7. General Sanchez, General Wodjakowski, and
20 the planners wanted us to keep a battalion--instructed us to
21 keep a battalion at the airport to do the HVD facility, the high
22 value detainees and to run the Corps holding area.

1 Q. This was Camp Cropper?

2 A. Camp Cropper.

3 And they instructed us to send a battalion to Aj Sharaf

4 [phonetic] to secure the MEK. To do a relief in place with the

5 infantry battalion that was there--I think it was armor, and

6 secure the MEK. They instructed us to coordinate with the

7 Prisons Department of the Coalition Provisional Authority to run

8 detention operations as required and to maintain a company at

9 Abu Ghraib to restore the jails to operational standards and

10 then transfer the prisoners that were being held there--there

11 was less than one-hundred fifty, I think, at the time, that had

12 been turned over to Abu Ghraib by some of the divisions. So we

13 had to come up with the plan of where the battalions were going

14 to be and what mission they were going to do. That was why it

15 was so important during the first week in Baghdad that we speak

16 to the Coalition Provisional Authority Prisons Department

17 because they had started out by saying that they had already

18 identified fifteen jails and they were still traveling around,

19 "they" being the command sergeant major from the Corps MP

20 brigade and [redacted] and [redacted] They were still

21 traveling around identifying other facilities. And I said, at

22 the meeting, I said, "Time out. I don't have an unlimited

23 number of MPs. We have to get the most bang for our buck. Tell

1 me which facilities you need that will secure the largest
2 populations, and when they are restored, then we'll put MPs down
3 there to occupy and to run them until you get your civilian--
4 your contractors in."
5 So, he said--[redacted] said to me, "Well, no"----
6 Q. Who does he work for?
7 A. [redacted] was one of the contractors under the
8 Prisons Department and the Prisons Department was under the
9 Ministry of Justice, and that's in the CPA.
10 DC: Okay. Alright.
11 A. ----so [redacted] said to me, "Well, ma'am, that's
12 not going to work because right now we have a facility that,
13 right now, might hold seventy."
14 I said, "If it's a separate facility, it requires 24
15 hours a day, 7 days a week, and force protection. I can't leave
16 an MP unit out there in Baghdad on their own without force
17 protection. What I need from you is a list of the prison
18 facilities that you're identifying and tell me what the capacity
19 is and what the projected capacity will be, and I'll tell you
20 which ones I can cover, because I only have so many MPs to go
21 around."
22 He said, "The ambassador's not going to like that."

1 I said, "Then we'll go and talk to the ambassador,
2 because I can't make more MPs appear. I have certain things
3 that I have to do. I have to continue to run Bucca," I went
4 down the list. So he said he would take a look at the list.
5 And [redacted] who was the senior guy, he was an Irishman who
6 ran the Prisons Department, he told me that he understood that
7 that's absolutely what we had to do and we would do that. And I
8 said, "Look, if I can take an MP company and run a prison, it
9 makes more sense to be holding three hundred prisoners than it
10 does to be holding seventy."
11 He said, "I agree."
12 So, that's what they were focusing on, and they got it
13 down to seven in Baghdad, a couple outside of Baghdad, one that
14 they were looking at down in Basra. So we were planning,
15 tentatively, the battalions that were still down in Bucca, we
16 were planning on where we would shift them depending on where
17 the prisons materialize. They were supposed to have contractors
18 come in to rebuild the prisons or at least supervise the
19 rebuilding of prisons with local contractors. Sir, I can tell
20 you that the only prison that was under construction with the
21 funds that they were expending for reconstruction was Abu
22 Ghraib, because I had my 72nd MP Company out there.

1 Q. And those others, there wasn't enough funds to do
2 construction?
3 A. There was funds. They were funded, but there was some
4 question when the contractors left, after their 90-day contracts
5 were finished and they were giving the--it was not my
6 responsibility to go out----
7 DO: It was the CPA responsibility.
8 WIT: It was.
9 Q. But they were having difficulties fulfilling that
10 mission to reconstruct those?
11 A. Well, not according to their timeline, sir, because
12 every week or more often they would provide to me how this
13 particular facility "X"--how it had this much more capacity now
14 restored. So I was briefing the ambassador once a week, at
15 least, and I was briefing General Sanchez at least once a week
16 on increasing capacity. They had similar goals, that being get
17 Iraqis back into Iraqi prison facilities and turn it back over
18 to the Iraqis, but they had a different motivation. General
19 Sanchez was interested because he wanted us to be more available
20 to do security detainee operations--specifically military
21 operations, and Ambassador Bremer was interested because he
22 wanted this to do be an Iraqi mission. But it was of one mind,
23 "Give us a briefing on the time line."

1 Q. How was Abu Ghraib chosen as a facility? Who made that
2 decision?
3 A. The original decision was made because there--it was
4 originally a prison, obviously, and because there was still a
5 wall around the prison facility that had not been looted.
6 Q. But who made that decision? Who went out there and
7 said, "We need facilities, this has a wall around it, at least,
8 and we're going to--we, CPA, are going to use this?" Is that
9 accurate in my question that it would be CPA that made that
10 first decision?
11 A. It was [redacted] and the CPA, but it was also the
12 Corps MP Brigade, the command sergeant major, who was going out
13 with [redacted] on most of these explorations.
14 Q. And which Corps was that?
15 A. That was Fifth Corps, because they had Baghdad before
16 the 800th got there, and they were doing hasty prison operations.
17 Q. What do you know about the original decision to use Abu
18 Ghraib by the CPA? Tell me what you know about that, because,
19 as you know, it's a controversial decision relative to using it
20 in the first place from a number of perspectives.
21 A. I tried to stay out of that decision-making process,
22 but I got deeply involved. I tried to stay out because I told
23 [redacted] and the ambassador, "Sir, I have MPs and I will run

1 the detention operations. You tell me the locations. We'll do
2 an assessment. It really makes no difference to me where they
3 are. I have MPs all over Iraq." I've been out to Abu Ghraib.
4 It has some aspects that we don't have at any other prison
5 facilities. It was large and it had a large wall around it, but
6 the humanitarian organizations and CPA were vehemently opposed
7 to it, and it was a big discussion.
8 Q. Is that because of its history, the humanitarians?
9 A. Yes, sir. They said there were--"The Ghosts of Abu
10 Ghraib," was the title of one of their position papers, because
11 there were stories and a lot of truth to it. They found the
12 ropes, they found the hanging chambers, they saw the--there was
13 a lot of things that were burned that I guess he set fire to a
14 lot of facilities to hide past travesties and everything, but we
15 went to a lot of facilities that were absolute nightmarish, but
16 Abu Ghraib, with its well-known reputation--I never participated
17 in a discussion or even listened to a discussion where anybody
18 talked about it being a long-term, restore Abu Ghraib to pre-war
19 standards and use it as a facility. Never. Never, ever. It
20 was always discussed as, "but we need to use Abu Ghraib now
21 because, number one, it's large, number two, some of the cells
22 inside can be refurbished with little investment, millions as
23 opposed to hundreds of millions, and the wall is still in tact

1 around it, so it will provide protection for the soldiers and
2 the prisoners that are out there." So they--I think the most
3 vocal person in opposition in the humanitarian sections in CPA
4 was a woman by the name of [redacted] I don't exactly
5 know--I just know that she was in the humanitarian sections and
6 she had some connection here in Washington, D.C. She was
7 opposed to it, they went out there, initially, before the 800th
8 even got to Baghdad, and [redacted] who was the Chief of
9 the Ministry of Justice, then--he's a Reservist. And he was in
10 charge of the Ministry of Justice at the time, and [redacted]
11 and the humanitarian representatives went out there and saw Abu
12 Ghraib, and [redacted] left with her contingent, three,
13 four, five--whatever it was, because she was so offended by
14 this. She said this is no different than going into Dachau and
15 saying we're going to use this as a prison facility. So that
16 was her position and she telexed back to the United States very
17 often her opposition. So the conversation with General--Deputy
18 Sec--Def--Wolfowitz came over before the decision was made. We
19 had Mr. [redacted] from the United Nations who came over there
20 several times, who was, I think, leaning towards not using it at
21 all because of the reputation, but we walked the grounds with
22 him, and he actually became a champion for the 800th MP Brigade
23 because he knew where our heads were. He knew why we needed to

1 use this facility temporarily because we could run one facility
2 and how several hundred as opposed to running five facilities
3 and housing the same number.
4 Q. Who was addressing the force protection issues, if
5 anybody, relative to the location of Abu Ghraib, aside from the
6 humanitarian issues and its dark history? Who was raising, if
7 anyone, who was raising concerns or addressing the issues of
8 where it was specifically located, the surrounding area, whether
9 it was a defensible site, those types of things?
10 A. Well, the CJTF7, the Corps MP Brigade, selected that
11 location early on in the war because there was a wall there and
12 because the sector belonged to the First Armored Division. The
13 18th MP Brigade--why do I keep saying that? The Corps MP
14 Brigade, Fifth MP Brigade--Fifth Corps MP Brigade--maybe they
15 are the 18th MP Brigade. Maybe that's why I keep saying it, but
16 whatever the MP Brigade is, they support it--First Armored
17 Division. That was their mission in Baghdad. They provided MP
18 support to the Armored Division.
19 So they selected that site because they knew that they
20 had very few prisoners in there during the war and they were
21 actually policed up during conflicts where they would be looting
22 or stealing a car or busting a checkpoint or whatever. And they
23 knew that the Armored Division patrolled that area and could

1 provide force protection for it. When we got there, the 72nd MP
2 Company immediately----
3 Q. But you got there after the decision was made to use
4 it. I'm still interested in who sat down--and I've been out
5 there and you've been out there, and you look at it, and it's
6 just not a good place from a defensive standpoint. It's in the
7 middle of the Sunni Triangle, it's surrounded by a network of
8 roads, it's got open fields, it's got urban areas close to it.
9 It's just not a good place.
10 So who was it that was looking at that perspective
11 before the decision was made to place them there?
12 A. Absolutely. The only person who was mentioning that
13 perspective was me, and I was mentioning it because, in spite of
14 the fact that major hostilities were over, sir, that location
15 was being mortared three nights out of the week. And my guys--
16 the largest vehicle they had was a five-ton.
17 Q. Well, we'll get to the defense and the force protection
18 issues, but I'm still at who was it that thought about that, if
19 anyone?
20 A. Yes, sir. I said to General Wodjakowski, I said to
21 General Sanchez, who said back to me when I said, "It never

1 makes good sense, sir, to run a prison operation of any kind in
2 the middle of a hostile fire zone."
3 And General Sanchez said to me, "The war is over."
4 Q. When did that conversation occur?
5 A. September?
6 Q. September was after the decision was made and they were
7 actually moved into it. Were there any----
8 A. Then it had to be before that, because the decision had
9 not been made yet by the CPA.
10 DO: The first units moved in in July, so the 72nd actually
11 arrived there in July.----
12 WIT: They might have even been there before that, because
13 they----
14 DO: They may have been, but my recollection was that they
15 had actually arrived in July.
16 WIT: They came under us starting in July, but they were
17 already on the ground, I think, securing those prisoners there,
18 but that decision was made----
19 Q. So somebody before that had to--so your conversation
20 with General Sanchez, if that occurred in September, had to have

1 occurred well after the decision had already been made to put it
2 out there.
3 A. Yes, sir. But at that time--I believe this, and I
4 wouldn't want to defend a decision that was made by the CJTF7,
5 but they were--they had some tents, and they had detainees
6 there, and it was----
7 Q. In the very beginning?
8 A. In the very beginning.
9 ----I don't know if they ever planned to make it a
10 full-blown operation then. If it was going to be an Iraqi
11 prison, they wouldn't have cared.
12 I talked to General Sanchez about why we were going to
13 limit the size of refurbishment, because it was not a good idea
14 for the Iraqis, even, to be using this facility.
15 Q. Okay. Before we even get to the refurbishment, I'm
16 still trying to find out, was there anybody that actually looked
17 at the force protection issues connected to Abu Ghraib?
18 A. Not to my knowledge. Not when the decision was made to
19 occupy.
20 DO: Not when the decision was made to occupy.
21 WIT: I brought it up because----

1 Q. And you brought it up to who?

2 A. At first I brought it up to [redacted] and to [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 Q. And what did they say?

5 A. And they said it's only--"That's why we're talking

6 about an interim facility." So then when they were talking

7 about long-term use, being two years, that is when I had the

8 conversation that this was never a good idea to run a prison----

9 DO: And that was afterwards--that was after the decision

10 had already been made, and units had already been placed there,

11 and detainees were already there.

12 WIT: And the insurgency----

13 DO: I'm not saying it shouldn't be addressed, I'm just

14 saying it's a different time period.

15 WIT: Yes, sir.

16 Q. Okay. So now Abu Ghraib has been chosen. And you said

17 that during that selection process, you had actually been to Abu

18 Ghraib. Can you tell me the first time you were at Abu Ghraib?

19 A. It was on that whirlwind tour. I went out there with

20 [redacted] and----

21 Q. So the 72nd was already in place?

22 A. Already in place----

1 Q. So that would have been in June, then?

2 A. Right. Late June.

3 Q. And----

4 A. And they had for a month. At least a month.

5 Q. So they perhaps had gotten there in May?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Were there any, at that point, when you made the

8 whirlwind tour, were there detainees present then?

9 A. There were prisoners that were the looters, the

10 criminals--minor crimes really, that the divisions didn't want

11 to carry along with them during their operations, so they just

12 dropped them off there to the MPs.

13 Q. But they were all criminals--?

14 A. All criminals.

15 DO: To your recollection, they were all criminals.

16 Q. When was the next time--then you took over command and

17 you had this major mission that was assigned to you, when was

18 next time that you actually visited Abu Ghraib after that

19 initial Whirlwind Tour?

20 A. We got up to Baghdad, and I went out there, probably

21 the second or third day I was in Baghdad, because [redacted]

22 and [redacted] the contractors under CPA, wanted to meet me

23 out there.

1 Q. When you were--when you arrived in Baghdad, where was
2 your headquarters? Was it in Victory?
3 A. It was.
4 Q. So you and the headquarters for the 800th was located at
5 Victory?
6 A. At Victory.
7 Q. And then you got a message from CPA that they wanted to
8 meet you out there?
9 A. Right.
10 Q. And what was the subject of that discussion? Why'd
11 they want to meet you?
12 A. They wanted to talk about what parts of the prison they
13 were looking at, getting the contractor in there to do the work
14 for refurbishment, and what parts of the prison grounds would be
15 available for troop living area. We walked the ground just so
16 we had a common feel for why they were only refurbishing a
17 portion of the prison, how the hanging chamber was going to be
18 segregated from the rest of the prison--really, their concept
19 of----
20 Q. Was the 72nd still there at the time?
21 A. They were.

1 Q. And Captain [redacted] was the commander?

2 A. He was. And by that time--no, it was in July that the

3 320th MP Battalion moved up there.

4 Q. And why was the--was it your unit's decision to move

5 the 320th MPs there? Did the 800th, you, decide to move the 320th

6 there?

7 A. The lay down of the units of where they were going to

8 move to was made before I took over command. General Hill asked

9 the operations people to do that prior to my arrival. As I

10 said, before I even took command, some of the units had already

11 moved.

12 Q. And when you then took over and you saw that there was

13 a plan in place and the 320th moving to Abu Ghraib was part of

14 that plan, did you object to it? Did you say that's

15 unreasonable or any issues with that?

16 A. I didn't object to that. I said I think we have to

17 keep a couple of battalions available for contingencies, because

18 I don't get a good feeling from CJTF7 that they know where

19 they're going to use us completely. And if we spread them thin

20 and then have to relocate them again--I wanted minimal

21 disruption to the soldiers.

1 incidents take place. The largest one was the prisoner abuse at
2 Bucca, and he was not in the theater when that happened. He was
3 back in the United States. He has twin sons that were
4 graduating from high school and were going off to Annapolis. He
5 had asked General Hill before he even deployed if he would allow
6 him to come back for their graduation. General Hill lived up to
7 that promise. So while he was back in the states, that incident
8 took place. According to him, there was an umbrella of
9 discrimination against the 320th that had taken hold at Bucca,
10 and he wanted to move to a different location.
11 Q. That sounds unusual. What was your assessment of that
12 conversation?
13 A. Well, I asked him what--he said--when he came back and
14 he found out about those incidents, the soldiers were telling
15 him that even though they weren't involved in that incident and
16 they did the right thing, they reported it, other soldiers that
17 they had been living with at Bucca were suddenly, "Oh, wait a
18 minute, you're with the 320th. I don't want to talk to you."
19 They felt that--he felt--and he felt that it was legitimate that
20 the soldiers were telling him that, you know, "The sooner we can
21 get out of Bucca, the better it will be for all of us."
22 Q. Other than this--the prior issues relative to prisoner
23 abuse at Bucca, was there any issues that caused you to question

1 Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] fitness for command or the 320th
2 selection as the unit to go to Abu Ghraib to take on the
3 detention mission?
4 A. No, sir. There really was not.
5 Q. Can you just briefly tell me what the issue was
6 relative to abuse at Bucca? It wasn't the same type of thing
7 that we're talking about at Abu Ghraib, so just for the record,
8 if you could briefly just tell us what issue was.
9 A. Okay. But I need to tell you that wasn't when I was in
10 command. That was before I got there. They heard that they--at
11 least the CID report indicates from their statements that the
12 soldiers heard that they were bringing in the prisoners who had-
13 -detainees, who had been involved with the [redacted] ambush
14 and they raped her and--there was all kinds of wild rumors
15 flying around. So they got together, "they" being the MPs, led
16 by a master sergeant, [redacted] (phonetic), and they put together
17 this plan if they ever came in and they came in to their
18 facilities, that they were going to take care of them. So as
19 they were getting off the bus, Master Sergeant [redacted] (phonetic)
20 and four or five of her subordinates took care of these
21 detainees, even to the point where one of them who was wounded
22 was actually man-handled and put on the ground and even in
23 noticeable pain.

1 Q. Now, the MPs that did that, were they members of the
2 320th MP Battalion?
3 A. They were. Of the headquarters. Yes, sir.
4 Q. And did Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] take corrective
5 action--disciplinary action on those soldiers?
6 A. He did. He did a CID report, an investigation was
7 done, he referred them for court-martial. The Article 32 was
8 done at Bucca. This was over months of time.
9 Q. Were there any other similar incidents that happened
10 with the 320th that you are aware of, either before you took
11 command or after you took command?
12 A. No, sir.
13 Q. That was the only incident that occurred?
14 A. Right. Now, there were a couple of other incidents at
15 Bucca, but they didn't directly----
16 DO: I'm just referring to the 320th at this point.
17 WIT: Okay. But no prisoner abuse cases--just disciplinary
18 cases.
19 DO: Right.
20 Q. Well, were any of those disciplinary cases involving
21 the 320th?
22 A. They were not.

1 Q. So the 320th arrives at Abu Ghraib. And why were we
2 going from a company to a battalion? What was changing that?
3 You know, the company had a few detainees. So why were we now
4 sending a battalion? What was the plan?
5 A. Well, when the decision was made to establish--General
6 Wodjakowski asked me to establish a location where we could hold
7 numbers of Iraqi criminals, and Abu Ghraib looked like the
8 place.
9 Q. Now, is that his assessment when you say that?
10 A. Sir, it had to have been either some information that
11 he had either got from Colonel [redacted] who was the Provost
12 Marshall on the staff, or from Colonel [redacted] because he never
13 got a briefing from me, and General Wodjakowski was never out at
14 Abu Ghraib. So he had to be briefed by somebody.
15 Q. Did you decide to put all of those detainees there?
16 A. I did not.
17 Q. You were told that that's where they were going to be
18 going?
19 A. He told me he didn't care----
20 Q. General Wodjakowski?
21 A. General Wodjakowski told me he didn't care if I
22 selected a site in the middle of the highway, but he wanted it
23 quick and Abu Ghraib looked like the most likely location.

1 Q. When did you have that conversation where he made that
2 statement?
3 A. That was before the 320th came up to Baghdad. We knew
4 they were coming up to Baghdad, but before they came up to
5 Baghdad to move to Abu Ghraib, that conversation took place.
6 Q. In a time period, that would've been July?
7 A. Later than that, sir.
8 Q. August?
9 A. Probably.
10 Q. The 3220th arrived?
11 A. September.
12 DO: I'm thinking before that.
13 Do you remember when the 320th arrived?
14 RC: Sir, I think they arrived sometime around the
15 September timeframe--September, October timeframe.
16 DO: Well, it was before October. I know that.
17 WIT: But we had to put them somewhere.
18 Q. They being?
19 A. The 320th. We weren't sure that they were actually
20 going to build a internment facility at Abu Ghraib at that
21 point, when they first got to Baghdad. But we knew we didn't
22 have any place at Victory. We wanted them up in Baghdad to be
23 able to move, because it was safe at that time--relatively safe.

1 RC: Would you like to take a break now, sir?

2 LA: If this is a logical point.

3 DO: Yes. And, by the way, if, in fact, at any point in

4 time, if you become fatigued or if for any reason you need to

5 take a break, just raise your hand and say you need a break.

6 [The deposition recessed at 1501, 18 July 2004.]

7 [The deposition was called to order at 1513, 18 July 2004.]

8 **Questions by the deposition officer (continued):**

9 Q. Going back to when you first saw Abu Ghraib and you

10 first showed up there and you saw its condition, and you briefly

11 described to us its condition and I've been there--of course, I

12 was there well after the time period that you first visited

13 there. Could you just tell me who it was you told at CJTF7

14 about the substandard or poor conditions that existed there?

15 A. I told General Wodjakowski and I told General Sanchez,

16 and I also told Ambassador Bremer.

17 Q. And to the best of your recollection, when did you have

18 those specific conversations with them?

19 A. It had to be the first week of--probably around or

20 about the 8th or the 10th--probably not the first formal week of

21 July, but around the 8th, the 10th, the 12th--sometime after that

22 visit, because I--and I said to him, "Sir, come out and see it

23 if you want."

1 He said, "Maybe I'll get out there one day, but I'll
2 take your word for it."
3 Q. And General Sanchez, when did you have a conversation
4 with him?
5 A. Well, the briefing--when I talked to General
6 Wodjakowski about it, it was part of a briefing that was going
7 to be given to General Sanchez, and the way that it worked was
8 you had to go and brief General Wodjakowski first, he'd make
9 some changes, and then you had to go and brief General Sanchez.
10 So it had to be within not more than 48 hours after I talked to
11 General Wodjakowski about it.
12 Q. And Ambassador Bremer, when did you talk to him about
13 it?
14 A. Not just once. I talked to Ambassador Bremer a lot.
15 And I've already talked about the conditions out at Abu Ghraib.
16 So I wanted it to be fresh in their mind every time I spoke to
17 any of them. So it was around the same timeframe. And, as I
18 said, I had to brief Ambassador Bremer at least once a week on
19 how the prisons were doing and how the project was coming.
20 Q. And as the mission was progressing, there were more
21 detainees that were being sent to Abu Ghraib beginning, I

1 building materials up there. Again, went back to General
2 Wodjakowski and said, you know, we can't even get building
3 materials up there. The train was looted, blah, blah, blah.
4 That kind of thing. I mean, we're just talking briefing him
5 about the delays, because he was pressuring us to get those
6 compounds built so they could take the prisoners out of the
7 division holding areas and put them in Abu Ghraib. We knew that
8 we had expansion capability at Abu Ghraib under tents in regular
9 detention compounds. When those compounds were initially
10 finished, we'd have housing for up two thousand, an expansion
11 capability that we had hoped would never come up to eight
12 thousand additional compounds.
13 So we were holding probably eight hundred--four hundred
14 in each compound. And as the contractor work was completed and
15 that long hallway of cellblocks were open--we transferred
16 prisoners out from under the tents into the facilities.
17 Likewise, there was two facilities downtown called Tas Perat and
18 Russafah, that were being refurbished and we were transferring
19 prisoners down there as well. I mean, the plan that we had was
20 working. We were going to get prisoners out from under canvas
21 into hard facilities. They had a smaller compound constructed--
22 and the outside compounds, the larger one was called Gancci and
23 then the smaller one was called Vigilant. We only used Vigilant

1 for housing crimes against the coalition or "security detainees"
2 as they were ultimately called. We had less than eighty in
3 Vigilant, and they had to be segregated from the Iraqi
4 prisoners. So still had a very small population, but the
5 majority of it was under canvas.
6 Q. Now that was in the beginning?
7 A. That was in the beginning?
8 Q. Up to what point?
9 A. Up to September, and I could be wrong on that date as
10 well, but around the September timeframe, because that was when
11 there was more. I believe they had just caught the sons, Uday
12 and Qusay, and then there was renewed interest and far more
13 activity in the effort to get Sadaam. That was the thing they
14 were holding out to--not only CJTF7, but CPA--if they could get
15 Sadaam then the insurgencies would reduce and we could get back
16 on track about going home. So there was a lot of activity.
17 They were running these raids. The first one, which was
18 classified at the time, the title of it was called "Operation
19 Victory Bounty." So whenever that operation was taking place,
20 that was the first. And they policed up those detainees, those
21 people, those prisoners in raids. Called them all detainees--
22 tagged them all as detainees, transferred them all to Abu
23 Ghraib, primarily from Fourth ID area, and--for example, we

1 asked the military intelligence interrogators, and they were
2 only military people doing interrogations there at the time. We
3 asked them, you know, "How long are you going to keep them in
4 Vigilant?" Because we were right on the verge of closing
5 Vigilant down altogether. We had reached a point where we had
6 transferred most of the Iraqi prisoners into hard facilities
7 whether downtown or out at Abu Ghraib. And we were just maybe
8 days away from closing Vigilant completely. General Wodjakowski
9 said, "Keep it open, because we're going to put the prisoners
10 from Victory Bounty there."
11 So the first night that they brought prisoners in, they
12 brought in about 37 prisoners. The interrogators did an initial
13 interview, and they determined that only two of the people had
14 any intel value that they could exploit. The rest of them were
15 just no value, wrong association, whatever. At the Separate
16 Unit Update the next night, I briefed that we were about to
17 close Vigilant because--unless he gave us further instructions,
18 because we only had two prisoners that the military intelligence
19 people wanted to keep because they had additional value.
20 He turned around and he said, "Who told you that?"
21 I said, "Sir, Colonel Pappas told me that it looked
22 like they were only going to ask to keep two."

1 He said--this is during the Separate Unit Update--he
2 said, "Go and get me somebody from the two shop. Go and get me
3 an intel person. I don't care what rank they are. Go and get
4 them."
5 Q. This is General Wodjakowski?
6 A. General Wodjakowski, and he went--and from the C-2
7 section in the headquarters, there, they got this captain, his
8 name was [redacted] He came in and General Wodjakowski turned on
9 him and pointed his finger at him and said to him, "You are not
10 to release any one of those prisoners. Do you understand that?
11 If any one of them is released, it's on your head and I'm coming
12 to find it!" He said, "I don't care--"
13 And he was trying to--"Sir, they said that there's no
14 value."
15 And he told him, "What part do you not understand,
16 Captain? Keep every one of them!"
17 And then he turned to me and he said, "And you, keep
18 Vigilant open!"
19 I said, "Yes, sir."
20 So, this Captain was standing in the hallway when the
21 SUU was over. He told me he was waiting to see me. He said,
22 "I'm sorry."

1 I said, "What are you sorry about?" And I said, "We'll
2 keep them."
3 He said, "Ma'am, there's no value in keeping them."
4 I said, "Well, apparently there is, because General
5 Wodjakowski was pretty clear. We're not going to release
6 anybody until we get further instructions."
7 And he said, "This is why our population is growing out
8 there, because we can't get anybody released." And then he told
9 me a little bit about how the mobile interrogation teams worked
10 at the divisions if they worked the right way.
11 Q. Who are you referring to? Captain [redacted]
12 A. Captain [redacted] He said, "But, we'll do what they tell
13 us to do."
14 So then two nights later, there was another forty that
15 were brought in. And then another one of the divisions brought
16 in fifteen. Then the population started to grow and then they
17 outgrew Vigilant and we had to put them back in to Gancci. And
18 we had security detainees in some of the compounds and prisoners
19 in some of the compounds.
20 Q. And, ultimately, because of all of these operations, as
21 I understand it, the population--and also because the numbers
22 being released did not match the numbers coming in, ultimately,

1 the population grew to about five or six thousand. Is that your
2 recollection?
3 A. Yes, sir. And quickly.
4 Q. Now, during that time, "quickly"--now, my time period
5 that I'm asking you about is between July and January, so that
6 time period. During that time period, could you tell me how
7 frequently you had conversations with General Wodjakowski
8 specifically about conditions out there and your requests for
9 support in order to address some of the short falls?
10 A. Every other night, at a minimum, I talked to him about
11 it. I talked to him before the SOF got under way. I talked to
12 him--I briefed him as an item for my--I mean, he often said to
13 me, "Look, I don't want to hear that anymore. We're working on
14 it."
15 Q. And what were the specific things you were asking for?
16 A. I talked about the force protection. We still had no--
17 it was the first item I always briefed, that we had no force
18 protection platforms out there and the soldiers were becoming
19 increasingly concerned. The mortars were not coming over the
20 inside wall, yet, but it was just a matter of time. The
21 conditions for the prisoners and for the soldiers, and with the
22 heat--he said, "Everybody is hot."

1 "I understand that, but they've rationed water, they
2 have no effective comms out there--"
3 "Well don't you have signal battalion?"
4 I said, "No, sir. I don't have a signal battalion. I
5 have signal section, and they are doing everything they can with
6 the equipment that they have. Again, we are a theater level
7 asset. We plug in to a mother ship. And, sir, you're the
8 mother ship, and we're not getting the support we need from
9 you."
10 He said, "Didn't I give you enough money to build those
11 compounds for two thousand?"
12 And I said, "Yes, sir, you did, and I appreciate it.
13 But building the compounds and putting prisoners in it mean that
14 you need equipment, you need water, you need food, you need a
15 lot of things to support the soldiers who are guarding those
16 prisoners and the prisoners themselves, and we don't have any of
17 it." And I said the--"We're already taking care of the Iraqi
18 prisoners that we're holding in the facilities that have been
19 refurbished because CPA isn't giving us any support, and now
20 you're not giving me any support." I said, "I'm going through
21 my commanders' emergency funds faster than I can get the ink dry
22 on a piece of paper."

1 He said, "We're looking at it. We're looking at it,
2 Janis. We're looking at it."
3 And then the mortars came over the wall and killed six
4 prisoners. And they had nine med-evac flights that night.
5 Q. And when was that?
6 DC: 17 August 2003.
7 A. So that's how long those conversations had been taking
8 place. Now, when those mortars killed those prisoners, I called
9 General Wodjakowski--I think it was after midnight, and I said,
10 "Sir, mortars have come over the wall. It's killed prisoners.
11 We had nine med-evac flights. I have no force protection out
12 there! I can't do much with soft-side hummers and a few up-
13 armors. The biggest piece of equipment I have, as I've told you
14 before, is a 5-ton truck," and I said, "We have one 50-Cal that
15 was borrowed from the Marines." I said, "You have to give me
16 force protection platforms out there. It's First AD's sector."
17 And he said, "Those are prisoners. We didn't kill any
18 soldiers."
19 And I said, "Sir, my soldiers are guarding those
20 prisoners. Soldiers are flying those med-evac flights, and my
21 soldiers consider those prisoners their responsibility, and
22 they're all out there at great risk. And you're not helping us
23 at all."

1 And they still didn't help us. I will tell you that
2 the next day, because there was a lot of press inquiries at the
3 briefing, they sent out two Bradleys, and they were at the entry
4 control point. You could see them from MSR Tampa. And when--
5 they didn't want to go, and when they arrived, because they were
6 ordered from somebody from the CJTF7 operations section, I
7 don't--I think General Davis was still the 3--I don't know where
8 the order came from, honestly, sir, but they arrived, and that
9 was when the Royders [phonetic] team was out there and the
10 Royders [phonetic] camera man put his camera up on his shoulders
11 and through the window on the Bradley, it looked like it might
12 be a weapon, and they killed him. They shot him.
13 So, right after that, the force protection platforms
14 left and they didn't come back again, because the--all of the
15 press attention, the media attention, died down again. About
16 two weeks later, more mortars came in, and it killed the MI
17 soldiers.
18 DO: You know, in my training--our training, relative to
19 protecting forward operating bases, there are certain practices
20 and procedures that are military--Army approved: frequent
21 patrolling, preplanned artillery fires, cutting off avenues of
22 approach and avenues of escape relative to the MSRs. All sorts

1 of things that the Army teaches us need to be done to protect a
2 forward operating base.
3 Q. Who's responsibility was it to make sure all of those
4 things were occurring at Abu Ghraib?
5 A. First AD had the sector, but as I came to find out--
6 because I went to the current ops section at CJTF7, and I said,
7 "Will you show me where the sector lines are so I know who is
8 supposed to be providing force protection platforms?"
9 He said to me, "Oh, ma'am. I know it's First AD, but
10 you're right on the seam and next to you will be the 82nd, but
11 right now-- ----"
12 DC: Third ACR.
13 A. ----ACR had it. "And they're not providing anything
14 for you, so it's First AD's responsibility. There's a curfew in
15 place, so the MSRs should be secure." And, "We don't know where
16 the mortars are coming from, but First AD has a fan with----"
17 Q. Okay. But who's responsibility is it to make sure that
18 all of those things that I just mentioned were happening?
19 A. CJTF7.
20 Q. Not the forward operating base commander, whoever that
21 is?
22 A. First AD? We didn't----

1 Q. Who's the forward operating base commander?

2 A. We didn't have one.

3 Q. So it wasn't Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]

4 A. No. It was not.

5 Q. Okay. Who was the forward operating base commander in

6 the time period that you are referring to?

7 A. Between July and January it changed. When they

8 declared Abu Ghraib an enduring camp.

9 Q. In November we know that it changed, but before

10 November, when it--in the first time period, which would have

11 been the July, August, when this first attack occurred,

12 September time period, who was the forward operating base

13 commander? Who was responsible for, if not controlling the

14 patrolling and ordering the patrolling, making sure that someone

15 was doing that patrolling, making sure that there was pre-

16 planned fires? Who was responsible for those things?

17 A. Colonel [redacted] who was the Provo Marshall on the

18 staff, was--told General Wodjakowski that he was coordinating

19 the support for Abu Ghraib, and he did not, or he didn't do it

20 the right way.

1 Q. But you didn't see Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] as
2 having any responsibility in that area?
3 A. Sir, he was doing force protection for the unit that he
4 had out there.
5 Q. On the base itself?
6 A. On the base. He was not----
7 Q. Did you see his responsibility going outside the walls
8 and making sure that all of those things that should have
9 occurred--I'm not saying that his units should have done it, but
10 that he had the responsibility to make sure, or someone had the
11 responsibility to make sure, that those things were, in fact,
12 occurring outside the walls, which is where you really needed
13 the force protection?
14 A. No, sir.
15 Q. Someone needed to be coordinating with, directly, with
16 either the Third ACR, 82nd Airborne, First Armored Division--
17 somebody had to be interfacing with those people making sure--
18 "Well where are my patrols? Why is that happening?" Who was
19 doing that? Who was having that level conversation?
20 A. If anybody was having that level conversation, it was
21 me with General Wodjakowski.

1 Q. And that--that's the extent of it? It wasn't happening
2 below you or General Wodjakowski?
3 A. [The deponent indicated a negative response.]
4 Q. How about the issue of clothing availability, which we
5 will get into in some detail when we get into later portions of
6 our inquiry here. But the issue of the lack of clothing was
7 mentioned frequently by both military intelligence personnel and
8 military police personnel. Can you tell me what you recall
9 about your requests for clothing?
10 WIT: For the prisoners?
11 DO: For the prisoners. Yes.
12 A. It was--I briefed the chief of staff--he was the Chief
13 of Staff for CJTF7, but his office was down in CPA--General Hahn
14 [phonetic]. And I was briefing him on why we were short on
15 everything. The reason clothing became such an issue was
16 because it was kind of a middle of the road item where we
17 couldn't even get that. We couldn't even get bars of soap,
18 honestly, sir. We couldn't get washbasins. We couldn't get
19 towels.
20 But General Hahn [phonetic] looked at me in complete
21 disbelief, and he said--he had a pen in his hand. He threw it
22 down on his desk, and he said, "They are asking you to run an
23 entire prison operation by the seat of your pants!" He said,

1 "I'm talking to these prisons people in CPA. They have funds.
2 What's wrong with [redacted] It's one of his subordinate
3 units."
4 And there was a line for Iraqi prisons and prisoners in
5 those facilities. "It's a CPA responsibility to fund them."
6 They were not. If they were supposed to have--and they did,
7 they had over eight million dollars--originally they had about
8 twelve million dollars, and then the ministry of justice took
9 some of that back and left them with just over eight million.
10 The majority of that money, allegedly, was spent on restoring
11 prisons and contract work. So, when we asked for money for jump
12 suits, soap, underwear, towels--
13 "We're working on getting a supplement to the prisons
14 department."
15 I said, "Well, meanwhile, you have prisoners in there.
16 And you have to put them in uniforms." So I went to my fund.
17 And several times we tried to have my funds increased because of
18 the extent of our responsibilities. I asked Ambassador Bremer,
19 he didn't have any problem with increasing it, but General
20 Sanchez did not approve increasing it. He told me that I was
21 only supposed to be providing the equipment and the logistics
22 for the security detainees and, you know, he was funding me, or
23 I had enough in my emergency fund to provide for that. Well, I

1 didn't, because I was using my emergency funds for every
2 prisoner we had. General Patrais [phonetic], up in 101st, a
3 couple of times supplemented for the prisoners up in his sector,
4 but the other divisions did not. So there was never enough
5 money. And then when we had the money, they'd send us--we'd put
6 in an order for a variety of sizes, and we'd get the order of
7 jump suits in and 300 of them would be large and the rest of
8 them would be medium or tiny. Most of them couldn't wear them.
9 It was just one of numerous impediments to success, but we were
10 fighting it on both fronts.
11 Q. When was the first time that a military intelligence
12 unit arrived at Abu Ghraib to your recollection?
13 A. The interrogation teams were out there early--as soon
14 as they started to take--that small group of detainees that we
15 had, they were out there to interrogate them. Then Colonel
16 Pappas was out there to check on them and he stayed over night
17 several times.
18 Q. This was in the beginning?
19 A. This was in the beginning.
20 And then after his MI soldiers were killed by a mortar
21 attack----
22 Q. Well, if we could just go--back it up a little bit
23 relative to the time line. The first MI unit, I believe, was a

1 contingent from the 519th MI Battalion. It was A Company or just
2 a segment of A Company, being some of their interrogators. They
3 arrived around July, I believe.
4 A. Late July or August.
5 Q. Did you meet with any of their leaders when they first
6 arrived?
7 A. There was a lieutenant. I don't recall his name. And
8 they were--I asked them if there was anything we could do for
9 them. They said that they were working with Captain [redacted]
10 Q. Were there any issues in the very beginning relative to
11 MI/MP working relations?
12 A. No, sir.
13 Q. Any problems that were brought to your attention, in
14 the beginning, when they first showed up?
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. And how often, in the beginning, in the July, August--
17 not in September, yet, but in the July, August timeframe, how
18 often were you visiting Abu Ghraib?
19 A. I don't want to say every day, but it was--[redacted],
20 was still there, and Colonel [redacted] the deputy, was out there
21 everyday, and I was out there a minimum of three times a week,
22 because it was in Baghdad. I mean, it was the most accessible.

1 Q. And you had seventeen different sites, but yet you were
2 visiting Abu Ghraib very frequently when you consider the
3 numbers of sites that you had responsibility for. Why? Why was
4 Abu Ghraib so high on your list to see so frequently?
5 A. There was construction work going on out there. There
6 was still this ongoing discussion about whether we were even
7 going to be allowed to use it, so we had a contingency plan--if
8 the humanitarian organizations won, we weren't even going to be
9 able to use it part time. And there was problems with getting
10 the building material there. So we were going to start--so
11 there was a focus. There was a lot of activity going on out
12 there. And it was also on the way to other facilities. I could
13 over to Cropper and then in another 15 or 20 minutes, I could be
14 out at Abu Ghraib.
15 Q. Now, when the 519th showed up--they were there from the
16 beginning. And then you had mentioned the Victory Garden, I
17 believe it was?
18 A. Victory Bounty.
19 Q. The Victory Bounty operation which was the first one
20 where they believed that they were going to bring in all of
21 these large numbers of Sadaam Faydayeen, and they were going to
22 interrogate them there at Abu Ghraib. And at some point the
23 population of the military intelligence units grew. What was

1 the next significant fact that you remember after the July,
2 August timeframe--and September? Do you remember who was the
3 next MI leader to show up?
4 A. [redacted] She was on site.
5 Q. And did you have a conversation with [redacted] when
6 she first showed up?
7 A. I talked to her several times. She had been there--she
8 was a new face, and she specifically came to see me. She said,
9 "I'm running the interrogations, and I'm going to be living out
10 here."
11 I said, "Is there anything we can do for you? Anything
12 you need?"
13 She said, "No. We have just about everything we need
14 right now. We'd like to see more of the detainees released."
15 I said, "So would I. So would everybody."
16 But, they were keeping them separate, you know, just
17 kind of "this is what we're doing, this is what our plans are."
18 And she had--I think she had about six or eight teams. So that
19 would be about eighteen or twenty-five interrogator teams. They
20 had a separate interrogation facility--a couple of them, under
21 canvas. They were all set up. They made that arrangement with
22 [redacted] He gave them the area where they could
23 operate.

1 Q. And initially they were operating in tents?

2 A. Right. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Do you remember when the--what's known as the hard site

4 was open? Also known as the 1A, 1B portion of the hard site.

5 Do you remember when that was opened?

6 A. Well, the 1A and 1B--they were ready first, because

7 they were at the end of the thing, and they were the maximum

8 security cells and everything, but that's where the contractors

9 started at CPA's urging and design, and then they were going to

10 work down the hallway.

11 So, we didn't want to put detainees in there--we didn't

12 want to put prisoners in there until after the press conference,

13 and they wanted to have press conference so that all of these

14 reporters could walk through the facilities. And it wasn't

15 only--I mean, it wasn't only cellblock 1A and B, but several

16 other cells had been refurbished also. So had them setup like

17 static displays with the mattresses and everything. The media

18 people came out there--there must have been several hundred of

19 them--and looked through the facility, said that it was

20 completely different than before. There used to be--there was

21 reports that there was a hundred crammed in a cell, and now

22 there's going to be twelve or fourteen, "where are you going to

23 keep the population," "we're opening more facilities," that kind

1 of thing. So, as soon as we got through that media event, we
2 had cellblock 1A and B opened, and we transferred Iraqi
3 criminals into those facilities.
4 Q. Into both 1A and 1B?
5 A. Yes, sir. And several of the other cellblocks after
6 that. So, 2A and 2B. Maybe not 3A, at that time. But, I mean,
7 we were just so delighted that we were getting people out from
8 that heat and the sand and inside. And it was working just
9 fine. The only request that the 72nd MP Company had was that
10 they be allowed to operate those cellblocks since they had been
11 out there from the beginning and worked very hard on this, so I
12 accommodated that. That was fine with me, and they did a great
13 job. I'm very proud of their accomplishments and everything.
14 When I went out to the prison, I would walk in to any
15 of those cellblocks and I would talk to the prisoners, and some
16 of them never wanted to leave, because it was better than what
17 they were living with, certainly out under the canvas, but it
18 was, in a lot of cases, better than what they were living with
19 at home. "How are the MPs treating you?" "Fine, fine, fine."
20 Then, [redacted] who was the operations officer for
21 the 205th MI Brigade, [redacted]--she asked me one day at a
22 prisons meeting, she said, "ma'am, you know, we have some
23 detainees in those separate cells in cellblock 1A."

1 I said, "I know. We're going to start to charge you
2 rent."
3 She said, "Ma'am, we need more."
4 And I said, "How many more?"
5 She said, "Well, we'd like all of them."
6 Q. Now when she said "all of them," was she referring to
7 just 1A?
8 A. 1A.
9 I said, "CPA--those prisons guys are going to scream."
10 I said, "I don't think that's a good idea. They just opened it,
11 they're the ones that put the money in there."
12 So, of those raids, of those operations like Victory
13 Bounty, if you arrest 37 people and only two of them have intel
14 value, you want to segregate them from the general population,
15 otherwise those two won't have any value either. So that's what
16 they were using those individual cells for. And they did. I
17 asked Major [redacted] I think is the guy I asked, "Tell me how
18 many they have in there."
19 He said, "I'll go back and check the numbers."
20 [redacted] brought it up again when she saw me that
21 they really needed to take control of cellblock 1A. That would
22 be September. And I went to [redacted] and [redacted] and
23 I asked them if they would be agreeable. Before I could even

1 finish the request [redacted] was shaking his head "no." I
2 said, "Let me explain to you why. This is not permanent, okay?
3 These are the ones that have value. If we can put them in
4 there, then they can get the information and then they'll make
5 up their mind whether they're going to release them or if
6 they're Iraqi criminals or whatever, but this is not permanent."
7 [redacted] said, "I don't agree with it. They
8 didn't lift one finger." So there was opposition.
9 But [redacted] said, "I think we should do this. I
10 think we should go ahead and relinquish control. But you think
11 it's temporary?"
12 And I said, "I really do. Now, I don't know what
13 'temporary' means, but I think it's temporary." So I told him
14 that. I told Colonel Pappas and [redacted] was standing with
15 him when I told him whenever it was, a week later. And I said,
16 so you can--you can have cellblock 1A. They've agreed to it.
17 Q. The entire 1A?
18 A. 1A.
19 Q. So, in your mind, when that decision was made,
20 concurred with by CPA, at that point in time, MI would have the
21 authority to place their detainees in 1A? The entire cellblock?
22 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. And that would still be in September?

2 A. That would be in September.

3 During that conversation, when [redacted] was

4 objecting, he said, "This is only the beginning. Mark my words:

5 This is only the beginning." And sure enough, a week or ten

6 days later, they're asking for cellblock 1B.

7 Q. Now, what was 1B--at this point in time, what was 1B

8 intended for?

9 A. Well, the higher--the more violent crimes. The Iraqi

10 criminals that were guilty of more--that had been in 1A were

11 transferred over to 1B.

12 Q. When was it that the decision was made, and who made

13 the decision that the juveniles and the female detainees would

14 go in to 1B?

15 A. When we had a facility--we had a facility downtown that

16 they were using, Russafah and Tas Ferat, and they were housing

17 the female detainees down there and some juveniles, because the

18 juvenile facility wasn't refurbished yet. So when they said we

19 can get more male prisoners in Tas Ferat and Russafah if you

20 have a place to transfer the females and the juveniles to. So

21 we said the only place we could transfer them to would be 1B.

22 So, since 1B--the upstairs tier was vacant, we transferred the

1 females up there and--we didn't have very many juveniles at the
2 time. I think they only transferred seven or eight.
3 Q. So the top part was juveniles----
4 A. It was females and juveniles.
5 Q. And 1B, the bottom part, was serious criminal
6 offenders?
7 A. Criminal offenders. But we transferred those serious
8 criminal offenders to Tas Ferat and Russafah in downtown because
9 they had some individual cellblocks. Not like Abu Ghraib--not
10 maximum security, but they were individual and they suited the
11 purpose. The only people that we had that were really violent
12 offenders were not guilty of those violent offenses when they
13 were brought in. They were picked up looting or stealing a car
14 or whatever their crime was. But rarely was an Iraqi prisoner
15 brought in that was arrested for a violent crime. The cops knew
16 who they were and they said, "Oh, well, this guy has a history.
17 You know, he shot 60 people," or whatever. And it may have
18 ultimately worked out that they were guilty of a violent crime
19 this time and fleeing in a stolen vehicle, but it was--the
20 smallest percentage of our population was really violent Iraqi
21 criminals.

1 Q. You began to tell me that there was a request about a
2 week later for 1B. Did MI then get authority for 1E?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. What was your description--or what is your description
5 of what it actually meant that MI--what did MI get as far as
6 control? I mean, did they have control? I mean, who was
7 actually running 1A and 1E?
8 A. Colonel [redacted] came out. He was assigned out there by
9 General Fast.
10 Q. Now, [redacted] was assigned in the mid to later
11 part of September.
12 A. He was at the [redacted] before that, though. He was
13 assigned under the [redacted]. He worked for Colonel, who was the
14 acting [redacted] (phonetic).
15 DC: Right. But not very long. [redacted] had only arrived in
16 country a few days before he was sent to Abu Ghraib.
17 WIT: I think he might have been there before that, sir,
18 but he wasn't assigned. He was over in Bosnia or Afghanistan.
19 DC: He came from here. He was actually assigned from the
20 Intelligence and Security Command, which is where he was before
21 he was sent to Abu Ghraib. He was in the very building that
22 we're in.

1 WIT: I know that in September, when cellblock 1A and 1B
2 went under the control of the MI, [redacted] was there. He
3 arrived. So I never really encountered him before that, except
4 maybe several times over--but [redacted] [phonetic] talked
5 about him.
6 DC: Yes. When he first got into country, he was assigned
7 and [redacted] [phonetic] was the person who actually sent him
8 out to Abu Ghraib.
9 Q. I interrupted you. You were telling me who was it that
10 was--now was it being controlled?
11 A. Well, cellblock 1A and 1B was never intended, and it
12 was never my thought,--nobody ever said, we're going to do
13 interrogations in the cellblocks or in cellblock 1A or 1B. I
14 mean, it was never discussed, never suggested. Nothing.
15 Because at that time they had the engineers building Facility
16 Wood, outside of 1A and 1B. That was an interrogation facility.
17 I do know that [redacted] considered himself to be
18 in charge of the operations in 1A and 1B.
19 Q. We'll get to who was in charge relative to MI, but as
20 far as the cellblocks themselves, how did it actually operate?
21 Who was controlling the entry, the exit? Who's responsible for

1 the feeding, the housing? Who decided who got in there and who
2 didn't get in there? How did that all operate?
3 A. The MPs were still responsible for the detention
4 operations: opening the cell door, taking the prisoner out,
5 putting the prisoner back in, and locking the cell door. They
6 were responsible for getting food to them, they were responsible
7 for getting medical attention. Everything as a normal detention
8 responsibility would be.
9 Q. Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] describes them as a
10 warden duties. Would you agree with that as a term?
11 A. Yes, sir. The jailers.
12 Q. Alright. So the jailer responsibilities were the MPs.
13 What was it when the MI was given authority to use that? What
14 did that mean? Did that just mean that they could assign people
15 in to the cells? You tell me what you thought it meant.
16 A. Yes, sir. The population in cellblock 1A and 1B would
17 be MI--would be security detainees, and it would be up to them
18 to monitor the population in cellblock 1A and 1B to determine if
19 there was a vacancy or if somebody came in with more value to
20 replace another prisoner that was in one of the isolation cells.
21 It was up to them that if they wanted a prisoner to be taken out
22 of a cell for interrogation, they would go to the MPs, the MP

1 would go and get the prisoner, bring them back to the MI person,
2 they'd sign for them and take them out for interrogation.
3 Q. Did you actually ever visit 1A and 1B?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. When was the first time that you remember?
6 A. Well, when it was being refurbished, so I could see
7 what the maximum security cells--I wanted to make sure the
8 hinges were on the right side. And then the day with the press
9 conference, of course, we took them in there. And then the day
10 when we actually transferred prisoners inside. And then,
11 routinely. Every time that I visited Abu Ghraib, I did not go
12 in to cellblock 1A and B.
13 Q. But how frequently would you go in to 1A and 1B?
14 A. Well, it was one of the few cellblocks that was
15 operational out there, so I would go, probably, safely, one of
16 every three visits.
17 Q. And would that have started in September and lasted all
18 of the way through January?
19 A. No, sir.
20 Q. From what period to what period, then?
21 A. From September until the middle of November. When the
22 transfer of the prison went under MI.

1 Q. So from September through November, when the FRAGO was
2 issued, you were coming and you were visiting maybe one to three
3 times per week and were actually going to 1A and 1B most of that
4 time?
5 A. Right. And there were several reasons for that.
6 That's where the females were. That's where the juveniles were.
7 That's where the most dangerous detainees were. And then after
8 the handgun incident in cellblock 1A--I was there a day before
9 or two days before. So I said,--I mean, we talked to the Iraqi
10 guards that were there, they knew us, they knew me. I just
11 could not believe that there had been such a breech of security.
12 And I know that [redacted] considered himself to be in
13 charge of cellblock 1A and 1B at the time, because he is the one
14 who had called me and told me why he had silenced the MPs.
15 Q. On all of those visits, and we'll go back to the
16 shooting incident and [redacted] but in all of
17 those visits that you made, did you ever see anything that could
18 be considered or was, in fact, abuse, such as naked detainees in
19 their cells?
20 A. No, sir.

1 Q. Did anybody ever tell you--any of your MPs ever tell
2 you about any of those issues, such as naked detainees in the
3 cells or any of those other things?
4 A. In the cells? No. But the MPs would say to me
5 sometimes, you know, this prisoner wanted to be on a hunger
6 strike, but that lasted for a day, and then he heard the rattle
7 of the MREs, as they said, so instead of being on a hunger
8 strike, he decided that he was going to take his clothes off.
9 So he's refusing to wear his clothes and the MI people took them
10 away so he doesn't hang himself. But we gave him an extra
11 blanket.
12 I specifically talked to the juveniles, because after
13 one time that they brought some in, I saw a kid that was--he
14 looked like he was 8-years old. He told me he was almost 12. I
15 asked him where he was from. He told me his brother was there
16 with him, but he really wanted to see his mother, could he
17 please call his mother. He was crying.
18 So, I never saw anything that was abuse or could be
19 considered abuse. When a prisoner was refusing to eat, he was--
20 he was "mentally ill," he was refusing to eat, they took
21 everything--the MPs took everything out of the cell that could
22 possibly hurt him or that he could use, and they were just--they
23 were considering taking out his bunk for fear that he would

1 really find some way to harm himself with that. So they were
2 doing all of the right things to the extent that you can in a
3 detention operation. They had showers. They had--some of them
4 had jump suits and they'd refuse to wear their jump suits;
5 they'd tie them to the bars, so they'd be in their boxer shorts
6 or their underwear or whatever in their cell, but I never saw
7 anything that was even close to what--.
8 Q. The first MP unit that had responsibility for 1A and
9 1B, as I understand it, was the 72nd MPs. The unit that you
10 said--the Nevada Army National Guard, as I recall?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. And they were a stellar unit?
13 A. They were to me.
14 Q. Any issues with them that you knew of, whatsoever,
15 relative to 1A or 1B?
16 A. No, sir.
17 Q. Did they ever bring anything to your attention relative
18 to their concerns about how it was being run, either by
19 themselves, the MPs, or any of the things that the military
20 intelligence personnel were doing?
21 A. Never an issue about--nothing. I mean, nothing.

1 Q. And they were followed, in October, by the 372nd MP
2 Company?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. And the 372nd came in approximately 1 October and there
5 was a transition period between 1 October and around the 15th of
6 October. Is that accurate to your recollection?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Now, the 372nd, where did they come from?
9 A. They were down in Ad Diwaniaah. They were with the
10 multinational division, that was the one that was originally in
11 support of the MEF, and then the MEF left, and they thought they
12 were going home with the MEF, and CJTF7 shortstopped that, kept
13 them there, said that the multinational division was coming in,
14 and that they were going to do detention operations until the
15 police or law enforcement component of the multinationals got
16 in. So they remained down there. They were aligned under the
17 310th MP Battalion and they did detention operations.
18 Q. Any problems with them that you knew of before they
19 showed up at Abu Ghraid?
20 A. No, sir.
21 Q. Any reason to question their assignment there as a
22 military police unit responsible for that section?
23 A. No, sir.

1 I visited them. I visited with the Iraqi police
2 officer that was there. He bragged about the MPs and the
3 support and the training that they were giving them--the 372nd MP
4 Company. I talked to [redacted] right after I got the
5 first information about these alleged-[redacted]
6 [redacted] was the MP Battalion commander down there. I talked to
7 him and I said, "372nd is up here. There's some allegations.
8 You have any problems with them?"
9 "Absolutely not. None."
10 When they came to Abu Ghraib, though, they came one
11 platoon short, because the CPA was working on getting a contract
12 for personal security details down there, and they had not been
13 able to do that successfully--they were dragging their feet on
14 it, honestly, because they liked the MPs. So the CJTF7 in the
15 ops shop said, "Keep the platoon down there for another two
16 week." I objected. Not as vigorously as I should have,
17 perhaps, but I knew that the 372nd was going in behind the 72nd MP
18 Company and they would get it good once they arrived. Two weeks
19 became a month, and then finally somebody from the CJTF7 staff
20 from the ops shop had to go down there and talk to the CPA South
21 to get those MPs released and sent up to Abu Ghraib.

1 Q. You had mentioned earlier [redacted]

2 When was the first time you met [redacted] to

3 your recollection?

4 A. I--after I met him--I met him, officially, I guess, at

5 Abu Ghraib. I was out there visiting. I went into cellblock 1A

6 and all of the sudden he was there. I said, "Where did you come

7 from?" He introduced himself. And I said--we had a visit

8 scheduled with Congressional Delegationer [sic] Wolfowitz

9 [phonetic]. And we were out there the day before to walk the

10 ground of which way we were going to go, where we were going to

11 take him, and he appeared. I was in cellblock 1A and he

12 appeared.

13 Q. When was that?

14 A. It had to be in September.

15 Q. And what did he tell you his role was when he saw you?

16 Did he tell you what his role was?

17 A. He did. Well, at first he told me what he did in the

18 civilian world. He said, "So, I know a lot of people." And I'm

19 sure he said to me, "And I was in," Bosnia or Afghanistan. "I

20 have a lot of experience with interrogation."

21 I said, "Are you with civil affairs out here?"

22 He said, "No, no, ma'am. I'm going to do the

23 interrogation. So the prisoners that they're putting in 1A and

1 1B will be my responsibility. If they're going to take them for
2 interrogation, we'll be responsible for getting them out there."
3 That was his function. That's what he told me.
4 Q. So, did he tell you he was in charge of the
5 interrogation operation?
6 A. He told me he was the link or the connector between
7 them in the cellblock and when they would be moved out for
8 interrogation. He was not doing the interrogation. He was very
9 clear on that.
10 Q. Alright. So he wasn't doing any interrogation?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. But did he say that, "I'm in charge of all of the
13 interrogators?"
14 A. Yes. That he was responsible for the interrogation
15 effort. He said, "You met Captain [redacted] She'll be answering
16 to me."
17 Q. And earlier you had said or made a reference to him
18 being responsible for the 1A area. What was that responsibility
19 that you were referring to, because we've established that the
20 MPs had warden responsibilities or jailer responsibilities--what

1 were the responsibilities that MI personnel, [redacted]

2 [redacted] had relative to 1A and 1B?

3 A. Well, in a regular detention operation, sir, if you're

4 bringing in a new prisoner and the cellblock is full, the MPs,

5 or whoever's in charge of the cellblock on that shift, can make

6 a determination that you can put--"Oh, put him in cellblock 16--

7 put him in cell 16. Even though there's one in there, he's

8 going to be released tomorrow or he's going out to general pop

9 tomorrow," whatever it is. So that was no longer the MPs'

10 decision. That was [redacted] decision.----

11 Q. I see.

12 A. ----If he was bringing in a new detainee for some

13 reason, he'd say, "Take the one in isolation out, put him in 14,

14 and put this guy in isolation." Similar with 1B.

15 Q. Is it your impression that 1A and 1B remained under the

16 control of [redacted] and he had that authority

17 and responsibility to assign MI holds to those cells within 1A

18 and 1B?

19 A. Right.

20 Q. Are you aware that there were others, even after the

21 time period that you referred to earlier, which was the

22 beginning--are you aware that criminals and problem performers--

1 problem detainees were being placed in 1A and 1B by military
2 police personnel? Were you aware that that was occurring?
3 A. I wasn't aware, specifically, but I know that a couple
4 of times they had to put an Iraqi criminal that they brought in
5 on suspicion of a violent crime and they put him into 1A, into a
6 cellblock.
7 Q. Were you aware that the MPs were putting detainees that
8 were causing problems in the other parts of the prison: those
9 that were starting riots, those that were--as an example, those
10 that were accused of raping other detainees--were you aware that
11 the MP personnel were using 1A and 1B to house those prisoners?
12 A. I was not.
13 WIT: Did they go through [redacted]
14 DO: No. Well, it's not our understanding that they were
15 going through [redacted] It's our understanding
16 from interviewing both the military intelligence personnel and
17 the military police personnel: [redacted]
18 [redacted] the NCOs that were actually doing the jailing
19 responsibilities. It's based on what they have testified to us
20 on is that the MPs were, indeed, taking these problem
21 performers, problem detainees, and placing them in 1A and 1B,
22 because they had no place else to put them. They had to be
23 taken out of the general prison population for disciplinary

1 reasons and reasons that they were determining on the spot.
2 They were placing them in what was supposedly going to be the
3 strictly MI area.
4 WIT: Right. Now, sir, if they were in the general
5 population compound at Abu Ghraib--at Gancci, from late October,
6 early November timeframe, they were all security detainees, so
7 they were all MI holds anyway, effectively. If there were
8 troublemakers amongst them--.
9 DO: Well, yes. It gets in to how you want to categorize
10 them. The categories that we've been told that were being used
11 were basically three categories. And those categories, number
12 one, was the criminals: pure criminals did not have any MI
13 interest or any security interests, but have committed
14 violations against the laws of Iraq. The second category would
15 have been security holds, and security hold were all of those
16 people that were being rounded up and detained and all of the
17 operations that referred to earlier.
18 WIT: Right.
19 DO: A subcategory of the security holds were what was
20 being called "MI holds." Those are the ones that after going
21 through screenings and after an MI analyst or interrogator would
22 do an initial assessment, they would specify that this person
23 needs further interrogation for whatever reason, and they were

1 then designated as "MI holds." So MI holds were really a
2 subcategory of the security detainees. So the people that were
3 going into 1A and 1B--very shortly after the beginning,
4 according to the testimony that we have--was a mixture of all
5 three of those categories: there was security holds, that is
6 people that were being held but didn't have any MI interests
7 anymore, and there were people that were in there for
8 specifically MI reasons where MI said, "We want this person
9 segregated for this reason." So all three categories were in
10 there from, pretty much, the very beginning.
11 WIT: I believe that. From the beginning; sure. Because
12 cellblock 1A and 1B--cellblock 1A, especially, had the isolation
13 cells and the maximum-security cells. It was the only cellblock
14 where you could hold individuals or two people in a cell. When
15 it was under our control, that's who we put in there. I don't
16 know if they put troublemakers or--I don't know, but when the MI
17 people, like from Victory Bounty, they had two of that initial
18 group that they wanted to put in there. So we had the cell
19 space and we put them in there. So there was a mix of prisoners
20 at that time. But it wasn't until these raids and these
21 specific operations where the security detainees were being
22 brought in that that population started to increase. I looked
23 at the population breakdown, [redacted] gave it to me, and it

1 showed the vast majority of those cellblocks upstairs and
2 downstairs, in cellblock 1A, were occupied by MI holds. So it
3 made sense to argue their case to get that put under their
4 control. But we had either transferred those prisoners out or--
5 the Iraqi criminals--they had been transferred into other
6 prisons, other cells, or into 1B. I was not aware that they
7 were--at some point, then, went back to mixing the categories of
8 prisoners.
9 DO: Yeah. They were. And we've actually done an analysis
10 of who amongst those that are claiming abuse and those that,
11 indeed, we know were abused from the pictures, who was who and
12 whether or not they were in a security hold, criminal, or an MI
13 hold. And so we can verify even by the pictures that, "Yeah,
14 this one was done specifically on this person and that person.
15 There's no MI interest. They've been placed there strictly from
16 a criminal standpoint," or "This person was an MI hold and is
17 there."
18 WIT: We distinguished the categories by where they had to
19 go for a release board.
20 [END OF PAGE]

1 Q. You did?

2 A. Yes, we did.

3 And the ones that were in that cell were not going

4 before my release board for Iraqi criminals. They were all

5 waiting for release by the MI Security Detainee Release Board.

6 DC: I'm sorry. You were going to--?

7 DC: Were the security detainees the troublemakers? I'm

8 just confused as to why they would be mixed in to 1A and 1B

9 based on the oral conversation that you just had.

10 DC: Security holds was the category of all of those that

11 were picked up on all of these, and considered to be thread to

12 the coalition.

13 DC: Correct. I understand that part.

14 WIT: So if a regular one from the general population ended

15 up in there----

16 DC: I'm trying to figure out where the group of people

17 that are the troublemakers come from.

18 DC: They come from both the criminal group and from the

19 group of security holds.

20 DC: So from both?

21 DC: From both. And they very well might have come--I

22 don't know this for a fact, but they might have come from the MI

23 holds also. So if you have an MI hold guy who starts a riot:

1 not an MI issue. The MPs are concerned with starting a riot.
2 So the MPs could've taken that MI hold and put them in to this
3 isolation area.
4 [The deposition recessed at 1613, 18 July 2004.]
5 [The deposition was called to order at 1635, 18 July 2004.]
6 **Questions by the deposition officer (continued):**
7 Q. Can you tell me, again, what you believed [redacted]
8 [redacted] role was? Was there anything in addition to
9 assigning who was going into those particular cells and who was
10 going to be assigned there? Did he have any other broader
11 responsibilities?
12 A. It was all related to interrogation, sir. I don't know
13 the depth of it, but I do know that he was the one who reported
14 interrogation progress back to General Fast.
15 Q. Who did Lieutenant [redacted] report to?
16 A. General Fast.
17 Q. And how did you know that?
18 A. He told me that, sir. And Colonel Pappas told me that.
19 Q. What did [redacted] tell you, as specifically as
20 you can recall, about his reporting relationship with General
21 Fast?
22 A. The only reason it came up was because of the handgun
23 in the cellblock, and so I said to [redacted] I said,

1 "I want a statement from each one of those MPs. I want to know
2 what happened. And get it while it's fresh. He called me back
3 really pretty quickly.
4 He said, "The MPs aren't making statements. [redacted]
5 [redacted] told them not to talk to anybody. He told them not to
6 make a statement."
7 I said, "Well, why is [redacted] telling them to do
8 anything?"
9 He said, "It happened in his cellblock. He said that
10 it it's his responsibility."
11 I said, "Those MPs are going to make statements for
12 you. They're one of your MP companies."
13 So [redacted] called me back and [redacted]
14 said, "Ma'am, the reason I told the MPs not to make any
15 statements is because I wanted them to get the story straight."
16 And I said, "Well, that's interesting, but I want the
17 truth. And the best way to get that is to capture it
18 immediately."
19 And he said, "I don't agree."
20 I said, "That's fine. They're my MPs, and they're
21 going to give statements to [redacted] There's going
22 to be an investigation." I said, "I'm looking out for them and

1 for getting the truth." So I said, "Have Colonel Pappas call
2 me."
3 He said, "Well, ma'am, I don't work for Colonel
4 Pappas."
5 And I said, "Well that's kind of interesting. Who do
6 you work for?"
7 And he said, "Well, I work for General Fast." That's
8 how I know that he worked for General Fast.
9 So I called Colonel Pappas, and he wasn't in the
10 office, but his XO, [redacted] said that
11 he'd call me right back. And he did.
12 And I said, "Who's [redacted] work for? Doesn't he work
13 for you?"
14 He said, "No, ma'am. He works for General Fast. Why?
15 What did he do now?"
16 I said, "This is about the handgun incident."
17 He said, "What handgun?"
18 So he hadn't heard anything--or he acted like, on the
19 telephone, he hadn't heard anything about the handgun. So I
20 told him. And I said, "And I wanted statements from the MPs,
21 and [redacted] told the MPs not to talk to anybody. Now,
22 reluctantly, he's backing off, I guess, because I told him that

1 I wanted statements and that they're going to give statements to

2 [redacted]

3 He said, "When did this happen?"

4 I said, "Today. They're arresting Iraqi guards or

5 something, because allegedly one of them smuggled it in to the

6 prisoner."

7 He said, "I'll call you back." So he came to me.

8 Q. "He" being?

9 A. Colonel Pappas.

10 So, he said, "I talked to [redacted] Ma'am," he

11 said, "I think he was sincere."

12 I said, "You can never be sincere if your first

13 statement is, 'I want them to get their stories straight.'" I

14 said, "That doesn't ring well with me, which is why I was

15 insistent about getting the statements, because it's the right

16 thing to do."

17 He said, [redacted] understands, now."

18 I said, "Did you go and talk to him?"

19 He said, "Actually, he came to see me."

20 I said, "How come he doesn't work for you?"

21 He said, "Well, I don't have a position for him. But

22 he really works for General Fast and keeps her informed on the

23 interrogations."

1 That's how I found out about these different pieces of
2 the parts of the--the operation out there. Not through grilling
3 anybody, but through those kinds of conversations.
4 Q. Did General Fast ever talk to you about [redacted]
5 A. Never.
6 Q. She never talked to you about the relationship that she
7 had with him?
8 A. No, sir.
9 Q. Did General Fast ever talk to you about Colonel Pappas
10 and what his responsibilities were relative to Abu Ghraib?
11 A. Not specifically, really. She said that she had
12 directed Colonel Pappas to move his headquarters out there.
13 Q. She said that she directed that?
14 A. Yes. That's what she told me.
15 And the reason for that was because the focus of the--
16 with all of these raids and everything, that there was so much
17 interrogation work going on out there. He needed to be out
18 there.
19 Q. Who did Colonel Pappas report to?
20 A. General Fast.
21 Q. Was--do you know if General Fast was his rater?
22 A. I have no idea.

1 Q. But you would have expected it to have been General
2 Fast?
3 A. I don't--I didn't expect it to be anybody one way or
4 the other, but he answered to her about everything and did
5 reports about once a day to her. Whenever I saw him over at
6 CJTF7 whenever I was in Baghdad, he was always either going in
7 to her office or coming out of her office. And if he went in to
8 brief General Wodjakowski or General Sanchez, he always had her
9 with him.
10 Q. So the relationship was between Colonel Pappas and
11 General Fast. How about--for their reporting relationships.
12 How about [redacted] Did you see him ever with General
13 Fast?
14 A. Yes, sir. Once I knew that he worked for her, then I
15 saw them more often. I made the association, I guess--it seemed
16 more automatically--I noticed it more often. Like when General
17 Fast came out with Congressman Atkins [phonetic] and his
18 congressional delegation. He and [redacted] and the
19 senior British civilian in the theater. [redacted] was
20 fairly new to the theater. This was in November, and they were
21 coming out to Abu Ghraib for [redacted] and the
22 congressional delegation and the British guy--to have a look at
23 the interrogation operations and walk the prison grounds.

1 The congressional delegations that came in there
2 weren't necessarily interested in our detention operations.
3 They wanted to see Abu Ghraib, primarily. But she was briefing
4 them--or they were taking a brief. So her aid called my aid the
5 night before and said, "General Fast is going to be out at Abu
6 Ghraib, and General Karpinski would like to come out and meet us
7 out there or go out with us, she's more than welcome."
8 So, [redacted] was one of the new assistant
9 Ambassadors to--I don't know. They called them all Ambassadors,
10 but he was one of the three that were subordinate to [redacted]
11 [redacted] about the November timeframe. It was going to be one guy
12 for operations, one guy for logistics and something else, and
13 the other guy for construction or whatever. So [redacted]
14 had a particular interest in coming out to Abu Ghraib to see
15 that whole operation and the logistics and everything. So, when
16 I got there, she wasn't there, yet, but they arrived right
17 behind us. [redacted] went right out to her vehicle. So I
18 just made that automatic connection that, you know, obviously he
19 has some important news to give her or something. He brought
20 that whole delegation inside, put them in the briefing room--.
21 Colonel Pappas stood up to give the briefing and then General
22 Fast told him to sit down and [redacted] would brief
23 initially and he could talk about the interrogation operation

1 when they got over to the ICE facility. But [redacted] was
2 with her most of that time. That was November--November 23, I
3 think it was. That's one of the few itineraries that I actually
4 have.
5 RC: Was that before the shooting or after the shooting?
6 WIT: Oh, after. That was long after the shooting.
7 November. The shooting took place, I think----
8 RC: The 24th of November.
9 WIT: Oh, it was?
10 RC: Yes, ma'am.
11 WIT: The handgun in the cellblock?
12 RC: Yes, ma'am.
13 WIT: Well, this was--I can look at the itinerary--but it
14 was--it must have been before. They didn't talk about the
15 handgun at the briefing. And [redacted] was back. He
16 was more relaxed, but he hadn't enhanced his skills at briefing.
17 Q. You had discussed earlier about the review boards and
18 the different review boards that existed, and one of those that
19 existed was the detainee review board for security holds?
20 A. Right.
21 Q. You were a member of that board?
22 A. I was. Yes.

1 Q. And, as I understand it, the other two members were
2 General Fast and [redacted] Is that accurate?
3 A. Yes, sir. It is.
4 Q. Could you tell me the mission of that review board?
5 A. It was to review the files of security detainees once
6 they've been nominated for possible release. Then we would
7 review the file--there wasn't very much in the file--and make a
8 recommendation. General Fast was the President of the Board and
9 she could overrule us or she could agree with us--or, if we
10 disagreed, she could have overruled us on that too. I mean, she
11 had the final say.
12 Q. Was there written rules of this--you know, is there
13 just, "Here it is."--You just described the way it worked. Was
14 there some SOP or memorandum that documented that that's the way
15 it worked?
16 A. No, sir.
17 Q. But that's the way it worked?
18 A. That's the way it worked.
19 Q. To your recollection, General Fast had the ultimate
20 decision-making authority for those detainee review boards?
21 A. Yes, sir. She did.

1 Q. When did they begin? When did you actually started
2 sitting on those boards?
3 A. Actually, the review boards were fashioned after the
4 Iraqi criminal release boards that I was running at General
5 Sanchez's request. So when they formed the Security Detainee
6 Release board, General Fast said she didn't want to be the
7 single person to review and release these people--she would
8 prefer a panel. That's how the board was formed. We had the
9 first releases, probably, in October.
10 Q. How long--it went from October until when? When was
11 the last one that you were sitting on?
12 A. The day before the--or a couple of days before the
13 transfer of authority, we were still sitting on those boards, I
14 believe.
15 Q. Which would have been--?
16 A. The end of January.
17 Q. And how often did those boards meet?
18 A. Initially, they met twice a week. And initially they
19 were painful because they were hours. Most of the people that
20 were recommended and their files became before the board, if we
21 reviewed, say on one day, because we'd meet for four or five or
22 more hours, and we would see what was in there--Like I said, the
23 files weren't very complete. Sometimes they had a picture that

1 said what they ere arrested for. So if we reviewed forty,
2 probably 30 of them were never released--and that's high--maybe
3 35 were not released. It was a very small percentage. It was
4 "releasaphobia." General Fast did not want her--and I don't
5 blame her--I mean, she didn't want to put her signature on a
6 release recommendation of the next high jacker.
7 Q. When one of the files would come in front of you with
8 limited information: this person was arrested at such and such
9 a point in time and alleged to have had a weapon in their
10 possession, or some such allegation, little more than that was
11 in the file?
12 A. Well, for the security detainees it said they were a
13 suspected associate of Sadaam and was arrested in a car with
14 weapons in the trunk and three other people in the vehicle were
15 known associates of Sadaam. So it was more than just a small
16 infraction. They were shooting at a coalition checkpoint and
17 when they were stopped, they found RPGs in the trunk.
18 Q. Well, that example would say to me, non-releasable.
19 A. Well, actually, what they would do is--I have to give
20 credit to the people that review them: the interrogation teams,
21 the CID, and the arresting division--that was very, very
22 important to the decision. They would cross-match, like if
23 there was an RPG attack that night and then this car was stopped

1 and there were RPGs in the trunk, then it was not likely that
2 they were going to be released. But if it was RPGs and the guy
3 that we were reviewing made a claim, very quickly when he was
4 arrested, that he was trying to turn them in to one of the
5 amnasty boxes or trying to get fifty dollars or whatever. But
6 those same individuals could have been held for months, even
7 though they were trying to do the right thing. So, upon
8 interrogation, they would discover that that was sincere. This
9 guy could take them to the point where he collected them, was
10 taking them to an amnesty box, was trying to make a hundred
11 bucks or fifty bucks or something. But we'd hold them for
12 months waiting for that record to get to the release board.
13 Very often what would happen, especially in that first--I'd say
14 the first month or six weeks when we were reviewing the records,
15 very often what would happen is General Fast would look at the
16 record and--I can site one example that might be an exception,
17 but not so much in those initial weeks: "His middle name is
18 Osama. He might know Osama Bin Laden. Put him back in box."
19 And not in an interrogation or military intelligence mindset,
20 you say, "Well, we just made another enemy." Because of his
21 name? Name association doesn't necessarily work in the middle
22 east, because everybody's got a middle name of Osama. And the
23 MI people who reviewed the records before they even came to the

1 board would almost plead with her in some cases that--"I'm
2 telling you, ma'am, this guy has no more value. We've drained
3 everything we could from him. We've had him for four months.
4 This is a release one." Sometimes they lost.
5 Q. Can you explain to me the dynamics of how that worked?
6 Because as you're explaining it, if I was on the board, I'd be
7 arguing with General Fast. So, tell me about the arguments that
8 you, then, would have General Fast to try to get these people
9 released, as I describe it.
10 A. Well, I--like I said, I always deferred to her if it
11 were--in most cases, if she had a sound direction. She would
12 say to the MI people with the interrogation folder--she'd say,
13 "Pull out the file. I can see some kind of a tattoo in this
14 photograph. Tell me what they found out about the tattoo."
15 Well, if they pulled out the interrogation record and found out
16 that that particular tattoo was never exploited, she'd say put
17 him back in the box. So, I'd say, maybe there's something
18 there; maybe he tattooed himself in prison--I never said that to
19 her, but I thought, you know, she's got a pretty sharp eye.
20 RC: There was a reason why some people were tattooed that
21 resembled they were part of an organization. I don't know if
22 you knew that back then.

1 WIT: Yes. Faydayeen. All of them. But the fact that the
2 interrogators didn't pick up on it or didn't record it in the
3 interrogation record was--that was an interrogation problem.
4 But when none of us saw that and she did, you know--and I think
5 she was hopeful that under interrogation or in the interrogation
6 file there would be a record that they had seen the tattoo or
7 whatever. So, "Put him back in the box. I want to know what
8 his affiliation is because of that tattoo."
9 Q. And what about [redacted] Was he of the similar
10 mindset as you relative to not challenging General Fast?
11 Because that's what I'm getting from this is you just weren't
12 challenging General Fast.
13 A. Sir, it wasn't that I wasn't challenging her. We had
14 an opinion on everyone of us, and we could speak openly. She
15 didn't ever communicate to me, or certainly not to [redacted]
16 [redacted] at least not in my observation that, you know, "You guys
17 don't know what you're talking about." We were all entitled to
18 opinion. It was her signature, though, that was on that release
19 recommendation. So, we became--after the progress started to
20 become a little bit better--a little bit smoother, then we were
21 likely to speak up, because we were reliably right. Then one
22 time they said they wanted to use some of these people as
23 sources. That we were going to release them, but they were

1 going to be released to task force and they were going to be
2 used as sources. So it kind of flourished as the system got
3 more developed. [redacted] was kind of interesting. We'd
4 review the file and it didn't like there was anything there,
5 whether there was a photograph or not or the unusual
6 circumstance with the tattoo--it just didn't look like there was
7 anything there, and then General Fast would say, "I don't know
8 if I like the way this guy looks. Put him back in the box."
9 Occasionally, we'd object. But [redacted] had a
10 thermometer--an automatic thermometer for the direction that
11 General Fast was going and the temperature of the water. If she
12 presented any kind of an argument, he would back down
13 immediately and say, "You're right, ma'am. You're right."
14 Q. So he wasn't putting up much of a----?
15 A. No.
16 Q. So why have a board?
17 WIT: Why have a board?
18 DO: Yeah. I mean, at this board there's a general officer
19 there that's, the way I hear it, she's calling all of the shots.
20 WIT: Right.
21 DO: And we've got another general officer, of lesser rank,
22 but another general officer, and a colonel who's the chief legal
23 advisor to the commanding general.

1 Q. Why have a board?

2 A. I'll tell you why they had a board, sir. Because in

3 the few cases--smallest percentage of the cases where we

4 released them, she wanted concurrence or other people's opinions

5 to fall back on. But more than that, it was a requirement under

6 Geneva/Hague, that when prisoners are held, they're entitled to

7 know their charges, every six months you review their cases, and

8 you don't necessarily have to give them legal advice again, but

9 that's the Geneva/Hague requirement. So [redacted] is the

10 one who pushed for some kind of boards to be taking place. And

11 they were specifically under our control, U.S. control, and

12 would remain under U.S. control, so they wanted to do everything

13 they could to be in compliance with that six-month review.

14 Q. Well it sounds like the letter of the law rather than

15 the intent of the law.

16 A. Right. It was a lot of time spent for little results.

17 DO: We've spoken to [redacted] and asked her questions

18 relative to the release boards, and she's provided us with

19 statistics that show, according to her reports that she's

20 provided, that between when the boards were first set up in

21 October and, I believe the timeframe was in--January, where they

22 had this transition to a lower ranking court, that, in fact, of

23 all of those that were reviewed, seventy-three percent were

1 released. That's significantly different from what you have
2 told us today.
3 WIT: I don't believe that statistic, sir.
4 Q. Do you have records to show how many people were
5 reviewed and how many people of those that were reviewed
6 actually were released?
7 A. Personally, I don't have the records, but I know that
8 my JAG, [redacted] kept those records. He
9 kept the list of the records we were going to review for each
10 board, and the markings to the side: "release, release,
11 release."
12 Q. Where would those records be now?
13 A. Up in Uniondale, I believe. They were in the connex in
14 ship, but the connexes have arrived.
15 Q. I'm sorry. Can we have his name again?
16 A. [redacted] But I don't believe he
17 is with the 800th anymore. But his files would be there for
18 sure. [redacted] is the----
19 Q. So whoever is the JAG, now, at the 800th should have
20 those records?
21 A. Right. They were both with me in Baghdad.
22 DO: Because it is something we're obviously interested in.
23 We've heard a lot of people being reviewed, not very many people

1 getting out. Then we hear a lot of people getting reviewed, a
2 lot of people getting out: seventy-three percent.
3 Q. So, you know, as investigators, we're--where are the
4 records?
5 DC: Obviously somebody's wrong.
6 DO: Somebody's wrong here. Yeah.
7 WIT: Well, the boards that I sat on, like I said, if we
8 reviewed forty, we wouldn't release ten. Now, sometimes the
9 recommendation was "not release; put him back in the box," and
10 maybe that person was ultimately released, but it didn't come
11 before the board again. It just went to her. And there was
12 significantly more numbers in December and January than there
13 had been prior.
14 Q. In what month was that?
15 A. In December and January. So if you roll up all of the-
16 -seventy-three percent? I don't believe it. I don't believe
17 that--we didn't release fifty percent by the end of the--when I
18 left in January, theater-wide, we had almost fourteen thousand
19 prisoners.
20 DO: She's not referring to the numbers of prisoners. And
21 we have to make sure we have the distinction clear in mind,
22 here. It's not the numbers of people that were coming in; it's
23 only those numbers that the board was reviewing. Of course, I

1 don't remember now, as we sit here, how many she's talking
2 about, but however many--it's the same board that you sat on.
3 However many that you and she and [redacted] reviewed:
4 that's the number that she's specifically referring to and
5 specifically has records that indicate----
6 WIT: Seventy-three percent were released?
7 DO: Yes.
8 WIT: There's no way.
9 DO: Okay. Well, we'd like to find, and we will, look at
10 those records that the 500th has to see what we can come up with.
11 It is an area of interest to us, obviously.
12 WIT: Our population of security detainees out at Abu
13 Ghraib stayed so steady in increase--I just don't know where
14 they were releasin' them. Now, I know that after we left----
15 DO: Because they were still releasing less than they were
16 bringing in.
17 WIT: Many more bringing in.
18 DO: Well, the numbers speak for themselves. But we
19 weren't referring to the population growth. We had covered that
20 earlier. At this point, we're talking about the efficiencies of
21 the release board, which is an area of concern and one that we
22 have a discrepancy in.

1 WIT: I will tell you that in an effort to get more people
2 recommended before the board, they increased the--this pre-
3 review review board made up of CID, MP, MI, the divisions--they
4 were reviewing a lot more and we were getting more to the board,
5 but we weren't recommending the release of more. And, when
6 Ambassador Bremer, around Ramadan or December timeframe, he said
7 that they were going to be releasing 500 prisoners over the next
8 month: 100 a week and then at the end, it would be a bigger--
9 whatever the balance was in addition to the 100. He said,
10 starting "this" Friday or Thursday, "We're going to release the
11 first 100."
12 Well, we didn't have 100 ready from the release board.
13 General Fast called me and said, "We have to release some
14 prisoners."
15 I said, "We have some criminals that have been approved
16 for release."
17 She said, "Any prisoners will due." Because the media
18 was going to cover it, so they were all out at Abu Ghraib.
19 It was a near riot out there outside the wall with the
20 media and family members. They thought that all 500 prisoners--
21 thousands of prisoners' families were out there and the media
22 and everybody else. So, [redacted] and [redacted]
23 [phonetic] were able to come up with 83 criminals that were

1 already approved for release. They put them on a couple of
2 buses and the buses left, so the media followed them. It was
3 like a parade. It was unbelievable how many people were out
4 there. Not one of them was a security detainee. The next
5 month--the next week, we didn't release any, because we had no
6 more to release and they didn't have any security detainees to
7 release. So, I don't know where she's getting these numbers
8 from or where they were releasing them from, but if I was the
9 one holding them at my facility, they weren't being released
10 from Abu Ghraib.
11 DC: Okay. Well, we'll see what--we need to get those
12 records from the 800th MPs and we'll contact them and get those
13 records.
14 RC: I have a question, ma'am, reference the release board.
15 The voting procedures and now--you know, whenever you saw a
16 file. How did the voting occur?
17 WIT: We reviewed it, she said, "Okay, let's vote on this."
18 I'd vote for release. [redacted] votes for release. She
19 votes for release or for hold. If they voted for hold--on one
20 or two occasions, we did convince her, but it was a rare
21 exception. But it was just release or hold open voting. She
22 signed a paper.

1 RC: So was it a consensus that they were all yes, release
2 or no, release?
3 WIT: It had to be an agreement to release them.
4 RC: So all three had to vote the same?
5 WIT: Right.
6 DC: But that's only for release.
7 WIT: For hold, we could recommend release and she could
8 override us.
9 RC: So how often did that happen where she overrode?
10 WIT: Often. Especially in the first four weeks of the
11 process. She was looking at it from a responsibility
12 perspective. If anybody had a question when the recommendation
13 got to SENTCOM, they called her back. They didn't call me, they
14 didn't call [redacted] they didn't ask us to get together
15 and review the file again: they called her.
16 Q. Major General Miller and his visit--when was the first
17 time that you met Major General Miller in country there in Iraq
18 that you recall?
19 A. Whenever he visited Iraq, at the in brief--that was the
20 first time I had----

1 Q. So that would have been--he first arrived in the latter
2 part of August. He was there the last week of August, the first
3 week of September. Is that when you--?
4 A. Right. That was the first time I ever met him.
5 Q. And were you at Victory when you met him or did you
6 meet him at Abu Ghraib?
7 A. No. I met him at Victory.
8 Q. And what did he tell you his mission was when he
9 appeared there in Iraq?
10 A. He gave an in brief. I really don't know if that was
11 the first day he was there or if that was the day of the in
12 brief, but it was very close to the beginning of his trip. He
13 said that he was there to help with the interrogation effort to
14 see what he could do to help Barbara Fast improve the
15 interrogations and the resulting actionable intelligence--he
16 made his own invented expression. And he said he was going to
17 take a look at our different prison facilities.
18 He knew for sure he was going up to the MEK, he was
19 going up to Abu Ghraib, might go down to Bucca, he was going to
20 go down to Cropper--unless it wasn't necessary. If they found
21 someplace early on that served the purpose. I said--I made a
22 comment about the MEK compound. But that was outside of
23 Baghdad, that that was actually the property of the people who

1 we were securing up there, and there would be a long discussion
2 about putting any kind of Guantanamo Bay type of an operation up
3 there.
4 Other people were kind of interjecting or asking
5 questions during these in briefs, so I just made a couple of
6 points the same way. And it takes a little bit of time to
7 understand the MEK mission, and if he didn't need to know that
8 and he wasn't going to use that facility--I was actually trying
9 to discourage him, I suppose. But it was under U.S. control, so
10 that was an advantage unlike some of the other facilities. He
11 said they would see; they were going to visit them. I asked if
12 he was there to take a look at detention operations. He said,
13 "No, but if we're looking at detention facilities, then I have a
14 lot of people that do that kind of work in their civilian job,"
15 and he pointed out a couple of people on the team and he said
16 that they might make recommendations. He said that they would
17 work with the interrogators. It was kind of like a generic
18 brief. It was clear, to me, during that in brief, that he was
19 really there to work with the C-2. But you couldn't do any of
20 those--you couldn't setup an operation anywhere in the existing
21 facility, because they all belong to me. So that's why they
22 included us in the in brief. And he made a comment about--one
23 of the interrogators asked the question about what made

1 Guantanamo Bay so different--or so good that they were going to
2 import those techniques. He said that it was the plan to
3 "GITMOize" the operation. That they had developed techniques
4 and they had so much success in Guantanamo Bay that they were
5 asked to come in and apply those techniques and teach
6 interrogation teams how to apply those techniques.
7 And I said, "Sir, I was down in Guantanamo Bay very
8 quickly, but I do know that the situation in Guantanamo Bay is
9 vastly different than the situation here in Iraq. All of our
10 facilities are routinely attacked. Contrary to wise judgment,
11 you don't run a detention operation in the middle of a hostile
12 firestone, which is what Abu Ghraib is right now." And he said,
13 you know, that they would make the determination and it really
14 wasn't so much different. I mean, I see completely different--
15 black and white differences between Guantanamo Bay and--but I
16 thought, you know, when you drive around Iraq a little bit and
17 you can see and you can feel and you can sense the tension,
18 you'll understand that it's different here.
19 And another interrogator asked him about the--I don't
20 remember the exact question, but it was something about
21 maintaining control. And it might have been the subsequent
22 question to my comment that in Guantanamo Bay they 800 MPs to
23 guard 640 prisoners, and I had--at Abu Ghraib, I had 300 MPs to

1 guard more than 7,000 prisoners. Then he said, "You have to
2 have full control, and the MPs at Guantanamo Bay know what--they
3 know what that means. A detainee never leaves the cell if he's
4 not escorted by two MPs in leg irons, and hand irons, and a
5 belly chain. And there was no mistake about who's in charge.
6 And you have to treat these detainees like dogs. If you treat
7 them any differently and they get the idea that they're making a
8 decision or they're in charge, you've lost control of your
9 interrogation."
10 Q. Was that a quote? Did he specifically say to treat
11 them like dogs?
12 A. Absolutely.
13 Q. And who else was present at that time when he made that
14 statement?
15 A. Everybody that was in that in brief.
16 Q. Can you give me some names?
17 A. General Fast, Colonel Pappas, maybe [redacted]-I
18 believe [redacted] was there, and I--he was there when
19 General Boikan (phonetic) was there. I don't really remember if
20 he was there when General Miller was in briefing. There were a
21 couple of people in civilian clothes that were interpreters--I
22 thought that they were interpreters. Now I don't know if they

1 were interpreters or interrogators. [redacted] might have
2 been there. And then--he had the people that were on his team.
3 Q. When was the next time that you had any conversations
4 directly with General Miller?
5 A. Our paths crossed a couple of times, but it was never--
6 I mean he was always in the middle of doing something at one of
7 the facilities. I saw him over at Cropper and he was on the
8 tail end of his visit there. He said, "Hey, isn't Task Force
9 121 around here? I want to go over there."
10 I said, "You usually have to call ahead."
11 He said, "No. I'm not going to call ahead. I'm just
12 going to over there." And we did. He said, "Come with me,
13 because your driver must know where it is." So he followed, he
14 got out, and they wouldn't let him in. The guy--the NCO at the
15 checkpoint said--you know he called--and they turned him away.
16 But that really wasn't a conversation.
17 And then I saw him when he was getting ready to leave,
18 and he asked me and my command sergeant major and my ops guy to
19 come over for an out brief. We went over to Victory for the
20 JVB--the visitor's bureau, and there's a conference room in
21 there with a long table.----
22 DO: I've been there.

1 A. ----Okay. So, you know how that's configured. He was
2 seated on the side by the fireplace with his back to the
3 fireplace, and there was three places set right across from him
4 with a pad and a pen or something. So we sat down, and I
5 remember thinking then, when I sat down, "We look like we're
6 outnumbered." But I didn't get any sense that this was going to
7 be bad news or confrontational or anything. So, he said, "Okay.
8 We finished our tour and we've seen a lot of your facilities. I
9 want you to give me Abu Ghraib."
10 I said, "Sir, Abu Ghraib is not mine to give you."
11 And he----
12 Q. What did he mean by give it to him? What was his
13 mission that he wanted it?
14 A. I didn't ask him, but I thought, you know, in
15 connection of what he had been looking at and what he had been
16 saying about interrogation and "GITMOizing" everything, that he
17 wanted Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo Bay, Iraq.
18 Q. Was he going to stay on as an assigned officer there?
19 A. I had no idea. I mean, he had no authority--well, I
20 shouldn't say that, because he told me that he had the
21 authority. But what he said was, "I want you to give me Abu
22 Ghraib."
23 And I said, "Abu Ghraib is not mine to give you, sir."

1 And before I could say another word, he said, "Okay.
2 Everybody out. Out. I want to talk to the general." And
3 almost in unison, his whole team stood up, as if this had been
4 planned. And my guys----
5 Q. About how many--we have a list of all the members of
6 his team, but about how many people were there?
7 A. Sixteen, eighteen, twenty. Their whole side of the
8 table and wall huggers.
9 Q. That many? And you--with you was your sergeant major?
10 A. And my ops officer.
11 Q. Just the three of you? You and two others.
12 A. Right. So they got up. I said, "Go ahead." They were
13 a little bit concerned, you know.
14 So he closed the door and he said to me, "Look, we can
15 do this my way or we can do this the hard way."
16 I said, "Sir, I don't know who told you I was going to
17 be difficult. I'm not being difficult. I'm telling you Abu
18 Ghraib is not mine to give to you. I don't own it. We run the
19 detention operations out there. It belongs to CPA. They're
20 putting the money into refurbishing it. It's the only facility.
21 It was a difficult road to get to this point."
22 He said, "Rick Sanchez said I could have whatever
23 facility I wanted, and I want Abu Ghraib."

1 I said, "Sir, if Ambassador Bremer tells me or tells
2 the prisons people to give you Abu Ghraib, I am not going to
3 stand in the way. What I'm telling you is I don't have the
4 authority to give it to you."
5 He said, "Look. We're going to run an interrogation
6 operation. We're going to get value out of these people that
7 they're bringing in. We're going to be able to release more.
8 And that will make life better for everybody. And that's what
9 I'm going to do. And I'm going to go and brief Rick Sanchez and
10 tell him that that's what I'm going to do."
11 There was no reasoning with him. There was no reason
12 for me to argue with him at all. He was on a mission. He told
13 me he had permission from Sanchez--General Sanchez.
14 Q. And then what happened?
15 A. And he left.
16 Q. He left the country?
17 A. He took his team, he went in and briefed General
18 Sanchez, and then left.
19 Q. And then left country?
20 A. Left the country.
21 Q. What happened next? Since he left country, who was
22 then to take Abu Ghraib in his words? I mean, how did that all

1 come about? What impact did his visit have relative to Abu
2 Ghraib?
3 A. What happened was there was more activity with
4 interrogations out there. And by more activity, I mean the
5 engineers got there, they started constructing the "Wood."--And
6 he said to me, during one of the--it must have been during the
7 in brief, I said to him about our frustrations with getting
8 uniforms and everything for prisoners.
9 And he said, "It doesn't make any difference. Funding
10 is not an issue. I have a hundred and twenty-five million
11 dollars a year, and I'm gonna transfer the funds to Colonel
12 Pappas, and he will take care of the requirements."
13 And I said, "Sir, we don't even have construction
14 underway to accommodate."
15 And he said, "We have connexes that we're going to
16 bring in, we'll reconfigure them, and the engineers are already
17 on board with this. They know how to do it. I'll bring up the
18 Sea Bees from Guantanamo Bay."
19 I said, "Sir, we can't even get a train up from the
20 port to Baghdad successfully. How are you going to bring all of
21 these connexes in? I'm just concerned that you're going to put
22 a plan together and you're not going to be able to execute it."

He said, "I'll bring 'em in from Turkey and from Jordan. We don't have to come from Kuwait from the port."

Well, after he left--I mean, honestly, sir, it was almost laughable, but, you know, with a hundred and twenty-five million dollars a year, I thought maybe he could actually do all of these things he was planning on doing.

Q. So did you see any of those changes after he left?

A. Well, we saw the engineers were working furiously on that wooden interrogation facility.

Q. Right, but that's not a major reconstruction project. Talking three, maybe four----

A. Six rooms. Three on each side of the hallway.

And then they asked for this-[redacted] [redacted] said that they needed this other building out at Abu Ghraib because they needed to set up the ICE facility as General Miller told them to do, and they wanted that room--you were out there. You know where their ICE facility was?

DC: I don't know where it was. I know where it is now.

WIT: Where it is. That was the only place it ever was.

DC: Oh, okay.

WIT: They have like cubicles or rooms where they work on coordinating the interrogation results and everything. Then the interrogation facility "metal" started. The engineers went over

1 there and started to work on that. So there was a lot of work
2 going on to make it a--and more people started to show up. And
3 the people that started to show up were coming from either
4 Guantanamo Bay or from Bosnia or from Afghanistan. So you got
5 the sense that there was----
6 DC: When you say people, you mean--what kind of people?
7 Define "people."
8 WIT: Well, there were some military people that came in.
9 DC: They're not Iraqis?
10 WIT: No.
11 RC: How do you know they were coming from Afghanistan and
12 Bosnia, ma'am?
13 WIT: They said, you know----
14 RC: "They" who?
15 WIT: These people that were arriving there.
16 RC: They were talking to you?
17 WIT: Yeah. Occasionally they'd come over and introduce
18 themselves and they'd say, "I just arrived. I'm coming in from
19 Afghanistan," or, "I'm coming up because General Miller sent me
20 up from Guantanamo Bay."

1 DC: So when you mean [sic] "people," you mean they were
2 part of the interrogation process?
3 WIT: Right. And I'll tell you, I never--I mean, if they
4 were military, some of them were in uniform: DCU. But some of
5 them didn't have any insignia on their collars and they
6 identified themselves as a special agent. Most cases they would
7 say, "I'm in the military, but I don't wear any insignia." And
8 the civilians that were there--I thought that they were all
9 interpreters, because interrogation teams need interpreters,
10 unless they're lucky enough to have a linguist that's an
11 interrogator too. So, the civilians that I saw arriving there,
12 I thought, you know----
13 RC: So the soldiers were identifying themselves as special
14 agents?
15 WIT: Right.
16 RC: Interrogators don't identify themselves as special
17 agents.
18 WIT: Oh, yeah. And they were in the interrogation--in the
19 ICE facility, and they were--and then there was also a--well,
20 that was in November, but a LRRSD team went out there--the
21 battalion.
22 DC: That comes after we go through the FRAGO, and we'll
23 get to the FRAGO. Maybe shortly we'll get to the FRAGO.

1 Q. So, General Miller leaves, and he leaves behind, as I
2 understand it, a report with General Sanchez.
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Did you ever see that report?
5 A. I did not. We saw the recommendations from that report
6 in December.
7 Q. In December? He left in early September. You didn't
8 see those until December?
9 A. December. And we never saw the whole report. What
10 CJTF7 did--and this was specifically [redacted]
11 [phonetic], who was the Provo Marshal at that time; he
12 extracted the two recommendations for changes to detention
13 operations. It had nothing to do with interrogation, but there
14 were two comments in the report, and [redacted] [phonetic]
15 extracted them, sent them out to us, and asked for us to
16 respond. We never saw the whole report.
17 Q. When you were with General Miller while he was there in
18 country during this visit, did he ever talk to you about any of
19 the specific operational issues at GITMO? Now, I'm not
20 referring to the two MPs on every detainee. I'm talking about
21 specifically what they used relative to interrogation
22 techniques.
23 A. No, sir.

1 Q. Did he ever mention to you the use of dogs at
2 Guantanamo?
3 A. No, sir.
4 Q. How they used them or how they didn't use them in
5 anyway?
6 A. No, sir.
7 Q. Any of those specific areas of interrogation
8 procedures?
9 A. No, sir. The only reference he ever made to me was
10 that they were going to identify specific MPs that would be
11 doing--supporting the interrogation effort, specifically. I
12 said, "Sir, they've never done this. Our prisoners are not
13 moved with leg irons or hand irons or anything."
14 They said, "No. It's not a problem. I'm leaving a CD
15 and printed material. The MI people are going to give them all
16 of the training that they need." That's what he told me.
17 Q. Did you ever see that CD or printed material?
18 A. No, sir.
19 Q. I think the term has been used that General Miller said
20 that the MPs were going to create the environment for which

1 interrogations would be conducted or something to that effect.
2 Do you remember him using anything to that effect?
3 A. He never even said--he may have used the expression
4 about enhancing the interrogation effort, but I couldn't even
5 swear to that. He said that they were going to give them
6 specific training.
7 Q. But you never had any specific conversations about what
8 that actually meant, did you?
9 A. No, sir.
10 RC: Ma'am, you mentioned that General Miller said they
11 were going to identify specific MPs. What do you mean by
12 "specific MPs supporting"?
13 WIT: That that would be their specific mission. That they
14 wouldn't be--you know how you get--like the first sergeant will
15 tasked to do, on a duty roster, you know, force protection, you
16 know, in a tower or something--that they were going to be just
17 specifically trained to do the interrogation support.
18 RC: So now MI is now going to tell you that they're going
19 to go and take MPs aside and give them the tasks?
20 WIT: Right.
21 RC: So now MI is tasking MPs?
22 WIT: Well, I don't think that they'd be tasking them
23 directly. You know, if the tasking had come down, it would have

1 gone through [redacted] to provide these soldiers--these MPs to
2 run detention operations in cellblock 1A and 1B.
3 This is just pure speculation on my part, but I would
4 imagine that [redacted] did not want new faces in there
5 every night. He wanted a consistent roster of MPs.
6 RC: And this is the August, September timeframe?
7 WIT: Correct.
8 Q. Did you--when you met Major General Ryder, he came
9 after General Miller--when did General Ryder come in to the
10 country to do his----?
11 A. At the end of October--maybe at the beginning of
12 November, but he was there in November for sure.
13 Q. And what was the mission that he was given? Why was he
14 there?
15 A. He was directed to come in and do an assessment of
16 detention operations. So, once again, sorry to say this, but we
17 had--we had lots of people coming in doing assessments and
18 nobody helping us.
19 Q. And when Major General Ryder showed up to do his
20 assessment, did you talk to him about whose idea was this--I
21 mean, who gave him this mission?
22 A. He said that he was directed to do this at General
23 Sanchez's request, but the request came through SENTCOM to do

1 this, and he was going to look at all of our detention
2 operations and do an assessment. I do have to say, though, in
3 General Ryder's defense, and, again, I don't need to defend him,
4 but at least his team--some of the people stayed to really help.
5 They did roll up their sleeves and sit down and take a look at
6 changing regulations and SOPs and things in writing and making
7 notes of how to go back to the school house and change those
8 regulations and FMs for training. So, I mean, some of them did
9 stay longer than they had expected to be there to help, and they
10 did help. But--you can now sympathize with General Ryder a
11 little bit, because I did the in brief for him, and I figured
12 this was going to be one opportunity--and maybe the only
13 opportunity, to give them an idea of what we were doing in the
14 theater, and how far spread we were, new missions everyday, that
15 kind of thing. So, I think I took about two hours of his time.
16 And he had a full team there with him. There must have been
17 about forty people with him. And, you know, they went out to
18 the four corners of Iraq. But, I think I was mostly
19 disappointed, because some of the people that were from the MP
20 school were not open to: "This is a new mission. This is
21 something we've never done before. And you need to write a new
22 book." They were still insisting on taking a square peg, that
23 being the 800th MP Brigade, and forcing it into this round-hole

1 mission. I had one of them--a major said to me, "Ma'am, don't
2 worry, I'm going to take care of everything. We're going to go
3 back and say that you really should do EPW, IR, and terrorist
4 detention."
5 I said, "You are kidding me." I said, "Look, how about
6 this: if you make every MP Brigade trained and capable in every
7 mission and then when you have to form a task force you reach in
8 and you don't have to say, 'Can they do combat support? Can
9 they do detention operations?' You know, make us multi-
10 dimensional, because that's what we're doing here anyway. So
11 rather than learn it on the fly, you might as well change the
12 doctrine and make everybody capable in all of those fields."
13 He said, "Oh, ma'am, we'll be rewriting doctrine for a
14 long time."
15 I said, "Well, no better time than now to get started."
16 Q. Did they give--the General Ryder group and his ultimate
17 report, was that helpful to you? How would you categorize the
18 General Ryder visit and the result of his visit?
19 A. Well, sir--I mean, he's Provo Marshal of the Army. He
20 has a team of experts in every one of the disciplines. But it
21 was not something that anybody had ever seen before. Securing
22 the MEK--how do you resolve that? These were such unique
23 missions--maybe not even appropriate for military police. But,

1 nonetheless, they wanted somebody that could detain or secure,
2 whatever, and that's typically MPs. And general Ryder
3 understood that, so there wasn't that strong learning curve that
4 we were subjecting everybody else to. And his opinion counted.
5 His report would have been extremely helpful if we had had it as
6 soon as he left or soon after, and we didn't get his until
7 months after either.
8 Q. When did you get his report?
9 A. Shortly after we got the two bullet comments from the
10 Miller report. Then we got most of the report--the Ryder
11 report. We didn't get the complete report until January.
12 Q. Okay. So around January?
13 A. Right.
14 Q. And, of course, a lot had occurred relative t Abu
15 Ghraib and I'm sure other places in that interim time?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. The command of Abu Ghraib had a forward operating base,
18 and we had briefly discussed this earlier in this interview.
19 When the prison first opened and there was only one unit there,
20 the 72nd, it was clear that that's who was in charge of Abu
21 Ghraib. Correct?
22 A. Right.

1 Q. Then the 72nd--then a battalion is sent from the
2 military police, the 320th?
3 A. The 400th was their first headquarters--their first
4 battalion, but that was brief.
5 Q. And they, the 72nd, at first reported was a unit of the
6 400th?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. But, then, as I understand it, when the 320th showed up,
9 it was a change in the reporting relationship when the 72nd
10 became a subordinate element of the 320th.
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. So when the 320th showed up, [redacted]
13 [redacted] he was the senior officer on board. Correct?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. And was he, then, in your opinion, the forward
16 operating base commander?
17 A. He was the Abu Ghraib commander. Yes, sir.
18 Q. And at what point in time did the Abu Ghraib commander
19 change?
20 A. The commander changed when the FRAGO was cut and
21 [redacted] became the commander of Abu Ghraib. That was
22 about the 19th or something of November.

1 Q. You mean Colonel Pappas?

2 A. Colonel Pappas.

3 Q. So on 19 November, CJTF7, General Sanchez,

4 specifically, ordered the FRAGO to be issued, changing the FOB

5 commander from [redacted] to Colonel Pappas.

6 Is that right?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Did you read that FRAGO when it came out?

9 A. No, sir. I didn't.

10 Q. Did anybody--member of your staff read that FRAGO when

11 it first came out?

12 A. No, sir. The first time they read it was like two days

13 after the FRAGO was released.

14 Q. So about the 21st?

15 A. Right. About the 21st.

16 Q. Did you read it then?

17 A. I was just coming back to Baghdad. I was out of the

18 country for five days. So I just got back to Baghdad and I

19 think they told me the day after--the morning after they saw the

20 FRAGO, they told me.

1 Q. And what did the FRAGO say to the best of your
2 recollection?
3 A. It said that effective immediately the operational
4 control of Abu Ghraib would be--was redirected to the 205th MI
5 Brigade and further that the commander of the 205th MI Brigade
6 would be declared the FOB commander. That's what it said.
7 Q. There was verbiage within that FRAGO that talks about
8 the 205th having responsibility for the FOB, Abu Ghraib, for
9 force protection and security of detainees. Do you remember
10 that verbiage?
11 A. Not specifically. I know that there was a mention of
12 the FOB and force protection in that FRAGO.
13 Q. Yeah. My recollection--of course, we can get that and
14 show it specifically to you, but my recollection is "the 205th MI
15 Brigade Commander is hereby appointed FOB commander for force
16 protection and security of detainees." What did that constitute
17 in your mind? Those limiting factors or those distinctive
18 factors for force protection and security of detainees? What
19 did that mean in your mind?
20 A. When I read the FRAGO, I remember my initial reaction
21 was that now they're cutting a FRAGO and making him responsible
22 for force protection, so that justifies them sending out extra

1 units that we have been asking for months for and never gotten.

2 And that Miller got what he wanted.

3 Q. General Miller?

4 A. General Miller got what he wanted.

5 Q. That's what was in your mind?

6 A. That was in my mind, that Abu Ghraib is what he wanted

7 and Abu Ghraib is what he got.

8 Q. Didn't you put any distinctive factors on--that it had

9 a limiting statement in there that it said "force protection and

10 security of detainees"? Why did it have that statement in

11 there? What was the meaning of that statement?

12 A. I didn't give it--I really don't--I don't recall giving

13 it any thought. And I sa[redacted] you know, within a

14 day or two, you know, a couple of days, and I said, "Where's

15 your boss? Is he busy out at Abu Ghraib or is he taking all of

16 his time?"

17 He said, "Hey, ma am, I'm glad you mentioned it,

18 because Colonel Pappas said his interpretation and his guidance

19 from General Fast is that he owns the whole thing.

20 Q. So [redacted] told you that Colonel Pappas'

21 interpretation was that he owns the whole thing?

22 A. Right. And that he got that guidance from General

23 Fast. And when I talked to Colonel Pappas, I asked him how was

1 he liking detention operations, and he said, "You know, [redacted]

2 [redacted] is really being very patient with me. He's teaching

3 me more about detention operations than I ever thought I'd want

4 to know."

5 Q. That's what Colonel Pappas said?

6 A. That's what Colonel Pappas said.

7 And I said, "Look, I don't think it's necessary," or,

8 "are we going to change," but there was a question either stated

9 or implied, "are we going to change the rating for these guys?".

10 Because rather than give them a rating and then go through the

11 whole thing again when the do leave, I think it's just better if

12 we leave it the way it is.

13 So he said, "I'm not worried about the administrative

14 portion. If you want to continue to rate him--if there's a

15 problem, I'll certainly let you know." You know, that kind of

16 conversation. So we left it as it was.

17 DC: Sir, could she see the FRAGO order?

18 DO: Sure.

19 DC: She's making comments on something that she's saying

20 from memory.

21 [The deposition recessed at 1738, 18 July 2004.]

1 [The deposition was called to order at 1756, 18 July 2004.]

2 **Questions by the deposition officer (continued):**

3 Q. You have now reviewed the specific FRAGO?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Does that refresh your recollection relative to what

6 was in your mind when you read that back when you were deployed?

7 A. It doesn't change it. I recalled it as being--before

8 Colonel Pappas was FRAGOed to do this, I tried to bring somebody

9 down there to establish a base--a planner cell and kind of serve

10 as the FOB commander for getting this thing organized since it

11 was declared an enduring camp. And I asked General Wodjakowski

12 for an O-6 to run Abu Ghraib as the FOB commander, because--

13 working with Colonel Pappas and he didn't want to give us people

14 to do the force protection piece and that kind of thing. He

15 said, "I don't have anybody to give you."

16 And I said, "I can't keep drilling into my brigade to

17 take people and put them out there."

18 So I wasn't completely surprised by this. But when I

19 saw the word "TACON" in there, I asked Colonel Pappas about it,

20 and he said that he had a question about it himself, and the

21 reason they weren't assigned to him, the units out there, is

22 because we were not assigned to CJTF7. But it was his

1 understanding that he had operational control--tactical control
2 of them.
3 Q. Even though that said TACON, you thought he had
4 operational control? Because there's a difference in the
5 terminology, here, as you well know.
6 A. Yes, sir. But he could define their work or their
7 assignments or use of them on force protection and those kinds
8 of things.
9 Q. On force protection? How about security of detainees?
10 A. He had that understanding.
11 Q. But what was your understanding about what Colonel
12 Pappas could do on what we referred to earlier as the warden or
13 jailer responsibilities after this FRAGO was issued?
14 A. I knew that he could not--it was my understanding, my
15 thought, that he could not change their work. I mean, he
16 couldn't take a warden out of a cellblock and say, "You're going
17 to be a driver of a vehicle," or, "You're going to be an
18 interrogator," but he could use them to do the detention
19 operations. If he thought they needed more MPs out on the
20 prison compounds--the general population compounds, then he
21 could go through the MP battalion, talk to [redacted] and say,
22 "I think that with all of the prisoners going out to the general

1 population compounds, you need to pull more people out of the
2 inside cell."
3 Q. What you're describing to me would be operational
4 control in my understanding of operational control and how the
5 Army normally operates and its usual definitions of those terms.
6 Whereas TACON, which is what the order says, tactical control,
7 would be that Colonel Pappas would give a specific mission to
8 [redacted] and then it would be up to
9 [redacted] to figure out how to do that with
10 his available forces.
11 A. Well, I would agree with you, sir. Only for the Iraqi
12 corrections--the detentions operations--the Iraqi criminals that
13 we were still holding out there. And there was not that many
14 anymore. There were all inside in the hard site in the
15 different cellblocks, and that wasn't Colonel Pappas' lane, and
16 he would give the mission to him, whatever it might be, as long
17 as it wasn't the Iraqi corrections or affecting the Iraqi
18 corrections officers that we had on site out there.
19 Q. Did you ever discuss this issue with [redacted]
20 [redacted] and see how his mindset changed after all of this?
21 A. Actually, I did.

1 Q. And what did [redacted] say?

2 A. He talked about how there was no disconnect--that him

3 and Colonel Pappas were meeting every day and they had these

4 updates in the morning, and he didn't notice any difficulties or

5 any questions, and I told him several times that the rating

6 scheme would still be in the 800th MP Brigade and the UCMJ and it

7 would--it would be less disruptive to all of the units out

8 there. I never got any indication from him that he was having

9 any problems with Colonel Pappas.

10 DC: And that's consistent with [redacted]

11 [redacted] told us when we talked to him. In fact, he told us

12 that he didn't perceive any day-to-day changes regarding his

13 warden responsibilities and that Colonel Pappas did not really

14 become involved with those warden responsibilities. The only

15 change that [redacted] saw was in the force protection

16 area, where there were changes relative to additional units

17 being assigned.

18 Q. So, do you have anything that would contradict what

19 [redacted] was telling us?

20 A. No, sir. And I still--and I continued to go out there.

21 I wasn't out there nearly as often as I had been before, but I

22 continued to go out there and continued to go--I mean, visit all

23 of the MPs, the units that were out there.

1 Q. Why was that? What changed in your mind that caused
2 you to go out there less often if, in fact, the warden
3 responsibilities remained the same? The force protection issues
4 changed and became Colonel Pappas' responsibilities. Were the
5 force protection issues your main reason for going out there
6 most of the time? I mean, why did you stop going there as
7 frequently?
8 A. Because I did not want to be disruptive to Colonel
9 Pappas' plan as the FOB commander. And I went out there a lot
10 prior to that transition because the FOB was still considered
11 our responsibility, and all of these contractors coming in, more
12 mortars every night, they were becoming more accurate, and the
13 force protection piece--that whole equation was primarily being
14 handled by the MPs.
15 Q. I know that you had discussions with General Sanchez at
16 various points in time relative to force protection of that
17 site. Can you tell me the first time you had a discussion with
18 General Sanchez on the force protection issues?
19 A. I went to him when the--there was an incident out at
20 Abu Ghraib in the August timeframe, and an RPG came in and hit--
21 or it was a--they didn't know if it was an RPG or an IED that
22 was on the ground, and the 5-ton that was out there drove over
23 it and it damaged the back of the vehicle and--there weren't any

1 soldiers that were injured, but hearing was affected. So I
2 talked to General Wodjakowski about it and told him that I
3 didn't--I know that they were telling me that the First Armored
4 Division was covering it with force protection, but I didn't see
5 it at any time that I was out there with one exception, and that
6 was around lunchtime, and they came onto the compound to eat
7 their MREs. That was the only time I saw any of their platforms
8 out there. And I told General Wodjakowski that I was scheduled
9 to brief General Sanchez on the timeline of the restoration of
10 the prisons, and I was going to mention that that was my number
11 one concern, that the force protection issue was more pronounced
12 out at Abu Ghraib because they had no effective comms out there,
13 and it was a big facility, and it was well known that on three
14 sides of the prison, the civilian population did not like us
15 being there. So I did brief him on that. That would have been
16 August. Then when we had the incident where the mortars came
17 over and killed those six prisoners, I talked to General
18 Wodjakowski immediately. Like I said, I'd hate to say it, but I
19 was almost pleading with him to get force protection platforms
20 on station out there. And then when the MI soldiers were
21 killed, General Sanchez came out to the prison, took a walk
22 around, just by the torture chambers and by the cellblocks, and

1 said--in the briefing, before he walked around on the grounds,
2 he said, "What is civil affairs doing?"
3 I said, sir, "The civil affairs soldiers have been told
4 by their commander not to leave Abu Ghraib, because it's too
5 dangerous outside of the wall."
6 He said, "Get the civil affairs commander on the
7 phone." I don't think he believed me. And he talked to [redacted]
8 [redacted] who--I mean, I could only hear General Sanchez's side of
9 the conversation, but it was very loud, and he was telling him,
10 "I don't care. I don't care. You get outside of the wall. You
11 get into the community. Do you understand me?" So, clearly
12 [redacted] had confirmed what we had been concerned about and he
13 said, "Okay. What else?" I mean, he came back and sat down
14 like nothing had ever happened and he said, "What else?" And,
15 "Where are your platforms?"
16 And I said, "Sir, we don't have them."
17 He said, "When did they get here?"
18 I said, "Sir, they don't stay here. They drive by, but
19 they don't stay on site."
20 So he tells his aid to get the brigade--whatever the
21 brigade commander's name was, on the phone. And again, another
22 one side of the conversation, of him telling him, "You have a
23 responsibility out here." So, he, at least it appeared that on

1 the telephone, he was acknowledging and confirming that we
2 didn't have the support that we needed. And then when we walked
3 around on the ground, he said to me, "If you don't get force
4 protection, you come to me." "You come to me."
5 Q. When was that?
6 A. That was when he visited after the MI soldiers were
7 killed.
8 Q. So that would have been after September 20th?
9 A. If that's the night that they were--that would be--
10 because he came the next day or two days later or whatever. And
11 then we had--about a week later, we had an MP and a sergeant
12 from the 82nd that were killed. And the soldiers are the ones
13 who said, "Maybe he wasn't even talking to anybody on that phone
14 when he was carrying on." Because they were encouraged that
15 General Sanchez was taking control of this and getting the
16 Armored Division to come out there.
17 Q. So after that conversation, which was after the MI
18 soldiers were killed and you had that conversation out there at
19 Abu Ghraib, correct? With the General?
20 A. Correct.

1 Q. And he told you if force protection issues continue,
2 for you to go to him. Force protection continued to be an
3 issue, did it not?
4 A. It continued to be an issue.
5 Q. Did you go to him?
6 A. I went to General Wodjakowski, and I told General
7 Wodjakowski, "I'm going to go to General Sanchez.
8 Q. And what did General Wodjakowski say?
9 A. "I'll talk to him about it."
10 And I said, "He told me at Abu Ghraib that if force
11 protection continued to be a problem to come to him. So I'm
12 going to go to him."
13 Q. Did you go to him?
14 A. I did.
15 Q. And when was the time that you went to him after that
16 conversation out at Abu Ghraib?
17 A. It had to be at least a week later.
18 Q. And was that at Victory that you went to him or was----
19 A. It was. It was in his office.
20 Q. And what occurred? What did you say?
21 A. I said, "Sir, you told me to come to you. Force
22 protection is continuing to be a problem."
23 He said, "They're out there on site."

1 I said, "No, sir. They are not." And he looked up at
2 me like--I mean like I was obviously lying to him. And I said,
3 "Sir, I don't have force protection--I don't have platforms out
4 there. The battalion doesn't--"
5 "I know what the battalion doesn't have."
6 Q. Did you have another conversation with him after that?
7 A. I had a conversation with him before he sent the 82nd--
8 General Swannack, the 82nd commander out there.
9 Q. When was that?
10 A. Sir, I believe that that was down at CPA.
11 Q. When?
12 A. After the conversation in his office that was----
13 Q. Give me, if you could, a timeframe, here. You were
14 talking to him probably some time in October? Because I'm just
15 taking the dates here: It was a few days after the 20th, then it
16 was the 22nd; then a few days or a week after that, then we're up
17 to the 27th, 29th--somewhere after that. So some days after that,
18 we're in to the first week in October?
19 A. We were in October.
20 Q. We were in October sometime? Okay.
21 A. And I told him that--I told him the same thing, that
22 the force protection--the platforms were there--the Bradleys

1 were there, but the only reason they came in to Abu Ghraib is
2 was if they stopped in to have lunch."
3 And he said, "You know, that was my division, and they
4 know the rules. And I'm not going to tell them how to--," he
5 used an expression. He said, "I'm not going to tell them how
6 to,"--"I'm not going to tell them how to suck eggs. You have
7 force protection."
8 I said, "Sir, I have snipers, who are people with
9 radios that are talking to the people firing the mortars, and
10 they have elevation. If it's on the bridge,----"
11 He said, "Securing your bridges and roads? Sounds like
12 a military police function to me."
13 I said, "Sir, it is. But it's not my MPs that are
14 doing that mission. I can't get the roads secured. I'm still
15 getting mortars."
16 He said, "We are taking care of you." He just was not
17 the kind of a person that you challenged repeatedly.
18 Q. So was that the last time you challenged him on that
19 subject?
20 A. And then the--General Swannack came out to Abu Ghraib.
21 Q. He was the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division?
22 A. Correct.

1 Q. Okay. And when did he come out?

2 A. He came out after the incident with the--it had to be

3 after the MI soldiers were killed, because the--he came out--I

4 met him at his helicopter. It was the first time I met him. He

5 took a look around. He said, "So, what platforms do you have

6 now?"

7 And I said, "We don't, sir."

8 And he said the same thing about being on a seam, that

9 they would go back to CJTF7 and tell them to push the seam out

10 so they were responsible for it, so that line was clear, and he

11 would put a platoon out there. And he said, "What do you have

12 now?"

13 And I told him the same thing: we had a 5-ton, that

14 was our largest vehicle, and a couple of buses to transport

15 prisoners, and a 50-cal that was loaned from the Marines.

16 He said--he looked around and he said, "They really,"

17 in very colorful language, "they really screwed you on this

18 mission." Then he hit me on the back and he said, "We're going

19 to take care of you." That afternoon, the platoon arrived. Two

20 days later, through a series of calls, I think through his--to

21 his company in the battalion, they sent the company out, and

22 then a counter-mortar battery. And it still didn't stop.

1 Q. And that would have been what timeframe, again, when
2 all of that occurred?
3 A. Late October.
4 Q. And that was before the change over of the FOB relative
5 to the security detainees and the force protection?
6 A. Correct. But it was after--I believe, it was after
7 they declared it an enduring camp. And General Wodjakowski told
8 me, when they declared it an enduring camp, "The reason we
9 haven't been able to take care of you or provide you any support
10 is because you're OPCON to us; you're not assigned to
11 headquarters. So we can't legitimately, according to my money
12 man, the bagman--we can't give you any funding for the things
13 you've been asking for."
14 Of course, that was several months later, but--so they
15 declared it an enduring camp, and I said, "It's only an interim
16 facility."
17 He said, "What does that mean? Two or three years?
18 I'll take that."
19 Q. And that changed the category of funding and authorized
20 funding and----
21 A. And amount of funding, and contracts, and how quickly
22 they could be exercised. But it also brought more contractors
23 out there.

1 Q. When the FRAGO was issued that changed the FOB
2 commander for force protection and for the security of
3 detainees, and we had our discussion relative to that, did you
4 believe that that had any impact on what was occurring or what
5 did occur relative to the abuses at Abu Ghraib?
6 WIT: Of--of making the MI brigade commander in charge?
7 Q. Yes. Did that have anything to do with the abuses?
8 A. Sir, I would say not directly. But I've always--more
9 information has come out about the instructions or the alleged
10 instruction from some of the interrogation team. In my own
11 mind, I thought that that was all in the works, and they wanted
12 to effectively remove General Karpinski from--not necessarily
13 from a blame line, but from direct knowledge. They wanted to--I
14 mean the intent was to reduce my requirements to be out there.
15 Q. You believe that's why the FRAGO was issued?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. I thought we had--you didn't think the FRAGO was issued
18 because of the force protection issues or the security
19 detainees?
20 A. No. I think that that was a benefit. It would be
21 difficult to release a FRAGO that says, "Transfer of the prison
22 responsibilities because the focus is going to be on

1 interrogation and some of those things might not sit well with
2 General Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade."
3 Q. So do you think that those abuses only started after
4 this FRAGO? When did the abuses start?
5 WIT: When did the photographs?
6 Q. When did the abuses start, at Abu Ghraib?
7 WIT: In terms of--maybe you need to tell me what you're
8 looking at as abuses.
9 DO: Abuses would be anything that we would consider an
10 actionable clause under the Geneva Convention or the UCMJ; a
11 violation of the rights and privileges of detainees. Any of the
12 usual mistreatment that we would consider: physical abuses,
13 humiliation, you know----
14 WIT: Okay. The acts that are depicted in those
15 photographs.
16 DO: Not only those acts. Well--some of those acts that
17 are depicted in those photographs are certainly abusive, but it
18 goes beyond what's depicted in those photographs. There are
19 abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib that go beyond those
20 pictures.

1 Q. So my question is, to your knowledge, when did the
2 abuses begin at Abu Ghraib?
3 A. The reason I'm asking is because the prisons in all of
4 the prison facilities were very austere. Logistics was not
5 working very well because of the long lines of supply. And the
6 problems associated with getting convoys and equipment to
7 Baghdad and then out from those operating bases. So there were
8 times when--when you keep prisoners under canvas, under tents,
9 in blistering heat, without any sense of relief where they can
10 get in under the shade of a tree or anything else, it is close
11 to being in violation of Geneva/Hague. And, often, we discussed
12 that with the ICRC. But they saw it consistently in all of our
13 facilities, and they knew that the soldiers were facing the same
14 conditions. So, I know that that was going on throughout the
15 theater for as long as we were there, because it was something
16 that--I don't want to say that it's a condition of war, but--it
17 is. But, the acts that were depicted in those photographs, I
18 don't believe that they were occurring anywhere else than in
19 cellblock 1A and B. And there were abuses early on down at
20 Bucca----
21 DO: Not--I'm really only referring to Abu Ghraib, now.
22 A. ----But I don't believe those activities or those
23 abuses were taking place until the interrogation operation

1 became so significant and the attention focused on the
2 interrogation operations.
3 Q. So, in regard to the calendar, when do you believe that
4 the abuses began?
5 A. When cellblock 1A went under the control of the
6 military intelligence, and when these other interrogation teams
7 started to come in and work the interrogation efforts. That
8 would be October.
9 DO: Well, it actually started in early September--I mean,
10 the actual 1A and 1B. MI started assigning people to 1A was
11 actually in September.
12 A. September. But there were some things that took place
13 gradually from September on, that made it, unfortunately,
14 easier, for them to do these things in exclusion from the rest
15 of the cellblock. They put up the exclusionary panels on the
16 doors, so you didn't have visual access, like you did in all of
17 the other cellblocks. And they----
18 Q. That was in 1A or 1B?
19 A. First in 1A and then in 1B.
20 Q. And who put those panels up?
21 A. The MI people said that they needed something put up.
22 They were going to talk to the engineers and that was the
23 engineers' design.

1 Q. Who were the MI people that----

2 A. Colonel Pappas.

3 Q. Colonel Pappas?

4 A. Yes. And the reason he did was because, you know that

5 door that you come in on that end of the cellblock, that was

6 where the Iraqi guards came in to work. And because those

7 particular prisoners in cellblock 1A and the juveniles and the

8 females in 1B, they didn't want the Iraqi corrections officers

9 to then become a source of information outside of the prison by

10 saying, "Hey, I saw [redacted] So--it's plausible.

11 Q. Yes. When did he order that? Was it after the Iraqi

12 shooting?

13 A. No. It was--they wanted the exclusionary panels, as

14 they called them, on the cell doors--they wanted those urgently

15 on 1A, so they put it there--they were in control of both 1A and

16 B, but they wanted it done in 1A, so that would have been the

17 first week of October timeframe. And then they got 'em to do

18 1B, but they put the plywood over the windows after the handgun

19 incident.

20 Q. Which would have been November 24th.

21 A. Right. So you have effectively excluded anybody that

22 would walk that long hallway, checking on guards or anything--it

23 wasn't that they wouldn't open the door for you, but you had to

1 announce by knocking that you were there and you wanted to come
2 in.
3 DC: I just want to point out, and I'm think she said, but
4 I just want to make sure it's clear, she had no personal
5 knowledge of any instructions that any of the MPs were given in
6 regards to interrogation techniques.
7 WIT: Right.
8 DO: Right. I did not perceive her as saying that, but I
9 understand your clarification.
10 Q. So, as far as the abuses, you don't have any direct
11 knowledge of the abuses, but you believe that the abuses began
12 somewhere in the September/October timeframe. Is that correct?
13 A. Correct. And I would say, most likely, late October,
14 because I had--I mean the 72nd MP Company had served there and
15 had run those cellblocks for many months, and the pictures that
16 I saw, anyway, were people--soldiers from the 372nd, and they
17 didn't get there until--or take over the operations until mid-
18 October.
19 [END OF PAGE]

1 Q. And the change of the FOB that we discussed was
2 November 19th. So the abused began before that and continued on
3 after that?
4 A. I think it was a gradual increase on what was being
5 done or how they being used to enhance the interrogation
6 efforts.
7 Q. Are you of the belief that it significantly increased
8 after the FOB command was changed?
9 A. I am of that belief, now. Yes, sir.
10 Q. What leads you to believe that?
11 A. There was a battalion out there that was--it may or may
12 not be in this FRAGO as well, but the LRRSD battalion was sent
13 out there--now they were a subordinate unit of the 205th anyway,
14 but they were at a different--I think they were up at Anaconda.
15 So they got down there and they were kind of, generally, they
16 were a little bit more aggressive and adventurous--more creative
17 with what they did. And they caused some problems. Now, I have
18 no knowledge that they were ever in the cellblocks or anything,
19 but it was that whole shift in mentality that they were doing
20 some of the force protection and--.
21 Q. Yeah. That LRRSD--was it a company or a battalion?
22 A. It was a battalion.
23 DO: To my knowledge, they never----

1 RC: They had a company, sir. They had a company of the
2 LRRSD.
3 DO: Okay. Well, that unit, to my knowledge, never had
4 anything to do with interrogation operations.
5 WIT: No. But it's the whole shift in--you know, they eat
6 in the same mess hall, and--it just seemed to be more reckless
7 out there.
8 Q. Since this changeover?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 DC: This is only of her opinion, sir, which is----
11 DO: Yes, I understand. But I'm trying to get at the logic
12 behind the opinion based on which facts, because the facts are
13 really what I'm trying to get at.
14 DC: Yes, sir.
15 DO: There's opinion and then there's opinion based on
16 facts, and what I'm really trying to find out is the facts. So,
17 you're of the opinion that things started getting worse after
18 the change of the FOB. And I'm just trying to find out what
19 makes you think that, because you knew there was abuse before
20 and there was abuse after.
21 Q. What made you think it got worse?
22 A. Well, first off, I didn't--and [redacted] is correct.
23 I didn't have any indication that it was bad, let alne to know

1 that it got worse. At the time, there was this prevailing
2 change out at Abu Ghraib after the switch to Colonel Pappas'
3 control as the FOB commander. Number one, there was more people
4 out there. There was a direction from the CJTF7 staff--we were-
5 -they were trying to close Bucca, and they were trying to get as
6 many of the detainees out of the division holding areas as
7 possible, because some of them had populations of several
8 hundred. I think there was seven hundred up in the 4th ID at one
9 point. And those are definitely austere and temporary
10 conditions, but they were transferring those prisoners, and then
11 we were overfilled. And one night the 101st brought some
12 prisoners in, flew them down, and they wouldn't take them
13 because they had nowhere to put them. They were sent back. So
14 we got that sorted out, but what [redacted] [phonetic],
15 the Provo Marshal, and the liaison of the CJTF7 staff was saying
16 was, literally, "Cram more tents into the compounds, ma'am."
17 So, I said, "No. I'm not going to cram more tents into
18 the compound. The secret here is getting these people released,
19 and we're holding innocent people out there."
20 And General Wodjakowski turned around and said to me,
21 "I don't care if we're holding 15,000 innocent civilians! We're
22 winning the war!"
23 I said, "Not inside the wire, you're not, sir."

1 RC: Ma'am, when is this timeframe? I'm sorry, because we
2 were talking about the LRZ [sic], which is sometime after
3 November 19th, and then you started talking about closing Bucca,
4 and that was occurring sometime in August----
5 WIT: Well, no. We were starting to close Bucca in August.
6 We were shifting towards closing some of the compounds. We
7 never closed Bucca.
8 RC: Right. But as I recall from officers who were
9 stationed in Bucca and came over to Abu Ghraib, they brought
10 their prisoners that they wanted to bring over to Abu Ghraib in
11 September with them. And that was [redacted] [phonetic] and
12 the rest of the folks that were there, said that we need these
13 prisoners to be transferred over to Abu Ghraib and the rest--
14 that they----
15 WIT: That was--they brought prisoners to Abu Ghraib that
16 were going to be interrogated further. But they didn't transfer
17 prisoners that were being held as regular prisoners at Bucca.
18 We were trying, over time, to close--we were moving towards
19 closing Bucca because we didn't have a replacement battalion
20 coming in, nor did the rotational brigades, to replace the
21 battalions down at Bucca. So, if they transferred specific
22 prisoners from Bucca in August, it was because the interrogation
23 teams were moving up to Abu Ghraib. They were no longer going

1 to be at Bucca. But from a detention perspective, not
2 interrogation, but from a detention perspective, that was on the
3 timeline that we would close--move towards closing Bucca. And
4 we did not--we never closed Bucca. We were getting close and
5 then they said to keep it open, and that was part of the
6 problem. CJTF7 was--I mean they were getting conversation and
7 complaints from the division commander that there was no--and
8 Bucca was too far away for them to take prisoners, so this was--
9 I mean, that's what I'm talking about: this prevailing attitude
10 change out at Abu Ghraib after the 19th of November.
11 Q. Okay. I hear you say that, but I have a hard time
12 dealing with what factual basis you have to say that, in fact,
13 there was a difference in prevailing attitude. Because, there
14 abuses before and there were abuses after. What causes you to
15 believe that things got worse? Because I haven't found it. I
16 haven't seen anything--I haven't seen any evidence of things
17 getting worse. Bad is bad.
18 A. But I can tell you, sir, that I didn't know it was bad.
19 The conditions were bad. And when you put more prisoners into
20 bad conditions, conditions get worse.
21 Q. I'm just referring to the abuses----
22 A. But I didn't know there was any abuse. So I can't tell
23 you what I thought--"Well, it was bad now, and how in the world

1 did it get worse?" With the information that's come out since
2 then, in all of the statements and the reports--I can't say the
3 Taguba report, because he made no reference to--really, to their
4 involvement except made a couple of recommendations. But when I
5 saw the pictures, for example, in January, I said, you know, the
6 72nd left in October, and they had a consistently good track
7 record and wide-open communications with me, and we were in
8 control of that facility like every other detention operation.
9 So, I was shocked by the photos, but I didn't see them until
10 January, and I was trying to figure out what happened to make
11 them lose their minds, and not only commit these acts, but take
12 pictures of themselves committing them. I don't think I've
13 resolved that completely, but I can't suggest to you it was bad
14 and what made it change to worse, because I didn't have any
15 knowledge that it was bad, let alone that it was changing to
16 worse. I'm talking about the whole environment out there: this
17 prevailing attitude of--what I sensed on Christmas day when I
18 was out there was a recklessness with the direction that the
19 interrogation teams were going, and this battalion that was
20 doing the capabilities demonstration and antagonizing the
21 prisoners by hovering over their compounds and blowing the tents
22 out of the way. And meanwhile, Colonel Pappas being concerned

1 about MPs saluting him when he was inside the wire. And I
2 talked to him about that. I talked to him about my concerns.
3 Q. And I'd like to go into the--into what you're referring
4 to, relative to the helicopters and the demonstration. I'm just
5 having a difficult time relating what you're saying to the
6 specific incidents of specific abuse of detainees and what
7 specific information you have that would lead you to say that
8 things--relative to that issue; not about their conditions,
9 their living conditions, or the helicopter demonstration; but
10 those specifics relative to the abuse of detainees: the
11 hitting, the kicking, the stripping, the humiliation, the use of
12 dogs, all of those types of things. What makes you say that you
13 think it got worse after than it was before?
14 A. I can't say that I know that.
15 DO: Alright. Alright. You've answered the question.
16 [The deposition recessed at 1834, 18 July 2004.]
17 [The deposition was called to order at 1836, 18 July 2004.]
18 **Questions by the deposition officer (continued):**
19 Q. We were talking about the helicopter incident and the
20 demonstration. Could you tell me what was the circumstances
21 surrounding that?
22 WIT: Do you want me to make a comment about what we were
23 talking about beforehand, first?

1 DO: I don't need any, but if you want to, you certainly
2 can.
3 WIT: I just wanted to make the comment that when I did see
4 the photographs, I did ask the CID commander when these took
5 place and he said that they believed that they took place in
6 November. There were some date stamps on some of the film, but
7 they found out that that was earlier at an earlier assignment,
8 and that was October, but the date stamps on a lot of the
9 pictures that were widely published was the end of November.
10 DO: Okay. And you understand we've done quite an
11 extensive investigation well beyond that.
12 DO: Well, we--we assume that you have.
13 Q. So, anyway, if we could--could you tell me about the
14 helicopter?
15 A. It was on Christmas day. We went out to Abu Ghraib to
16 visit the MPs out there. We--the group that was the "we" was
17 the acting command sergeant major, [redacted] and
18 my--well, my battle captain, [redacted] (phonetic),
19 she's now a major, and my driver--my aid and driver team. And
20 when we got out of the vehicle, it was about 9 o'clock or 9:30
21 in the morning. And I saw these soldiers getting ready to go--I
22 looked like they were on a range rover or something. I said,
23 "What are you guys doing?"

1 They said, "We're going to do a capabilities
2 demonstration. We just got done with the rehearsal on the
3 ground, and we're going to rehearse again."
4 I said, "What time is it going to be?"
5 They said, "Twelve o'clock. We just wanted the
6 prisoners to know that we have helicopters and we're very quick
7 to respond in case they have any ideas consistent with some
8 rumors about rioting or attempted breakout. So we just want to
9 reinforce our capabilities."
10 So, I said, "Well, I'll be here. I'll make sure that I
11 see you." So, I was.
12 I walked through all of the units and several of the
13 living areas. I went out of the compound. I had been through
14 most of the compound, so I was up in the towers. I could hear
15 the helicopters coming. They told me, when I saw them outside
16 when we first got there, that they were going to be--they had
17 the spot marked over by the wall. So they came in over the
18 tents and one helicopter went right to the mark by the wall.
19 The other helicopter hovered over a compound, and it blew three
20 of the tents all over the place. Now, there had been a lot of
21 rain, so there was water--that particular day, it was beautiful:
22 sunny, blue sky, but there was a lot of standing water in the
23 compounds because, you know, the ground doesn't drain that well.

1 So these prisoners--all of their clothes were going flying all
2 over the place, and, of course, landing in the water. And then
3 he moved--it doesn't take long to screw with the prisoners along
4 their way, and they moved back over to the wall, and they did
5 their repel, and it was a successful operation.
6 So I called Colonel Pappas and I said, "I don't
7 appreciate this." You know, I had told him what had happened.
8 And he said, "Well, I'm sure they didn't do it
9 intentionally."
10 And I said, "Well, I'm sure they did. And it's the MPs
11 that have to deal with the aftermath of that kind of screwing
12 around, and they have to be told the fallout is more dangerous
13 than their toying with the detainees."
14 And Colonel Pappas did come and see me the next day or
15 called me or whatever it was--I think I saw him over at CJTF7,
16 actually, and he said to me that he spoke the battalion
17 commander and he said that he just missed the mark somehow. He
18 didn't--he made some mistake.
19 And I said, "Well, yeah, following that other
20 helicopter was really difficult to do, I guess. He managed to
21 do it after the fact." And I said, "You know, you have to deal
22 with it. You're going to have a riot on your hands next time.

1 The detainees were only behaving because they knew it was a
2 holiday for the U.S."
3 He said, "Okay, ma'am. I'll make sure that it doesn't
4 happen again." And that was the end of it.
5 Q. The ICRC visit that has gained so much notoriety--I
6 believe that happened in October?
7 A. It did.
8 Q. When was the first time that you became aware of that
9 ICRC visit?
10 A. When I saw the report, and that would have been the
11 last day of November or the first or second of December.
12 Q. So when the ICRC showed up, my understanding, from
13 talking to [redacted] and
14 others-[redacted] they showed up and the representatives
15 from the ICRC found naked detainees in their cells and then were
16 told all of these other allegations that I think you're now
17 aware of. That happened in October, yet you did not know about
18 it until the report came in in November?
19 A. Right.
20 Q. Why didn't [redacted] call you about that?
21 A. [redacted] was with, as they would
22 traditionally be--the battalion commanders would escort the ICRC
23 representatives or team around, and he was with the people when

1 they were looking at the compounds outside--the general
2 population compounds. And I believe [redacted] ay have been
3 with him as well. And then they said [redacted]
4 [redacted]
5 [redacted]
6 [redacted]
7 [redacted]
8 [redacted]
9 [redacted]
10 [redacted]
11 [redacted]
12 [redacted]
13 Q. Well, I was following you up until [redacted]
14 [redacted]
15 [redacted]
16 [redacted]
17 [redacted]
18 [redacted]
19 [redacted]
20 [redacted]
21 [redacted]
22 [redacted]
23 [redacted]

1 [redacted]
2 [redacted]
3 [redacted]
4 [redacted]
5 [redacted]
6 [redacted]
7 [redacted]
8 [redacted]
9 [redacted]
10 [redacted]
11 [redacted]
12 [redacted]
13 [redacted]
14 [redacted]
15 [redacted]
16 [redacted]
17 [redacted]
18 [redacted]
19 Q. All of that information you just gave to me, you didn't
20 learn until after November?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. And you learned that from speaking with----
23 A. [redacted]

1 Q. - [redacted]

2 A. Right.

3 Q. After November?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. But when it first happened in October, my question is

6 why didn't [redacted] pick up the phone and

7 call you about it?

8 A. Well, you know, sir, he told me that the ICRC was

9 coming out to Abu Ghraib, because that was the standard

10 procedure. And when he escorted them in the outside compounds,

11 [redacted]

12

13

14

15

16

17 Q. He never mentioned all of that stuff about the

18 [redacted]

19 A. No, sir. And I don't know, and [redacted]

20

21

22

23

1 Q. Well, the reason for our questions is because

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 A. [redacted]

7 Q. ---[redacted] Then [redacted] came down

8 to the cellblock. But you didn't know any of that, and I'm

9 wondering why your battalion commander didn't----

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. ----talk to you about it. Why didn't he call you and

12 tell you if this was an unusual incident?

13 A. It was. And I'm surprised, because, again--I'm

14 referencing the ICRC report, and there was no reference to

15 [redacted] being in cellblock----

16 Q. Did you ever talk, afterwards, to [redacted]

17 [redacted] about the ICRC visit?

18 A. When we were putting the response together--or the

19 first or second draft, I didn't talk to him, but they were out

20 at Abu Ghraib. "They" being my JAG officers. They were out at

21 Abu Ghraib for this meeting on how they were going to word their

22 response. And they talked to [redacted] briefly. And

1 he told them he--know, [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 DC: We had worked under the assumption tha[redacted]

4 [redacted] wasn't aware. So, you're telling us something we

5 didn't know.

6 DO: Yes. I'm finding that out, now. It's just surprising

7 to me.

8 DC: Well, it surprises me, too, sir.

9 DO: Which is why I've asked these questions. Because it

10 wasn't a small incident in [redacted] mind.

11 So therefor----

12 WIT: Why didn't--well, you don't know, certainly. My

13 question is, "Why didn't he call me?"

14 DO: Yeah. That's my question as well. I don't know why

15 he didn't call you.

16 WIT: In October, he did not have a--I don't think [redacted]

17 [redacted] [phonetic] was out there yet.

18 DC: Sir, were you aware of the problems that [redacted]

19 [redacted] was undergoing?

20 DO: Only what I read in the General Taguba reports,

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted]---

1 WIT: Well, [redacted] But, you know, sir, I
2 didn't that on the fly, either. [redacted]
3 [redacted]
4 [redacted]
5 [redacted]
6 [redacted]
7 [redacted]
8 [redacted]
9 [redacted]
10 [redacted]
11 [redacted]
12 [redacted]
13 [redacted]
14 [redacted]
15 [redacted]
16 [redacted]
17 [redacted]
18 [redacted]
19 [redacted]
20 [redacted]
21 [redacted]
22 [redacted]
23 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 Q. And this was the time period, that you're referring to

11 now, with [redacted] that you actually

12 brought in [redacted] as I recall, on a temporary

13 basis to command at Abu Ghraib?

14 A. Right.

15 Q. How long was he at Abu Ghraib?

16 A. Probably ten days. He might have stayed a couple of

17 days longer, even after [redacted] got back, because he was

18 helping with the base defense plan. He was the commander of the

19 battalion over at Cropper, and Cropper had already closed down.

20 The HVD facility was the only thing that was operational, and he

21 had a full battalion, so--. And they were getting ready to

22 transfer back to the United States.

1 But, now we get the ICRC report, [redacted]

2 has taken place, I see the report at this in-prompt-two--it

3 wasn't even a meeting. It was after SUU, I was sitting there

4 getting ready to leave, "Oh, ma'am, can we talk about ICRC

5 report?"

6 "What ICRC report are you talking about?"

7 Q. [redacted] has told us--testified to us

8 that he talked to you about the ICRC visit the Sunday after it

9 occurred. Do you remember having that conversation with

10 [redacted]

11 A. No, sir. If [redacted] had had a conversation with

12 me--about the ICRC visit out at Abu Ghraib?

13 DO: That's what he testified to.

14 WIT: I would have recalled that. No, sir. I don't recall

15 that at all.

16 DO: Okay. That's what he told us. He testified that, in

17 fact, he did have a conversation with you and he informed you

18 about the ICRC visit, before the report was written, after the

19 visit, and what occurred at that----

20 WIT: [redacted]

21 DO: About the entire incidents as they occurred--I can't

22 remember specifically what it was that he said he told you, but

23 it was the essence of what occurred at the ICRC.

1 Q. But you don't remember any conversation with [redacted]

2 [redacted] on that subject?

3 A. And he, when he was at Cropper, he would make sure that

4 he--reliably, when an ICRC visit came there, he would call me

5 and tell me the good, the bad, and the ugly, and then I'd wait

6 for the report.

7 Q. When you were informed about the visit, which was the

8 receipt of the report, there was a response that was prepared.

9 Could you tell me how that response was prepared?

10 A. Yes, sir. And I have to tell you that I didn't receive

11 the report through the normal channels.

12 Q. How did you receive the report?

13 A. After the update that I was attending, I was getting

14 ready to leave, and then--Colonel Pappas was there, [redacted]

15 [redacted] was there, [redacted] was there, [redacted] was

16 there, I believe, and they said, "Ma'am, can we talk about the

17 ICRC report?"

18 I said, "What ICRC report are you talking about?"

19 They said--the [redacted] jumped right in. He

20 said, "Ma'am, we're already working on the response. We'll have

21 it ready for your review before your----"

22 I said, "What, the prison transfers--" I said to

23 [redacted] who was sitting right next to me, I said, "It

1 figures, the prison transfer that's under your responsibility,
2 and now you have a whole team of people writing the response.
3 It was usually my battalion commander and my JAG officer doing
4 the response for me. Things changed." And I said, "I haven't
5 even seen the report."
6 [redacted] said, "I have a copy right here for
7 you."
8 And I said, "Where did this come from?" I started to
9 read it, just glancing through it, and I turned back and I said,
10 "Where has this thing been?" Because it talked about October.
11 "Well, we received it."
12 And I said, "Well, why are you talking to me about it?"
13 And [redacted] said, "Ma'am, we're working on the
14 response. The prison was under your control at the time that
15 this report--this team came in. And rather than explain that
16 we've transferred the control of the prison, now, we just want
17 you to be able to sign the report."
18 So, when I went back to the TOC--I shouldn't have
19 jumped ahead that way. Because I read the remark, I said to
20 them, [redacted]
21 [redacted]
22 And [redacted] said to me, "Ma'am, I told the
23 commander not to [redacted]

1 [redacted] And they

2 all laughed.

3 And I said, "You know, I don't think that [redacted]

4 [redacted] And I said, "What

5 about [redacted]

6 Again, plausible response. Jumped right in there and

7 said--I don't know if it was [redacted] or [redacted] but

8 the response was, [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 [redacted]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 [redacted]

15 [redacted]

16 [redacted]"

17 So, I mean, I don't know how interrogation teams work.

18 I know more now than I did then, but it wasn't my lane. I hate

19 to say that, but--but I know that they kept them in isolation

20 and I didn't count the days. [redacted]

21 [redacted]

1 Q. Is there a difference between isolation and
2 segregation?
3 A. There is.
4 Q. What is the difference between isolation and
5 segregation?
6 A. In segregation, you segregate the prisoner, but they
7 can still have access or visual--they might be in a cell with
8 cell bars on the door, and they can still talk or communicate in
9 whatever way, but they are segregated. In isolation, the
10 isolation cells have solid doors with a small window--I think it
11 was a flip-down window, and that's where they were isolated.
12 Q. And what was occurring in 1A and 1B? Was it
13 segregation or isolation?
14 A. That was where the isolation cells were, but
15 occasionally they would segregate a detainee as well, in a
16 separate facility--segregate them from maybe a brother or
17 somebody they brought in with them--put distance between them.
18 Q. So was the intent really to use 1A and 1B, from the
19 military intelligence aspect, not the females or the juveniles--
20 was the intent there to use them as isolation cells?
21 A. In 1A, yes, sir. It was. And, they also--that reminds
22 me. They also said in the response how this was a distortion of
23 the truth. They said, "You know, ma'am, isolation is the same

1 no matter if you're a security detainee or a regular criminal.
2 You get value out of the isolation process. So if the ICRC
3 wants unrestricted access and feel that they should be able to
4 drop in on any of these [redacted]
5 [redacted]
6 [redacted]
7 Q. Who was doing the background information on the
8 response, if you know? Who was actually going and checking to
9 see if there was accuracy to the ICRC statements or not, and
10 verifying that these were the right things to say in the
11 response?
12 A. They relied very heavily on the 205th-[redacted]
13 [redacted] But the team that [redacted]
14 put together with his JAG officers, and both of my JAG officers
15 went out there and participated in that, that was out at Abu
16 Ghraib in the magistrate cell out there. So they wanted to be
17 on the ground in case there was any questions about what
18 isolation cells looked like or whatever.
19 Q. Did your JAG officers participate in that background
20 information before the response was written?
21 A. They did.
22 Q. Did they ever come to you and talk to you specifically
23 about any of the findings about, you know, [redacted]

1 [redacted] Or did they come back and say--not just them, but
2 the whole team, "We looked into it, ma'am, [redacted]
3 [redacted]
4 A. No, sir. The opposite. They came back and said to me-
5 [redacted]
6 [redacted]
7 [redacted]
8 [redacted]
9 [redacted]
10 [redacted]
11 [redacted]
12 [redacted]
13 [redacted]
14 [redacted]
15 [redacted]
16 [redacted]
17 [redacted]
18 [redacted]
19 Q. Did any of those officers that you just named mention
20 to you--come to you and say that we have--"We have verified
21 abuses that have occurred?"
22 A. No, sir.

1 Q. It was the opposite?

2 A. It was.--Not that it was the opposite, but they weren't

3 focusing on----

4 Q. They weren't focusing on that?

5 A. Right. Because they had Colonel Pappas, and I think

6 they said [redacted] sitting in with them explaining how

7 [redacted]

8 [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 Q. How about other government agencies? What do you know

12 about other government agencies involved in Abu Ghraib?

13 WIT: Do you want me to transport myself back to then--what

14 I knew about other government agencies then?

15 DO: Yes.

16 A. The first time I was introduced to an OGA was out at

17 Abu Ghraib. They brought out a detainee that was not an HVD,

18 but they had interrogated him at a separate facility. Not one

19 of my facilities, but over at the task force and of no further

20 intel value, but they still wanted to hold him, so they turned

21 him over to us. And they come out in these SUV's, and none of

22 them had uniforms on. They all had their black shirts or khakis

23 or whatever, and you just know they're different. It could be

1 something to do with the armament all over themselves and their
2 vehicles, but they were very professional. They made sure that
3 the prisoner was handled correctly. I watched them. He had
4 flexi-cuffs on him, and they--they cut them, and made sure that--
5 -you know, they asked him in Arabic if his arms were okay. And
6 they introduced themselves--three of them did anyway. And they
7 said that they were with the task force. I said, "What are you
8 bringing him here for?"
9 And he said, "Well, we need somebody to detain him, but
10 we're pretty much finished with any kind of exploitable
11 information."
12 They were very professional, but they all identified
13 themselves as CGA. So, I asked the--I think I asked [redacted]
14 [redacted] [phonetic], my security guy, [redacted]
15 [redacted]
16 [redacted]
17 [redacted]
18 I never had a bad encounter with them. Every time I
19 saw them--one time they brought somebody out, and they got him
20 to the ground, then they took the bag off of his head--it was a
21 sandbag, you know. But, you know, they treated them, as I would
22 expect somebody to treat them. I never saw bruises, blood,

1 broken arms. I seem to recall a prisoner one time that had a
2 gunshot wound, but it had been treated, and it was wrapped.
3 Q. Were you aware that the OGA mostly was [redacted]
4 detainees to Abu Ghraib and not going through the normal
5 inprocessing procedures, creating what was known out there as
6 "the ghost detainees?" Were you aware of all of that?
7 A. I only became aware of it one time, and I addressed it
8 immediately. They brought a detainee out to Abu Ghraib, and
9 [redacted] is the one who called the operations center from
10 out at Abu Ghraib. He said, "OGA is here. They want to drop
11 this prisoner off, and he's beat up really bad. They said that
12 he was caught in the crossfire. There doesn't seem to be any
13 bullet wounds, but he's really black and blue and everything,
14 and they want to leave him here. And I don't want to take him.
15 I want them to take him." And it was a matter of three phone
16 calls, and they took him away. They got him medical attention
17 and then they released him. I don't know, two days later, 24
18 hours later, whatever it was. But he was cleaned up, and then
19 they brought him back out. But bringing prisoners out and
20 hiding them? No.
21 But we did get a FRAGO one time that told us
22 specifically to hide a prisoner--or to not register him and to

1 not allow the ICRC to see him, to know he was there, to move him
2 around if we were going to get a visit from the ICRC.
3 Q. Was that prisoner detained at Abu Ghraib?
4 A. No, sir. He was detained at Cropper.
5 Q. At Abu Ghraib, did you ever get any such order?
6 A. To hide prisoners out at Abu Ghraib? No, sir.
7 Q. But at Abu Ghraib--well, were you aware at Abu Ghraib,
8 that, in fact, OGA were bringing out detainees and leaving them,
9 and they were being detained there without being put through the
10 normal inprocessing?
11 A. Who was telling them to--were they saying don't process
12 this guy? Is that what the story was? I do know, now, that we
13 had some third country nationals down at Bucca. There were
14 three Saudi's that were down there. And, I mean, we had others.
15 We had [redacted] we had [redacted] but when prisoners were transferred
16 from Bucca up to Abu Ghraib in an attempt to close Bucca down,
17 eventually, they--the prisoners that left Abu--that left Bucca
18 to be transferred, were all processed out of--what was in place
19 at the time was BAT [phonetic] system. They processed them out
20 of the database, and they sent a record up to Abu Ghraib. Now,
21 if it was a large transfer: 150, 120, whatever the number was;
22 they would give them a roster or--the database was maintained
23 down at Bucca, so they would coordinate by saying, you know,

1 you'll see them show up on the roster tomorrow, so you don't
2 have to inprocess them when they get there. If the prisoners
3 were under the control of the MPs the whole time, it just saved
4 time. And, apparently, they included three Saudis in that one
5 transfer, and they were never inprocessed or in any database
6 down at Bucca or up at Abu Ghraib as a result of how that was--
7 that particular transfer was done. But I didn't know about it
8 at the time.
9 Q. So, at the time, you didn't know that that was
10 occurring?
11 A. No, sir.
12 Q. None of your MP--none of your--your battalion commander
13 or [redacted] or any of those people brought that to your
14 attention that that was occurring?
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. You made frequent visits out there. Did you look at
17 their board of how they accounted for detainees?
18 A. And went through the processing line.
19 Q. And went through the processing line?
20 A. Absolutely.
21 Q. Did you not ever see the board listing of OGA's just by
22 numbers?
23 A. No, sir. Never.

1 Q. You weren't aware that the MPs were keeping that
2 account for 1A and 1B--they were accounting for how many OGA
3 ghost detainees there were in place at any one point in time?
4 A. I was not aware of that, and it never showed up on the
5 detainee report.
6 DO: No. It wouldn't, because--they were ghosts.
7 WIT: But they never told me that they were holding
8 unknowns out there.
9 Q. Do you know anything about the death of the OGA ghost
10 detainee at Abu Ghraib?
11 A. The only thing I know is what I heard afterwards.
12 Q. When that occurred and the death occurred, did anyone
13 from your MP command call you and tell you about that?
14 A. I'm trying not confuse what I know that [redacted]
15 now is alleging, but----
16 Q. I'm talking about what happened while you were there,
17 before all of this has now come out.
18 A. They brought a detainee to the gate one night, and the
19 MPs refused them entrance. They called over to the TOC and
20 spoke to [redacted] who got [redacted] and the
21 detainee that they were refusing entrance to was already
22 deceased. But they refused to take him, and they left with him.
23 But the one that was inside? No.

1 DO: I think we're getting close to the end of--

2 Q. When did you first become aware of the abuses at Abu

3 Ghraib?

4 A. On the 13th of January.

5 Q. And how did that occur?

6 A. I was up at the MEK compound coming back from a meeting

7 late at night. It was after twenty-three hundred. I opened my

8 email, and my SIDPER. There was an email from [redacted]

9 so that was an unusual email, so I opened it up. It said,

10 "Ma'am, I just want you to know I'm going in to brief General

11 Sanchez on the progress of the investigation out at Abu Ghraib.

12 This is the allegation of detainee abuse and the photographs."--

13 --

14 DC: Just to clarify, sir, she did already know about the

15 ICRC report.

16 DO: Yes.

17 DC: However, she did not view that as abuse.

18 DO: Yes.

19 DC: The reasons have already been explained.

20 DO: I understand.

21 A. ----And I sent him one line back. I said, "I don't

22 know what to say."

1 And the next day I went down to Abu Ghraib. We were an
2 hour and about forty minutes away. We went down to Abu Ghraib,
3 went out to the prison, and of course, all of the primary
4 players were all out of their positions, so I talked to the
5 "second string" that was in there, and--"What's going on out
6 here?"
7 And the NCO said to me, "Well, ma'am, what I'm doing
8 right now is rewriting all of the SOPs, because they took all of
9 ours, so we don't have any references or anything, and I don't
10 even have a sign-out sheet, so I'm not letting any prisoners go
11 out."
12 And I said, "Why were they suspended from their jobs?"
13 And he said, "Well, somebody said that there was some
14 prisoner abuse."
15 I said, "I'm not, you know, I didn't read your rights
16 or anything. I'm just trying to figure out where to start in
17 all of this."
18 And he said, "Ma'am, I don't know any more than what
19 I'm telling you. They told us that we were coming over here to
20 work. They asked us not to discuss it with anybody. Do not
21 speculate. And to go back in to detention operations, and
22 that's what we're doing."

1 So I said, "Let me have a look at the books. What
2 procedures are you following now? If somebody wants to come and
3 get a prisoner, what do you do? And if the MI want to take
4 somebody out for interrogation," those kind of things.
5 And went over to the operations center, to the TOC, and
6 people were not--I mean it was--I think there was a lot of
7 rumors flying around. Some were saying that they heard there
8 was going to be a health and welfare, and, I mean, you could
9 hear all of that rumbling.
10 I left, tried to put some of this together, asked in
11 the cps center, you know, "Give me when the units arrived out at
12 Abu Ghraib, who was out there, who had been working in the
13 different cell blocks," and they were asking what was going on,
14 and some people were suspended out there. Did I know anything?
15 And I said, "I know some things, but I don't want to talk about
16 it yet, because a few details is dangerous, and just get me some
17 information." They did, and then [redacted] came out to
18 the TOC--my TOC, on the 23rd of January, and showed me the
19 pictures. And, whatever I could have imagined on the 13th when I
20 read that email, I never imagined what I saw in those
21 photographs. Not even a worst-case scenario. And I looked at
22 about three of them, and I couldn't look at them anymore. And

1 he insisted that I had to look at them, because I had to get the
2 full picture. But it really made me sick.
3 I went over to see General Sanchez and I told him that
4 I had seen the pictures and I would make a statement. I had a
5 lot of credibility in the Middle East, and I--from working with
6 the Iraqis as closely as we were, I thought that it was
7 important. And I would make the statement in Arabic, in
8 English, and he said, "No. Absolutely not. And if you have any
9 inquiries, you direct them to [redacted] And he never
10 spoke to me about--other than that. He took the letter that he
11 had written and put his hand on it like this (making a gesture
12 with her right hand) and turned it around and pushed it that way
13 (gesturing away from herself).
14 Q. Why do you think the individuals that were involved
15 took the photos?
16 A. When I first saw the photographs, I couldn't imagine
17 why. I mean, when I first saw them and I saw that they were
18 MPs--except that I said--I had a question about [redacted] and one
19 of the other male soldiers. But I was particularly offended by
20 the expressions on their faces, [redacted] with
21 their thumbs up. I was just offended by that. I said, "What--
22 what makes somebody do that?" You commit a crime and then make
23 sure you capture it in a photograph to make sure that people

1 know you were involved in it! But I think, now, that these
2 were--for lack of a better expression right now, souvenir
3 photos. And I--I mean that--they understood that photographing
4 prisoners was not acceptable, and I know they understood that,
5 because whenever we had congressional delegations or visitors
6 out there, they were very quick to say, no photographs.
7 Q. Weren't there signs?
8 A. Posted everywhere. And the Geneva/Hague was posted
9 everywhere, and given to the prisoners in their language. So
10 they knew. But if there was somebody directing--setting up
11 photographs for official purposes, the official purpose being
12 use during interrogation, it would be very tempting--obviously
13 they gave in to the temptation, to slip one of those digital
14 cameras out of a pocket and start taking pictures. And when--
15 when one of them got away with two or three of them without
16 being stopped by the official photographer or that team, then
17 twenty or thirty seemed like a great idea.
18 Q. Do you have any information about this official team
19 that you're referring to? That you know that there was any such
20 official team?
21 A. No, sir.
22 Q. That's speculation on your part?
23 A. Pure speculation.

1 DC: Hearsay.

2 DO: Who's the hearsay from?

3 DC: We've heard from some of the people that have been

4 accused.

5 DO: Who have you heard from?

6 DC: Their attorneys.

7 DO: Their attorneys told you that there were official

8 photographs?

9 WIT: That the photographs were intended to be used for

10 interrogation. New arrivals.

11 DC: I don't know if "official" is the right word, but we

12 had been told that----

13 DO: That they were taking, as opposed to another team of

14 MI personnel or other personnel?

15 DC: Let me clarify. The clarification is that we have

16 been told that there were photographs being taken for

17 interrogation purposes. I can't tell you that any of these

18 soldiers were directed to take photographs for interrogation

19 purposes. That I do not know. Nor do I know what the truth of

20 the statement that we just made. Only that we had been told

21 that there was--there was an official purpose behind taking

22 photographs for interrogation.

1 DO: And that information comes from the attorneys
2 representing those that are already charged?
3 DC: Charged. I can also tell you that I have been told by
4 the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Bragg, that none of the people
5 in the photographs, at least the ones that were made public,
6 were being interrogated. So, therefor, there would be no reason
7 to have a photograph for interrogation purposes.
8 WIT: These were all old arrivals. The intent----
9 DC: Again, I don't know the truth of the statement, I'm
10 only telling you what the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Bragg
11 told me.
12 DO: Where did he get his information from?
13 DC: He tells me--he said he got his information from their
14 investigation out there. And I don't know the truth of it, but
15 this was all in reference General Karpinski testifying at an
16 Article 32 investigation.
17 DO: Do you remember the name of that SJA at Fort Bragg?
18 DC: Sir, I have notes.
19 DO: I'd like the name of the----
20 DC: I do know the name of the attorneys--of the
21 prosecutors.
22 DO: Okay. I've got it.

1 Q. In your opinion, based on everything that you knew from
2 the beginning of when you were there to the things that you have
3 learned since, what is your current opinion regarding what
4 happened at Abu Ghraib? What broke down? Who were the
5 responsible parties at Abu Ghraib?
6 DC: That led to the photographs----
7 Q. That led to the abuses in the photographs?
8 A. Sir, I think that there was a tremendous--I know, not I
9 think--this is fact. I know there was tremendous pressure being
10 placed on the interrogation teams and on Colonel Pappas,
11 especially, to get more sooner, to find Sadaam, to--I mean,
12 amongst all of those pressures, there was never any pressure
13 exerted, to my knowledge, to release prisoners. But, to get
14 more sooner, and the real focus was finding Sadaam. And there
15 was a lot of--a lot of conversation and a lot of Iraqi press
16 with hopefulness of finding Sadaam, and then people would be
17 convinced that they could come back to work, get underway with
18 running their own country, and that kind of thing. So that was
19 the objective, and it wasn't enough. It wasn't fast enough. At
20 one time I asked Colonel Pappas--now this was before he took
21 over, but I asked him, "How many interrogation teams do you
22 have?"

1 And he said, "I have sixteen interrogation teams, and
2 three of them are up at the MEK, two are at Anaconda." So, I
3 mean, with thousands of prisoners and General Fast saying, you
4 know, put them back in the box, you know, it delays the new
5 ones, it jumps the line--he said, "We don't have enough."
6 I said, "Well, it's not like the school is so easy to
7 get through. You know, you don't run them through in two weeks
8 and bring them over here."
9 And he said, "There aren't enough in the Army. So we
10 have to work on releases and housing." And he said, "Now
11 they're starting to put pressure on me about the MEK, and I'm
12 not even up there like I am at Abu Ghraib." He was under
13 tremendous pressure to get more and get better and get faster.
14 Q. Did he tell you from whom that pressure was coming?
15 A. He said that General Fast was pressuring him.
16 Q. Anybody else?
17 A. He didn't say specifically, but he did get beat up
18 routinely by General Sanchez.
19 Q. How do you know that?
20 A. I saw him come out of there several times, and we had
21 this communication between us. He would talk about time with
22 Sanchez being like a root canal. One time I saw him, he came
23 holding the side of his head. I said, "Bad?"

1 And he said, "I'd rather have a root canal." And then
2 he came out one time and he was holding both sides of his head.
3 Q. Staying with the pressure, did you ever speak with
4 General Fast about a pressure being exerted on Colonel Pappas
5 and Abu Ghraib personnel?
6 A. I did not talk to her about Colonel Pappas,
7 specifically, because I didn't want to create a difficult
8 situation between the two of them, but I talked about the
9 pressure out at Abu Ghraib, and the facility was never designed
10 to be a large detention facility, ever. And, you know, the way
11 that the conditions were going, and growing population and the
12 ineffective release boards, I said all of them are contributing
13 to--you know, we're so close to the line of being in violation
14 of humane treatment of detainees out there, that, you know, they
15 could have mud--and not only that, but the rain washed away the
16 top level of the soil, and it exposed the more rocks, the more
17 pieces of glass--it was on a landfill. So we had concerns about
18 the safety of the MPs, about is it practical--what I said to her
19 was, "Is it practical to use ten interrogation teams for
20 thousands of prisoners?"
21 Q. Did you ever have a conversation with General Sanchez
22 about the interrogation pressures at Abu Ghraib?
23 A. No, sir.

1 Q. That was part of your answer relative to what was the
2 cause of the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. So pressure
3 was one. Are there other reasons?
4 A. They were short people. They were short personnel like
5 we were. We were--it was an enduring camp. It was in the
6 middle of a hostile fire zone, so the shortage of people becomes
7 very pronounced when you have contractors and contract work
8 going on out there, every one of those people has to be cleared
9 before they can come on to the installation, every vehicle has
10 to be examined. They got dogs to use--sniffer dogs for
11 vehicles. I believed that that's what they were out there for.
12 That's where I saw them. I never saw them around prisoners or
13 anything. So they were short people to do what they needed to
14 do. There was this looming mission up at the MEK that was not
15 going to be going away. Nobody seemed to be concerned about the
16 real intelligence value of what they were giving us.
17 Let me just give you a for example on that very
18 quickly,--on Fridays, seven, eleven, fourteen buses of Iranians
19 would come across the border to visit some of their relatives at
20 the MEK compound. Nobody stopped them on the border. Very
21 often they didn't get into the MEK compound, but it was a
22 privilege, because they weren't prisoners. They were just
23 barely detainees, if you want to call them that, but they were

1 entitled to have visitation. But they had to be cleared,
2 sometimes they weren't cleared, so they had to wait outside the
3 gate, but the fact that the Iranian border was so wide open, it
4 seems like it would have been a very big concern, but they kind
5 of dismissed it. "They" being General Fast and the task force
6 that was assembled, led by General Sergeant, for the MEK
7 mission. And--personnel resources, couldn't get prisoner
8 uniforms still, under pressure from General Miller to get that
9 new compound stood up, the one that is now called Redemption, I
10 think, out there at Abu Ghraib.
11 Q. General Miller? Okay. You've lost me, now, because
12 General Miller left the country in September, and he goes back
13 to Guantanamo Bay.
14 A. Right.
15 Q. So when did he start exerting pressure?
16 A. Well, he was following up on the development or the
17 enhancement of the interrogation efforts.
18 Q. Even from Guantanamo Bay?
19 A. Even from Guantanamo Bay. Now, he never called me, but
20 that's what they were saying, whether it was in the release
21 review board or just in conversation with Pappas or [redacted] or
22 any of them. They said that, you know, he is following up and
23 he is pursuing their progress. That's why--he had discovered

1 very early on that getting connexes shipped down from Turkey and
2 Jordan was not going to work, and he was talking about
3 airlifting them in. And, I mean, I did--I just felt sorry for
4 Colonel Pappas, because, you know, it was--it was a losing
5 situation.
6 Q. How about individual responsibilities as far as
7 individuals are concerned, who was responsible for what happened
8 down at Abu Ghraib?
9 A. Well, certainly, the MPs belonged to me, sir. And, for
10 whatever reason, they didn't come and tell me. I didn't know.
11 Q. Who else?
12 A. The battalion commanders. [redacted]
13 operations center, [redacted] the company commander of the
14 372nd. They lived--the soldiers lived in the same area. I mean,
15 the company was in one particular area out there. They had
16 several different groups. If soldiers who slept next to these
17 guys and ate with these guys and showered with these guys didn't
18 know anything about it, then you start to move up the chain-of-
19 command and understand how it is possible. When--if [redacted]
20 [redacted] knew, as you indicated earlier, that he knew about
21 the ICRC report or whatever, or [redacted] did, they knew that
22 they could tell me. And they knew that I would have been

1 screaming louder than anybody else. I don't think that that's
2 whey they didn't tell me. I don't know why they didn't tell me.
3 DC: Sir, let me just add to that, we worked under the
4 assumption, until the news papers reported [redacted]
5 statement about what his knowledge, we worked on the assumption
6 that no officers were aware of this. And that was the
7 assumption that we had worked under. Obviously, that's a false
8 assumption.
9 DO: That's why asked, based on everything you know.
10 DC: We don't have an explanation for why we weren't told.
11 Q. How about outside of the MP community? Who do you
12 believe were responsible parties? Was MI or both of you?
13 A. General Fast certainly knew about all of this.
14 Q. Now, what do you mean by that?
15 A. She was with General Miller when General Miller was----
16 Q. But do you specifically mean that you think she knew
17 the abuses were occurring?
18 A. No. I can't speculate about that, and I wouldn't. But
19 what I mean is she was likely aware of one of the techniques to
20 break new arrivals sooner was showing them a photograph of
21 likely scenarios that could become your fate unless you
22 cooperate.

1 Q. So you have no direct knowledge?

2 A. No, I do not. But I do know that General Fast was out

3 there, that she was visiting the ICE facility often. I know

4 that General Sanchez was out there and visited Abu Ghraib very

5 often. Especially----

6 Q. Do you know how many times?

7 A. In one month--or after they took control of the

8 compound, in one week he was there three times--or in the course

9 of ten days he was there three times. That's often for one MI

10 brigade out at Abu Ghraib when you're the commander of the whole

11 theater.

12 Q. So that three times within ten days, what month was

13 that?

14 A. November. I know that--at least in my mind, everything

15 that was taking place out at Abu Ghraib, at least the progress,

16 seemed to be falling in line with the plan that General Miller

17 made reference to. That was my perception. I do know that the-

18 ---

19 DC: And by that, she means the "GITMOtizing" of Abu

20 Ghraib, whatever that means.

21 A. ----I don't think that the--even though all soldiers

22 know about Geneva/Hague and fair treatment and humane treatment

23 and everything, the combination of the environment, the mortar

1 fire, the constant threat, the same unit that lost two MI
2 soldiers to mortar rounds, maybe they were--had an even stronger
3 motivation to get actionable intelligence to find out who these-
4 -where Sadaam was--"How do we end this nightmare?"
5 Q. You have mentioned in statements to the press, Doctor
6 Cambone as being someone that I believe you said had some
7 responsibility. Can you explain to me how you believe he has
8 responsibility and if you have any specific knowledge about his
9 involvement?
10 A. I didn't even know who Cambone was. Colonel Pappas and
11 General Fast mentioned one time that it was a message that came
12 from Cambone. That was the only time I ever heard his name
13 mentioned. They were talking about something to do with
14 interrogation. I don't know what the connection was. All I
15 know--and then when I saw him testifying, I said, that's the guy
16 that they mentioned that time. I couldn't find any documents or
17 any notes to myself that made mention of that. Because, I knew
18 he wasn't in Iraq, so he really didn't make a difference to me.
19 RC: Ma'am, how often did you meet with General Fast?
20 Because throughout the whole thing, you were talking about
21 several time you talked to her about this, about that, about
22 whatever.

1 WIT: I never met with her. But I saw her at the review
2 and release boards.
3 RC: And that's the only time you would actually speak to
4 her was during the release boards?
5 WIT: Well, I mean, there would be occasions, like she came
6 out to Abu Ghraib to do the briefing or to bring [redacted] out
7 there. And that was in November, and we believe that it was
8 before the handgun incident. But she, during the briefing,
9 [redacted] said, "Well, looking at the numbers up here,"
10 that [redacted] was briefing, "looking at the numbers up
11 here, it looks like you're already overcrowded." And [redacted]
12 [redacted] gave the affirmation on that, and he said, "So what
13 are you doing--" he turned to General Fast, and he said, "What
14 are you doing about it?"
15 And she said, "Well, we have another camp, and it's
16 just about to be open in another day or two, and that's going to
17 be for fifteen hundred." And I was shocked by that. I figured,
18 well, okay. You know, this is another thing that I didn't know.
19 And I asked Colonel Pappas after the briefing was over,
20 before he could escape, "I said, where is that other facility?
21 I want to go take a look at it, because I don't need to go with
22 you walking the grounds."

1 He said, "Ma'am, we haven't even sited it yet. We
2 haven't even broken the ground."
3 I said, "So would you be opening that in two or three
4 days?"
5 He said, "No, ma'am. She just made a mistake."
6 But it was an in-prompt-two--I saw her often over at
7 the CJTF7. She might ask me a question. In that particular
8 case, Colonel Pappas was walking out of her office, and she made
9 that comment to him about something do with Cambone and then the
10 rest of us went in and sat down for the release board.
11 DC: Sir, we have been given information that the Iraqi
12 survey group, whose original mission was WV [phonetic], was
13 heavily involved in interrogation techniques and getting
14 information on the whereabouts of Sadaam Hussein and/or anybody
15 who was involved in the killing of Americans, and that they
16 claimed that they reported directly to Doctor Cambone. Again,
17 the truth of these statements, we don't know.
18 DO: Okay. Who gave you that information?
19 DC: I don't know if I can tell you, sir, but I will ask
20 the people if I can tell you. It's information gained through
21 attorney/client privilege.
22 DO: They're your clients?
23 DC: Some of the people----

1 DO: How many clients do you have?

2 DC: I actually have more clients than anybody in the whole

3 region. I think I'm up to about forty. But, in part of that,

4 my team has over two hundred clients, so I'm aware of what goes

5 on with all of the other allegations with all of the other

6 clients that my team represents. I can just say that this is

7 what we've been told. Again, I have no idea if any of it is

8 true or not because--I don't know. And I'm supposed to meet

9 with the person next week who is supposed to fill me in on that

10 information.

11 DO: Okay. Well, we're obviously interested in anything

12 relating to Abu Ghraib's military intelligence operations and

13 any connections that your sources may have that would relate to

14 allegations that have been made.

15 DC: Like I said, I don't know if any of it is true or not.

16 The other thing that I would--and this is just conversations

17 that me and General Karpinski have had, that we believe that the

18 morale and conditions at Abu Ghraib sort of led into what I

19 would call a fraternity type of atmosphere, or I'll call it

20 hazing of the detainees. Some of these pictures really do look

21 like college fraternity hazings, as opposed to--the images you

22 might see on TV, as opposed to what professional soldiers should

23 be doing.

1 DO: Yeah. Those issues that you raise relative to hazing
2 and the camaraderie that might have been developed----
3 DC: Well, it appears to be that way. I mean, again, we're
4 not there. I'm looking at these photographs and it looks like
5 they're having fun.
6 DO: There's been some talk and allegations regarding
7 liquor being present at Abu Ghraib.
8 Q. Do you have any direct knowledge of any liquor being--?
9 A. I do--the only direct knowledge I have is not really
10 direct. It's from a guy by the name of [redacted] who was the
11 chief contractor for U.S. contractors out there for services for
12 the detention operations: food services, running water, that
13 kind of thing. And he had a soldier ask him one time to bring
14 some beer out, and he said, "No. Absolutely not." And then he
15 reported it to me. He wouldn't tell me who the soldier was, but
16 I made sure that [redacted] was aware of that, and he
17 said that they did--first sergeant and sergeant major did health
18 and welfare inspections or when they walked through the billets,
19 they weren't afraid to open boxes, footlockers, or anything that
20 didn't have a lock on it. They just didn't see any evidence of
21 it.

1 Q. Did you have any knowledge that drinking was a
2 significant problem out at Abu Ghraib by either MI soldiers or
3 MP personnel?
4 A. No. There was a unit that showed up out there that was
5 a RAOC unit. I believe they were a National Guard unit. They
6 came sometime in November and thought that they were going to be
7 working for the 800th MP Brigade, and then ended up working for--
8 but that incident didn't take place at Abu Ghraib.
9 Q. It was a drinking incident?
10 A. It was. It was in Iraq, but it was at their previous
11 location, whatever it was. You know, and when there isn't any
12 alcohol around anywhere in Iraq--I mean, you could certainly get
13 it from the Hadjis [phonetic] or whatever, but when nobody is
14 drinking and you're not accustom to smelling alcohol, not that
15 you would anyway--I just seemed to be very sensitive to it. I
16 could detect it. And I asked my brigade surgeon one time did I
17 smell alcohol, and he did. He said he had a cold and he had had
18 some Nyquil shipped in from the states and that that's all it
19 was. But I was never aware of any drinking or consumption of
20 alcohol. We had a problem down at Bucca with it, but--.
21 DC: Sir, I'd like to add--I'm not sure how it plays into
22 anything that you're doing, but in terms of at least one of the
23 soldiers involved in these pictures, and that's [redacted] as

1 far as General Karpinski is concerned [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 RC: That's what you meant when you mentioned that you had

8 a concern about [redacted] in the photos?

9 DC: And you're aware that [redacted] has already received an

10 Article 15----

11 WIT: And was reduced from Specialist to PFC.

12 DC: That might have been in the reports, but I wasn't

13 specifically aware of it as we sit here now.

14 WIT: We had a detainee--sorry. He was not a--He was

15 Titan--hired under Titan. And he was at Bucca as an EPW and

16 former member of the Iraqi Republican Guard. And the regulation

17 is very clear about hiring former EPWs. Especially around U.S.

18 operations or food or like an administrative office or anything.

19 And he ended up being hired by Titan, and he was out at Abu

20 Ghraib, working as a translator. And I asked him where did he

21 come from, and he said that he knew all of the MPs down at

22 Bucca.

1 I said, "Were you from that area?" I was trying to
2 make the connection.
3 Then he told me, no, that he was a prisoner. So I
4 asked what is he doing up here. You know the regulations--Titan
5 hired him. So I asked [redacted] [phonetic],
6 to call Titan and find out what his file said, because then we
7 could get rid of him for lying on an application. They said
8 they had no file on him and that he was hired on somebody's
9 recommendation down at Bucca. And we couldn't get rid of him.
10 I went to the MI people and asked them to--actually, I went to
11 one of the guys that was from OGA, and I asked them if they
12 would put him on the polygraph, if they would interview him, and
13 he said they would. They never did get around to doing it, but
14 I couldn't get rid of this guy. I thought we had him gone one
15 time, according to [redacted] [phonetic], and the next
16 time I was out at Abu Ghraib, there he is. Called him [redacted]
17 the Pirate," because he converted to Christianity when he was
18 down at Bucca. Here's a former Iraqi Republican Guard, former
19 EPW, and now you're going to convince me that you've converted
20 to Christianity and now you're interested in us? The MI people
21 kept using him as an interrogator.

1 Q. As an interpreter?

2 A. Interpreter. Sorry. And then--I'm just trying to

3 cover some of the other things that I thought maybe you might

4 have questions about it.

5 Q. Was that an interpreter in interrogations or an

6 interpreter in what we call cat 1, which would be a non-cleared

7 interpreter?

8 A. He was supposed to be.

9 Q. A cat 1?

10 A. A cat 1.

11 Q. A non-cleared interpreter?

12 A. Right. But they were using him because he spoke

13 English.

14 Q. They were using him in interrogations anyway?

15 A. [The deponent indicated an affirmative response.] And

16 the other thing that seemed to be a subject of interest last

17 week, and that's the only reason I'm going to mention it

18 briefly: I was escorting General DeLong [phonetic] and his

19 group when they were going through Iraq. He was getting ready

20 to ready. He was a four-star from SENTCOM. I think he was the

21 deputy--he was a Marine four-star. And he went over to--we went

22 towards the task force. So we stopped there. They had an

23 interrogation underway. He wanted to go back and see it. He

1 asked me if I wanted to go back, and I said, no, I would stay in
2 the foyer-type of area of this one building. There were these
3 three guys that were there that were in--one of them had DCU
4 pants on, two had blue jeans on, and t-shirts. And they said,
5 "Wow. A female general officer. You know, how is that?"
6 And I said, "It's a lot of fun. It's really
7 interesting. What are you guys doing here?"
8 And the guy that was sitting up on the counter--like a
9 counter-level thing----
10 Q. This was at Abu Ghraib?
11 A. This was Task Force 121. You're just focusing on Abu
12 Ghraib?
13 Q. Yes. But I'll hear--I've made other reports about
14 other areas, so what do you have to tell me about Task Force
15 121?
16 A. Well, this particular individual, I said, "What are you
17 doing here? Are you an interpreter?"
18 And he said, "Well, I do some interpretation, because I
19 speak several different languages, but I'm really
20 interrogations."
21 And I said, "Are you from Iraq? Are you a Kuwaiti?"
22 He was clearly from the Middle East.
23 And he said, "No. I'm neither. I'm an Israeli."

1 I said, "I visited your country a couple of years ago.
2 I was amazed at how much we look alike. I mean there's a lot of
3 people in the cities that are speaking English."
4 He said, "Yes. We're not terrible people." And that
5 seemed to be a subject of interest.
6 Q. Did he ever tell you what he was specifically doing in
7 Iraq and who he was working for?
8 A. He did not. And I didn't ask him.
9 Q. Did he say, "I'm an Israeli citizen," or did he say,
10 "I'm a member of the Israeli Intelligence Agency?"
11 A. No, sir. He said--when I asked him if he was a Kuwaiti
12 or an Iraqi, he said, "Neither. I'm an Israeli."
13 Q. So you took that to be citizenship?
14 A. I did. He looked like and Israeli back when he said
15 that.
16 Q. And that was at Task Force 121. And what time period
17 was that?
18 A. When General DeLong [phonetic] came to visit on his----
19 Q. Can you tell me what month?
20 A. August, September.
21 Q. August, September timeframe?
22 A. Probably late August. I have his visit written in my
23 books.

1 Q. If we could just go back for a second to the other
2 incident you told me about, which was that cat 1 interpreter
3 that you believed was being used in interrogations. Did you
4 actually see him in the interrogation booth?
5 A. I did not. I did not.
6 Q. How do you know that he was being used in
7 interrogations?
8 A. I saw him over at the ICE facility with some of the
9 people that worked for [redacted] and I said to her--when I
10 saw him there, I said, "You know, that guy used to be an EPW."
11 And she turned around and she looked up, and she said,
12 "He's not--he doesn't have access to anything."
13 I said, "He's supposed to be controlled and just doing
14 translation."
15 She said, "I don't know how they're using him."
16 But, to be in the ICE facility alone, you needed
17 clearances, and there he was.
18 [The deposition recessed at 1951, 18 July 2004.]
19 [The deposition was called to order 1957, 18 July 2004.]
20 **Questions by the deposition officer (continued):**
21 DO: I have a couple of follow-up questions, and then we'll
22 end this by asking whatever it is that you'd like to add.

1 Q. Were you personally aware of what interrogators were
2 allowed to do and what they were not allowed to do as part of
3 their mission?
4 A. I was not. I did see an interrogation one time when
5 the interrogation facility [redacted] first opened, and they said
6 that they were about to get an interrogation underway. I went
7 into the hallway and watched it from the one-way mirror. It
8 looked perfectly normal.
9 Q. But no one ever talked to you or gave you any
10 instructions relative to these are the lanes of road, this is
11 the extent of what an interrogator can or cannot do?
12 A. Absolutely not.
13 Q. How about your MPs? Were they aware of what MI could
14 and could not do?
15 A. There was some rules for interrogation that were posted
16 in the cellblock, in their office--their admin place where they
17 signed prisoners in and out and check on--keep the records and
18 everything. It was like an admin room, and there were the rules
19 for interrogation posted there.
20 Q. But those were for MI personnel?
21 A. They were. But no rules for the MPs.
22 Q. No rules. They didn't tell the MPs what to do?
23 A. No.

1 Q. Do you think it should have occurred? That, in fact,
2 MI should have known what MPs could do and MPs should know what
3 MI could do?
4 A. Absolutely. I think one of the big lessons from this
5 should be how do we make that lash up better. The MI people
6 have to understand the different mindset of an MP--particularly
7 interrogation operations. That they--they have rules. And if
8 interrogation gives them permission to operate outside those
9 rules, that's their lane, but the MPs are no longer going to be
10 involved unless they are trained with the interrogations teams
11 at the MI school.
12 Q. Are you familiar with sleep management methods that
13 were occurring in Abu Ghraib?
14 A. I did not know that they were--I know that one of the
15 interrogation techniques that they were using was sleep
16 deprivation, but I didn't know that they were using them in any
17 of the cellblocks. They had a regular regimen for when lights
18 went out, and sleep, and--there was always chatter afterwards,
19 but that was in the general population compounds.
20 [END OF PAGE]

1 Q. Did any of your MPs ever come to you and tell you about
2 what methods MI were using--were instructing them, the MPs, to
3 use as to how to keep detainees awake?
4 A. No, sir. I am aware that one night they finished the
5 interrogation at interrogation facility [redacted] and the
6 interrogation people did not want to escort the detainee back to
7 Vigilant, so they called the MPs to escort the prisoner back to
8 Vigilant. It was late at night, and one of the MPs on duty that
9 night was a female, and she didn't feel comfortable with that
10 responsibility. And that was not a responsibility--the
11 interrogators were supposed to pick them up at one point and
12 return them to that point. So this was an exception. But [redacted]
13 [redacted] (phonetic), who was the XO out there, went to Colonel
14 Pappas and told him, "We're not doing that anymore," because
15 it's almost like mixing apples and oranges at that point.
16 Q. Do you know who [redacted] was?
17 A. [redacted]
18 Q. [redacted]
19 A. No, sir.
20 Q. You're not aware that he was the captain that was in
21 charge of the military police personnel within the 1A and 1B
22 section? In other words, [redacted] and the sergeant

1 that was in the daytime [redacted] (phonetic]? They were part of
2 his responsibility?
3 WIT: Was he an MP?
4 DC: Yes.
5 WIT: In one of my battalions?
6 DO: Yes.
7 A. I might recognize him by sight.
8 DO: He was in the 372nd MP Company, as I recall.
9 WIT: Doing--he had the platoon down--that was left behind
10 with the multinationals. He came up late.
11 DO: I don't know when he came out. I just know that he
12 was there--as an example, I know he was there during the Iraqi
13 shooting incident. When, exactly, he arrived on site, I do not
14 know.
15 WIT: I might know him by sight, but I knew [redacted]
16 as the company commander for the 372nd.
17 Q. Right. And [redacted] company had responsibility,
18 as I understood it, for the hard site?
19 A. Right.
20 Q. [redacted] was a member of that company, also.
21 I'm not sure when he arrived at Abu Ghraib, but he was also a
22 member of that and had responsibility for the 1A and 1B area.
23 A. I was not aware of that, and I never saw him----

1 Q. You never saw him when you went down to all of those
2 areas?
3 A. No, sir.
4 Q. You never had any discussions about what was going on--
5 --
6 A. The name isn't even familiar to me. What General
7 Sanchez, in his letter, what he ordered me to do was to evaluate
8 the chain-of-command, and----
9 DO: He was missing within all of that chain that was----
10 WIT: Nobody ever mentioned his name, either. I even asked
11 every one of them, "Is there anybody else that I should talk
12 to?" Nobody ever mentioned his name. But, visually, I might
13 recognize him.
14 DO: I don't have any further questions. I believe that
15 you have some additional comments that you--I'm sorry. Did you-
16 -did either of you----
17 RC: No, sir.
18 LA: No, sir.
19 WIT: I just wanted to make two, I think they'll be brief,
20 comments. One was, you, know, because I think there's millions
21 of lessons to be learned in all of this, but [redacted]
22 was a smart guy, but he was not a leader. He was selected for
23 command of that battalion by my predecessor. Whatever the

1 reason was, the battalion commander was not deployable, and
2 General Hill asked [redacted] if he wanted to be a
3 battalion commander so he filled the position. He was not an
4 MP. He was an engineer, and he commanded an engineer fire truck
5 company as a captain for, if I recall correctly, seventeen
6 months, and that was his only command experience. He had worked
7 with civil affairs, and decided in the course of assignment
8 possibilities that taking the course to qualify as an MP, the
9 correspondence course would be a good idea. So, I don't know
10 what his lash up was with General Hill or how they knew each
11 other, but that's how he was selected for that position, and I
12 don't think he had the background or the experience, and
13 certainly not any knowledge to be an effective battalion
14 commander. I didn't know that, because General Hill spoke very
15 highly of him. And when he briefed me--like I said, he was not
16 a very effective briefer, but that was very early on right after
17 I took--or was just about to take command.
18 And the other thing that I wanted to mention was that I
19 think that there was some--I don't even want to go so far as to
20 say that it looked like it was intentional, but I asked Colonel
21 Pappas one time, and this was very early on when we were getting
22 more numbers of--it was principally soldiers who were doing--
23 military intelligence soldiers that were doing the

1 interrogation. We didn't have--and if they had civilians it was
2 translator--interpreters. And I asked Colonel Pappas how did
3 this work at other locations, you know. Could they get people
4 released, or--and he said, "I've never worked interrogation
5 before."
6 And I said, "Never?"
7 He said, "No, ma'am. I was doing strategic
8 intelligence work, and I was a tactical intel commander. I've
9 never worked interrogations before. I'm relying on [redacted]
10 and their experience and the interrogators, you know, because
11 they're really good and they're very well trained."
12 And I would hope that he wasn't put there because of
13 that. I would hope that there wasn't any plans to exploit
14 professional weaknesses, including my own or battalion
15 commanders. I would hope, and there doesn't appear to be any
16 information, so far, that--MPs were not specifically selected
17 because in their security clearance file it said that they might
18 have a propensity to something. I do believe that people,
19 interrogators, were so convincing that they did exploit an
20 opportunity to get the military police personnel to agree to do
21 this. Simply by saying, "The more information we get, the more
22 prisoners get out of here, and the sooner you can go home. And

1 this is your ticket out of here." It was a carrot used in a lot
2 of different situations.
3 Down at CPA, [redacted] told me that if I gave him
4 a company to work down at CPA, that was my ticket out of there,
5 but otherwise we were going to be there for years. I said, "I'm
6 not going to give you a company, sir. I don't have a company to
7 give you. You can hire people to do the work in the ministry of
8 justice. I'm not going to use MPs to do that." Well, he left;
9 we stayed. I think there was broken parts.
10 DO: Well, you've caught my interest with a number of those
11 comments. The first being the assignment of military police
12 personnel. You were suggesting some pre-arranged plan on the
13 selection of those military police personnel for this
14 assignment.
15 Q. I heard from what you stated a "propensity" for the
16 ones selected to be controlled or manipulated at some point. Is
17 that what you're suggesting?
18 A. That's what I'm suggesting.
19 Q. And what leads you to believe that there was that type
20 of process actually used? Who do you believe did that?
21 A. Well, there's other possibilities, but they all focus
22 on the same conclusion. How do you end up with seven soldier
23 assigned to a company that were successful and in compliance, to

1 the best of our knowledge, for months when they were deployed in
2 Ad Diwaniaah--and then they come up to Abu Ghraib, they take
3 over a mission, following a visit by Major General Miller who
4 obviously has a plan of some sort to enhance actionable
5 intelligence at Abu Ghraib in his "GITMOizing" Abu Ghraib
6 efforts, and you take those techniques and those ideas and those
7 plans, and you put those in the hands of relatively--
8 comparatively, not relatively, but comparatively inexperienced
9 interrogation teams, under far less supervision than what
10 General Miller would have Guantanamo Bay, and it's like a powder
11 keg. And you apply pressure to the person responsible for
12 applying those techniques. In this case, Colonel Pappas,
13 perhaps. And you keep him under pressure, and he is trying to
14 get more, faster, sooner, better, and--a clear and critical step
15 in this is finding MPs who will be cooperative. So if you're
16 not telling them, "This is your only ticket out of here," or
17 you're not telling them, "You talk about this outside of this
18 cellblock, and you have compromised national intelligence," or
19 you tell them, that, "Look, Secretary Rumsfeld signed this
20 letter," now they don't know if that's his signature or not,
21 but, "Secretary Rumsfeld signed this letter. We have his
22 authority," or you tell them, "We know what your record is in
23 your civilian job, and we will take everything away from you."

1 How did a guy like [redacted] get over there? A truck driver.
2 Because they knew he had an affair at some point with a married
3 woman. I don't know. Who would have access to their security
4 clearance data? That would be the MI people. Did they go to
5 the database and say, "These are the people we have in the 372nd.
6 Who are the ones we would like to assign to this kind of
7 operation? Who are the ones we can convince they need to keep
8 their mouths shut?" [redacted] Everybody
9 knew that. [redacted]--
10 DC: She got an Article 15 for it.
11 A. --[redacted] I mean, these guys
12 are responsible soldiers--or they were. What made them go
13 wrong? I mean, that's the million dollar question, obviously.
14 DC: It's one of them. But you're theory--you're
15 suggesting a theory, here----
16 DC: A hypothesis.
17 DC: Your hypothesis suggests that when various MP
18 personnel, such as [redacted] said that they were the ones
19 that assigned the military police personnel. They were the ones
20 that chose who would man that facility, and they did that based
21 on civilian experience, because [redacted] and [redacted] had
22 civilian experience. So that's why they--I'm not sure if it was
23 [redacted] himself or the sergeant under [redacted] made the selection of

1 those two individuals. That would seem to be contrary to your
2 hypothesis.
3 WIT: Unless somebody said to [redacted] knowing that there
4 were two of that selection that had years of experience in a
5 civilian facility, said that is one of the likely fills for--I
6 mean, when you hedge the bet.
7 DO: General, I hear your hypothesis, but I have to tell
8 you, after the very significant investigation involving a lot of
9 people and thousands of documents, I see no indication of that
10 kind of a conspiracy or hypothesis.
11 DO: Sir, obviously, you have access to a lot more
12 information than we do.
13 DO: I do.
14 Q. Okay. Are there any other points or issues that you
15 would like to make?
16 A. I can't think of any right now.
17 DO: There is one concluding point. This is still an open
18 and active investigation. It is not closed. I do not actually
19 even know when it will be closed. We anticipate presenting a
20 report sometime this coming week to General Kern. That's very
21 tenuous, because General Jones has to complete his further
22 inquiries into other individuals at higher levels, and, in fact,
23 it still has to go through a legal review. As a result of that

1 legal review, it's frequent that lawyers look and say, "Well,
2 you've got to go back and ask this person this question." I
3 have to give you the same order I am giving everyone that I have
4 interviewed, and that's well over one hundred and fifty people.
5 And that order is: You are not to discuss what I have asked
6 you, today, or any of the specifics of what I have asked you
7 today with anyone outside of this room, except for your
8 attorney.
9 WIT: Yes, sir.
10 DO: You can tell people that I have interviewed you, but
11 that's where it has to stop. And that's an order.
12 WIT: Yes, sir.
13 DO: Is there anything that you don't understand about that
14 order?
15 WIT: No, sir.
16 DO: Counselor, is there anything you don't understand
17 about that order?
18 DC: No, sir.
19 DO: The same order applies to you, counselor. Do you
20 understand that order?
21 DC: Yes, sir.

1 WIT: Sir, do you want me to get in touch with Major

2 [redacted] up at the 800th MP Brigade for those--? You'll do that?

3 DO: No. We'll do that. If we need your further help and

4 assistance--I appreciate your help. But we'll get a hold of him

5 for that for those records. Alright. Unless there are any

6 further questions?

7 LA: No, sir.

8 [The deposition closed at 2014, 18 July 2004.]

9 **[END OF PAGE]**

10 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of [redacted]

On 10 May 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed Ms [redacted] Due to the time constraint, the statement was written after the interview was completed and based on answers [redacted] gave to questions asked of her. The statement below is currently being reviewed by [redacted] in Iraq. She was on leave and had not had a chance to review it. Once she signs it, it will be sent to our office for record.

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in mid December. I was assigned as a screener, but for four weeks, I worked in the Hard Site with interrogators. When I first arrived, we were told we needed to report any abuse and that id we did not report it, we were just as guilty. The CHIEF took us around the area and gave us a tour of the facilities. In reference to any detainee abuse, I know the following. I heard that a soldier took a female detainee and took her shirt off. The linguist did not report it and they both got charged. I never witnessed the use of dogs during interrogations nor did I witness any detainee abuse. I did not witness any detainees wearing women underwear. One day during a screening, one of the detainees was stripped of all his clothes. The detainee was in one of the rooms. For about 15 minutes, no one touched him. There was a MP female who worked during the in-processing of detainees. The female would hit the detainee on his legs to make him open his legs. She would first hit his left leg and then his right until he fell down. He was then pulled up and pushed to the wall. The MPs were rough and having a female searching male is not right because that is against their religion. There were many detainees who came in abuse. While we were screening the detainees, they would ask us, "Are they going to beat us here too?" In the medical facility, they would start talking. Some would have broken shoulders, others came in on crutches. They do not know who beat them. They said they were beat at ASAMIYA PALACE. The detainees said that even the linguist beat them. They didn't know if Americans were involved. They were abused with cigarette burns, and electric shocks. The doctor documented the bruises. I would say there were about 90 incidents that took place in ASAMIYA PALACE. Some detainees would say they were beat up by Iraqis. [redacted] name was mentioned a lot by detainees. He was accused of bribing people for money and taking revenge on them. One detainee stated that [redacted] would stick bottles up their rectum. The detainee couldn't sit down. This occurred at ASAMIYA PALACE. There was also a detainee who was handicap and was beat up very bad. [redacted] was a BA'ATH Party member who would gather people up. He would arrest the people and turn them over to coalition forces. The Iraqis said that he was killed by the Iraqis and his body was hung. They say they have no more fear of him. A detainee said he was tortured

for 7 days at night at the palace. They submitted two sworn statements. I heard this January or February time frame. There was a group that had been taken to the palace. They were two sisters, two brothers, and two uncles. One of the ladies does not want to talk about what happened to her. There was a detainee who said that he was given cold showers and was under sleep management in the isolation area. The MPs were there and they took orders to do it. The doctors didn't do anything. I checked into this and was told that cold showers were not abusive. The new unit that has taken over is much better and more organized. I spoke to every single woman and they said they spoke very highly of the soldiers. They would be taken out to get some sun. They were treated like brothers. Even detainees who are leaving say there were not abused here.

[redacted]
MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility			

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, Abu Ghraib

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in mid December. I was assigned as a screener, but for four weeks, I worked in the Hard site with interrogators. When I first arrived, we were told we needed to report any abuse and that id we did not report it, we were just as guilty. The CHIEF took us around the area and gave us a tour of the facilities. in reference to any detainee abuse, I know the following. I heard that a soldier took a female detainee and took her shirt off. The linguist did not report it and they both got charged. I never witnessed the use of dogs during interrogations nor did I witness any detainee abuse. I did not witness any detainees wearing women underwear. One day during a screening, one of the detainees was stripped of all his clothes. The detainee was in one of the rooms. For about 15 minutes, no one touched him. There was a MP female who worked during the in-processing of detainees. The female would hit the detainee on his legs to make him open his legs. She would first hit his left leg and then his right until he fell down. He was then pulled up and pushed to the wall. The MPs were rough and having a female searching male is not right because that is against their religion. There were many detainees who came in abuse. While we were screening the detainees, they would ask us, "Are they going to beat us here too?" In the medical facility, they would start talking. Some would have broken shoulders, others came in on crutches. They do not know who beat them. They said they were beat at ASAMIYA PALACE. The detainees said that even the linguist beat them. They didn't know if Americans were involved. They were abused with cigarette burns, and electric shocks. The doctor documented the bruises. I would say there were about 90 incident that took place in ASAMIYA PALACE. Some detainees would say they were beat up by Iraqis. [redacted] name was mentioned a lot by detainees. He was accused of bribing people for money and taking revenge on them. One detainee stated that [redacted] would stick bottles up their rectum. The detainee couldn't sit down. This occurred at ASAMIYA PALACE. There was also a detainee who was handicap and was beat up very bad. [redacted] was a BA'ATH Party member who would gather people up. He would arrest the people and turn them over to coalition forces. The Iraqis said that he was killed by the Iraqis and his body was hung. They say they have no more fear of him. A detainee said he was tortured for 7 days at night at the palace. They submitted two sworn statements. I heard this January or February time frame. There was a group that had been taken to the palace. they were two sisters, two brothers, and two uncles. One of the ladies does not want to talk about what happened to her. There was a detainee who said that he was given cold showers and was under sleep management in the isolation area. The MPs were there and they took orders to do it. The doctors didn't do anything. I checked into this and was told that cold showers was not abusive. The new unit that has taken over is much better and more organized. I spoke to every single woman and they said they spoke very highly of the soldiers. They would be taken out to get some sun. They were treated like brothers. even detainees who are leaving say there were not abused here.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARtiCLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27 [redacted]	1735 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 22 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a few classes from the 519th personnel on the jobs and roles of MI and MP personnel. There was an individual from GTMO who gave us some insight on interrogations. We then took a tour of the facilities. We did receive the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and a hand out on the IROEs which I signed. I do not remember receiving any information on the Geneva Convention. There was no doubt as to what was allowed and not allowed during interrogations. There was a huge poster with the IROEs as you walked in to the Joint Interrogations Debriefing Center (JIDC). I began interrogations operations after two weeks on site. When I first arrived [redacted] was in charge of all JIDC Operations. After [redacted] left, [redacted] became the JIDC OIC. When COL PAPPAS arrived, he took over everything. I never witnessed or heard of any detainee abuse. I heard about the abuse only after the photos were found. I never saw the photos. There was a time when I witnessed the use of dog but I do not know who used them or for what. The event happened at WOODSIDE. I was going to the site. When I arrived, I went left and the MP was coming from the right. I believe that happened in December. I reported it. There was another time in November when an MP used loud music which I believe was used to control his sleep schedule for an interrogator. The music was pretty loud. I do not know who was the MP or which detainee it was used on. When I first arrived, rules were more relaxed. Interrogators were not always disciplined in completing an Interrogation Plan prior to entering the booth. I can't provide any specifics. [redacted] could probably provide more information on detainee abuses.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27 APR 04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE [redacted]

[redacted]

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April 2004 at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 28 May 04

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

Purpose of the interview was to clarify possibly conflicting statements concerning detainees being stripped naked and held in cells in the 1A area. Statements by [redacted] reflected that detainees in 1A were often placed there for extended periods of time; statements by [redacted] tended to contradict this. [redacted] stated that [redacted] might have been the one who designated which detainees would be stripped and held naked.

1015-1025, 28 May I conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] A Co, 519th MI Bn, Fort Bragg, NC. A call was placed to his cell phone, [redacted] from my extension at Metro Park [redacted]

I introduced myself and indicated the charter of the Task Force under the leadership of MG Fay and that it had been directed by LTG Sanchez. I did not provide the actual purpose of the interview, but explained that I was attempting to gain additional information concerning possible abuse or humiliation of detainees at Abu Ghraib.

[redacted] arrived at AG circa 25 July 03 and departed just before Christmas 03. He was assigned at NCOIC of the screening section and as such conducted the initial screening of incoming detainees, to ascertain potential intelligence value and/or determination that segregation might be required for security reasons. His section would select to which Camp or area they would be confined (Vigilant, Ganci, 1A, etc). Screening would then have MP escorts move the detainees to the determined location. [redacted] would most often accompany the transfer, carrying paperwork. A handoff was made to MPs at the receiving end and [redacted] would then carry paperwork to ICE/Operations. The paperwork would have a rationale as to why certain detainees were placed in 1A as opposed to other locations (priority intelligence value, possible threat to handlers, hard to control, etc). Operations would review and could overcall [redacted] original site determination if necessary. There was no SOP or established TTPs when [redacted] first started working there. He developed procedures and briefed them up the line to operations where they were reviewed and accepted by [redacted]. From an interrogation perspective, there were no set rules about clothing or nudity until the formal IROEs were established. From a MP perspective, detainees were to be issued jumpsuits when available, otherwise they work the civilian clothing they had when they were brought in. [redacted] commented that sometimes the MPs would strip search a detainee as part of a security inspection or response to a tip that the detainee might have contraband or a weapon and could pose a threat. This was a MP, not a MI decision. [redacted] that this made sense from a security standpoint (less likely to be a threat, less likely to attempt escape if not clothed, etc.); however, stripping and/or keeping a detainee without clothing did not make sense from a professional interrogation perspective (would be contra to establishing trust and confidence in getting the detainee to cooperate).

[redacted] said he would be in 1A on a random, irregular basis and did not see or hear of any detainees being stripped and kept without clothing for periods of time. He said it might have been an interrogation tactic that could have been attempted, but would have required advance approval. He was not aware of any requests, but was not fully knowledgeable of all that went on in interrogation operations. He added that stripping a detainee as a control measure might have been a tactic used by the MPs as a control measure or punishment, but he was not aware of any particular instance.

He commented that there was general gossip floating through AG that some detainees had been issued pink underwear because that was all that was available in the supply system, and that some detainees wore pink underwear under their jumpsuits. He could not name any specific individual who might have told him that, nor did he ever see any detainees with pink underwear.

[redacted] did not see or hear of any abuse or humiliation of detainees, nor did he see or hear of any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees.

[redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: BLDG AT-5636 Gorham St. Fort Bragg, NC 28310
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/04
3. TIME: 1500 hours
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-5
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade
9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From the end of Jul 03 to early Oct 03 I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97B Counterintelligence Agent who performed interrogations. My team's initial mission upon my arrival to AG was to set up the work and life support areas to be used to conduct interrogation operations for detainees gathered during operation VICTORY BOUNTY. Prior to initial operations, [redacted] with interrogator input, an Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. Shortly after my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the IROE and signed memorandum stating I understood and would follow the IROE. The IROE in Iraq was similar to the one used by the 519th in Afghanistan. A difference in the two documents was the IROE for Iraq was more detailed. This was done to preclude questions concerning limitations. In my opinion, the IROE was clear and adequately established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. Certain techniques contained in the IROE had to be justified and approved. The vehicle for requesting these techniques was the interrogation plan, which had to be done for every interrogation. For example, Adjusted Sleep Schedule [redacted]. The request had to be requested through the interrogation team chief to the operations cell ([redacted]. The operations cell would pass the authorization through included a detailed proposed schedule and justification. Once approved the operations cell would then take the schedule to the MP's who were the team leader back down to the interrogator. Someone in the operations cell would then take the schedule to the MP's who were supposed to ensure the schedule was followed. I do not know the methods the MP's used to ensure the detainees were awake at the proper time. The 72nd MP's kept a three ring binder in cell block 1A, [redacted] its contents were unknown. On several occasions the instructions we gave the MP's concerning detainees were not executed. [redacted] told me of one such occasion in which an interrogator moved a detainee outside without shade for an approximate period of 15 to 20 minutes for an unknown reason. The interrogator told the MP guarding the detainee to look after his welfare during that time. [redacted] speculated the guard changed during that period and the instructions were not relayed to the relief, not executed. A medic discovered the incident and scolded [redacted] for allowing the incident to occur. One to two months into our operation of interrogating these detainees our facility started to receive other detainees from various detention facilities in Iraq after it was decided to make AG the centralized location for detainees. Due to the chaotic nature of the detainee transfers, many detainees arrived without documentation. [redacted] and elements of the 325th MI Bn and detainees those personnel were interrogating arrived in late September. COL PAPPAS and [redacted] were under intense pressure from LTG SANCHEZ to provide intelligence reporting and subsequently micromanage interrogation methods and processes, to include the actual questions in interrogation plans. On occasion [redacted] conducted interrogations themselves. One interrogation occurred at the request of LTG Sanchez in the middle of the night. It seemed COL PAPPAS was not experienced in interrogation operations and was more concerned with reporting than proper interrogation techniques. On approximately 29 Sep 03, I overheard someone making a statement about a detainee dying while being interrogated by an Other Government Agency (OGA) official. The OGA then packed the detainee in ice and placed him in a local taxi. The taxi driver was paid to take the body away. I was not sure if I had heard correctly until [redacted] confirmed the statement was made by [redacted]. I am not sure if it was a joke or a true story. [redacted] allowed OGA to house their detainees at the AG facility. [redacted] "ghost cells" in block 1A and allowing them to interrogate their detainees at their discretion. I heard rumors [redacted] received cigars and liquor from the OGA as gifts for letting these activities occur. During the course of interrogation operations I once received [redacted] Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross were present at AG during this incident. I did not request this to be done and was told the reason [redacted] I informed my chain of command of the incident. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I never directed the MP's to abuse or maltreat the detainees, nor did I ever hear of it. The MP's never offered to abuse the detainees for me, nor did I ever hear of them offering to do so for other MI personnel. After the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center was established, COL PAPPAS kept the 519th MI Bn 97E's and removed the 519th MI Bn. 97B's from the interrogation facility and put them on Tactical HUMINT Teams. I departed AG in early Oct 03 [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED 2004/06/04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT?

A: NO

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [redacted] OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DPCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
CJTF-7 HQ, IRAQ	18 JUN 04	1325	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		E-7/SPC

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

A Co. 202 MI Bn, Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Baghdad Central Correctional Facility on the 21st of October 2003. The document flow on detainees worked as follows. The interrogators would print out all documents referring to a detainee and would place the documents inside the detainee dossier. The detainee dossier would then be given to OPS, Collection Management & Dissemination (CM&D). CM&D would check for outstanding requirements and then send the file to the Detainee Assessment Board (DAB). The DAB would review the file for missing documents, conduct a briefing with the detainee, and make an assessment whether or not the detainee could be sent to the review board. At any time the file could be returned to the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) if the detainee was deemed to have further knowledge. If the DAB approved the detainee dossier, it was then given to the Magistrate Cell. The Magistrate Cell would review and pass the detainee dossier to the Release Board. The Release Board would then approve or deny the release. I believe that a denied detainee dossier would be given back to the Magistrate. It is possible that the Interrogation Plans were [redacted] working documents, but some may still [redacted]. The database we were using was nicknamed the [redacted] as it was compiled and maintained by [redacted] 97E from 205th MI BN. Some detainee dossiers and files concerning Interrogations where placed on the [redacted] Interrogation Notes and Information Intelligence Reports. The database was supposed to be backed-up daily. There was a list of required documents to be included in the detainee dossiers. At different times at the prison interrogation notes were required or not required as part of the DAB packet. Every Interrogation Plan was to be signed and approved by [redacted], or me. I know that [redacted] would not have approved any interrogation plan that involved humiliating the source by stripping them, and neither would I. [redacted] took control of a special section after the capture of HUSSEIN, Saddam. I was not allowed to review any of the interrogation plans for that section. [redacted] and a Warrant Officer arrived to Baghdad Central Correctional Facility from Guantanamo Bay, CUBA to [redacted] what was working for them at GITMO. Before an interrogation the detainee could be stripped and searched for weapons, this was to be done by the military police. If they refused the interrogator had the option of doing it. Military Police had control of the hardsite during my time at Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. They had the keys to the site and had to let us in. I remember the International Committee Red Cross visiting but I was not briefed on them [redacted] I went down to the hard site about once a month to show new interrogators the facility. I never saw a detainee naked. I never approved the use of dogs in interrogations. I told the interrogators that military police were not to be used as part of the interrogation approach. I do not remember talking to [redacted] concerning [redacted] poor interrogation abilities and report writing skills.

Nothing Follows

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V2.00

STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted]. HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of June, 19 04 at CJTF-7 HQ, IRAQ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ 136 (b)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPPC V2.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27 [redacted]	1310 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SSG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 21 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a tour of the facilities, screening sites, Hard Site, and Camp Vigilant I also received a briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement and a hand out on the IROEs which I signed. The briefing presented by [redacted] was clear cut on the IROE. I do not remember receiving any information on the Geneva Convention when I arrived, but [redacted] were given on a regular basis. At the time I arrived, COL PAPPAS was in charge but not on-site. [redacted] ran operations. The MPs were initially in charge of the facility until LTG Sanchez placed COL PAPPAS as the commander. I really didn't see any changes after COL PAPPAS was placed in charge. I never witnessed or knew of any detainee abuse. I first heard about it when CID began their investigation. I did not know of abuse during interrogations or any MI personnel telling the MPs to "soften up" or "give the MP the Treatment". I found out after the fact that a dog was used during an interrogation. I do not remember who told me. We had an incident where a prisoner was smuggled a gun by the Iraqi guards that run the prison. The prisoner used the gun to try to kill an MP. So all of the Iraqi guards were stopped at the gate and questioned. That was when I heard a dog was used inappropriately. I Never saw any photos. Personnel who might know about detainee abuse or photos are [redacted] and one of the contracted linguists, whose name I don't remember, who worked for the Tactical Human Team.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27 APR 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INTERVENTION.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of APRIL, 2004 at Abu Ghraib

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CRYSTAL CITY, VIRGINIA	2004/05/18 [redacted]	1251 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/CO. 470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, CAMP BULLIS, TX 78254

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on or about 20 October 2003 [redacted] assigned me as a section leader for four Tiger Teams, after [redacted] and I sat down and discussed my soldier's strength and weaknesses. When we first arrived, we were given a tour of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC). We were told when to wear our gear. There was no training on interrogations or procedures. We were given a sheet with the Interrogation Rules of Engagements and were told what we could and could not do. We were also told about some of the interrogation techniques which required [redacted] approval prior to us executing them. Within the first two weeks of our arrival, we were given the IROEs to sign. The thing that surprised me about the IROE was that certain approaches required a certain level of approval while others that I felt should have required approval were acceptable. When I asked about them, I was told that is what had been approved and that was the way it was. One of the techniques requiring prior approval was [redacted] and Pride and Fear Down. The teams I had consisted of [redacted] For linguists support, we pulled from all the linguists available. When I took over as Section leader from [redacted] the teams were already interrogating. We all jumped right into our roles. I conducted an initial counseling of all my personnel when I first arrived. I saw [redacted] and [redacted] as being experienced but not well trained even though they had been there a while. [redacted] were not experienced. I felt that [redacted] had a problem with authority. [redacted] had been an analyst in the Navy but he did not have any interrogation experience before Abu Guraib. He had a problem with the military. He did not like the way the military chain of command functioned. And he didn't view the chain of command as something he needed to follow. I worked with all my teams and asked them to tell me what they knew. I would do my best to train them during Sergeant's Time. We would focus on the IROEs, different type of approaches, paperwork, and report writing. I would help them rewrite their memorandums. [redacted] really had a hard time writing his reports and they often had to be rewritten. He would ask me to help him with some approaches and I gave him some correspondence course manuals on approaches. I felt I had strong analysts, but they needed a lot of supervision. I conducted interrogations as needed or as time permitted. I usually assisted with interrogations when the interrogator could not break a detainee. My workload was too much and there were too many issues to deal with. I didn't really get very much sleep. The average number of interrogations each team was required to conduct were two per team per day. All of my soldiers struck me as very intelligent. The detainee abuses I witness are as follows: One of my jobs was to go check on my soldiers and the detainees. When we moved to the night shift, I would go to the cellblocks to speak to the MPs. I usually went with another interrogator or by myself. I went to Camp Vigilant during the day to move detainees we were going to interrogate during the night. I know that prior to the gunfire, [redacted] was scheduled to interrogate [redacted] but another detainee had mentioned that [redacted] might have a gun. [redacted] notified the chain of command. Instead of [redacted] going to interrogate, the MPs approached [redacted] to find out if he had a weapon. [redacted] had gone to visit him at the hospital to find out where he had gotten the gun. He found out that an IP had brought the gun and other weapons in to the detainee. One time after the gunfight, I heard [redacted] was back. I went to check on him in the cell. I was surprised to see the MP who [redacted] had shot, was on duty guarding the section where he was. I asked the MP if he thought this was a good idea. He told me he didn't really want to be there but that he could be professional about it. [redacted] was in the same cell he had been in prior to the incident. I walked to his cell to check up on him. It was very cold that night. I found [redacted] without clothes, no blanket or mattress. His wounds were still bleeding and he still had the catheter in. He did not have the bag just the catheter. I yelled at the MP and asked for the NCOIC. I asked why was the detainee without any clothes and no blanket. He said they didn't have any clothes or blanket. I told him he better find some. I went over to the Medical site and told the specialist on duty to get the doctor. It was after 2200hrs and the specialist told me that the doctor (a COLONEL) did not want to be bothered unless it was an emergency. I told him it was an emergency and to wake the Colonel. The Colonel asked me what I wanted. I asked him if he was aware that [redacted] still had a catheter in. He said yes that the CSH had made a mistake. I asked him "can't you take it out". He said no because the CSH put it in so the CSH had to take it out. I told him this was unacceptable. He asked me what did I want him to [redacted] do. I told him to take it out. He said he couldn't do it and that the detainee was due to go back to the CSH the following day. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF 7 [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ *TAKEN AT* _____ *DATED* _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

He said fine sergeant you do what you have to do, I am going back to bed. [redacted] was with me during this incident. After speaking to the COLONEL, I notified my supervisor. I don't remember if it was [redacted] the night OIC or [redacted] when he came in for day shift. I told him that the COLONEL might be a bit upset. [redacted] was on leave at this time. I do not know what [redacted] or [redacted] did after I told him. I believe that [redacted] was taken to the CSH the following day. I do not know if the MPs recorded it. They kept a log, but it was not detailed or accurate. I asked to see the log and they had not recorded the incident. I also notice they had not recorded some other incidents which I knew had happened based on what my soldiers told me. When I went to check on a detainee, I would go straight to their cell and did not look at other detainees for several reasons, I did not want the detainees to see me because I might interrogate them at some point and I did not want them to see me in other circumstances than in the interrogation booth. It was also too dark in the cells to see anything unless the detainee was right up against the cell door. Sometimes a detainee would call out to me as I walked by. They asked us for things. I tried to minimize my contact with them. I never saw an MP kick, punch or push a detainee. There were sometimes when I questioned their actions. Once, I noticed that a detainee was wet and cold. His blankets were also wet. The detainee stated that the MPs had washed their clothes and gave it back to them wet. I went to the MPs and told them to get the detainee dry clothes. They said they did not have any, I told him to get some. I can't remember the date; it must have been in December because it was fairly cold outside. I believe this occurred in the late nighttime or early morning. I believe the linguist with me was [redacted] or [redacted] was one of my favorite linguists. He was very good. In reference to female panties, I remember seeing the detainees wearing them. Anyone who walked out to the cell should have seen them. I didn't report it because I thought they were approved. This was considered an acceptable approach and the MPs did it for disciplinary action. I personally never signed off on an interrogation plan on this technique. If one of my Tiger Team members purposely did this without my signature, I would have recommended removal from interrogations. The MPs had some detainees handcuffed to the cell door. I asked them if this was part of their SOP, they replied with, "What SOP?" My first line supervisor I would report it to was [redacted]. We had daily meetings with all the section leaders. [redacted] and myself attended. [redacted] and/or [redacted] sometimes attended. All section leaders should have been aware of the women's underwear. My section didn't use the dogs for interrogations. At GTMO we used the dogs for security purpose during in processing. In Iraq, the dogs were used differently. They were used during a shake down and inside the first line of concertina wire in the camp. The dogs if they had been used for interrogations, would be used as a fear up and needed an approval from higher. After the gunfire, my section came on duty while the IP questioning was going on. [redacted] had ordered an IP round up and they were all questioned. The team we were replacing had been at it for over 12 hours. I spoke to the [redacted] and asked if he wanted my team to take over. He said yes. I cleared it with the chain of command and my soldiers relieved the other teams. I do not remember where [redacted] was at this time. [redacted] were on duty and maybe [redacted] as well. [redacted] was already relieved of her interrogation duties and I found her interrogating. [redacted]

I notified [redacted] and she went to stop [redacted] from interrogating. I think she had some arguments from others in the chain of command about [redacted] being allowed to have "contact" with detainees. At that moment, there were no interrogation plans. I took my teams and told them "do not do anything you would normally not do. Watch yourself." I interrogated one IP who might have known who brought the gun. After being unsuccessful, I handed him over to the MPs to process him as a detainee. I saw no dogs that evening. If an interrogator asked an MP to have a dog bark near a detainee who was being interrogated or questioned and if that interrogator told the detainee that if he did not answer the questions they were going to sick the dog on him, that would have been a violation of the IROEs. If they did it without a prior approval from higher, they were wrong and would be pulled from interrogations immediately. I constantly made comments to my section about not doing anything without my approval. Obviously, things occurred without my approval but as soon as I found out about misbehavior, I took action. Sometimes I was supported by the chain of command and sometimes I wasn't. There was no doubt in my mind that my section understood my rules about approving approaches before they went in the booth and following procedure for exceptions to IROE. There was a rumor about three male interrogators who had done an interrogation with a female. If a gathering was called for this incident, I do not remember since we were always having formations for [redacted] where he appeared to be agitated. One evening, around 0200 or 0300 hours, there were some administrative issues I was busy dealing with from higher. [redacted] came to me and said he needed to speak to me. I told him to wait and he said he needed to speak to me now. I hung up the phone and began to speak to him. He told me that [redacted] and her analyst [redacted] had just screwed up. She had just walked a naked detainee across the camp. I told him to get them in now. When they came to me, I asked what had happened. They both did the talking. [redacted] said she had questioned the detainee and he would not answer and he had a bad attitude so she stripped him of his clothes. I asked her if the detainee was naked when she walked him back into the compound (Vigilant) and she said she gave him a blanket. I told her that we had had riots and this event could have caused a riot if the detainees saw a female walking a naked detainee. I told her she did not have this in her interrogation plan I had signed and that was relieving her from interrogations pending me notifying the chain of command. [redacted] was nervous and very remorseful. [redacted] concerned me with her attitude. No matter how I explained it to her, she still didn't feel that she had done anything wrong. This event happened even after I had a session with everyone in my section about what they could and could not do. I went to see the MPs and asked if the detainee was clothed and if they had had any problems. I asked them to log it and write an incident report. I notified [redacted] when she came on duty around 0600 or 0700 hours. [redacted] asked us to write sworn statements. I found out during the sworn statement writing that there was a third soldier who was involved but he was brand new and was sitting in the interrogation for the first time. I think [redacted] had a problem with me being her supervisor because we were specialists together at DLI and I had gotten promoted before she did. [redacted] just seemed to be burned out. I had told him before that if he had any questions to ask me and he did come to me on some occasions to bounce things off of me. Later that day, [redacted] wanted to talk to me and asked for my recommendations. I told him that [redacted] should get a[redacted]

Article 15 and the max punishment; [redacted] should get an Article 15 with less punishment. The third individual should be counseled and told what was wrong with the incident and probably trained. [redacted] myself and a couple others (whom I can't remember) discussed the incident. We went through everything that happened and how [redacted] had done a "strip interrogation". I was asked again for my recommendation and I gave the same recommendation. [redacted] also gave the same basic recommendation. [redacted] took several days to make a decision but no Article 15s were given. I believe that [redacted] told me they received a local letter of reprimand. The incident was apparently kept quiet. My soldiers would ask me what happened, I told them that I made my recommendations and could not discuss them. I believed [redacted] had a clear understanding of her boundaries. Any advice I gave her, she was real quick to pick it up. I was very shocked when I found out what she had done. After the incident, [redacted] shut down with me. She was pulled from my section and reassigned. She wouldn't speak to me anymore. I knew she had a good understanding of the IROE but I felt she could not distinguish the difference between right and wrong. [redacted] left on leave and things were still being run the same. When word got out that she was not returning, things went down hill from then on. I spoke to [redacted] and told him that everyone was doing whatever he or she wanted and I requested to be relieved as the Section Leader. My section was selected to be a special project section by [redacted] This project was to interrogate those who could not be broken. This project did not last long because we requested permission to use techniques that required approval from higher but we never received the approval or it took to long to get a response. I had requested to be taken away from interrogations. After [redacted] was captured, [redacted] was selected to be in a special project and departed for a while. I was told he no longer reported to me and belonged to someone else. My opinion was that [redacted] was not that experienced, but my opinion did not matter. His reports were very bad and he often had to rewrite them but he was very people oriented and someone in the chain of command thought he was a good interrogator. He had 30 detainees, but he only concentrated on five. [redacted] and his four associates. [redacted] was very ignorant of a lot of the procedures. He was strong willed and proud of the fact that he could get along with almost everyone. Others in the chain of command considered him one of the best interrogators. I had requested, through [redacted] to have [redacted] taken out of my section and was told that [redacted] was a "golden child" and I would be moved before they would move [redacted] came and told me I was no longer the section leader. I asked him why was I being relieved, "because I had requested it or for another reason?" He said he didn't know. He said the decision came from higher than him. I saw [redacted] I told him that I needed to know why. I told him that if I had done something wrong, someone should have counseled me and given me a chance to correct what I was doing wrong but no one had. [redacted] told me he was sorry and that I hadn't done anything wrong. I asked him if [redacted] had made the decision, he said he didn't know. Everyone knew that [redacted] had a personal problem with me. Some of the decisions made at Abu Ghraib were made on personal opinions not professional. [redacted] replaced me as the section leader. We were all, [redacted] (Section Leader for new Special Project), and [redacted] given a new project. We were receiving direction straight from [redacted] This special project was supposed to [redacted]

have the most qualified interrogators but I questioned some of the interrogators on the team. [redacted] was very aggressive and I refused to work with him. I told [redacted] that I thought [redacted] was a lose cannon and a jail sentence waiting to happen. I had been in the booth with [redacted] before and I felt that he and I clashed as interrogators. One day when I went up to one of the camps, I began to speak to one of the MPs on duty. He told me he didn't know I was the NCOIC. He thought that [redacted] was because he always gave his name as a point of contact. [redacted] liked to BS with the MPs. In reference to [redacted] shaving detainees head, I know we had a head lice problem and we had to shave off the hair. IF the shaving was done for interrogation approach purposes, it was an exception to IROE. Once, [redacted] and I had a conversation about the use of dogs. He and another SGT wanted to used them as part of a drawn out approach. I told him that there were aspects of the approach that were crossing the line. He disagreed with me and wanted to go higher up the chain of command. We took the issue to [redacted] He didn't listen to me very often because he always had others from the chain of command that supported him and told him he was doing a great job. Most of the requests we submitted were on sleep deprivation and we did get some approved. The requests should be in the JIDC, but I can believe them getting lost because we often lost complete files. Our filing system was not the best. We did not have serviceable fie cabinets and teams were given approval to place file in cardboard boxes. One day when I briefed LTG SANCHEZ and MG FAST, I was asked what support we needed. I gave her my list. File cabinets and safes were on the list. MG FAST delivered about 40% of the list, but no file cabinets. Civilians were placed in position of authority. One of the CACI employees, [redacted] was placed in charge of screening. [redacted] was in charge of B Section. [redacted] was in charge of the Detainee Assessment Board (DAB). Who did I think was in charge? When I first arrived, I knew [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE). I knew COL PAPPAS was the Brigade Commander but he was never there. He later lived in the ICE area though. I knew that [redacted] and [redacted] were there but honestly I do not know what their true roles were. [redacted] was more involved with housing issues and didn't really get involved with interrogations so when he would call formations and was giving us orders in relation to interrogations, I questioned that. Once he held a formation to incorporate a new "salute" policy. I raised my hand and asked him how that would affect the interrogators who use a different rank as approaches. He yelled at me and said he wouldn't argue this with me. I felt it was wrong for him to be involved in interrogation rules or procedures with no interrogation background. I don't think his boundaries were clear to anyone, including him. I know [redacted] reported to [redacted] but I did not know what he did. I found this out during one of the meetings when [redacted] was trying to give her opinion, she was told by [redacted] to be quiet and back down. As far as ghost detainees I didn't deal too much with them. We had a board in the ICE that showed all the cells to include those that had "OGA" on them. I was told the detainees in those cells belonged to OGA and we shouldn't be concerned about them. I was told that I did not have to allow OGA to see my detainees. When [redacted] was there and I denied their request, the chain of command backed me up. Once [redacted] left, my requests to deny OGA access to my detainees were denied by my chain of command. [redacted] might have more information. She worked more with them. When OGA would take my detainees I would ask that one of our interrogators sit in on the [redacted]

interrogation and a copy of the report be provided to me. I did get both requests. The only other thing about OGA is that I was told that one of their detainees died of a heart attack in our detention facility while being interrogated. The detainee was taken out on a stretcher and treated as if he was sick so as not to upset the other detainees. In December, I told [redacted] that I didn't want to be involved in interrogations anymore. [redacted]

Not

Used [redacted]

INITIAL OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Shortly afterwards I became the reports officer. I did this for one week and then I was placed back on interrogations on a special team. While on this team, I told [redacted] and [redacted] that there were several incidents that I felt uncomfortable with and requested to be taken out of an interrogator role. I said I would assist as an advisor but not to go back into interrogations. One incident occurred when I was running an interrogation on an Iraqi general who was being questioned in relation to SADAM's capture. I reported to COL PAPPAS that I was getting nowhere with the detainee. I was later called into the ICE and told there would be someone assisting me. It was a JORDANIAN MAJOR. A warrant officer (I can't remember his name) told me to brief the JORDANIAN on everything I had on the general. I asked to speak to the warrant officer outside. I told him that I could not do that because some of the information was SECRET/NOFORN. He told me to do what I was told. I told him not if it was unlawful. [redacted] came out and wanted to know what had happened and I told him it was an OPSEC violation. He told me just to give him the Jordanian the unclass version and take him into the booth. While in the booth, I introduced him as my colleague. The translator introduced him wrong and stated that the JORDANIAN was my assistant. I told the detainee that I was getting nowhere with him and that I was going to leave him with my colleague (the Jordanian). The detainee jumped up and told me he would tell me whatever I wanted to know. The following day, another interrogator went in to talk to the detainee without consulting me. This totally ruined the rapport I had established with the detainee. Another issue was an OPSEC issue; I felt that we were putting too much information in the SIPR database. I felt we developed tear lines for a reason, but they were not being used. All the information on a detainee's background was posted plus the number of times he was interrogated, personnel reading the reports would then be able to link the detainee with the interrogator. In reference to photos: Sometime after the CID investigation, around March or April 2004, [redacted] (who lived in the same cell block I lived in) came to me and handed me a thumb drive. When she told me that a guy had told her that she had left it in the Internet café. I told her it wasn't mine. We decided to look in the pictures to see whom it belonged to. We saw several pictures of MPs with dead bodies and MPs with detainees. We recognized [redacted] in several photos. I reported it to [redacted] because the photos appeared to be something that should have not been taken. I went to [redacted] and told him we found pictures of detainees and how we had acquired them. [redacted] looked at the photos and told us to write sworn statements on what we knew. [redacted] told me later that the photos were not that bad. I do not know what happened after that. I know that one of the files had 40-50 photos and there were several files. I was shown some photos and was able to identify some individuals. Photo 3 file name [redacted] shows [redacted] facing the camera. There are some dog handlers with two dogs barking at a detainee. [redacted] was very close with [redacted] They would both hang out and watch movies together. She would sit on his lap or under a blanket very close to him. I saw this because she and I lived in the same area and he would come to her area to visit her. Photo 6 on file named [redacted] shows a picture with an analyst who worked in the FAC. He was called [redacted] for [redacted]. He is standing with his back facing us and he is looking down at naked cuffed detainees on the ground. Photo 23 on file [redacted] shows [redacted] leaning against the left wall facing the naked detainees on the ground. [redacted] is in the photo as well. He is wearing PT shorts and is looking down at the detainees. Photo 25 on file [redacted] shows [redacted] facing away looking down at the detainees. Photo 54 on file [redacted] shows [redacted] (a CACI employee) with [redacted] (a Linguist) interrogating a detainee who appears to be in a dangerous stress position sitting on a chair with his back exposed and a concrete floor to his back. The ICRC came by to visit but I was never made aware of the ICRC results.

Q. is there anything else you woul like to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of MAY, 2004 at CRYSTAL CITY, VA.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 36
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1988

USAPA V1.00

CJTF7-TFF-I

29 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. (FOUO) On 25 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] Medical Corps, South Dakota National Guard, [redacted]

2. (FOUO) [redacted] was deployed to Abu Ghraib from early October to late December 2003. He was the head of a medical team for detainees in Camp Vigilant and the security holds (inclusive of MI holds) in the Hard Site. [redacted] was the primary physician and supervised a physician's assistant and several medics' a total of 5-10 personnel which constantly varied. His team worked in the medical treatment station which was located across the road from Camp Vigilant. Camp Gancy received medical support from a different medical team.

3. (FOUO) [redacted] neither heard of or observed abuse while at Abu Ghraib. He saw no indications of abuse during his treatment of detainees. He recalled after the first visit of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) they informed him they had observed treatment of the detainee which they didn't like; specifically that [redacted] described his treatment and records as very good and detailed. When he departed all records remained at Abu Ghraib and were turned over to his replacement, [redacted]

4. (FOUO) [redacted] recalled the detainee involved in the shooting at Abu Ghraib [redacted] He treated [redacted] immediately following the shooting and evacuated the detainee to the Combat Army Surgical Hospital (CASH). Upon [redacted] return he again provided him care. He did not observe injuries or indications of abuse upon his return. He did recall just before his departure in December and during his handover to [redacted] being treated for a dislocated shoulder. [redacted] was treated and evacuated to the CASH. He did not recall [redacted] having a catheter or any other detainees with catheters. In accordance with standard procedure, a catheter would be removed before a detainee's return to the Hard Site.

5. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27	1340	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
			CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. I, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib around on 8 October 2003 to work as a screener. When I first arrived, the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center was being stood up. Due to my background, I was placed as the senior advisor to the Detainee Assessment Board (DAB) an interrogator. I had two Tiger Teams who reviewed the detainee files and prepared them for the 78 or release board. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received an orientation from and I was briefed the on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and signed them a couple of times. I don't remember ever receiving any Geneva Convention training. There was some confusion as to the leadership on site. was in charge and I believe was on loan as the deputy. There were so many units it was a bit confusing. Every LSA had their own command. I never witnesses but I knew of a detainee abuse allegation and I never knew of the use of dogs (other than sniffing around)by MI personnel. The abuse allegation was against Mr CACI contractor. I reported the abuse to and my site lead, at that time but before anything could be done. Mr resigned. Mr working in the DAB and the DAB's interrogations techniques were to be direct approach only. It appeared that Mr had a personal vendeta. I wrote a statement and included the comments the other interrogators made. I also have no knowledge of MI encouraging MP's to "soften up" or give a detainee "the treatment." There was one instance where I did see some photos of detainees in the month of March. A thumb drive was found in the Cyber Center and in order to find out who it belonged to, we and others from the office) opened. The photos were of dead detainees, some MP and MI soldiers. There was also a photo of a blindfolded inmate. I couldn't tell who the soldiers where. I knew you couldn't take photos like that so we turned it in to the command, We all wrote sworn statements and turned them in. Prior to the investigation, I did hear of some photos of MPs in the LSA. I heard of prostitutes, local nationals living in the LSA, alcohol, cameras in the shower. I believe was aware. An investigation was started and I heard some folks were relieved. I did not hear allegations of MI only MP's involvement. I did hear an MI person was implicated but that was all. I don't know who it was.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at [Abu Ghraib]

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE YYYYMMDD	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
151 Horizon Ridge Parkway, Henderson, NV	2004/06/06	1420	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		O-3/NG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
72nd Military Police Company, 992 Troop Command, Army National Guard

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 23 May 03 to 15 Oct 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG) as the Commander of the 72nd MP Company. My company's mission was to prepare the facility for use within three days with a follow-on mission of training Iraqi corrections officers for the eventual transition of AG into Iraqi control. On 27 May 03 the first detainees started to arrive. Until the end of Jul 03, every detainee was criminal. At the end of Jul, the criminal prisoners were transferred to Rusafa in preparation of a suspected influx of security detainees associated with operation VICTORY BOUNTY. When the security holds started to come into the facility, I found them to be more disciplined and less rowdy than the normal criminal detainees that were in the facility. Around the same time as operation VICTORY BOUNTY, the 205th MI Bde [redacted] arrived to set up a screening location for the security holds. Once the MI Bde was on board, the 320th MP Bn assumed all records keeping which had previously been done by my company. During the initial set up of the interrogation site, we lent the MI personnel tents and escorted the detainees to and from the interrogation site. The interrogation site consisted of a couple of tents that were open on the sides which allowed personnel to see the conduct of the interrogations. In early Aug 03, at around 1900, a 320th MP reported to me at 1300 he had been told by [redacted] to place several detainees in the sun and leave them there. A medic examined the detainees and determined that [redacted] dehydrated, but no permanent damage was noted. I reported the situation to [redacted]. In my opinion, [redacted] was not sure of his limitation concerning the handling and interrogation of detainees. After the incident, he remarked that he would not do any special interrogation techniques until he had something in writing setting his boundaries. I never personally attended an interrogation and can only recall seeing a detainee in an interrogation tent on one occasion with his arms outstretched. I constantly walked around the facility and could see the interrogations as they were conducted in open-sided tents. I never witnessed any abuse during these interrogations. In Sep 03, GEN MILLER visited AG. He spent most of his time with the MI folks, but he had an MP Captain on the team who provided information on how the MP's in GTMO supported MI operations. These passive techniques included listening during detainee conversations and documenting the results for later use. The MP Captain provided a soft copy of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for MP operations at the facility at GTMO. We took the SOP and changed it to make it applicable for our operations. There was nothing referencing MI in the SOP. In my opinion, it was clear that the shift for the facility was going to be MI collection. This was in contradiction to our original mission. As a result of his visit, we placed an additional guard at the entrance to 1A. I had one interpreter for use. On occasion, I could utilize the MI interpreters for various activities. One particular [redacted] seemed to always be available and wanted to interpret for me when I had contact with the local Iraqi corrections administrative staff. This happened so often it started to get annoying. Detainees were routinely stripped searched during inprocessing and upon entering the hard site. I never witnessed or heard of a detainee being stripped as a form of humiliation. Other that then the incident already discussed with [redacted] I never witnessed any detainee abuse or maltreatment while at AG. I never witnessed or heard of any MI person asked the MP's to abuse the detainees to help with interrogations. I never witnessed or heard any MP offer to abuse a Detainee to help with interrogations. At the beginning of Oct 03, we started our transition with the 372nd MP Co. The transition consisted of a walkthrough and a right-seat-ride. One of the immediate changes the 372nd made was to drop two security positions. It appeared to me they had more guards working inside the facility. I have seen the pictures and the actions depicted by the photos clearly fall outside the doctrinally authorized restraining techniques. MP training calls for the restraint (with handcuffs) and the segregation of unruly detainees. Detainees were stripped searched during their inprocessing, but I never witnessed or heard of a detainee being stripped as a form of humiliation. On 5 Jun 04, [redacted] reported to me that on one occasion while working in Iraq, an OGA member asked her to look at a naked detainee as a form of humiliation. She indicated she refused, but did not report the information to anyone at that time.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement? [redacted]

A: No.//End of Statement//

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Henderson, NV DATED 2004/06/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[redacted]

Nothing Follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004
at Henderson, Nevada

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27	1415	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 15 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received 2-3 days of orientation. [redacted] gave a briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). She discussed the right and left limits and we signed a memorandum for record stating that we knew and understood those limits. There was nothing out of the norm from the school instruction. I never witnessed detainee abuse but I had heard rumors once the investigation began. I never heard anyone tell the MPs to "soften up" a detainee or give them "The Treatment." The MPs would be told when a guy was an "asshole." I was not aware of any photos on detainees. On 14 December the as the Section Chief for Special Projects, one of my interrogation teams requested the use of dogs for adetainee capoured in conjunction with Saddam Hussein. At approximately 0200hrs, I requested the dogs from COL PAPPAS and he stated that he wold call higher to request permission. I began writing the memo IAW our IROE and an hour later it was approved and I was given the guidelines for using the dog. The dog did not hurt anyone as it was always about 5 feet away from the detainee. I was standing to the side of the dog handlers during the entire time that the dogs were used for this interrogation. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, I do not remember who was the FOB Commander. Sometime during my deployment here, [redacted] took command of the FOB and took over the entire site, there was an increase on force protection, but nothing else to my recolection. I do not know what [redacted] was. The chain of command was very convoluted. The relationship with the MPs was good but there were a few problems. Some of the issues were escort duties. They would escort at the beginning and then those duties became the MI's responsibilities.
Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004

at [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
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DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27	1435	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9.
I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraibaround the 19th of October 2003 to work as an interrogator. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received three days of training from the 205th personnel and one GTMO representative, [redacted] I was also mentored by [redacted] on interrogations. We received several briefings on detainee handling, and Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROEs. The training was similiar to that taught at the school, with the exception of stress positions which were done away with. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse or any photos of detainees. I did not witness any use of dog; but I did hear from an E-4 from the 470th MI who had an Iranian detainee and a dog bi the detainee on the tight. There was no interrogation being conducted at the time and the interrogator did not incite the dog. The interroaur present was [redacted] andhis analyst, [redacted] COL PAPPAS was in charge of rhe entire site. I believe [redacted] an the Interrogation Control Element. I was never aware of any MI personnel telling MPs to "soften up" a detainee or give them "the treatment." I am refering to the treatment being a bad thing.
Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF	_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____	

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004

at [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Building AT-5636 Gorham St; Fort Bragg, NC 28310	2004/06/15 [redacted]	1515 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		E-4/AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

9. [redacted] I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 27 Jul to 21 Dec 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97E Interrogator. My initial mission upon my arrival to AG was to set up the Life Support Area (LSA) and prepare for operations. The initial mission of the interrogation facility was to find members of the SADAAM FEDAYEEN. I conducted screenings, translation and interrogation support. As time went on, the focus of the facility broadened as AG became the central interrogation and debriefing center. Prior to initial operations, we were briefed on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. At first, approvals were verbal, but as the IROE changed, written approvals became more prevalent. [redacted] established the IROE. Initially the IROE was briefed during shift changes and daily update briefs. I remember signing at least one memorandum stating I read, understood and would follow the IROE. I cannot compare the Afghanistan IROE with the Iraqi IROE as I was not with the unit while they were in Afghanistan. In my opinion, the IROE was clear and adequately established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. The approaches used during an interrogation were requested in the interrogation plan which was done and approved prior to any interrogation. The approval level depended on the proposed approach. When the 325th MI Bn personnel arrived at AG there were several integration problems. The 325th MI Bn personnel seemed more interested in going home than in conducting the mission. Over time both units overcame these issues and we built a cohesive work environment. The 205th MI Bde also presented a problem in that seemed to micromanage operations and would cause more unnecessary work. The 72nd MP's were the typical Army unit. There were a few soldiers who were unprofessional. The transition from the 72nd MP Bn to the 372nd MP Bn was rough. It appeared the 72nd MP Bn leadership was unclear in their methodology and there was only a three day train-up for the 372nd MP Bn. In Dec 03, I did witness a guard dog being used in an interrogation. I believe COL PAPPAS authorized the use of the guard dog. The guard dog had to be muzzled and could not touch the detainee. At least twice during the interrogation, the guard dog was brought into the interrogation booth to scare the detainee. I am not sure of the effectiveness of this approach. A team from GTMO came to AG on two occasions. On the first occasion, the GTMO team provided advice and assistance to the overall interrogation operation. On the second occasion, the team actually integrated into the unit and performed interrogations. On one occasion, I did observe an Other Government Agency (OGA) interrogation. The line of questioning was not smooth, however, I did not witness any detainee abuse. There was a lot of pressure to produce reports regardless of intelligence value. In my opinion, there was never enough pressure to necessitate an interrogator bending the rules. During my time at AG, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee. I never witnessed nor heard of any MP offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations. I did not witness any nudity used for interrogation purposes. I heard of occasions in which interrogators and/or MP's would threaten the detainees with the loss of clothing, bedding and shoes if they did not cooperate. These were also given back to the detainees as a form of reward for positive behavior. I never witnessed or heard of any unauthorized photographs taken of detainees. If I would have seen any unlawful or abusive behavior, I would have reported it to my supervisor.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No.////////////

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Fort Bragg, NC DATED 2004/06/15

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ ~~OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT~~ WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of June, 2004 at Fort Bragg, NC

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] PAGES

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Camp Victory DATED 2004/06/16

[redacted]

MNF-I, C2, IMIR

[redacted] I was reinterviewed on 16 June 2004 by MG George R. Fay, [redacted] and [redacted] I was questioned in reference to interrogation plans: How were interrogation plans created and what happened to them? The investigative team stated they had not been able to find interrogation plans. Again, I stated that I arrived at Abu Ghraib on or about 12/13 September. The unit on site was the 519th MI BN and I arrived with a small operations group from the 325th MI BN. A couple of days later, elements of the 325th MI BN arrived to form up Tiger Teams. [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Elements (ICE). My function was to go through the files of detainees being held at Camp Vigilant and determining who had not been spoken to and still required to be spoke to and then prioritizing them for interrogations. I also went through the files of detainees who had been transferred from Camp Cropper. I reviewed their records and made sure the work we had done was in the file. There were sometimes several documents missing from the detainee files. We would search for them on the database and made copies of the documents we could find such as missing (IIRs). Interrogation plans were created by the interrogator and then run through the first level supervisor (senior interrogator). This was usually an E-6. The senior interrogator would go through the interrogation plan by adding, mentoring, coaching and then finally come up with interrogator what was going to happen. Once the senior interrogator approved it, it would go to the ICE OIC, [redacted] or [redacted] for approval. I do not know if the senior interrogators took every single interrogation plan to the ICE for approval. I did not approve any interrogation plans in the beginning. Sometime in early October, [redacted] and I were added to the list of individuals who could approve interrogation plans. I felt it was a good idea for me to review the interrogation plans to get a better idea of was going on in the interrogations and I had to get smart on the interrogation plans to be able to talk about them when persons visited Abu Ghraib and asked questions. I have no idea who ordered detainees to be naked. I have no knowledge of detainees being naked during interrogations. I do not remember when I first went to the Hard Site. I know it was after the incident with the three interrogators were caught conducting an unauthorized interrogation. I remember this because I didn't know where the area the unauthorized interrogation was. In the beginning, the interrogations were being conducted in tents offset from the operations tent within eyeshot of Camp Vigilant and the Operations area. When we had exceptions to policy (such as sleep management) we made a photocopy and provided it to the MPs so that they would know what was going on. In late November, I walked through the hard site and [redacted] pointed out that there were two exceptions with handwritten notes requesting a detainee to be stripped down. He asked me if I wanted them stripped naked. I told him no and I scratched over the handwritten notes and initialed it. I then went to go speak to his boss [redacted] and told her that we had a problem and that she needed to get with the interrogators and tell them that that was a no go. She said she would speak to him. I also told [redacted] I believe the interrogator who had written the statement was [redacted] He came up to me and told me no problem chief. I went back to

Initials of person making statement [redacted]

Exhibit 1

[redacted] check and speak to [redacted] I didn't see any problems.. During the time I approved interrogation plans, I did not approve nakedness and I read them thoroughly. Interrogation plans were kept a soft copy in the database and hard copy in the dossier of the detainee. I will state that I did go back and looked at some files and there were screening sheets and IIRs missing. Sometimes an interrogator would take out a document, review it and use it for other interrogations and sometimes they would get lost. Personnel in charge of making sure documentation was in the files were the heads of sections for each section, such as [redacted] and MYSELF for OPS. [redacted] was responsible for QCing the files and making sure the right paperwork was there. The ICE was responsible for interrogation files. The Detainee Assessment Board would review files before they went up to the magistrate cell for the release board. An assessment written up by the DAB would accompany the file. The assessment had to be there in order for the Magistrate Cell to review the files. Personnel working in the magistrate cell were [redacted] IN reference to the shooting incident: I was not one of the individuals who responded to the shooting initially. I was at Chow when the incident occurred. I found out about it when I was passing through the ICE. I asked about the situation and was told it had been locked down. NO one could go in or out because the MPs were going to do a complete search. I was tasked by [redacted] to work in helping identify who from the Iraqi Police were possibly involved and worked with [redacted] and myself had two HMWWVs. One of the detainees was sitting in the vehicle identifying the IPs. The MPs and MI personnel would bring out an IP and the lights of the vehicles would be on shinning on the IP. The detainee in the vehicle would then identify who from the IPs were possibly involved. A total of 11 IPs were identified. All IPs were returned back to the Hard Site and lined up. Once we completed this task, I typed the list of those identified and provided it to [redacted] He in turn would turn it over to [redacted] I do not know who made the decision to keep the 11 IPs detained. I was not aware any interrogations were going on or that dogs were used during interrogations. The dogs were used to search the cells, but I was not there. I was outside identifying the IPs for about three and a half hours or so. I do not know who was the MI person in charge. All I know is that I got my orders and tasking form [redacted] I do not know if he was telling other MI persons what to do. There were not supposed to have been any interrogations going on. The only thing that was supposed to happen was gain an assessment of every IP; those on shift and those who would come on shift the following days. Assessments typically last around 15 minutes and I assume that these assessments should have been the same, as they are meant not to be lengthy and fast but accurate enough to identify anyone of intelligence value. This went on for another two to three days. The dogs came in to the Hard Site sometime before I went outside and my understanding was that they only guarded in the open hallway but I never saw the dogs. I never saw the detainees or IPs naked that night. After I completed the task given by [redacted] I passed the area where the IPs were lined up. I do somewhat recall any chaotic situation in the area where the IPs were lined up. No one told me that interrogation techniques had been lifted and that we had a blanket approval the night of the shooting. I do not know who called the dogs or ordered interrogations. There were no interrogation plans or results to those interrogations. Q. Is there anything else you would like to this statement? A. No. ////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////[redacted]

Exhibit

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2004/05/06		

5. NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: CW2

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CJTF-7, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraid on 12 September 2004 as the IPW Platoon Leader for B/325 MI. My duties, along with the other seven individuals in my platoon, were to help run operations in the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. When I arrived, there [redacted] BN already at Abu Ghraib. The Company Commander was _____ and the first sergeant was [redacted] was the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center OIC. The 72nd MP Co was on site and under the command and control of the 800th MP BDE. My understanding was that the Forward Operating Base at Abu Ghraib was the responsibility of the MP assets. The first day we arrived was kind of hectic. We had to set up our billeting area, life support and start developing a work schedule for all my folks. About a day after I arrived, 20 more MI personnel arrived. These newly arrived personnel were forming the Tiger Teams (1 x Interrogator, 1 x Analyst, 1 x Translator). After three to four days on the [redacted] they began interrogation operations. My folks did not interrogate they stayed to work in the operations section. [redacted] knew why we were there and understood our mission. I began scrutinizing the existing requirements and detainees of interest. We continued to refine our role and responsibilities well into February when I finally departed. The training began around three days after we arrived around 17-18 September. The newly arrived personnel were trained on interrogation operations. They were told and shown where detainees were being held and who was segregated and why. They were thought questions and answers techniques as well. Before interrogation operations began, we did not get the Interrogation Rules of Engagement but my team had just arrived from Camp Cropper and they were aware of the IROE. There was no doubt in my mind that my team knew what the rules were. Once we received the IROEs, they were no different than what we had learned at the school or what the interrogation Field Manual stated. I believe we would discuss the Geneva Convention during normal conversation. Although we did not get additional Geneva Convention training, my [redacted] ll aware of due to the schooling they had receiv[redacted] Around the [redacted] time the 20 additional MI personnel [redacted] the senior MI officer in operations unti[redacted] arrival (around 13-14 September). [redacted] co-seated the operations duties. [redacted] showed up around the 16th of September to work in JIDC operations. He was the one who greeted everyone when they arrived. I believe he was in charge of Force Protection but it wasn't really clear. At one point I thought he was governing our Oper[redacted] of Administrative support to operations and not interrogations. He would go to the Hard Site with [redacted] myself or his staff. I did go to him for assistance a handful of times on detainee not of MI issues (criminal issues). There were no hard lines or specifics as to what the unit's organization was. Some more personnel form 323rd joined us 10 days later. COL PAPPAS visited the site regularly, but he did not live there. Once COL PAPPAS arrived on camp I didn't see too many changes. The communications with the MPs was not good at the beginning. Once COL PAPPAS became the FOB Commander, things did change some. The Entry Control Point to the Hard Site was better tracked. The movement of detainees was smoother. The MPs were more responsive to our needs and requests. Communications with the MPs was better. I was never aware, or witness any detainee physical abuse or inappropriate behavior of interrogation techniques, any photos or videos. A couple of times I was asked to observe an interrogation which possibly fell on the border line. I observed it and no inappropriate techniques materialized. I heard of an unauthorized interrogation by three interrogators. The interrogators took a female detainee and became fresh with her. I didn't [redacted] had a detainee strip were pulled off interrogation[redacted] do not know what punishment they received. Another time [redacted] off his clothing. [redacted] was also with her. They were pulled off interrogations. I believe she was counseled by her Team Leader [redacted] also given additional training on IROE. They were not my interrogators. In mid November, a group from GTMO came to instruct us on the GTMO role and worked amongst our ranks. Ghost detainees are those detainees who arrive to the JIDC and are not processed but held over for Other Government Agencies or TF-121. They are not given an ISN until their status is identified. When I first arrived, there was no memorandum of agreement as to what the procedures were. [redacted] were being dropped off without anyone knowing. Once COL PAPPAS arrived on the ground, he met with [redacted] and a memorandum was agreed upon all parties. This occurred sometime before Christmas. [redacted] kept a tie on these ghost detainees. Once they were turned over to us. Their paperwork followed a few days later. We were frequently hit with mortars but we were so short of personnel to get roving patrols started. I knew that there were Q-36 in country and in the

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/06

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

area but they were never deployed to our area. COL PAPPAS brought in the 165th MI BN who has LRSD to assist with the guarding of towers. There was a Scout company from the 82nd when we arrived. I really do not know why we were never reinforced. I know that the soldiers often voiced their concern of our location and the mortar attacks. I know who [redacted] and [redacted] are because they were part of a Tiger Team. They are part of the 325th and arrived after I did. They did [redacted] then reviews photos and identified. [redacted]

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

I, , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPA V1.00

CJTF7-TF-FAY 9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephonic Interview [redacted] DIA

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview with Mr. [redacted] DIA. [redacted] was deployed to Baghdad as a debriefer with the Iraqi Survey group (ISG). His team, comprised of both military (DIA) and Other Government Ageny (OGA) personnel, routinely coordinated with CJTF7 and conducted debriefings of detainees at Abu Ghraib. Their Points of Contact were [redacted] and two Sergeants, names unrecalled, who ensured detainees were available and brought to the interrogation facility for ISG. All of the ISG debriefings he was knowledgeable of occurred in the interrogation site known as "wood," outside the cell blocks. [redacted] was never in the Hard Site. [redacted] never observed or heard about abuse of detainees. The ISG conducted "debriefings" vice interrogations and no coercive methods were employed. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement he was provided and signed were compliant with the Army FM and Geneva Conventions as he recalled. Mr. [redacted] could not recall any names (or nicknames) of his OGA co-workers.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

25 June 2004

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS BASED ON A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN [redacted] S-3, 28TH COMBAT ARMY SURGICAL HOSPITAL (CASH).

On 25 June at approximately 1500hrs, I phoned the 28th CASH to request a list of all medical personnel tasked to support Abu Ghraib prison. [redacted] stated the 28th CASH had no personnel assigned to Abu Ghraib but that they did support prisoners form Abu Ghraib when they were transported to their facility to receive medical support. He provided a list of all PAs or doctors assigned to the CASH form Mid November to Mid December. Document is attached.

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD, VA

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/01

3. TIME: 1430 [redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Titan Corp. with Duty Iraq

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on 24 or 25 October 2003. In processing consisted of orientation of the facility and training on the IROE and Geneva Convention, presented by [redacted] I had to sign a statement that I had received training on them. We also received training on a monthly basis on the IROE's. These monthly sessions were presented by [redacted] and [redacted] told us that any request for measures listed on the IROE would have to be routed to her and passed up the line for approval. I was initially assigned to the Detainee Assessment Board for two days and then assigned to work with two different interrogation teams until after Saddam was captured on 14 December. One team included [redacted] and a military analyst whose name I do not recall. I usually worked in the interrogation sites, but on one occasion, I did go out with [redacted] I worked one time with [redacted] and [redacted] on the operation which took down Saddam. After Saddam's capture I was moved to the Special Operations Team, working with [redacted] I went into Block 1A on occasion to pick up or return a detainee. Sometimes we conducted interrogations in the shower area or stairwell of 1A; we also used the "wood site" and the "metal site". I did not see or hear about any instance of abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about the use of dogs for interrogation purposes. I did hear dogs barking as they were being used by the MPs to search cells the night of the shooting, but did not actually see them in use. I did not see or hear about detainees being stripped and kept naked in cells, nor did I see or hear about detainees having to wear women's underwear. I had heard about sleep management where in a detainee would only be allowed an hour or so sleep in a 24 hour period. I do not recall sleep management being used on any interrogation team to which I was assigned. I do not recall any instance of a detainee being thrown to the ground from a vehicle and/or dragged on the ground. I do not have any knowledge of OGA personnel doing any unauthorized interrogations. I was reassigned from AG on Feb 8th 2004. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No [redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

Initials

Follow [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

USAPA V1.00

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/06/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

J.T

USED
S.R.

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of June 2004
at Springfield, VA

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: DARMSTADT, GERMANY
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/05/1[redacted]
3. TIME: 1525[redacted]
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: SPC
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in [redacted] October 2003. I am a 96H and when I arrived at Abu Ghraib I was assigned as an Assistant Interrogation Analyst to work with Interrogators. My focus was Extreme Fighters. The first day we received a tour of the site. We were shown interrogation booths, where CAMP Vigilant and CAMP Ganci were. [redacted] an Analyst worked with interrogators. The interrogators I worked with were [redacted] Every interrogator had his way of using an analyst. Some allowed you to ask questions which were relevant to the interrogation plan. Other interrogators did not allow you to ask questions they just wanted you to take notes and do the research. We also received some general information on the Geneva Convention but no classes on it. We received the Interrogation Rules of Engagements (IROEs) and [redacted] of iterations of the IROEs. I was not taught what was acceptable or not acceptable. But the section leader [redacted] discussed it with us. I understood that I was not to touch a detainee. I remember one time when I was dropping off a detainee after an interrogation. I went upstairs to TIER 1 to drop off the detainee to the MPs while [redacted] stayed below to do something else. I handed the detainee to the MP and they asked me if how come the detainee was in shackles. I told them that the detainee had been untruthful. The MP (I do not recall who they were just that he was a male, not an NCO and had a brown T-shirt) took the detainee and jerked him toward the wall. The detainee hit the railing. When the MPs took the bag off, I noticed the detainee had blood on his head. [redacted] They reported it to either [redacted] I told [redacted] as well and maybe even [redacted] I do not know what they did. This occurred sometime in November after we took [redacted] over escorting of detainees. On another time I saw the MPs making two detainees do PT. These two detainees had raped a boy. The MPs could make them do MP but we were not allowed. No one ever suggested that it was okay for MPs to abuse detainees but we knew they could use the necessary force hen detainees [redacted] control. I never saw or had any knowledge videns of detainees or dogs being used for interrogations. I did see [redacted] (who always had a camera) take photos of detainee once. She took a photo of a detainee who was standing next to [redacted] This is the only time I knew of anyone taking photos of detainees. The MPs had cameras and [redacted] Hard Site. I knew photos were not allowed in the interrogation area but I did not know of the Isolation Area. [redacted] NCOs were there and they saw her so I just assumed they allowed to since the NCOs didn't say anything. [redacted] I knew there were detainees delivered by Other Government Agencies (OGA) but I never dealt with them. [redacted] dealt with them a lot. OGA never shared any intelligence they obtained from the detainees even when they belonged to us. There was a time when two female OGAs went in to the cell with weapons. I didn't notice the weapons until after they had walked out. I notified [redacted] and stated it was wrong. Do not know what happened after that. We had a shortage of clothing for detainees. We did not have enough blankets, jumpsuits, shoes, or other items. I saw a naked detainee who was thrown in the black room (the Hole). The detainee was a troublemaker and had gotten violent with a female MP. I was told that the MPs policy when placing a detainee in the Hole was to put him in the cell naked. I never heard or was aware of any MI personnel tell MPs to "soften-up" or give "the treatment" to detainees. One stressed position I witnessed only once was when we had a detainee handcuffed to the floor but we only did it for a short period and kept watch on him. We would check his fingers and hands to ensure he had good blood circulation. This was in following with the interrogation plan. When I first arrived, there were rumors of prostitution and alcohol but [redacted] happened that. Two of our soldiers were caught with alcohol and they received Article 15s and lost rank [redacted] I didn't really know DJ but his analyst was [redacted]

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No [redacted]

END of STATEMENT

LOTTIE 6

Follow S[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/11

2. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

[redacted]

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS [redacted] HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION [redacted]

[redacted]

Signature of Person Making Statement

WITNESS:

Witnessed and taken by me, a person authorized to do so, this [redacted] day of MAY 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

Signature of Person Administering Oath

[redacted]

Typed Name of Person Administering Oath

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

Authority to Administer Oaths

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2004/05/0[redacted]

3. TIME
1330[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372ND MILITARY POLICE COMPANY, CUMBERLAND, MD (DEPLOYED TO IRAQ)

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Bu Ghraib on 15 October 2003. My role was 372nd MP Co Commander. When I arrived [redacted] was in charge of the 320th MP Bn. I believed [redacted] was in charge of the MI folks. He was involved [redacted] would go to him when I needed something done. He made things happened. It wasn't until later that I found out [redacted] was actually in charge. [redacted] wasn't approachable. I began a Relief in Place with the previous Company Commander, [redacted] gave me a tour of Abu Ghraib. He took me to the Hard Site in particular, WING 1. He told me that Wing 1 belonged to the MI [redacted]. The MPs controlled access to the wing. They had the keys and would let people in and out. During one of my visits with [redacted] I was shocked when I noticed that the detainees in Wing 1 were naked. There was one with women's underwear. I questioned that and [redacted] told me that the MI folks told him that was an MI procedure. I then asked [redacted] the previous company commander and he stated that was a common practice by MI. I did think there was something wrong, but I would go to Wing 1 with MI folks [redacted] and some folks from Other Organization Agencies (OGA) so I just figured they knew what their procedures were and that this was an acceptable practice. The visits were at all hours not just during one part of the day. They saw what I saw. I never did question this to any MI Person. Maybe I should have looked into it. Both [redacted] and I did ask [redacted] for the MI Rules of Engagement but I never received them. There was some confusion as to who was who. We had MI personnel without nametags; there were folks in civilian clothes, detainees, and ghost detainees. It was very frustrating. Things got a little better after the International Community Red Cross (ICRC) came to visit for the second time. Sometime after that, they stopped having naked detainees. This occurred sometime in December. I never saw or had knowledge of any detainee abuse by MI personnel except for one day when I was down at Wing 1. One of the interrogators ([redacted] tall, big guy) an MI person, took a detainee to a cell. While he was getting him into the cell, he pushed the prisoner into the cell by giving him a push with his foot. It wasn't real hard. I went up to him and told him to stop that. There was no other abuse by MI personnel that I was aware of. I have no knowledge of any photos or videos before the investigation began. The only time I heard of dogs used was after the shooting. I never saw or heard of MI using dogs during their interrogations. We used to get mortar attacks a few times a week. That was a big issue with soldiers because nothing was really being done. It caused a big morale issue. We recommended placing sandbags around the holding areas but were told the detainees could hide behind them. We also requested bunkers to be placed in the holding area but was told that couldn't be done.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? Yes. One of the main focuses while I was there was the construction of the prison. I had weekly visits and corresponded through email with [redacted] and [redacted] of the CPA. I gave morning reports to the 320th BN of the status of the construction and possible completion dates of projects. There was a huge push to open up the rest of the prison because of over crowding in the camps. Another area I was focused on was supplies for the prison. I worked closely with the Iraqi supply person and [redacted] at the prison. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had the primary responsibility for all supplies at the prison. There were many times that we had no supplies to include jump-suits worn by the inmates. Often when we did get a supply, it was of very few quantities and sizes. This was a major issue early on and after a few months we were able to maintain some sort of stock. Often because of the lack of supplies many inmates were forced to wear ladies underwear or articles of clothing either to large or to small. I also know that we had to give the females some male items also. The command climate was not good at ABU [redacted] was a moral commander and never gave me an order or asked me to do anything that was unprofessional. [redacted] was in my opinion afraid of BG KARPINSKI and I even told him a few times that I would try and answer her questions for him the best I could. I only did this because she liked to humiliate him or belittle him when she could. So as we walked around the prison, I tried to answer as often as I could for him. Also, I had little to no respect for [redacted] he made comments regarding the reserves and I feel he was extremely prejudice. I saw him on several occasions take time his and he showed no respect to anyone. I witnessed him walk by a NCO who saluted him and [redacted] blew him completely off. The NCO was very upset and said" If you want respect sir, it goes both ways!" I have recently seen BG KARPINSKI on TV. I totally disagree with several of her statements. First off, how can anyone say the MP's are not responsible? I take full responsibility for my seven soldiers and believe they are the main problem not the [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The last thing I would like to say is BG KARPINSKI has been a total disappointment. She does not have her facts straight and the only time we saw her was when the media or a VIP was present. She also made [redacted] her scapegoat and blamed everything on him. Her staff was the most incompetent and I never new who the SOM was.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

Nothing

follow [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of MAY, 2004

at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Victory IRAQ
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20040616[redacted]
3. TIME: 1951 [redacted]
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: CW2
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: MNF-I, C2 MIR
9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib on 12 September 2004 as the JIDC Operations section Warrant for the 205th MI BDE. My duties, along with the other six individuals of my platoon who arrived from Camp Cropper, were to help establish operations in the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. When I arrived, elements of the 519th MI BN were already at Abu Ghraib. The Company [redacted] was the Joint Commander was either [redacted] and the first sergeant was [redacted] the command and Interrogation Debriefing [redacted] ol Element OIC. The 72nd MP Co was on site and under control of the 800th MP BDE. My understanding was that the Forward Operating Base at Abu Ghraib was the responsibility of the 800th MP BDE. The first days we arrived were hectic. We had to set up our billeting area, life support and start developing a work schedule for my personnel. About a day after I arrived, 10 more MI personnel arrived. These newly arrived personnel were forming the Tiger Teams (1 x Interrogator, 1 x Analyst) to augment the 519th Tiger Teams. After two days on the ground, they began interrogation operations. My six OPS personnel did not interrogate and stayed to work in the operations section. [redacted] We [redacted] knew why we were there. My team and I first began scrutinizing the existing requirements and detainees of interest. We continued to refine our role and responsibilities well into February when I finally departed. Familiarization (walk-through) training began the day after we arrived. The newly arrived Tiger Team personnel were familiarized with interrogation operations. They were told and shown where detainees were being held and who was segregated and why. Before the Tiger Teams began interrogation operations, they did not get a formal Interrogation Rules of Engagement, but my team had just arrived from Camp Cropper and they were aware of the IROE. As for my OPS team, I am confident they knew what the rules were as they helped implement these rules at Cropper. Once we received the actual IROE, it was not different than what we had learned at the school or what the Interrogation Field Manual stated, however many school-house taught techniques had to be approved by higher. I believe we would discuss the Geneva Convention during normal conversation and although we initially did not get additional Geneva Convention training at JIDC, my team was aware of its responsibilities due to the MOS schooling they had received. Around the same time the 20 additional MI personnel arrived, [redacted] was the senior MI officer in operations until [redacted] arrival (around 23 September) [redacted] co-seated the operations duties. [redacted] arrived around the 16th of September to work at JIDC as well. At the beginning, I thought he was governing our [redacted] Operations section. He was in charge of Administrative support to JIDC and operations. He would go to the Hard Site with [redacted] myself or a member of the OPS staff. I did go to him for assistance a handful of times on detainee [redacted] terminal issues/ matters. More personnel from the 323rd joined us 10 days later. At first [redacted] visited the site regularly, but he did not live there. Once [redacted] arrived on camp, I didn't see too many changes as he appeared to be observing the existing 519th battle-plan. Communications with the MPs did not appear good at the beginning. Once [redacted] became the FOB Commander, things did begin to change. The Entry Control Point to the Hard Site traffic was better tracked. The movement of detainees became smoother. Communication with MPs appeared improved and they appeared more responsive to site needs. I was never aware of, or witnessed any detainee physical abuse or inappropriate behavior of interrogation techniques or any photos or videos depicting such. A couple of times I was asked to observe an interrogation which possibly fell on the border line. I observed it and no inappropriate techniques materialized. I heard of an unauthorized interrogation by three interrogators in SEP 03. The interrogators took a female detainee, at night, and became fresh with her. I didn't fully hear what they did. The interrogators were pulled off interrogations. I do not know what punishment they received. Another time, I heard of [redacted] having a detainee stripped of his clothing. Her analyst [redacted] was also with her. They were pulled off interrogations. I firmly believe she was counseled by her Team Leader, [redacted] and given additional training on IROE. They were not my subordinates. In mid November, a group from GTMO came to instruct us on the GTMO model and worked amongst our ranks. They outlined the responsibilities of each member and section and an Organization Chart was developed accordingly. Ghost detainees were those detainees who arrived at Abu Ghraib, but did not possess all documentation necessary for full in-processing. They were usually sourced from TF-121 or Other Governmental Agencies. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT [redacted]

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT BAGHDAD, IZ DATED 16 JUN 04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

They were not issued an in-processing ISN until fully in-processed, and until then were tracked and accounted for by Capture Tag number and personal data. When I first arrived, there was no memorandum of agreement as to what those procedures were. Sometimes, detainees were dropped off without any JIDC member knowing. [redacted] later met with OGA and TF-121 representatives and a memorandum was drafted and agreed upon by all parties. This may have occurred sometime before Christmas. Prior to that, the MPs maintained a personal file on these ghost detainees until their necessary paperwork followed a few days later. We were frequently hit with mortars, but we were so short of personnel to get roving patrols started. I thought that there were Q-36s in country and in the area, but counter-actions in our area were not observed. [redacted] brought in the 165th MI BN who has LRSD to assist with the guarding of towers and base security issues. There was also a Scout unit 82nd that arrived sometime after we did. I really do not know why we were never fully reinforced. I know that soldiers often voiced their concern of our location and the mortar attacks. I know who [redacted] are. They were members of Tiger Teams. They were cross-leveled to the 325th from other units and arrived at Abu Ghraib after I did. They did not work for me. (CW2 [redacted] possibly [redacted] and possibly [redacted] then reviews photos and identifies [redacted] and a contract linguist whom he could not name in photos where detainees are being abused.) Q. Is there anything you would like to add? A. No [redacted]

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[redacted]

MNF-I CJ2 FMTF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

MNF-I CJ2 FMTF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16 day of JUN 2004

at: FMTF BAGHDAD IRAQ

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

CJTF7-TF-FAY

9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJEC [redacted] B CO/302nd MI BN

1. (FOUO) On 31 May 2004, the undersigned telephonically contacted [redacted] at the 302nd MI BN, Wiesbaden, GM, to clarify details of his sworn statement taken in May 2004 concerning his time at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] denied ever seeing or hearing about specific incidents of abuse. He stated that rumours were rampant at Abu Ghraib concerning MP abuse of detainees and that these rumours were often discussed between himself and his friends. [redacted] identified [redacted] as his friends with whom he conversed. [redacted] reiterated his statements to friends that "MPs were doing their thing," "detainees were having sex," and "videos of the detainees were being made" were just rumour; he didn't think anyone would take him seriously or construe that he had personal knowledge.

(U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2004/05/		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/302ND Military Intelligence Battalion, Weisbaden, Germany APO AE

9.
I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib toward the mid to late November 2003. My role was to be an intelligence analyst and be a member of a Tiger Team. When I first arrived we were told how to do our job. We were told to sit in on the booth and take notes. I do not remember getting specific training. There was hearsay that we were not to touch the detainee. We were told there were mirrors in the booth. At the beginning I was not doing interrogations because CID was conducting an investigation on prostitution, photos and videos. I do not know if I ever did sign the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. I might have. I was just thrown into it. There were three interrogators I worked with. One of them was [redacted] also worked with us at times. I sat in with others as well but I do not remember their names. I never went to Tier 1B alone. [redacted] put it out that no one would go to the hard site alone. I worked the day shift so I didn't go to the hard site at night except for the time of the handgun incident. I never witnessed or had knowledge of any detainee abuse, any photos or videos of detainees or the use of dogs during interrogations. We were told not to take pictures or weapons in the booth. The MPs used the dogs. I witnessed the dogs once after the handgun incident. I was one of the individuals called to assist. I didn't do anything but showed my presence. There were a lot of MI and MP personnel there. I do not remember the MI personnel except for [redacted]. The Iraqi police were all lines up stripped searched, given their clothes back and questioned. The dogs were barking and being walked around. I never saw or was aware for the dog biting someone. The hard site seemed unorganized because there were so many folks there. [redacted] was in charge of the main personnel; we just had a presence. I do not remember who was talking to whom. There was a female in the Hard Site during all this. She was [redacted] an interpreter she was with [redacted] and [redacted]. The day following the incident I was sent to Camp Victory for three weeks. When I returned, I was made a guard. At first we would pick up the detainees but that stopped and I never returned to the Hard Site. We just kept guard outside the booths at Camp STEEL and Camp WOOD. There were rumors about personnel saying there were videos about detainees having sex. My friends and I would joke around making comments about detainees. When we would pass by the hard site and heard noise we would say, oh there are the MPs doing their thing. I never thought anyone would take it seriously.

Q Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A No.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu G	2004-06-15	1345	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: Contractor
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CACI, 504 MI BDE, JIDC A/202 MI BN, APO AE 09342
9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

My name is [redacted]. I made a previous statement to MG Fay about two weeks ago. What I know, is from translating for [redacted] and [redacted], during their screenings. I've been here since December 8, 2003. I've heard many, many detainees talking about the palace and [redacted]. Detainees also talk about bad treatment from Iraqis and Coalition forces at the airport. Last week a detainee complained of being stepped on his chest at the airport. I don't know where the airport is. Detainees were brought from the airport in bad shape by I think 4ID, but I really don't know the name of the unit. [redacted] told me that a detainee mentioned [redacted] and asked "do you know [redacted] and [redacted] they are here?" He said [redacted] sent a message through him, telling the Coalition forces, "I'm going to clean up the area and her family". I don't know of any Coalitions forces' units involved. The two sisters came here January 4th. [redacted] mentioned that a detainee she was screening, mentioned Adamya Palace about two months ago. I'm not familiar with any detainees associated with CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF.

The detainee who made the complaint about the treatment at the airport was not related to [redacted] in any way

NOTHING FOLLOWS

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

space

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

1. [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of June, 2004 at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPPC V3.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Detention Facility Baghdad Iraq			

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad Iraq

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib on 5 December 2003. I have never witnessed and physical abuse in Abu Ghraib. I have seen and heard a lot of yelling and screaming during in-processing. The detainees are yelled at to move faster. These were the MPs not the interrogators. I have never observed dogs being used to threaten a detainee. I never heard any MI tell any MP to "soften-up" a detainee. I never witnesses or heard of any detainee being humiliated or made to wear any women underwear. What I know is what [redacted] has told me. There were two sisters [redacted] and I do not remember the sister. One of the ladies told me that they had been taken to Al Azimiyah Palace. She said that [redacted] an Iraqi Police captured her. He would beat them up and threaten them with their children. [redacted] sexually abused the other younger brother who is handicap. He could not sit and was bleeding from the rectum. The boy was crying because he was sexually abuse with a stick up his rectum. [redacted] took her older brother outside and beat him until he passed out. They brought him naked and threw him at me. They said he was dead. [redacted] send a message with those captured that he was going to clean up Iraq. [redacted] was an Iraqi officer who was promoted for doing a good job. There was one detainee who said [redacted] got him and told him that if he wanted to see his wife and children, he had to pay some money to him. His wife delivered the money but he never saw her. One interpreter [redacted] was present when he was naked and given a cold shower. He was placed on sleep patterns and was forced to be naked. He did not remember receiving any training. The training we received was nothing in the classroom environment. I felt confident on information we received on dealing with detainees. We didn't get any information on what was acceptable and not acceptable until later on when I was there for a while. In January we finally got a policy. I basically have two individuals I report to. On the administrauve, [redacted] (CACI) is my immediate supervisor and in the military side it is [redacted]

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. No.
//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF ____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, . HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at Abu Ghraib, Detention Facility

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieva
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq	20040615	1345	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted] | 6. SSN: [redacted] | 7. GRADE/STATUS: Contractor

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: PATT 504 MI BDE, TIPC A/BDE MI BN APO AE 09342

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

My name is [redacted] I am a screener here at Abu Ghraib since December 2003. I made a statement about two weeks ago to [redacted] in reference to a palace and [redacted] I screened both brothers [redacted] and both sisters [redacted] The sisters arrived on January 4th, and the brother on January 2nd. When initially screening the brothers, they were scared to death and they thought we were going to beat them. One said he was raped with a bottle by [redacted] and they mentioned another brother that was supposedly beat to death.

In my opinion, [redacted] came in emotionally and physically abused. [redacted] said, I don't remember in exact words, "they have taken everything from me."

I don't remember their capturing unit; all I know was that they came from the palace. I asked them if Americans were present and that's when the American flag tattoo on the arm came up, and someone said they a saw black man there.

The first thing I do when I do a screening is ask them if there are any medical conditions that I need to know about. That's when anything like, if they've been abused, comes up and I'll stop the interview and take them to the aid station next door. The next day if we MI hold them for a military value, they're seen by the Air force doctors as well. I want to say that we took the brothers to the aid station, but [redacted] said we didn't because we were getting hit by mortars. I don't know if they got a rectal examination. I don't remember anything about their wrists. When I screen detainees and view their packets I can generally tell who their capturing unit was.

When SF brought detainees in they used to put sandbags on their heads and they'd drop them off and leave. They stopped all the sandbags because when they took the sandbags off their head, you could see that they were facially abused. Not all of them, just some of them, but that just sticks out, SF. I don't know which SF unit. I saw detainees with bruises, black eyes, blood in the eyes, beaten, physical abuse. If we get them like that, we'll stop and take them to the aid station or MPs, that way we're cleared of it. We don't want it said that it happened here.

It's to the point now when we MI Hold someone they all say they've been tortured, it's ridiculous. Since the Abu Ghraib thing broke out detainees are saying it, more than looking it. They know they'll get money from Americans, and they know Abu Ghraib. Over the course of my time here I have seen maybe ten detainees come in here physically abused, downright beaten and tortured, and I've easily screened hundreds of detainees. The only trend associated with that abuse would be with SF detainees. [redacted] name comes up a lot among detainees and abuse. One of the first questions I'd ask was "why were you detained" and if they would mention [redacted] it was usually associated with extortion, and "he beat me". Those were the two predominant there.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

10. EXHIBIT	11. [redacted] PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

Signature of Person Making Statement

WITNESSES

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of June, 2004 at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

[redacted]

Signature of Person Administering Oath

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPPC V2.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*

PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility			

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, Abu Ghraib

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in mid December. I was assigned as a screener. When I first arrived, we were given the briefed on teb Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I did have a general understanding of the Geneva Convention, Military Policy and the CACI policy. I never witnessed or was awareof any detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. I did see alot of the detainees come to Abu Ghraib abused. There was a family who was brought in because they were supposely Fedeyeen. I would always ask about their health problems. If teby told us they were beaten, we would take them to the medical facility to get checked. There was one incident of rape with a bottle and a death of a brother. I wrote the report and sent it up higher. This occurred in January at ASAMIYA PALACE. [redacted] and Iraqi Police, was causing this. I heard that the Iraqis recently killed him and hung him. I heard this through interpreters but not official channels yet. I do not know who [redacted] worked for. One of the indivudal who had been abused said he remembers one of the Americans had a flag on him arm. I worked for [redacted] for operations, military side, and [redacted] during screenings,

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____
at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARtiCLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

21 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of [redacted]

On 05 MAY 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] was read his rights (Detainee abuse, failure to report that abuse, false testimony) which he invoked. (DA Form 3881 provided). Source requested legal counsel and MG Fay ended the interview.

[redacted]
MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

A: Isolation. It's where the Military Intelligence prisoners are kept.
Q: Who were the Military Intelligence personnel that conducted the interviews of the alleged rapists?
A: I recognize the faces, but I don't know their names. I know that one of the MI people has left Iraq, but the other one is still here. I don't know his name though.
Q: Who else was present when you saw the detainee's handcuffed together?
A: There was a bunch of other MI people there, but I don't know their names. There was also other MP's there, but I don't know their names either.
Q: Did anyone other than [redacted] hit any detainee's that night?
A: No, the only people that hit the detainees wa[redacted]
Q: Do you recall anyone throwing anything at the detainees while they were handcuffed together?
A: I saw [redacted] throw a football at the prisoners. He was pretty close and it hit one of the detainee's in the stomach.
Q: Did you ever see anyone jump on or kick the detainees that night?
A: No. Like I said, I only saw [redacted] hit the detainees with their hands, not their feet.
Q: Why were you there that night?
A: I was ordered to work at the ISO area to translate between the guards and the detainees.
Q: Why do you think [redacted] placed the alleged rapists in a sexual position after undressing them?
A: I think they were trying to humiliate them.
Q: Did anyone at Military Intelligence order [redacted] to do these things to the detainees?
A: I don't know, but I do know I never heard anyone tell them to do anything like they did.
Q: How were [redacted] acting when they placed the detainees together in a sexual manner?
A: They were laughing and having a good time.
Q: When you heard [redacted] brag about hitting a prisoner into the cell door, how was he acting?
A: He seemed happy to have caused a lot of pain for the detainee.
Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A: No.///END OF STATEMENT///

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT, WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OR BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by Law to administer oaths, this 14th day of January, 2004 at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
10th Military Police Battalion (CID)
Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Article 136, UCMJ or 5 USC 303
(Authority to Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

fficial Use Only

EXHIBIT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; The proponent agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq	18 Jan 04	15:10 pm	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		CIV

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Titan Corporation, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq 99335

I, [redacted] want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. Are you making this statement on your own free will?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you been advised that you do not have to answer or questions or say anything?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you able to leave at this time if you decide to terminate this interview?
A. Yes.
Q. Has anyone threatened you in anyway?
A. No.
Q. Are you currently taking any medications that would impede your ability to answer these questions?
A. No.
Q. On 14 Jan 04, when you gave CID a sworn statement, was that a truthful statement?
A. I did not say the part of how I held the detainees foot that was on the floor so he would not run away.
Q. Why did you hold the foot down of the detainee?
A. So he would not run away and he would answer the question. I held it with my hand. Not in any powerful way.
Q. Did anyone ask you to hold the foot of the detainee?
A. No.
Q. Did anyone force you to hold the foot of the detainee?
A. No. I thought I was helping the MP's to get to the truth.
Q. How many interrogations have you been a part of since arriving at Abu Ghraib?
A. Maybe between 80 and 100 interviews
Q. What agencies do you assist in the interviews?
A. MI and MP's, and some OGA.
Q. Have many times have you seen MI, MP, or OGA interrogate three detainees at the same time, handcuffed and nude, on the floor?
A. One time.
Q. Are you aware of the guidelines that are allowed by MI, MP and OGA when they are interviewing a detainee?
A. We were briefed on the guidelines. [redacted] briefed us back in November sometime.
Q. Was this briefing prior to the incident mentioned above?
A. After this incident.
Q. Do you think that what the MPs and the MI were doing to the three detainees was a correct form of interrogation?
A. No. I think they took matters into their own hands.
Q. Why was it not the correct form of interrogations?
A. Well first of all they wanted to interview the detainees they should have let MI talk to them. I do not think

[4-1]

For Official Use Only

EXHIBIT 73
p 43

MPs are qualified here to do these interviews.

Q. So you realize this was an unauthorized interrogation?

A. Yes. I did not know if it was authorized or not.

Q. Did any of the men the detainees in this incident speak English?

A. No

Q. Were you the only translator at this incident?

A. Yes. I even apologized to the detainees after this was down. I told them I thought what had happened was very degrading.

Q. What specifically did you tell the detainees to do?

A. Don't try to run away, stop right there, are you gay, do you like what is happening to you, are you all gays, you must like that position. These were some of the questions or things that I told them.

Q. Did you realize at the time that you were saying these things to the detainees that it was wrong to tell them these things the soldiers wanted you to say?

A. I do realize it was wrong at that time to say these things.

Q. Why was it was wrong to say these thing to the detainees?

A. Because it was degrading to them.

Q. Why did you translate these things anyway?

A. I thought that was what I was required to do as a translator.

Q. Did you ever receive any briefing how detainees would be treated?

A. No.

Q. Were you ever told who you could report detainee abuse to? [redacted]

A. No. The only thing that is logical is to report it to your boss or ~~the~~ the unit.

Q. Do you feel what you said to these detainees was wrong?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever translate for [redacted] on any other occasion when they abused the detainees?

A. Just when they would shake them. Nothing that was significant.

Q. Have you ever hit or assaulted any detainee?

A. I just held his foot, and I shook them by grabbing their clothes.

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 18th DAY OF Jan 04 AT Abu Ghurib Prison, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Warren D. Worth
(Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136, UCMJ
(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGES 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA Form 2823 (AUTOMATED)

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EXHIBIT Z

Q. Was there ever time when you were in a c_.l with a detainee alone?
A. I do not recall ever being alone in a cell with any detainee. I always have a guard present when I am in the cell.
Q. Have you ever been in a cell alone and the detainee was nude?
A. No not alone. Only when they were being questioned by MI or someone and I was translating.
Q. Did you ever engage in sexual intercourse with a male detainee?
A. No.
Q. Were you ever present when photographs of detainees were taken?
A. When they took the picture of the detainee that busted his chin, I was present for that.
R. Who took this picture?
A. [redacted]
Q. Why did [redacted] take the picture?
A. I do not know. Maybe to prove he was injured.
Q. How did this detainee get injured?
A. [redacted] pushed the detainee against the wall.
Q. Did you witness this act?
A. No. I was upstairs at the time.
Q. Who else was there?
A. I think [redacted] was in the office up stairs; maybe [redacted] or he came after.
Q. Why did [redacted] push this detainee into the wall?
A. I do not know. [redacted] did not say why he did it.
Q. Who stitched the detainee's chin up?
A. The medics and [redacted] helped sew up the wound.
Q. Did you ever witness [redacted] assault any other detainees?
A. To the extent of injury no, but they would shake the detainee around. Especially when they detainee was a high-ranking officer or political value.
Q. Did you ever take any pictures of the detainees?
A. No.
Q. Do you have a personal computer here?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever seen any other MP's conduct interviews of the detainees?
A. I have seen [redacted] shake some of the detainees.
Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No.///End of Statement///

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

For Official Use Only

EXHIBIT 73

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2004/05/05 BA	1410	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
TITAN

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib on 23 July as a linguist. I was with the first group of Linguists who arrived on site. The were some MPs on site already. The 205th MI personnel arrive a couple of days before we did. When we first arrived, Abu Ghraib was not set up yet. [redacted] gave us a tour of the facilities and were introduced to the 205th members. Our focus was to clean up the place and get it ready to operate in. We had some mock interrogations. We were told how interrogations would occur. At that time, no one spoke to us in detail about any rules on how to treat detainees. We were told on how and what to translate basically to maintain the same state of mind as the interrogator. We didn't have a class on prohibitions against detainees. Just in General we were told not to physically touch, push or hit a detainee unless a detainee initiated the act. Within two days of my arrival, I was translating for interrogators. I worked with several interrogators initially.
I knew no weapons or cameras were allowed in the cells. It was a general rule no pictures were allowed. I understand that. If I had a question of taking photos, I would ask [redacted] As far as humiliating a detainee, there were times when interrogators used dirty language. I brought this up to [redacted] and this was discussed with [redacted] Interrogation Operations Chief. She said sometimes the interrogators were allowed to use dirty language. Approximately two months after my arrival, there were a group of 6-8 brothers delivered to the detention facility. One of the detainees was [redacted] The interrogators believed he was the leader of the group and the leader of a smuggling operation. While I was conducting interrogators, I saw [redacted] walking down the hallway naked. The interrogator was a 205th military soldier. I do not recall his name. Another incident I saw was of a naked detainee leaning against the wall and water being poured at him. This was during the winter. I did not report it because I did not know what I was supposed to do in such incidents. We were not told what our responsibilities were. It wasn't until another incident occurred that we were told our responsibilities in reporting such acts. We were told that if any abused occurred in the booth the entire team along with the linguists shared the responsibility. The incident I am referring to was when three interrogators with linguist went into a female detainee cell and harassed her (that is what the detainee and other detainee witnesses reported). [redacted] stated that if females were to be interrogated by male a female interrogator or a female MP had to be present. [redacted] explained the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and made everyone sign the IROE. We all received a copy of the IROEs but we had to turn them in the next day. I don't know why we had to return them. [redacted] posted the IROEs on the ICE wall. There were some interrogation techniques that required approval from higher. When interrogations were complete, the MPs would ask the MI if the detainee had cooperated or was good. MI would answer and tell them to put them in sleep deprivation or place loud music, in summer they would request to cover the window. In winter, they would request the blanket be taken away. One time I heard an MP tell MI to put it in writing. The MPs were there to keep order. I was never aware of the use of dogs except when the dogs were used for accountability in the general population and at that time the dogs were distant from the detainees. The detainee complaint to the interrogator that they did not want to wear women's underwear. The detainee was told that that was the only thing available at that time. I never heard or was aware of MI telling the MPs to "soften up" or physically abuse a detainee. I never witnessed such things. At the beginning it was a very hostile environment. MI was under pressure to produce results. The soldiers were young and some were upset because they felt that some of these detainees had killed Americans. There was another time when four interrogators took a detainee and while interrogating him they asked him if he wanted to take his shirt off. They asked him if he wanted to be touched by a man. (one of the interrogator actually touched the detainee's breast). During another interrogation a female interrogator told me she was going to use humiliation techniques. She told the detainee he had a nice body and that if his wife appreciated or liked his body. I requested they stop and she did. I believe the interrogator's name was [redacted] or something like that. I was shown some photos where I identified the linguist [redacted] On several photos he was standing next to other military personnel with a naked detainee. On another photo he was sitting on the floor with his back to the wall next to a naked detainee who appeared to be treated. [redacted] would spend a great amount of time in the isolation area. Most of the time I went to the isolation area, he was always there. I saw him a couple of times in the women's detainee area. I do not recall anything else.
Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
A. No. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2003/05/05

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

//////////////////////////////////////End of Statement// [redacted]

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5th day of MAY, 2004
at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

09 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Telephonic Interview of [redacted]

On 09 June 2004, I conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] The following is a statement based on questions I asked. [redacted] is currently reviewing his statement and getting it signed.

[redacted]

DET OKINAWA, 500TH MI GROUP

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 October 03. The first few days I arrived, [redacted] took us on a tour of the facilities and we received training on the Interrogating Rules of Engagement. I believe the training was sufficient and I made sure my team understood them. The training was no different than what we had received at the school with the exception of the use of dogs. The school never taught us how to use dogs and we did not know how we could use the dogs. I do not remember anyone explaining how to use the dogs. I remember in casual conversations that dogs were allowed to bark. I remember thinking if you have a dog barking that is not going to be a good interrogation technique. I never used a dog nor did any of my team members. Techniques as sleep deprivation were a common thing. We were never trained on the use of dogs. Everyone read the IROE and signed that they understood them. As far as the commanders go, the training was sufficient. I did believe that the junior soldiers could have receiving more training because interrogation operations in not a science. You never know how a detainee is going to respond to certain detainees. You cold never get enough training. In interrogations there are a lot of calls we had to make. It is not a science when dealing with people. New things that are not covered in the IROE come up every day. I was fortunate that I had some more experience individuals. I didn't know anything was going on until I got back from leave. I was made a section leader for the Force Protection Tiger Team and took over [redacted] team. I was team leader from OCT until DEC (1st week).

My team consisted of [redacted] a CACI member (big football physic African American), and a linguist - [redacted] (he was fired after a short time; nothing that had to do with interrogations.) [redacted] d their stuff together. The first time I went to the Hard Site was on the tour of the facility. [redacted] ICE NCOIC took us on the tour. I am not 100% sure that the 470th arrived the same time we did. I am pretty sure that they did go on the tour. I was toward the rear of the group because of my leg problem. On the tour I saw detainees mopping the floors. I also saw guys in civilian clothes leading the detainees and military personnel were present as well. I was told the guys in civilian clothes were the Iraqi Police. I did not see any naked detainees during the tour. As far as I know, I never saw a request to interrogate a detainee naked. I do not think anything like that

happen. I made pretty regular spot check and never saw any naked detainees. I do not know who the interrogators got approval from. When I went to spot check, the only thing I saw that was humiliating was a detainee who had a Mohawk. The MP (NFI) was bragging that his clippers run out on him and I felt this was wrong and not helping the issue. I thought he wasn't helping the issue. [redacted] was there and witnessed it and I expected he would do something about it. I didn't think it was breaking a rule but it was truly walking a fine line. There was one time when [redacted] conducted an interrogation of [redacted] detainee (I think detainee number 108). [redacted] were having a difficult time with this individual. And in their culture dealing with females is lower. [redacted] wanted a male to go interrogate.

He wanted to see if he could get something from the detainee. He did not get anything that [redacted] did not already have. I didn't like the fact that he was interrogating and wasn't trained to do so, but I thought "He is a major and I guessed he had gotten approval from [redacted] to go in there. Interrogation plans were already being written when I arrived at Abu Ghraib. Everything was a bit Chaotic. The JDIC hadn't been fully stood up. It was a kind of hit and miss on interrogation plans. To say that every time the interrogator went to go interrogate a plan was written down would be false. Support for resources was very limited. There were way too many people for the area we were working out off. People were bouncing off each other. The resources we had were very limited; only one printer worked half the time. A lot of time we ran out of Interrogation Plan forms so they were written on back of paper. We would scream at the NCOIC and OIC that we needed printing support but there were no printers. All interrogation plan forms should be kept on the interrogation plan. I might sound like a broken record on interrogation plan, but I mentioned it during the team leader meetings. I stated that we needed to do interrogation plans and they needed to be approved by section leaders and the ICE Operations; [redacted] when [redacted] was not around). [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and [redacted] was in charge of the JIDC. [redacted] was there but I am not sure what he did. Some of the techniques required to be approved were send soft copy via e-mails and [redacted] would review them and send it up the chain to [redacted] would get it back and give us a Yes or No. I know that during the team leader's meeting we were told that we would get a paper copy back but that it would take a couple of weeks to get it back. If we needed an extended IROE, it would take time to get it approved. I never had an extended IROE request from any of my team members. I do not think when I was a team leader we had an extended. [redacted] did discuss sleep deprivation on one of our detainees.

When an interrogator asked to use a technique requiring approval from higher, I would tell them, "Okay this is the procedure memo for [redacted] and once it comes back approved, you can do it. But some of the team members would not follow up with the request because it was too much trouble. We had about 440 detainees to interrogate and our list was growing. I do not remember anyone being naked during interrogations. I can't imagine [redacted] would allow something like that to happen. There might have been some of the lower enlisted trying to push the blame up if they actually did this. The interrogators are not kids and they have been trained at the school. For someone to

say they had the okay to have a detainee naked is probably not true. I worked with [redacted] quite a bit. I know she would not have approved this. When formations were called, we would be told to read the IROE but we were not told what went wrong and what we needed to do to prevent it. We just wondered "Why we were resigning?" As far as detainee abuse: I do not know if it was but it didn't seem right. One time when I walked through the hard site, I noticed one detainee naked on the mattress. I do not know if he was chained. He was called the "bottle boy" because he shoved a bottle up his ass. I asked the MPs why is he naked? There were NCOs all around and I thought it wasn't right. I told them, "You guys are MPs and I do not know what you can do and cannot do. There was no continuity between MPs and interrogators so that if we see something, we can question it. To me to have a detainee naked was wrong. I was working the day shift. I do not remember who the MPs were. I think there was captain there. I saw him there a couple of times. I was in the area bout 15 times from October to December. I did not do interrogations but I sat in on several. I sat in the one with the [redacted] I guess he was leaving and he wanted glory to take it with him. Another incident I heard about after I returned from leave on 2 February 04. I never saw or was aware of any unofficial photos of detainees. The only time I saw someone taking photos was when we went on tour. He was caught and his camera was confiscated. I knew nothing about videos. I don't remember ever seeing dogs, but I do remember them coming. The night of the shooting, I was in a different area. We were guarding the LSA. I just remember [redacted] bragging and talking about having to shoot the detainee. HUMILIATION: the guys with the hair cut. The detainee through interrogator stated they do this without remorse. I think 108. MPS had done that.

I remember [redacted] He was always the one very friendly. It wasn't him. It was another NCO who was bragging about the clippers running off.

I don't really recall OGA except for one time when they wanted to speak to one of our detainees. I rearranged the schedule so that they could speak to the detainee. One of my guys went in with them. It might have been [redacted] After they finished, they simply left and did not say thanks. We never saw them again. We had ISG come by and speak to one of our detainees, but our detainees had such a low profile neither OGA nor ISG wanted to speak to them. We had a job to do where a lot of the tasks go beyond the individual morals and interrogators have to make a judgment calls. As far as women's Underwear: I recall someone saying something about women's underwear. More of a "hey" we should try that. Something of that nature. Nothing formal. I remember people laughing over that. I do not know how the conversation started or maybe I walked into. I want to say it was a CACI guy named [redacted] (an older guy). He was on my team. His interrogation techniques were very harsh. He once interrogated someone to the point of making them pee. It was [redacted] and his analyst (came out laughing about it. I addressed both of them.). I took FM 34-52 and sat it down with [redacted] and gave him a verbal counseling on his job performance and to have him read the FM 34-52 and follow it [redacted] did not like me telling him how to do his job. He told me, "I have been doing this for 20 years and I do not need a 20 yr old telling me how to do my job. I told him not to do things of that nature (having detainees [redacted] while interrogated). I told [redacted] about [redacted] and he said, "What do you want me to do about it?" I basically had a shoulder turned on me. I spoke to [redacted] about other things in particular [redacted] report writing skills. I had one guy who worked with COMPUSA who was an investigator and

was hired on that experience. We did have a report writing class after that but during one of the classes, [redacted] was sitting in the back of the room not even facing the instructor I remember telling this. It is really hard when you tell upper management and you get that in response. You hold this guy's hand? I had [redacted] and an African American CACI employee on the same team. I had to switch The African American because he was known to take over interrogations so I placed him with [redacted] because [redacted] was a strong 97E. The African American on my team was kind of doing Knowledgeability Briefs, but he was hire to as an analyst. I believe [redacted] put him to conduct Knowledgeability Briefs. I told [redacted] that the CACI guys we were getting had no clue and did not know how to write the reports. I was spending more time editing reports. It would have taken me 1/3d of the time if I would have written the reports myself. I did sit down with the AFRICAN AMERICAN CACI guy we had and went over report writing. We were told we needed more interrogations, MORE, MORE, And MORE. [redacted] cared more about numbers and not quality. I mentioned to folks that what was more important; good information or more detainees. I did know [redacted] He was a very nice guy with high morals. My first impression of him was good. He was very motivated to work. I was surprise to see his name on the investigative report. [redacted]

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kadena AB, Japan	2004/06/14		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
500th MI GRP CIDET-J OFO, Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 October 03. The first few days I arrived, [redacted] took us on a tour of the facilities and we received training on the Interrogating Rules of Engagement. I believe the training was sufficient and I made sure my team understood them. The training was no different than what we had received at the school with the exception of the use of dogs. The school never taught us how to use dogs and we did not know how we could use the dogs. I do not remember anyone explaining how to use the dogs. I remember in casual conversations that dogs were allowed to bark. I remember thinking if you have a dog barking . I never used a dog nor did any of my team members. Techniques as sleep deprivation were a common thing. Sleep management was part of the Extended IROE and, to the best of my knowledge, was used on occasion with the detainees. On one occasion with detainee 108 [redacted] advised [redacted] that they should use sleep management on him. I don't remember seeing an Extended IROE for that particular time for that detainee. We were never trained on the use of dogs. Everyone read the IROE and signed that they understood them. As far as the commanders go, the training was sufficient. I did believe that the junior soldiers could have receiving more training because interrogation operations is not a science. You never know how a detainee is going to respond to certain detainees. You cold never get enough training. In interrogations there are a lot of calls we had to make. It is not a science when dealing with people. New things that are not covered in the IROE come up every day. This statement is based off of the idea that you can't go into the interrogation knowing exactly what is going to happen and a lot of what happens in the interrogation was not planned that way so you have to be flexible and use YOUR judgment to make good sound and moral decisions while in the booth with the detainee. For example, you receive notes from the capture date that the detainee is cooperative so your engagement or approach is to do direct line of question with a pride and ego up due to the detainee's disposition at time of capture. You go into the booth and the detainee does not react to such approaches. What the interrogator should use next is his/her decision because of rapport and time issues. That is the way it was taught to us and that is the way it was implemented at Abu Ghuraib. I was fortunate that I had some more experience individuals. I didn't know anything was going on until I got back from leave on around the 2nd or 3rd of February 2004. I was made a section leader for the Force Protection Tiger Team and took over [redacted] team. I was team leader from OCT until DEC (1st week).

My team consisted of [redacted] a CACI member (big football player African American, another linguist - [redacted] (he was fired after a short time; nothing that had to do with interrogations.) [redacted] and [redacted] had their stuff together. There was another SSG from the same reserve station as [redacted] but his name eludes me. He was on the tiger team with the CACI analyst but they were working to [redacted] doing KB's, so I rarely interacted with them operationally. I believe they were placed on my team just for administrative purposes. My team changed after a short time and Tiger Teams were added to include - [redacted] My team changed after a short time and Tiger Teams were added to include [redacted] in place of [redacted]. The first time I went to the Hard Site was on the tour of the facility. SFC [redacted] CE NCOIC took us on the tour. The 470th did arrive the same time the 500th personnel arrived, however I am not 100% sure they were on the tour with us that day. I am leaning toward they were there because I remember there being more than 8 people and around 13. There were 5 people from the 470th and we met them in Texas, so we actually got acquainted with them before any one else from the prison. I am pretty sure that they did go on the tour. I was toward the rear of the group because of my leg problem. On the tour I saw detainees mopping the floors. I also saw guys in civilian clothes leading the detainees and military personnel were present as well. I was told the guys in civilian clothes were the Iraqi Police. I did not see any naked detainees during the tour. As far as I know, I never saw a request to interrogate a detainee naked. I do not think anything like that happen. I made pretty regular spot checks and never saw any naked detainees. I do not know who the interrogators got approval from. When I went to spot check, the only thing I saw that was humiliating was a detainee who had a Mohawk. The MP (NIT) was bragging that his clippers run out on him and I felt this was wrong and not helping the issue. I thought he wasn't helping the issue. [redacted] was there and witnessed it and I expected he would do something about it. I didn't think it was breaking a rule but it was truly walking a fine line. There was one time when [redacted] conducted an interrogation of SGT [redacted] detainee (I think detainee number 108). [redacted] were having a difficult time with this individual.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____, TAKEN AT _____, DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT O[redacted] TAKEN AT Kadena AB, Japan DATED 14 Jan 04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

And in their culture dealing with females is lower. [redacted] wanted a male to go interrogate. He wanted to see if he could get something from the detainee. He did not get anything th[redacted] not already have and this was the time that he and [redacted] discussed the sleep management and advised [redacted] to do so. I didn't like the fact that he was interrogating and wasn't trained to do so, but I thought "He is a major and I guessed he had gotten approval fro[redacted] to go in there. Interrogation plans were already being written when I arrived at Abu Ghraib. Everything was a bit Chaotic. The JDIC hadn't been fully stood up. It was a kind of hit and miss on interrogation plans. To say that every time the interrogator went to go interrogate a plan was written down would be false. Support for resources was very limited. There were way too many people for the area we were working out off. People were bouncing off each other. The resources we had were very limited; only one printer worked half the time. A lot of time we ran out of Interrogation Plan forms so they were written on back of paper. We would scream at the NCOIC and OIC that we needed printing support but there were no printers. All interrogation plan forms should be kept on the interrogation plan. I might sound like a broken record :no interrogation plan, but I mentioned it to my Tiger Teams. "Where is the Interrogation Plan?" I stated that we (Tiger Teams) needed to do interrogation plans and they needed to be approved by section leader and the ICE Operations [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and [redacted] was in charge of the JIDC [redacted] was there but I am not sure what he did. Some of the techniques required to be approved were sent soft copy via e-mails and [redacted] would review them and send it up the chain to [redacted] would get it back and give us a Yes or No. I know that during the team leader's meeting we were told that we would get a paper copy back but that it would take a couple of weeks to get it back. If we needed an extended IROE, it would take time to get it approved. I don't remember ever having an extended IROE request from any of my team members. I do not think when I was a team leader we had an extended [redacted] and discuss sleep deprivation on detainee 108.

When an interrogator came back from an interrogation with no new information or the detainee just didn't talk, the interrogator would mention in his debrief to me that he/she thinks they need to use an extended IROE technique requiring approval from higher. I would tell them, "Okay this is the procedure memo for [redacted] and once it comes back approved, you can do it. But the Tiger Teams would not follow through with the request. I think the reason for this is that each Force protection Tiger Team had about 100 detainees and the tempo was so fast that the Tiger Teams did not want to focus so much time on the extra paperwork for one detainee who wouldn't talk when there are hundreds more to get intel from. We had about 440 detainees to interrogate and our list was growing up until the time I left when we had about 1000 detainees. I do not remember anyone being naked during interrogations. I can't imagine [redacted] would allow something like that to happen. There might have been some of the lower enlisted trying to push the blame up if they actually did this. The interrogators are not kids and they have been trained at the school. For someone to say they had the okay to have a detainee naked is probably not true. I worked with [redacted] quite a bit. I know she would not have approved this. The only person in the Command who I could imagine would [redacted] for the sake of a positive interrogation would be [redacted]. He seemed like a "John Wayne" type of leader who, at times seemed to go outside the lines when he spoke and didn't really care who was in the audience or formation. When formations were called, we would be told to read the IROE but we were not told what went wrong and what we needed to do to prevent it. We just wondered "Why we were resigning?" As far as detainee abuse, I do not know if it was but it didn't seem right. One time when I walked through the hard site, I noticed one detainee naked on the mattress. I do not know if he was chained. He was called the "bottle boy" because he shoved a bottle up his bum. I asked the MPs why is he naked? There were NCOs all around and I thought it wasn't right. I thought that it wasn't right, but they are MP's and I don't know what they are within their rights to do. I did mention it to some people on my team, just because I thought it was crazy that a guy would do such a thing, but that was about it. There was no community between MPs and interrogators so that if we see something, we can question it. To me to have a detainee naked was wrong. I was working the day shift. I do not remember who the MPs were. I think there was captain there. I saw him there a couple of times. I can't remember exactly what the CPT looked like, however, I do believe if I saw a picture of him I would be able to identify him. I was in the area about 15 times from October to December. I did not do interrogations but I sat in on several. I sat in the one with the [redacted] I guess he was leaving and he wanted glory to take it with him. Another incident I heard about after I returned from leave on 2 February 04. I never saw or was aware of any unofficial photos of detainees. The only time I saw someone taking photos was when we went on tour. He was caught and his camera was confiscated. I knew nothing about videos. I don't remember ever seeing dogs, but I do remember them coming. The night of the shooting, I was in a different area. We were guarding the LSA. I just remember [redacted] bragging and talking about having to shoot the detainee. HUMILIATION: the guys with the hair cut. The detainee through interrogator stated they do this without remorse. I think 108 MPS had done that. I remember [redacted]. He was always the one very friendly. It wasn't him. It was another NCO who was bragging about the clippers running out.

I don't really recall OGA except for one time when they wanted to speak to one of our detainees. I rearranged the schedule so that they could speak to the detainee. One of my guys went in with them. It might have been [redacted]. After they finished, they simply left and did not say thanks. We never handled another request from them again. We had ISG come by and speak to one of our detainees, but our detainees had such a low profile neither OGA nor ISG wanted to speak to them. We had a job to do where a lot of the tasks go beyond the individual morals and interrogators have to make a judgment calls. As far as women's Underwear: I recall someone saying something about women's underwear. More of a "hey" we should try that. Something of that nature. Nothing formal I remember people laughing over that. I do not know how the conversation started or maybe I walked into it. I want to say it was a CACI guy named [redacted] (an older guy). He was on my team. I took FM 34-52 and sat him down with [redacted] and gave him a verbal counseling on his job performance and to have him read the FM 34-52 approaches, and follow it.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Kadena AB, Japan DATED 14 Jun 04

STATEMENT (Continued)

[redacted] did not like me telling him how to do his job. He told me, "I have been doing this for 20 years and I do not need a 20 yr old telling me how to do my job. I told him not to do things of that nature. He came out of an interrogation bragging that he made a detainee throw up. I believe it was. I spoke with his analyst [redacted] and asked him what had happened and he said that [redacted] and thrown a chair and caused fear in the detainee to the point that he threw up. In joking he said [redacted] going to try to make the detainee piss himself next time. I sat [redacted] down and I told them that I DID NOT want to hear of this again. Your objective is to get information out to [redacted] and make jokes about it. They both acknowledged that they understood. I told [redacted] and he said, "What do you want me to do about it?" I basically had a shoulder turned on me. I spoke to [redacted] about other things in particular [redacted] report writing skills. I had one guy who worked with COMPUSA who was an investigator and was hired on that experience. We did have a report writing class after that but during one of the classes, [redacted] was sitting in the back of the room not even facing the instructor I remember telling this. It is really hard when you tell upper management and you get that in response. You hold this guy's hand? I had [redacted] and an African American CACI employee on the same team. I had to switch The African American because he was known to take over interrogations so I placed him with [redacted] because [redacted] was a strong 97E. The African American on my team was kind of doing Knowledgeability Briefs, but he was hired as an analyst. I believe [redacted] put him to conduct Knowledgeability Briefs. I told [redacted] that the CACI guys that we were getting had no clue and did not know how to write the reports. Her response was to go over the reports with them and train them. I was spending more time editing reports. It would have taken me 1/3d of the time if I would have written the reports myself. I did sit down the with the AFRICAN AMERICAN CACI guy we had and went over report writing. We were told we needed more interrogations, MORE, MORE, And MORE. [redacted] cared more about numbers and not quality. When I went back to my AO with my Tiger teams I remember saying "Hey Guys, they want us to do more interrogations per day." "It seems they care more about quantity than quality."

The civilian guy named [redacted] that sat up in the front rear [redacted] was a very nice guy that would always listen to what I had to say. I remember talking to him frequently about the poor quality of [redacted]'s reports and that I would spend more time going over the report and showing [redacted] what he did wrong over and over again then just fixing the report for him. [redacted] would agree that he was not a good report writer because of the Interrogator Notes that he edited for him. I believe [redacted] had over hear me talking to [redacted] about [redacted] on occasion. You could sit him in the corner. It was him and his analyst (came out laughing about it. I was addressing both of them.) I did know [redacted] I did know [redacted] He seemed to be a very nice guy with high morals. My first impression of him was good. He was very motivated to [redacted] I was surprise to see his name on the investigative report.

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES [redacted]

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of June 2004 at Kadena Air Base, Japan

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 3: DA FORM 2823, DEC 1988

AG0000309

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/24	1400	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Co, 141 MI Bn, 300 MI Bde, Utah National Guard Draper, UT

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived Abu Ghraib on [illegible] 03 and remained until 5 Feb 04. I was assigned as the unit mail clerk. I was not given an overall orientation of AG nor any specific training or briefings on interrogation operations or IROEs. There were none posted in the area in which I worked. I was somewhat restricted as to what areas I could enter.
On one occasion circa Thanksgiving 03 in a MP with whom I was in casual conversation made an off hand comment that they had to be mean to the detainees in order to get them to talk because that is what they were used to - how they had been treated under [redacted] He did not make any amplification of that comment and did not provide any specific details. I do not know the identity of the MP.
I did not see, become aware of, or hear about any humiliation or abuse of detainees. I did not see, become aware of, or hear about any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. I do not know of any use of guard dogs with the detainees.
Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No
//End of Statement//

NOTHING

FOLLOWS

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATE: 20040524

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING

X

FOLLOW S

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May 2004

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia [redacted]	[redacted]004/06/04		
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
6410 Battlecreek Court, West Valley City, Utah 84118 [redacted]

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] employed as a contract interrogator working for CACI at Abu Ghraib (AG) Prison, Iraq, from 23 Nov 03 to the end of Jan 04. I received a telephone call from CACI and offered the interrogator position in late Sep 03, having been recommended by a friend because of my Strategic Debriefer work and interrogator experience at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). [redacted] a CACI Program Manager, offered me the position after a telephonic interview. I have had about 12 years of experience in HUMINT, including both interrogation operations and Counterintelligence Tactical HUMINT. I was on active duty with the Army and graduated from the HUMINT Collector (MOS 97E) Course at Fort Huachuca, AZ, in Aug 94. Highlights of my active duty experience include working at the 66th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade in Augsburg, Germany; conducting strategic debriefings for the On-Sight Inspection Agency (OSIA) (the predecessor to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)); serving on a Force Protection Team and Interrogator for a six month deployment in Bosnia. After leaving active duty, I joined the 300th MI Brigade, Utah Army National Guard, at the beginning of 1999 and eventually got a full time position there. In Jul 02, I was activated for deployment to GTMO and served as an interrogator there for about seven months from early Aug 02 to late Feb 03. I then went to Colorado to train elements of the 142nd MI BN (part of 300th MI BDE, Utah National Guard) and then deployed to Kuwait in Apr to Jun 03 to continue training of further elements of the 142nd. I was deactivated at the end of Jun 03 and returned to Utah until I was deployed to Iraq in the CACI position in Nov 03. I arrived at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on about 21 Nov 03 and then at AG on 23 Nov 03. I was amazed at [redacted] things were run and how bad the conditions were. I, along with other arriving CACI contractors, had a meeting with [redacted], a CACI Vice President who was visiting Iraq. I also met with [redacted] the CACI site manager at AG. I initially considered not staying due to the conditions and how poorly things appeared to be run, but after a conversation with [redacted] I decided to stay and see if things would [redacted] better. Within two weeks, I realized that they needed experienced folks, and I decided to stay and contribute what I could. [redacted] a CACI analyst, showed me around AG on an initial tour, but I did not receive any initial training or verbal briefing on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I was provided a cursory hardcopy briefing which included IROE, which I had to sign acknowledging I had read it. When I read the IROE, nothing in particular surprised me about them, mainly because of my experience at GTMO. Those techniques on the left side of the IROE slide were standard techniques derived from FM 34-52. Some of the techniques listed on the right side of the IROE slide were proposed and argued back and forth at GTMO. I believe dogs were used at GTMO interrogations, although I never personally used or saw dogs being used in interrogations. My impression was that the dogs were used as an initial scare tactic to set the stage for select interrogations. Sleep management and deprivation were also used when authorized. It was generally implemented by keeping lights on in the detainee's cell for 20 of the 24 hours and varying the detainee's feeding schedule to throw off the detainee's biorhythm. Dietary manipulation and stress positions were also used, with approval, at GTMO. In possibly Dec 03, I became suspicious of a possible incident of detainee abuse. I was working on the Special Projects Team and was handed a High Value Detainee (HVD) named [redacted] who was a former major general in the Political Bureau of the former Iraqi regime. [redacted] had been brought into AG on 17 Dec 03 and he was given to me on 25 Dec 03. He was in his late 50s to early 60s and had borderline medical condition. [redacted] my team leader, came to me and said that a doctor had told him that if they went any harder on [redacted] might have a stroke. I preferred a low stress, calmer approach to interrogation and I think [redacted] gave me [redacted] because of this, saying that [redacted] off, and you're out. The original interrogator, according to the detainee [redacted] and the second interrogator was [redacted] (CACI contractor). During my first interrogation with [redacted] he showed me a large bruise on his forearm and bruises on his head. [redacted] told me that he had been blindfolded and thrown around and against a wall during a previous interrogation and had banged his head on the wall. He also claimed that he had been wakened at all hours of the night and had lost track of time. I was initially skeptical of his claims because the detainees often lied and made false claims. In reviewing [redacted] file, I did not find any entries to explain the injuries and I began to suspect that there were one or two sessions not listed in the dossier. Then [redacted], my partner analyst, told me that [redacted] was telling the truth because [redacted] had seen it. [redacted] then told me about an incident where [redacted] had forcibly dragged [redacted] by the forearm across the gravel. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 TWO PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA [redacted] DATED 2004/06/04 [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] was my roommate and one night we were in our room and [redacted] had been drinking and was telling "war stories". He recounted a story saying he had done a really good job on a general. [redacted] somehow got the general's son and had dirtied up the son's clothes and face to make him look like he had been roughed and mistreated. He had the general's son in the corner of one of the interrogation booths and brought the general in to see him. The general broke down when he saw his son and started to cooperate. He said that he had tried the similar approach on another general, but it did not work on him. I had the impression that this other general was the same general [redacted] that was handed over to me. [redacted] also related a story about another interrogation. [redacted] had been working with a military interrogator sergeant and he didn't think the sergeant was very good because he would go into interrogation, just ask straightforward questions, and then would readily believe the detainee's response. Apparently this frustrated [redacted] and he decided to be more aggressive. During an interrogation of an unidentified detainee, [redacted] hand-cuffed the detainee to the eye bolt on the floor of the booth. The eyebolt was intended to be used to cuff the leg irons of the detainee to the floor, not the hand-cuffs By doing this, it place the detainee in a position where he was squatting or kneeling down next to the table with his nose right above table level. The sergeant leading the interrogation had asked all his questions, was satisfied with the answers and was finishing up the interrogation. [redacted] then kicked the table from the bottom with such force that it flew up and hit the ceiling of the booth. [redacted] said that the military interrogator thought the table actually hit the detainee, but [redacted] did not believe that it did. On another occasion, I was walking a detainee back to his cell from an interrogation in the Hard Site. While doing so, I saw an inmate on the floor with both his arms and legs through the bars on the cell, and this arms and feet cuffed. There was a "gheto blaster" on the floor in front of him with loud music playing This detainee was clothed, and I never saw any naked detainees Other than these instances and others previously documented in CID Sworn Statements, I did not witness and am not aware of any instances of detainee abuse. While I saw dogs present within the Hard Site, I never saw dogs being used in interrogations at AG. I never requested, nor ever saw, any request to employ exceptional techniques as listed on the right hand side of the JROE slide, and I never used any of them. Therefore, I don't know who the approval authority was. I understand that [redacted] has directed that I not discuss details of this inquiry with anyone other than those investigators I know to be directly involved in this inquiry, or with my legal counsel. I have nothing further to add to this statement [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

November 2003 while observing

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; The proponent agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq	21 Jan 04	11:44	

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	GRADE/STATUS
		Contractor

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

I, want to make the following statement under oath:

As far as some of the things we talked about yesterday. The people I suggest you look at is these two gentlemen, I have looked at their files. I sat next to an interrogation that was doing one day, where he was breaking a tables and chairs in the room with the detainee. has a reputation for breaking the tables in the room.. Look into file 155215 He is my detainee now. One of the first times I interviewed him at the beginning of Jan 04, he showed me a large bruise to his left forearm that was about six to eight inches long, and he stated he got it from being grabbed and being thrown around. He had a bump on his forehead over his left eye that he related he received that from being thrown into a wall. He said that the interrogator grabbed him and threw him down. He is evasive and deceptive, but when he is talking about how people have treated him, I tend to believe it based on the stuff that I have heard and seen. Evidently the people who talking to him before I was working him were very hard on him. was the person working him before I think his number is155800. I would look at the interrogation on 12 Jan 04, of this detainee, and talk to the interpreter of that helped interview him. He should be able to give you more information. I am working his brother at the time. His story is very forth coming and very cooperative. Talk to was working another detainee who is the brother of my detainee; this person related to detainee, I think the number is 155794 as well about this incident. Pull up the fill on this detainee After the first interview says to put this guy in isolation because he is not being forthright in his information is a young interrogator, he is very excited and motivated, and he believes everyone here should be broken. and interpreter he might have info. has seen a lot of stuff that goes on. is an interpreter with Titan as well. He has stated that he has witnessed some of the interrogators being ruff. I do not know if it was abuse. There is another incident was involved in where one of her detainees, she wanted to degrade him; she stripped him naked and made him walk back. She was moved into Bn Ops, and taken out of the interrogation role would know more about that. I would really look at the files for the detainees of was the detainee that was allegedly taken and thrown out of the vehicle handcuffed. I believe the incident was witness by He is on leave in the states and is getting married. You would have to go through Titan to get his info. was sitting in the vehicle sandbagged, the interrogator who I think might have been grabbed him and threw him out of the vehicle to the ground, the interrogator then yells at him for falling on the ground, and then started dragging or pulling the detainee by the cuffs. This information came from We were doing an interview and he provided this information out side of what he was interpreting.

Q Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A No.///End of Statement///

TSN

Page 1 of 2

AG0000315

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/0[redacted]	1[redacted]3[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, 1 CAV Division Interrogation Facility, CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

9. I, [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I arrived at Abu Ghraid in Mid November and was assigned as a screener. I performed these duties for about two months and then I was moved to the interrogation Control Element (ICE) as an analyst. [redacted] was in charge of the ICE. When I first arrived I did not get much training. I do not remember receiving the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) or any information on the boundaries on how to treat detainees by the military personnel. [redacted] gave me a hand out to sign and I believe they were the IROEs. I got the impression from the military personnel that they believed CACI employees to have experience and knew what they were doing. The NCOIC had come from Afghanistan and appeared to have been burned out. When I first started screening, we were receiving 300 plus detainees at a time. We had to review all the files and I wasn't quite sure what we were supposed to do. I would ask if the only thing we had to do was fill out the screening sheet or continue with a short interview to determine if detainee was an MI hold or security hold. I chose to sit next to the most intelligent screener for two weeks until I understood the process. I did work with a Tiger Team and the interrogator was [redacted] and another SPC who was a Puerto Rican. Their supervisor was [redacted]. I would spend a lot of time in the back doing research and never conducted any interrogations. I never witnessed any physical abuse of detainees. I did feel it was inappropriate for females to search male detainees. We had a detainee who was a source "per say" who was providing information to us. We had him in his individual room and treated him well. We had to move him to the Hard Site because the room was needed for someone else. I told the MPs to treat this guy well and take care of him. The MPs gave him a shower while a female MP was guarding. The detainee told us that he had a problem with that because his wife had not even seen him naked. We kept telling the MPs to treat him well, but again, when we went to see him the following day, the source looked very tired. The source stated that the MPs woke him up at two 0200 and walked him to the end of the hall. They would make him walk toward them and ask him his detainee #. The source did not know it and he was sent back. This incident went on for about an hour and a half. We finally moved him out because the MPs would not follow our instructions. I heard rumors about things going on but I didn't personally see them. I never saw or was aware of any photos or videos with detainees. I never heard of MI tell MPs to "soften up, or give "the treatment" to detainees. The person in charge of Abu Ghraib was an MP. Later I heard that [redacted] was going to be in charge. [redacted] was never around. I never really knew what [redacted] did. When I first arrived, it was assumed that [redacted] was in charge when [redacted] was not around. He would address the troop when something happened. He lived with the troops in the LSA. I never had knowledge of anyone using guard dogs during interrogations. I knew that dogs had to be muzzled and therefore no one would use them. The SFC in charge of the ICE put out a statement to everyone, including OGA, that no interrogator would close the blinds over the windows. If they did, they would be reprimanded. In reference to clothing of detainees, when a detainee was taken to Ganci or Vigilant, they would wear their civilian clothes, if they were taken to the Hard Site, they would have to wear a jumpsuit. [redacted] was working with an Al-Qaida detainee. He told us he had shaved his beard off. I got the impression from [redacted] that he was the leader. His analyst was a female imagery analyst from a unit in Germany). Her supervisor was [redacted] (Do not recall the analyst's name) In reference to ghost detainees, I knew of one who existed. But the word "ghost detainee" didn't really exist. We had intelligence reports from one particular detainee and the report showed we did not have him at our facility, but he was there. When I asked [redacted] analyst, she said the detainee was providing information to OGA and we couldn't touch him. I am not sure how long these ghost detainees stayed in our facility. I want to report something else. I am now working in the 1 CAV Division Interrogation facility. We often get detainees from 5th Group. The detainees say they were at the Adamya Palace. The detainees state that 5th group is working them real hard, physically. One individual needed a psych eval and there is no way this individual was faking his status. Another prisoner stated he was transferred in the trunk of a vehicle. Some of the incidents reported to have occurred at Adamya Palace are bleeding from the ears and electrocutions. The reason I am reporting this is because several detainees have reported the same thing. [redacted] might be able to provide some information because he has worked at Abu Ghraib the longest. There was a huge animosity between the MI and MP command and it made it difficult to work with one another. I overheard an interrogator [redacted] a tall, black, 260lbs male. Currently working in the Tikrit Division Interrogation Cell) describe an interrogation [redacted] technique utilizing a cigarette and circling it without touching, the detainees nipples.) The conversation occurred in the LSA [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT O[redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/06

Q. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]oking area. I overheard it while I was having a cup of coffee. I do not know who he was talking to. This was around the time the ICE NCOIC spoke to everyone and stated no closed blinds in the interrogation booths.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6TH day of MAY, 2004 [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BLDG AT-5636 Gorham St. Fort Bragg, NC 28310	2004/06/04	[redacted] 1500 hours	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 2 Aug 03 to 19 Dec 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97B Counterintelligence Agent who performed interrogations. I was also the Platoon Sergeant for a platoon consisting of eight 97B's and two 97E's. My initial mission upon my arrival to AG was to set up operations to conduct interrogation operations for detainees gathered during operation VICTORY BOUNTY. As time passed, the focus went from VICTORY BOUNTY to other operations. Prior to initial operations, [redacted] wrote an Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. Shortly after my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the IROE and on three separate occasions signed a memorandum stating I understood and would follow the IROE. I cannot compare the Afghanistan IROE with the Iraqi IROE as I was not conducting interrogations with the unit in Afghanistan. In my opinion, the IROE was clea and adequately established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. Members of my team presented an Interrogation Plan (IP) to me prior to every interrogation. The IP's included the ability to make requests for various methods of interrogation to include sleep adjustment schedules. After approval, I provided the sleep adjustment schedules to the MP Sergeant of the Guard. The approving authority for most special requests was the operations cell [redacted] All approvals were verbal; I never received any approval in writing. There was constant pressure to report intelligence information. On two occasions [redacted] ordered [redacted] to perform unscheduled interrogations of a detainee because [redacted]. [redacted] had information that the detainee was lying. COL PAPPAS said he could not tell [redacted] how he got the information or how he knew the information. In my opinion, COL PAPPAS was not an experienced interrogator and appeared to be in over his head with seven MI Bn's and the mission at AG. During my time at AG, I witnessed several detainees wearing pin women's underwear. I questioned the MP's about this matter and they said that the detainee in-processing facility ran out of regular underwear. Detainees were stripped searched during their inprocessing, but I never witnessed or heard of a detainee being stripped as a form of humiliation. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I never directed the MP's to abuse or maltreat the detainees, nor did I ever hear of it. The MP's never offered to abuse the detainees for me, nor did ever hear of them offering to do so for other MI personnel. After the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center was established, the 97B's were removed from the interrogation rotation and put onto Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT). During my time on a THT, I submitted a request to [redacted] to bring police dogs to AG. I requested that the dogs be used to search vehicles as a force protection measure at the entry control points. This request was part of a Threat Vulnerability Assessment my team conducted of AG. At no time did I request the dogs to be used in interrogations or for use of mistreating detainees. I departed AG in Dec 03. [redacted]

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT?
A: NO//END OF STATEMENT//

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 1500 hours [redacted] DATED 2004/06/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT [redacted]

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE [redacted] AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, Virginia	2004/05/24	1645	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		MAJ/O-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Co, 141st Military Intelligence Battalion, Utah Army National Guard, Logan, Utah 84020

9. _____ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am the Commander of B Company, 141st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), Utah Army National Guard, Logan, Utah, and, having assumed Command on 24 Jul 02. The 141st MI mobilized on 7 Feb 03, to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. After spending about two weeks and a half at the mobilization site at Fort Carson, CO, undergoing deployment preparation and training, we deployed and arrived in Kuwait on 4 Mar 03. We stayed two nights at Camp Wolf and then moved to Camp Udairi, KU, on 6 Mar 03. I crossed into Iraq on or about 21 Apr 03. I departed Iraq on 8 Feb 04, and returned to Kuwait, where we remained until I redeployed to US on about 14 Feb 04. During my deployment, I took "Rest and Relation" leave from 14 Nov to 2 Dec 03. The 141st MI FWD3 mobilized for deployed with 98 personnel. Most of the training at Fort Carson was concentrated on convoy operations, react to fire, weapons qualification, and threat briefings. I do not recall receiving any classes regarding Geneva Convention requirements or Interrogation Rules of Engagement. Upon our arrival in Kuwait, most of the 141st was farmed out to fill positions in different companies in the 202nd MI BN. Most of my leadership was also farmed out and I personally was assigned to the 202nd Tactical Operations Center and served in S-3 Operations until 21 Apr 03, when (202nd MI BN Commander) assigned me to be the 202nd/513th liaison officer to the 800th Military Police (BDE) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. After the 202nd MI redeployed in Jun 03, I remained with the 323rd MI, and I became the Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) at Camp Bucca. I never saw or heard of any interrogation techniques being used at Bucca that were inconsistent with FM 34-52 and I never saw or heard of any abuses. The Bucca facility was a joint British/US facility. US interrogators predominately used the Direct Approach and focused on calling the detainee on inconsistencies in his answers. British interrogators appeared to focus on Fear Up and used a lot of yelling. I received word via e-mail from the 205th MI BDE S-3 that the decision had been made to consolidate interrogation operations at Abu Ghurayb (AG), and I began shutting down Bucca interrogation operations to begin the transition to AG. About 23-27 Sep 03, I arrived at AG, bringing with me from Bucca the last six 141st and 323rd soldiers I had with me there. When I arrived at AG, introduced himself to me as the Deputy Direct of the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center and COL PAPPAS was the Director. was the Operations Officer and of the 519th MI BN was the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) OIC. It appeared to me that they were struggling with the screening and in-processing process. had been chief of my ICE at Bucca, and I recommended that he head up the AG screening process. and also 141st soldiers I had brought with me from Bucca, were also assigned to the screening cell. The process was problematic since few incoming detainees arrived with capture tags or sworn statements. This problem persisted, but progressively improved until Jan 04. My other 141st soldiers were assigned to logistical roles. I assumed the responsibility as the Operations Officer and transitioned to become XO. Basically my responsibilities were to manage Human Collection Requirements (HCRs), manage the information flow to CJTF-7 C2X, ensure the ICE had current and appropriate/answerable Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and track other intelligence requirements. During Oct 03 and early Nov 03, was at AG one or two times a week, until he moved there on a permanent basis in mid Nov 03. I believe he moved to AG to help ensure that interrogation operations were producing actionable intelligence. predominately spent his time with external support functions such as coordinating with other agencies, doing Force Protection things, addressing signal/communication problems, talking to MPs in the hard site area (Cell Blocks 1A and 1B), and attending daily MP meetings. He was not very involved in interrogation operations and left that responsibility to the ICE. and had what appeared to be a good system in place and apparently didn't feel a need to get into their business. I left on "R & R" leave on 14 Nov 03, and I believe permanently departed AG two days later, on 16 Nov 03. Inmates fell into three categories: "Security Detainees" - those who posed a threat to Coalition Forces, "Iraqi Police Detainees" - those who were dropped off by Host Nation authorities, and "MI Holds" - those of interest to MI. In mid Oct 03, a "Tiger Team" of five or six personnel from the detention facility at Guantanamo (GTMO) Bay, Cuba, showed up at AG. There was no real explanation about the Team, but it appeared to me that they were there in the capacity of advisors to help the AG process any way they could. There was no direction to implement the advice or suggestions they offered. and I all talked to the GMTO Team. The suggestions the Team offered were very good and wha

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | PAGE 1 OF ___ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/24

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

think we needed. The GTMO process was very methodical and they offered useful SOPs, ideas for analyst support packages, management reports, and various training classes. We did not have the background and experience that the GTMO Team had acquired from two years of operations there, and it was not until their process was showed to us that we were really about to reorganize into a more effective organization. COL PAPPAS was the major decision maker in implementing the GTMO organization and the changes really began in earnest after he arrived there on or about 16 Nov 03. [redacted] ICE OIC, really took the lead on the IROE. She made everyone sign that they had read and understood the IROE MPIC signed by [redacted] Additionally, the IROE slide she had created was posted in numerous locations around the operational area as a reminder. [redacted] was managing and driving the intelligence cycle and talking to the CJTF-7 C2X. The GTMO Team really didn't bring any interrogation techniques beyond those which were listed on [redacted] IROE slide and appeared to think that the techniques were acceptable. LTG SANCHEZ and BG FAST visited AG in early Nov 03. During that visit [redacted] SANCHEZ asked how we were getting information from recalcitrant and uncooperative detainees. When he received the answer that measures and techniques available in FM 34-52 were being implemented, LTC SANCHEZ asked if we were utilizing all of the available approaches and techniques and that he had not seen any requests for more aggressive techniques. Such requests went from the ICE through SJA to COL PAPPAS, who presumably would have passed them on the CJTF-7 for LTG SANCHEZ'sapproval. I never saw any approvals signed by LTG SANCHEZ I do not how many requests COL PAPPAS forwarded for approval. I do know that COL PAPPAS said early on that he would not approve any stress positions, and, as a result of that declaration, no one put in any such requests. I do not know if COL PAPPAS got authority to approve other techniques beyond FM 34-52 Upon my arrival, I heard about an incident of an "unauthorized interrogation" conducted by three 519th MI BN soldiers. I heard that there was a CID investigation and that they had been punished, but I do not know any other details. This was the only abuse I had heard about until CID contacted me on 14 Jan 04 and learned some details of the MP abuses. I never personally observed, nor did anyone ever report to me, any detainee abuses. Although the 205th MI BDE had requested and received military working dogs, those dogs were assigned to the MPs for force protection and security duties. I never observed, nor did anyone ever report to me, the unauthorized use of military working dogs during the course of an interrogation. Interrogations approaches requesting the use of military dogs were submitted thru COL PAPPAS for approval. After hearing about the CID allegations in January we developed a 1 page letter of instruction on the rules of using a military dog. I never observed, nor did anyone ever report to me, the unauthorized photography or videotaping of detainees. I never heard of any incidents where detainees were forced to wear female clothing. [redacted] dealt directly with OGA until he departed the AG. In January [redacted] and I developed an MOU for COL PAPPAS's signature that outlined the requirement for OGA to in-process OGA detainees.

//END OF STATEMENT//

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May, 2004

at Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/0[redacted]	1830 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, 1 CAV Division Interrogation Facility, CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I arrived at Abu Ghraid in Mid November and was assigned as a screener. I performed these duties for about two months and then I was moved to the interrogation Control Element (ICE) as an analyst. [redacted] was in charge of the ICE. When I first arrived I did not get much training. I do not remember receiving the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) or any information on the boundaries on how to treat detainees by the military personnel. [redacted] gave me a hand out to sign and I believe they were the IROEs. I got the impression from the military personnel that they believed CACI employees to have experience and knew what they were doing. The NCOIC had come from Afghanistan and appeared to have been burned out. When I first started screening, we were receiving 300 plus detainees at a time. We had to review all the files and I wasn't quite sure what we were supposed to do. I would ask if the only thing we had to do was fill out the screening sheet or continue with a short interview to determine if detainee was an MI hold or security hold. I chose to sit next to the most intelligent screener for two weeks until I understood the process. I did work with a Tiger Team and the interrogator was [redacted] and another SPC who was a Puerto Rican. Their supervisor was [redacted]. I would spend a lot of time in the back doing research and never conducted any interrogations. I never witnessed any physical abuse of detainees. I did feel it was inappropriate for females to search male detainees. We had a detainee who was a source "per say" who was providing information to us. We had him in his individual room and treated him well. We had to move him to the Hard Site because the room was needed for someone else. I told the MPs to treat this guy well and take care of him. The MPs gave him a shower while a female MP was guarding. The detainee told us that he had a problem with that because his wife had not even seen him naked. We kept telling the MPs to treat him well, but again, when we went to see him the following day, the source looked very tired. The source stated that the MPs woke him up at two 0200 and walked him to the end of the hall. They would make him walk toward them and ask him his detainee #. The source did not know it and he was sent back. This incident went on for about an hour and a half. We finally moved him out because the MPs would not follow our instructions. I heard rumors about things going on but I didn't personally see them. I never saw or was aware of any photos or videos with detainees. I never heard of MI tell MPs to "soften up, or give "the treatment" to detainees. The person in charge of Abu Ghraib was an MP. Later I heard that COL PAPPAS was going to be in charge. [redacted] PAPPAS was never around. I never really knew what [redacted] did. When I first arrived, it was assumed that [redacted] was in charge when COL PAPPAS was not around. He would address the troop when something happened. He lived with the troops in the LSA. I never had knowledge of anyone using guard dogs during interrogations. I knew that dogs had to be muzzled and therefore no one would use them. The SFC in charge of the ICE put out a statement to everyone, including OGA, that no interrogator would close the blinds over the windows. If they did, they would be reprimanded. In reference to clothing of detainees, when a detainee was taken to Garci or Vigilant, they would wear their civilian clothes, if they were taken to the Hard Site, they would have to wear a jumpsuit. [redacted] was working with an Al-Qaida detainee. He told us he had shaved his beard off. I got the impression from [redacted] that he was the leader. His analyst was a female imagery analyst from a unit in Germany) Her supervisor was [redacted] (Do not recall the analyst's name) In reference to ghost detainees, I knew of one who existed. But the word "ghost detainee" didn't really exist. We had intelligence reports from one particular detainee and the report showed we did not have him at our facility, but he was there. When I asked [redacted] analyst, she said the detainee was providing information to OGA and we couldn't touch him. I am not sure how long these ghost detainees stayed in our facility. I want to report something else. I am now working in the 1 CAV Division Interrogation facility. We often get detainees from 5th Group. The detainees say they were at the Adamya Palace. The detainees state that 5th group is working them real hard, physically. One individual needed a psych eval and there is no way this individual was faking his status. Another prisoner stated he was transferred in the trunk of a vehicle. Some of the incidents reported to have occurred at Adamya Palace are bleeding from the ears and electrocutions. The reason I am reporting this is because several detainees have reported the same thing. [redacted] might be able to provide some information because he has worked at Abu Ghraib the longest. There was a huge animosity between the MI and MP command and it made it difficult to work with one another. I overheard an interrogator [redacted] a tall, black, 260lbs male. Currently working in the Tiger Division Interrogation Cell) describe an interrogation technique utilizing a cigarette and circling it without touching, the detainees nipples.) The conversation occurred in the LSA's [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

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STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/06

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]king area. I overheard it while I was having a cup of coffee. I do not know who he was talking to. This was around the time the ICE NCOIC spoke to everyone and stated no closed blinds in the interrogation booths.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

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[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 1 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 1 June 2004, the undersigned an[redacted] met wit[redacted] [redacted] LTC, USA; Deputy Director, Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC), Baghdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), Iraq; and [redacted] USA; Senior Interrogator, JIDC to obtain all logs concerning JIDC operations between 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004. [redacted] advised that no such logs or records currently existed within the JIDC. He recommended we contact the 391st Military Police Battalion, BCCF to obtain logs and records concerning detainee operations.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27	1425	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 29 September 2003 to work as an analyst and was asked to be an interrogator due my background. I served in a dual capacity as an analyst/interrogator. I departed Abu Ghraib in mid-November 2003 to work at the 1st Armored Division DIF and returned to Abu Ghraib on December the 16th 2003. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib gave us a briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROEs. I was explained the process and duties assigned to an analyst. I did not receive any Geneva Convention training as it pertained to detainees at that time. I received it a week after I arrived when a Fort Huachuca team came to train the Tiger Teams. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse, any photos taken or the use of dogs. I was never aware of any MI personnel telling MPs to "soften up" a detainee or give them "the treatment." There was always a question as to who ran things at the site. I know that and ran the Interrogations Control Element. I had no knowledge of a base commander played a role though I am not sure what it was. I believe he was kind of in a supporting role.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT ABU GHRAIB DATED 27 APRIL 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

Follows [redacted]

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Coraopolis, PA	2004/05/26	1525 (JUP)	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	05

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
320th MP Bn, Ashley, PA

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am currently assigned to the 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN) in Ashley, PA, having been the 320th Commander from 1 Jun 02 until 1 May 04. The 320th was mobilized for Operation IRAQ FREEDOM on 10 Feb 03 and assembled at the mobilization point at Fort Dix, NJ, on 19 Feb 03. On 12 Mar 03, we departed Fort Dix and deployed to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait where we remained for about two weeks before crossing into Iraq. Our first mission was to take over operations from the British at Camp Freddy, which later became Camp Bucca. HHC 320th was at Camp Bucca and had about 140 or the authorized 154 personnel. The 314th and 447th MP Companies were assigned to the 320th. On 24 Jul 03, the 320th advance party went to Abu Garayb (AG) to establish operations, and I personally arrived at AG on 28 Jul 03. My Rater was the 800th MP Brigade (BDE) Commander, initially BG Paul HILL until the end of May 03, and then BG KARPINSKI. Upon my arrival at AG, the 72nd MP Co, an Army National Guard (ANG) unit from Las Vegas, NV, was the only MP unit there, and it had arrived at AG at the end of May 03. It was subordinate to the 400th MP BN headquartered at BIAP. Since the 72nd was already in place, the decision was made to reassign the 72nd to the 320th, and the 314th, which had been assigned to me at Bucca, was "traded" to the 400th in exchange. The 447th MP Co arrived AG together with the 320th. The next MP unit to arrive at AG was the 229th MP Co, an ANG unit from Virginia Beach, VA, and they arrived about the Aug 03 timeframe. The 372nd MP Co arrived on 1 Oct 03, followed shortly thereafter in early Oct 03 by the 870th and 670th MP Co, and then the 320th MP Co toward the end of Oct 03. The 72nd MP Co, which had been deployed for approximately 13 months, was then redeployed and departed AG during the first couple of days in Nov 03. The conditions at AG upon my arrival on 28 Jul 03 were not favorable. AG covered a grid square and was divided into four compounds. Local Iraqis had thoroughly looted and stripped AG after Saddam Hussein fell, and there was no infrastructure to speak of. The 72nd had only cleared and occupied one area. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was funding the reconstruction of AG and had hired local contractors to refurbish the facilities. However, thee were never any CPA representatives at AG, there was no CPA project officer, and there was not, until much later, CPA oversight of the Iraqi Correctional Officers. One of the compounds became Camp Vigilant, and was designated as the holding area for suspected Saddam Fedayeen members that were to detained as a result of Operation VICTORY BOUNTY, which began in early Aug 03. Camp Ganci, which would eventually occupy one compound, did not yet exist. Elements of A Co, 519th Military Intelligence (MI) BN were already on the ground when I arrived at AG, and my thinking was that they must be there in preparation for VICTORY BOUNTY: [redacted] was already there, and it was with [redacted] that I had my first conversation about the delineation of MP and MI roles at AG. [redacted] arrived shortly thereafter. [redacted] was the Operations Officer that ran and managed interrogation operations, she was the highest-ranking MI officer at AG at that time, and it was with her that I would coordinate any MI related issues. The hard site was still being remodeled and MI interrogations were taking place in tents at Camp Vigilant. I would go to [redacted] to ensure we were accomplishing our mission and that we were appropriately separating high and low value detainees. It became obvious to me that the majority of our detainees were detained as the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and were swept up by Coalition Forces as peripheral bystanders during raids. I think perhaps only one in ten security detainees were of any particular intelligence value. It appeared that there was an extreme reluctance to release these low value inmates because of the fear that one of them might return to attack Coalition Forces [redacted]

NOT USED

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Coraopolis, PA DATED 2004/05/26

8. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Detainees were coming into AG faster than they were being released. The release process was very slow and laborious. There was a "Security Release Board" that was set up in late Sep to early Oct 03 to review Security Detainees for release. The Security Board was chaired by BG FAST and also had BG KARPINSKI (800th MP BDE Commander) and [redacted] JA) as members. I really don't know how the board was created. I know that [redacted] had been sending recommendations for release of selected Security Detainees to her higher headquarters, but they were all denied. There were many Criminal Detainees accused of Iraqi on Iraqi crimes and the criminal element was managed well, and there was an efficient release process in place. There was a "Criminal Release Board" which was headed by BG KARPINSKI, and also had BG FAST and [redacted] as Board members. I also had the authority to authorized release of misdemeanor offenders after they had been incarcerated for 30 days. Major offenders still had to be reviewed by the Criminal Release Board for determination. This authority granted to me was instrumental in managing the numbers of criminal detainees, and there was no similar mechanism or authority in place for review of the Security Detainees. The Security Release Board met for the first time in late Sep/early Oct 03 and was supposed to review 20 to 30 cases at least once a week. About the same timeframe (late Summer to early Fall), there were still considerable number of VICTORY BOUNTY Security Detainees of no or minimal intelligence value and they were contributing to the overcrowding situation. Many of the maneuver divisions were turning in very large numbers of Security Detainees that also contributed to overcrowding. As an example, the 4th ID contributed triple digit number of detainees every week. The 4th ID Commander appeared to be of the mind set that they would send every detainee they picked up in sweeps to AG. The divisions would hold similar boards to review Security Detainees for release, but the division commanders frequently overrode the boards' recommendations and the detainees were sent to AG. And along the Nov/Dec 03 timeframe, busloads of Security Detainees began arriving at AG from Bucca as operation there were being transferred to AG. Although at this time the total number of detainees at AG remained about the same, as a result of the criminal releases, VICTORY BOUNTY detainees, and the increasing number of Security Detainees pouring in from the divisions and Bucca, the demographics of the AG detainee population began to change increasingly to Security Detainees. This is when I realized that the Security Release Board was not doing its job and this was also perfectly clear to the local MI folks. The Security Release Board did not initially have a set schedule to meet and because there were two generals and colonel, it was difficult to find a time for all members to coordinate their schedules. There was also the problem that board members, especially BG FAST, had questions about the detainees being reviewed and the process was slowed. After about four weeks, we formed a "Pre-Board" that would meet before the Security Release Board in an effort to anticipate and address the general's questions. This board consisted of representatives of MI, MP, CID, and the Magistrate Cell, and the Pre-Board appeared to streamline the release process somewhat. By Jan 04, the Security Release Board was meeting once a week. [redacted] arrived in late Aug/early Sep 03 and he was then the highest ranking MI officer and I worked closely with him. I [redacted] his job to be that if I had a problem or question about MI, I went to [redacted] assumed from [redacted] the role of attending the MP daily morning meetings. The "hard site" opened for detainee operations on 25 Aug 03. I had envisioned that the hard site would be used as a post-trial confinement area. However, the Iraqi legal system was very slow and there were only about 25 convictions the entire time I was at AG. Cell Blocks 1A and 1B were the Isolation areas. 1B was designated for female, juvenile, and psychiatric detainees. 1A was designated for MI Holds, and MI decided who would be put there. To the best of my knowledge, MI controlled who went in 1A and 1A was exclusively MI. MI was afforded the latitude to pick who went in 1A, and when and where detainees would be moved to interrogations, and MPs would facilitate those decisions. I left the daily running of 1A and 1B to the 372nd and MI. Trouble-makers or problem detainees were put in 1B. Only MPs were allowed in 1A and 1B. The rest of the prison was CPA and Iraqi Correctional Officers covered those area, but were not allowed in 1A or 1B. LTG SANCHEZ had his first visit to AG on 30 Sep 03. BG KARPINSKI and COL PAPPAS were there as well, but BG FAST was not. I briefed LTG SANCHEZ on all aspects of AG operations and I discussed the prisoner population demographics and US Soldier population with him. He basically saw everything. [redacted] briefed LTG SANCHEZ on the interrogation process. LTG SANCHEZ's second visit to AG was during the first week of Nov 03. This was strictly an MI function and I had no role in this visit, although I did accompany his entourage on part of the tour. BG FAST accompanied him. He received briefings on MI and interrogation issues. It is possible that an interrogation was going on at the time of his visit to the interrogation area, but he was only in that area for five to ten minutes. There was no one from the MP Chain of Command present when LTG SANCHEZ was in the interrogation area, although it's likely there was an MP guard or guards present. BG KARPINSKI visited AG less than ten times and they were on media days and VIP days. She also came in early December to make a decision on the location of Camp Avalanche and came on Christmas to visit Soldiers. I tried to get her to go see Ganci and the other sites, and visit the troops and detainees, but she was too busy. When she visited AG, she got to go wherever she wanted to go and she was never denied access to anywhere. I personally escorted her on all her visits. On 19 Nov 03, there was an OPORD which appointed COL PAPPAS as commander of the AG Forward Operating Base (FOB). I had been the FOB Commander up until then. I do not know the rationale or reason for the OPORD [redacted]

NOT USED

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

The OPORD was a surprise to me and to the 800th. No one had discussed it with me and I was not consulted about the FOB changes. Basically, I saw no real immediate change in the conduct of operations as a result of the OPORD, as the change was gradual between 19 Nov 03 and the arrival of elements of the 165th MI BN. I never had any concern that MI was trying to interject itself into the MP Chain of Command and I never had any questions about Command Authority. I was please to see COL PAPPAS arrive, because he brought with him additional resources. [redacted] Commander of the 165th MI BN, brought some elements of his battalion to AG in early Dec 03 and assumed much of the base operations. After the OPORD, I would go to COL PAPPAS rather than to the 800th for support. I understood that I retained responsibility for detainee operations and that I was responsible for the mission assigned to me. The first time I spoke to MG MILLER was in early September. I believe that MG MILLER was there to give MI an assessment with extracting actionable intelligence. MG MILLER left and he returned to Abu Ghraib, a few days later he returned and I met with him. He tried to give us Lessons Learned from GTMO and what worked between the MP and MI units. He said, and I agreed, that both MP and MI needed to work closely together. MG MILLER wanted the MPs to set the conditions (what he meant was there were rules to be followed and ensure we keep to the rules i.e. cigarettes rations as a reward. MPs control the issue of cigarettes. They would be the bad guys and MI would be the good guy to gather information.) He gave example of how GTMO processed detainees. Not all detainees are treated the same. While moving from Point A to Point B, the prisoners are shackled and have hood over their heads. He did discuss the use of dogs. MI was supposed to have money to build an interrogation facility and MG MILLER gave them options to select from to help them establish an organization and begin construction. In reference to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), they were funding the renovation of Abu Ghraib but they were not there. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, there were no CPA representatives on site. The military was running the facility. I had requested a Project Manager from CPA to come out to Abu Ghraib to maintain oversight of the renovation project and to have oversight of the Iraqi Criminals. A representative was never provided the entire time I was there. Clothing was an issue at Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was a rough environment and the conditions were not the best. We did not have jumpsuits for everyone. Those detainees held in the general population got when available and were able to keep their civilian clothes. All those going to 1B and 1A wore their clothing in their possession. Prisoners assigned to the CPA portion of the prison were all issued jumpsuits. The first time I heard about detainees being stripped naked was when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) came to visit Abu Ghraib sometime in October. I received a call from one of the ICRC female representative who sounded frantic and wanted me to go down to the Hard Site. I quickly went to the hard site and was told by the ICRC that the detainees were naked in their cells. I saw between 12-15 detainees naked in their own individual cells. [redacted] and chased down [redacted]

NOT USED

[redacted]

Initials of person making statements [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Caraopolis, PA DATED 2004/05/26

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Around this time, I was moved to the 800th MP Brigade staff. On the 18th of October [redacted] came in to take over the battalion. Sometime in November, CJTF-7 sent in some JAG representatives including [redacted] (Australia) to Abu Ghraib to try to come up with some responses to the ICRC report. [redacted] was there with the JAG representatives. They came to the consensus that there was a provision in the Geneva Convention that allowed them to keep the ICRC from certain detainee classification. The ICRC was returning in December/January time frame and they were deciding what areas the ICRC should go visit and what areas according to the Geneva Convention, they were allowed to keep them out of. Shortly after 1A was opened, Other Government Organization (OGA) showed up with two detainees. They wanted to house the detainee at Abu Ghraib for a few days. I told them to process them in. They did not want them processed in. I did not like the idea, but told them they needed to leave someone behind to keep watch over the detainee. The detainee was taken away the next day. This became more of a routine and I became aware it was becoming an impact on MI operations. I had a discussion with [redacted] about how OGA was doing their own thing [redacted] said he would write up a memorandum of understanding for OGA. I relied on him to be the liaison between OGA and us. I was never aware of anything bad occurring between the detainees and OGA. The only incident I am aware of was the death of an OGA detainee. OGA had brought two detainees to the Hard Site in the afternoon. By late evening or early morning, one of the detainees was dead. I was told that the detainee had put up some stiff resistance when he was captured and got hit on the head. I told the folks gathered that that was not the situation I wanted to be in, this is what I wanted to prevent by processing detainees. I told them, "You take care of it." I believe the body was taken to BIAP to the mortuary unit there. I wrote up a serious incident report and sent it up to my higher headquarters. On 20 September the night of the mortar attack in which two MI Soldiers were killed, I was notified about a possible abuse of detainees by MI personnel. I spoke to [redacted] my S-3 about the incident. The MPs claimed to have seen MI roughing some detainees and the MI personnel claimed to have been yelling at the detainees while they were unloading them off the vehicle. [redacted] told me he heard them yelling. I received the sworn statements from everyone who was around and passed them on to CID to investigate the matter. CID conducted an investigation and the incident was unfounded. When MI wanted a detainee on sleep deprivation, they would tell the MP guard that prisoner "X" was on sleep deprivation. They would give instructions that the detainee was to sleep four hours within a 24-hour period. In Camp Vigilant, the detainees on sleep deprivation would be separated from the rest of the group and placed near the wire, where the MP Guard could monitor the detainee. The detainee was provided a cot where he could sleep and would be awoken by making him walk, stand, and sit. In the Hard Site, the MPs would go around periodically and wake the prisoner up by making noise, or possibly putting the detainee in a different position. I do not believe MPs were given specific instructions on how to keep a detainee awake. It was left to the MPs. When I first arrived, [redacted] met with me and she gave me a list of the rules of engagement for MI personnel and she explained what they were trying to do. At that time they were focused on the Fedeyeen members. In general, I went to [redacted] for all issues after he arrived. I would ask him how the cooperation between MI and MP was going and he said, "Oh Yeah, these guys are great." I never had any issues brought up to my level. I saw dogs on some occasions being walked around, but that was it. I did hear about cold showers, but everyone took cold showers because that is all we had for a long time at Abu Ghraib. I have been ordered by MG Fay not to discuss any issues related to this inquiry with anyone not directly associate with the inquiry. I was at Abu Ghraib from the end of July 2003 to 19 January 2004 except for emergency leave to attend my father-in-law's funeral between 17 - 27 December 2003 and the period 18 - 31 October 2003 when BG Karpinski appointed [redacted] as acting commander of the 320th. Q. Is thre anything you would like to add to this statement? A. No [redacted]

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of May 2004

at _____

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
320th MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
APO AE 09432

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

12 April 04

MEMORANDUM THRU [redacted] Staff Judge Advocate, III Corp

FOR [redacted] CG, III Corps

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of AR 15-6 fo[redacted] 320th MP Battalion

1. I acknowledge responsibility for al actions taken by soldiers assigned to the 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN). I have been thoroughly embarrassed and humiliated by being suspended from my duties while the 320th MP BN has returned home. I acknowledge the failure to implement all corrective security measures as ordered by BG Karpinski and documented in GOMOR dated 10 November 2003. I acknowledge failing to have all soldiers assigned to the 320th MP BN trained in Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Operations and knowledgeable in the protections afforded detainees in the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War. I acknowledge failing to properly supervise soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib understanding that proper supervision would have prevented prisoner abuse.

2. I offer the following information in deciding on administrative actions to be taken against me. I assumed command of the 320th MP BN in June 2002. I was selected for promotion in November 2002. In accordance with Army Reserve policy, I found an O-6 position and requested a transfer of units in January 2003 to obtain my promotion. My request was denied because activation of the 320th MP BN was expected. The battalion was called to active duty on 10 February 2003. After packing unit equipment to operate a 4000 man Theater Internment Facility (TIF), the 320th MP BN began the mobilization validation process at Fort Dix on 19 February 2003. At Fort Dix, the 320th MP BN received training on the Geneva Convention, Law of War, and Arab cultural awareness. On 12 March 2003, the 320th MP BN departed Fort Dix for Kuwait. The battalion was able to validate in only three weeks when other units exceeded five weeks at Fort Dix at that time because of demonstrated expertise in I/R operations. First Army and the 78th Training Division used the tactical SOP of the 320th MP BN to validate the mobilization readiness exercise of all other I/R battalions. In 2000 and 2001, the 320th MP BN performed its wartime mission in South Korea extremely effectively. The 320th MP BN had served as a test bed for various versions of the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) so that personnel were well prepared to process and account for EPW. The competence of the battalion and an aggressive training schedule enabled the 320th MP BN to arrive at Fort Dix weeks after the 310th MP BN and 744th MP BN and depart weeks ahead of those battalions.

3. The 320th MP BN arrived in Kuwait on 13 March 2003. While waiting at Camp Arifjan, at my request the 320th MP BN received another cultural awareness class from the Free Iraqi Force (FIF) which included a mock prison scenario involving female MPs giving orders to Iraqi EPW. On 22 March 2003, the 320th MP BN operations staff to include [redacted] and several other NCOs entered Iraq as part of the advance party for the 800th MP Brigade (800th MP Brigade staff was slow to appear at the TIF near Umm Qasr, Iraq.) By 29 March 2003, I had moved the HHC of the 320th MP BN and two recently arrived MP Guard Companies to the TIF by commercial 20 ton dump trucks, SSTs used to empty porta-lavatories, and commercial busses. My units were committed to action while vehicles and containers of MTOE equipment were aboard ship. (Vehicles and equipment arrived in Kuwait in late April through late May.) On 1 April 2003, I assumed command of Camp Freddy from a British Air Defense Artillery unit. Camp Freddy was not designed to TIF standards in that compounds were small and located very close to one another with a total design capacity of about 2500. By 13 April 2003, the population of Camp Freddy exceeded 7200. All soldiers under my command were working a scheduled twelve hour shift (routinely working 14-16 hour shifts) without any days off. I typically worked 18-19 hours daily. During April, I recall two meetings that I held with officers and NCOs regarding the review of proper treatment of detainees following alleged events that were investigated and subsequently found to be groundless. By mid-May, engineers had completed the TIF named Camp Bucca, Holding Area Freddy was closed, and the 320th MP BN executive officer had been REFRAD. (The battalion CSM was held at Fort Dix for medical problems until December 2003.) We continued to provide security for in-processing, the medical clinic, Tribunal screening, and the Joint Forces Interrogation Facility. The 320th MP BN assumed some escort missions from the 223rd MP CO. On the afternoon of 12 May 2003 [redacted] was assigned on the first escort mission along with 9 other soldiers to take an empty bus to TSP Whitford at Tallil, pick up prisoners, and return to Camp Bucca for processing. Prior to departure, a mission briefing was held which included a review of the Rules of Engagement. At this briefing, I emphasized treating the EPWs firmly, but with respect and emphasized utilizing the 223rd MP CO personnel to resolve questionable situations (223rd MP CO was providing the left seat/right seat ride.) When [redacted] returned to Camp Bucca shortly before midnight, she took vigilante justice against EPW that she believed had raped [redacted] 4 out of the 10 320th MP BN soldiers abused some of the EPWs; a clear indication that the abuse was the responsibility of those individuals acting alone and was not condoned by myself or any leader at Camp Bucca.

4. Between April and June 2003, four different MP Guard Companies were assigned to the 320th MP BN for varying lengths of time. This resulted in a very dynamic mission with transition being the norm. In June 2003, the 800th MP Brigade made me the Commandant of Camp Bucca when they relocated to Victory Camp. During June and July 2003, I was responsible for a population of about 3000 prisoners and 1500 soldiers (320th MP BN, 530th MP BN, and 724th MP BN). On 17 July 2003, the 320th MP BN was ordered to relocate to FOB Abu Ghraib and assume command and control of the prison complex to include Camp Vigilant, Camp Ganci, and the renovated prison facility. I was assigned the missions to construct Camp Ganci, improve Camp Vigilant, and be prepared to operate the renovated, existing prison complex. I was told by the Deputy Commander of the 800th MP Brigade, [redacted] that the 320th MP BN was selected

over the 530th MP BN and 724th MP BN because the 320th MP BN had demonstrated a greater ability to accomplish this assignment than other battalions.

5. I arrived at Abu Ghraib with the main body on 24 July 2003 without the battalion S-4 who was evacuated to Walter Reed Hospital for knee surgery. (The escapes and shootings at Camp Vigilant on 4 June and 13 June attributed to the 320th MP BN on report pages 27 and 28 occurred while the 400th MP BN was responsible for Camp Vigilant.) Within ten days, all the concertina wire for all eight Camp Ganci compounds had been laid. Simultaneously, we were receiving prisoners from Operation Victory Bounty into Camp Vigilant and Iraqi criminals into compound 1 of Camp Ganci. We immediately assisted the Military Intelligence (MI) unit with intelligence collection effort by isolating detainees as much as possible and by executing sleep management. (Annex A) Accounting for all detainees at all times was an extremely high priority for me. I asked the battalion S-[redacted] at least daily if there were any prisoner accountability problems. It was a very rare event when there was a lapse in prisoner accountability. I visited the processing area and the compounds daily and asked about compound manifests. I found the compound manifests to be accurate with a few minor changes required. These changes to NDRS were worked behind the priority of physically accepting detainees, transferring detainees to another detention facility, or releasing detainees. Inaccurate NDRS information does not constitute an inability for me to account for detainees. Whenever there was an escape, a timely report identifying the escaped detainee was filed. I believe that [redacted] as quoted on report page 24, to be in error. I believe that the escapes he identified are recorded as e. on report page 28 and p. on report page 31. I find [redacted] confusion understandable as he was the platoon leader in charge of escorts and [redacted] was in charge of the Hard-Site until December 2003 when [redacted] was REFRAD.

6. At the end of July 2003, seven PR&Cs were submitted for logistical support that [redacted] 800th MP Brigade S-4, combined into a single PR&C only to realize its impracticality through the PR&C process and was subsequently forced to divide the one huge PR&C into several PR&Cs. The net effect was that support requested in July 2003 was not received until October 2003. Since arriving at FOB Abu Ghraib, there was a continuous expansion of facilities and of number of personnel working there. My schedule at Abu Ghraib consisted of 18-19 hour days without any days off. This schedule enabled me to visit many soldiers and observe operations. I reviewed all statements from soldiers assigned to the 320th MP BN (Report Annex 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 68, 71, 73, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 101, 105, and 106) and conclude that I was seen frequently while BG Karpinski was rarely seen which contradicts in part paragraph 19 on report page 43.

7. Expansion of operational compounds in Camp Ganci was very painful because of the lack of support. Water, food, porta-lavatories, light sets, and sufficient personnel were issues that took significant effort to overcome to open additional compounds to meet the growing prisoner population. On 25 August 2003, the first three wings and the medical clinic of the Hard-Site opened while the remainder of the prison remained under renovation. No CPA representative was assigned on-site. The Iraqi correction officers assigned by the Ministry of Justice were supervised by MPs.

8. Force protection was a major issue from day one of arrival. FOB Abu Ghraib is routinely subjected to small arms, rocket propelled grenade, mortar, and rocket attack. An internal threat arises from local labor used to renovate the Hard-Site. The 320th MP BN provided all perimeter security and force protection until A CO of the 1/504 PIR arrived at the end of September 2003 and until the 165th MI BN arrived in December 2003 to assume the northern perimeter and assist at the entry control point. On the night of 16 August 2003, 59 prisoners were injured (43 required Medevac) and 6 prisoners were killed when a mortar round impacted in Compound B of Camp Vigilant and Compound 2 of Camp Ganci. On 23 September 2003, two MI soldiers were killed by a mortar impact in Camp Vigilant. At this time, I requested a Combat Stress team visit. Thereafter, [redacted] Combat Stress team periodically returned because of the high stress levels faced by soldiers at FOB Abu Ghraib. This contradicts in part the conclusion reached in paragraph 20 on page 43 of the report.

9. The CJFT-7 IG, [redacted] inspected FOB Abu Ghraib in late September 2003 and exited with the observation that "You are the forgotten." [redacted] found that we were doing the best job possible with the resources given, but were receiving woefully inadequate support. On 30 September 2003, [redacted] inspected FOB Abu Ghraib. He made FOB Abu Ghraib an enduring base. He also initiated efforts to correct deficiencies. My early October 2003 was spent escorting primary CJTF-7 staff officers on inspections of FOB Abu Ghraib, integrating four new MP companies into confinement operations, providing information to an engineer team to develop a base master plan, and familiarizing [redacted] (acting as the 320th MP BN CSM) and [redacted] with FOB Abu Ghraib. BG Karpinski reassigned [redacted] from serving as commander of the 324th MP BN to mayor of FOB Abu Ghraib. (I strongly recommended to BG Karpinski that she provide a staff for [redacted] but a staff never arrived.) On 15 October 2003, the 372nd MP CO relieved the 72nd MP CO of operation of Camp Vigilant and the Hard-Site. On the morning of 18 October 2003, BG Karpinski reassigned me to the 800th MP Brigade staff. She said that she wanted a new face and new ideas. She wanted me to work with CPA on detention facilities. [redacted] would be the interim 320th MP BN commander for two weeks until someone else could be found. She had expected the mayor of FOB Abu Ghraib [redacted] and not me to brief and escort [redacted] during his inspection the previous day. She wanted CJTF-7 to provide a mayor. Finally, BG Karpinski suggested that I go to Camp Arifjan to meet with the 99th RRC Commander [redacted] during her visit. I did go to Camp Arifjan, met with [redacted] and returned to the 800th MP Brigade on 22 October 2003. (Annex B) When I first met with BG Karpinski upon my return, she informed me that she [redacted] intended to reassign me to duties as 320th MP BN commander at the completion of [redacted] two weeks. In talking with [redacted] he told me that he reported to BG Karpinski that the mission at FOB Abu Ghraib was overwhelming and that there were no major problems with the 320th MP BN. On 31 October 2003, I returned to FOB Abu Ghraib. During the time that I was assigned to the 800th MP Brigade staff, 85% of the egregious acts were committed in wing 1A of the Hard-Site. Some acts also occurred in early November 2003 while I was commander. The egregious acts of abuse did not occur every night from late October through early November 2003; rather, the acts occurred on 3 isolated nights. My oversight of operations eliminated the abuse after mid-November.

10. On 10 November 2003, I received a GOMOR for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by BG Karpinski. In my rebuttal to the GOMOR, I pointed out compliance with all

corrective measures for which adequate resources were provided. I also pointed out corrective measures which were not complied with involved positioning of light sets to illuminate all dark areas that could provide an escape route for prisoners within the grid square of FOB Abu Ghraib and involved the number of personnel to assign to operate Camp Ganci compounds and serve as an interior FOB Abu Ghraib roving patrol. These corrective security measures could not be complied with because all available light sets were used to illuminate Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci compounds and there was an insufficient amount of soldiers to meet doctrinal requirements for operating detention facilities at FOB Abu Ghraib. I made personal contact with the 800th MP Brigade S-4, [redacted] and S-3, [redacted] to request additional light sets and soldiers. In December 2003 when the 320th MP BN located a vendor for light sets [redacted] sent all the light sets to the 530th MP BN. [redacted] repeatedly denied all requests for forces. During mid-November [redacted] was assigned as my acting executive officer. On 19 November 2003, COL Pappas became FOB Abu Ghraib commander.

11. On 24 November 2003, 4500 prisoners rioted in Camp Ganci. While conducting an AAR of the operation to quell the riot, I was informed of the shooting in the Hard-Site. In early December 2003 the 165th MI BN arrived to perform duties of overseeing FOB Abu Ghraib operations. Actual transition of responsibilities was limited because the 165th MI BN expected to return to Germany in early February. The 165th MI BN did not want to transition things twice within 2 months. All units on FOB Abu Ghraib continued to attend my daily briefings. The 320th MP BN TOC continued to coordinate internal and external force protection. The 165th MI BN assumed responsibility for mayoral functions and the management of hundreds of local contract laborers to fulfill contracts awarded to improve FOB Abu Ghraib.

12. On the evening of 13 January 2004, [redacted] turned a CD of digital photographs over to CID. At 2300 hours, [redacted] came to me and showed me the photographs. I agreed to assist his investigation by utilizing the Quick Reaction Force to secure the crime scenes. Between 2400 and 0400 on 14 January 2004, I helped [redacted] secure evidence and take sworn statements. On 18 January 2004, I was suspended from duties by BG Karpinski. On 16 March 2004 while the 320th MP BN prepared to redeploy home, I received a continued suspension from duties from [redacted] To this date, I have never seen [redacted] Report, [redacted] Report, or [redacted] Report making it impossible for me to implement their recommendations absent direction from my higher command. I have recently received notification that [redacted] will assume command of the 320th MP BN in early June at a change of command ceremony.

13. In summary, during this entire deployment, I was assigned missions without the resources to accomplish the missions by doctrine. A lack of unit equipment and vehicles existed until May. Other logistical issues were present throughout the deployment. There was a chronic shortage of personnel which necessitated 12 hour shifts with few days off. On the 320th MP BN staff, for the majority of the deployment I was without an executive officer, S-4, and command sergeant major. I relied heavily on [redacted] to run the day to day confinement operations so that I could concentrate on everything else. The "numerous" witnesses referenced on report page 39 were statements made by [redacted] (Annex 64) and [redacted] (Annex 80) who worked for [redacted] that confirmed "day to day operations were ran by [redacted]. My assigned missions were constantly changing, usually growing. Over the course of the

deployment, I had command and control of ten MP companies not counting the battalion HHC. At Abu Ghraib, MP companies received training during transitions that failed to include formal, documented training on the Geneva Convention or I/R operations. I accepted missions assigned, requested support as needed, task organized, and completed the missions to the best of my ability. In my opinion, [redacted]ed acts of abuse in clear violation of any standard of morality. Training alone would not have prevented these acts of abuse. As battalion commander, I could not be everywhere at all times and therefore delegated authority. If I were omnipotent, I would have removed [redacted] from their duties and avoided the abuse of prisoners and the disgrace to the nation.

14. On the civilian side, I elected [redacted] at the end of 2002. I applied for various jobs prior to mobilization. I have a federal government position held open for me [redacted] I return home in April.

15. I offer OERs from my previous mobilization where I worked for the V Corps G-5 to my OER ending in June 2003 to show that I have a history of accepting challenging assignments and doing well. (Annex C) My OER for the period of December 2001 to December 2002 is not included because the electronic copy in my OPMS is for a captain unknown to me.

[redacted]
LTC, MP
320th Military Police Battalion

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Alexandria, VA	2004/05/27	12 [redacted]	

5. [redacted]ST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]

6. SSN [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS E-7/ARNG

8. [redacted]

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Abu Ghraib on 20 August 2003 and was assigned to the 229th MP Company. My primary duty was as the NCOIC of the Detention Facility Internal Reaction Force (IRF). Our sections core mission was to provide a quick reaction capability inside the facility related to the detainees (security, riot control). For the first few months the IRF also provided security and transferred detainees for interrogations. This ceased circa circa October 2003 and MI assumed responsibility for detainee transfer and security. Before this mission transfer I had an encounter with [redacted] (sic), 205th MI. I had asked [redacted] for the MI Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and he was very vague in his response. The IROE were; however, posted on the walls of the Interrogation Center. I told [redacted] that my rules of engagement were that MPs would be used first to protect US soldiers and second to protect detainees and that we would not stand by if abuse or assaults were observed. [redacted] responded that I was not a team player and my team subsequently had little interaction with MI. Initially my section consisted of approximately ten personnel and we grew to about 15 by my departure on 29 March 2004. We had five canine teams assigned to the IRF, three Navy and two Army. These teams had initially been requested for Abu Ghraib by Military Intelligence; however, upon their arrival circa 20 November 2003, there was controversy over who "owned" the dogs. I recommended to my BN XO [redacted] that the dogs be attached to the IRF and it was ultimately decided this would be a good mix. The dogs were employed primarily as a force multiplier to support MP detention operations. The understanding was their priority for support would be to the IRF with assistance to MI as a secondary mission. Most of our missions prior to December 2003 were in Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci to conduct searches of detainee tents. We had only a handful of calls to the Hard Site. Under my direct supervision were the three Navy dog teams [redacted] They [redacted] They were billeted with my MPs and answered directly to me. The two Army dog teams I rarely saw. They were assigned to [redacted] S3, 320th MP BN, billeted separately, and provided virtually all the support to MI. My section only provided a dog team to MI on one occasion. The day of the riot in Camp Ganci (I believe 24 November, about 4 days after the dog teams' arrival at Abu Ghraib) my teams were called to tier 1A to conduct a search for weapons. There had been a report that an inmate had a hand grenade. When we got to 1A the detainees were all handcuffed to their cell doors. As we searched each cell they were un-cuffed one at a time, moved away, the search conducted, and then re-cuffed. During this search MI asked for a dog team on the other side of the cell block and I sent [redacted] We always deployed an MP with the dog team. When [redacted] returned he told me that MI had told him to get his dog "fired up" and to go into a cell with a detainee. He complied and it was during this time his dog bit a female interrogator who was present. I am not sure if his dog bit the detainee but [redacted] would know. [redacted] told me he had been very uncomfortable with the MI (not further identified) request to place his dog in the detainee's cell and I directed him not to do so again. Generally all requests for our dogs were routed through me; however, later that evening MI contacted [redacted] and requested he come back to Tier 1A again and [redacted] refused. Following this incident I continued to receive requests for dog teams from MI but was very clear with my rules of engagement and the requests completely "dried up" a few weeks later. Any requests were routed from MI through our TOC. We did return to Tier 1A on occasion to support initial or final movement of detainees into or out of 1A but did not support MI interrogations. Other than on one occasion I never observed MI or MP abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib. That incident was circa 23 September 2003. The QRF had detained a vehicle with an Iraqi male and female occupant and brought them to the gate. My entire IRF team and an MI interrogation team were summoned to the gate to take custody of the Iraqis. When we arrived I observed an MI soldier chocking and beating a detainee. We intervened and directed the abuse stop. The MI soldier told us he was a trained professional and to let him handle the situation. He was told if it did not stop we would detain him. He dragged the detainee to a vehicle and threw him in. I asked for his name and the names of two soldiers with him which he would not provide. Within 20 minutes of this incident [redacted] IRF Commander, and the entire IRF wrote statements which we forwarded through the 320th MP BN to the 800th MP BDE. I believe [redacted] 320th S3, also contacted the 205th MI BN to report the incident. Shortly thereafter a [redacted] 205th MI came over and told us he would handle the situation. We again asked for the names of the soldiers involved and he would not provide them. On 20 January 2004 I followed up on what had happened with our report and was told by the SJA that it had been referred to CID who turned it back over to [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 1245 DATED 27 May 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

205th MI for action. I have no direct knowledge of any other abuse of detainees. I never heard or was asked for MPs to "soften up" detainees. Once an MP [redacted] told me that "the General" (a detainee) he had transported had his face severely beat up. He told [redacted] that MI had done it. I reported this incident to my supervisor [redacted] who advised me he sent the report forward.

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A: No.

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

[redacted]

Nothing Follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of May, 2004

at Metro Park, Alexandria, VA

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

On 10 February 2004, a panel of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

[redacted]

The interview is summarized as follows:

I'm Sergeant First Class [redacted] 229th MP Company. My sosh is [redacted] I am in the IRF, the Internal Reaction Force, which is separate from the Quick Reaction Force. We handle all issues inside the wall, dealing with prisoners. I work for [redacted] Before, I worked in Customs at Camp Doha.

[redacted] reads an excerpt from a sworn statement, dated 20 January 2004:

"The MI person hit him on the back of the head with a closed fist, causing the suspect to fall forward. The suspect was handcuffed, on his knees, and had a towel wrapped around his head. The MI soldier kept yelling, 'Eyes down,' and 'Get up,' while knocking the suspect down, and repeating the verbal abuse towards the suspect. Another MI soldier came to the assistance of the MI person. The 2nd MI soldier put an arm lock around the suspect's neck, pulling the suspect forward from the ground. While pulling the suspect from the ground by the neck, the MI soldier was twisting left and right, yelling at the suspect, while the first MI soldier struck the suspect in the mid-section of the stomach. [redacted] IRF Commander, approached the soldier and asked if this treatment was necessary. The MI soldier told the 1LT that he was a trained professional and to let him to let him handle the situation. The 1LT reminded the soldiers that the suspect may be innocent. The MI soldiers continued their verbal abuse, and excessive force. The 1LT stated to the MI soldiers that this abuse was not necessary. The MI soldiers ignored the 1LT, and continued to verbally abuse the suspect and drug the suspect off by the neck. The 1LT approached [redacted] and asked the Major if he was going to let this continue. The Major said nothing, and the 1LT stated that he was not going to allow this abuse to continue. The 1LT went to the MI vehicle and wanted to know who was the

Finished reading the statemen[redacted] continues the interview with [redacted] responds as follows:

I do recall the incident. We all wrote statements on this on August 23rd, about 20 minutes after the incident. I'm surprised you don't have it. 20 January is the second time we reported this incident. We reported this a second time, because we didn't know if this had been investigated. [redacted] a Marine who works in the Magistrate Cell, and [redacted] said he spoke with the 800th, who told the Captain that he could handle the investigation, that they didn't have time for it. In a few days, after that, the CID folks showed up because of another incident going on at the prison.

I don't recall who interviewed me, but he told be this was turned over to CID. They looked at it, and turned it back over to the command. He knew of no resolution to it. I was under the assumption, from CID, that it was turned back over to the MI command, who have since left a few months ago. I think it was the 205th or 202nd... I remember the 1SG's name was [redacted] Shortly after the incident occurred, [redacted] and I were called to the Battalion TOC, by [redacted] and met with their 1SG, who tried to do some battle damage assessment.

We did the statements, that night, after the incident. We turned them in to [redacted] our Company Commander, who turned them over to [redacted] I don't recall seeing them in the Battalion, but we got no resolution from the South at all.

I haven't met [redacted] yet, but I know [redacted] s leaps and bounds over anything we've seen from the 800th. He recognizes senior NCOs by name. Speaks with you every time he sees you. He asks you how things are going. The Brigade CSM met with all senior NCOs, last week, after only being on the ground just a few days. And, within a few days, issued us all brand new brassards. I've hadn't had a brassard from the 800th, since I've been here. I was told we could buy some. I only know of a couple of occasions when BG Karpinski had interaction with any of the soldiers in our unit. It was back in August or early September. She went into 2 towers, and spoke with one of soldiers, who was augmented to another platoon, and spoke about the prisoners. She didn't ask him how his living conditions were; she just wanted to know how the prisoners were. She talked about setting up an intramural inter compound soccer league with him. The other occasion was when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld came. I wasn't there, but my soldiers said she told Rumsfeld we had everything we needed. She told him we were "good to go." We were far from "good to go."

As far as the Brigade CSM from the 800th, that was another investigation we brought to the Brigade. The 377th Theatre Support Command investigated him. He came to visit, and had an inappropriate liaison with one of my soldiers. He spoke directly to one of my E4s, before speaking to anyone else. He put his arm around her, and walked around with her. He was rubbing her shoulders, and they disappeared for about 5 or10 minutes. When they came back, he sat down with her. He was holding his hand on her leg, with his arm around her. She was having some difficult times, with the stress of coming from

Camp Doha to up there, but it wasn't anything that required the physical touching. I think she was trying to play the stress card, to get out of pulling duty. We had her evaluated, and the doctor said she was completely fine. But, several of my soldiers observed that, including myself. A couple of them were so angry, that they wrote sworn statements and turned them in to [redacted] our EO Representative, which eventually spearheaded the 15-6. That was my first time meeting [redacted]

[redacted] came out another time, and I spoke with him about the lack of communication devices. We had no phones, no way of calling home to say we're still alive, even though the mortar attacks happen every night. He gave me his satellite phone, and said, "Call home." I said that's not the issue. "We have 115 soldiers, here, that don't have access to a phone. What's being done to fix that?" He said, "Well send up a request for a phone." I said that's already been done. He said, "Well use mine," and I said, "Well, we need to line up every soldier out here, and get them a free phone call," and he then he told me he had to go.

The only other person I know from the 800th is the HHC Commander, a female Captain. When we were at Arifjan, I had a soldier whose brother was killed. She helped me get all the emergency leave paperwork squared away. And [redacted] helped us get up here.

They've never come and talk to us. We'd tell them our living conditions suck, and that we've eaten T-Rations, and that we've eaten breakfast 12 days in a row in September for dinner, but none of those people would come out to see that [redacted] and the folks from the 16th are the first people from the Brigade to spend the night at that prison. I've never seen anybody from the 800th come and spend the night, there. They are gone by dark, because Abu Gharib is a dangerous place after dark.

Morale was really bad back in August and September, because we moved from Camp Doha, which has ideal living conditions, to Iraq. But, morale kind of leveled off mid-field. The mortar attacks don't help, and the fact that we don't do anything about the mortar attacks really doesn't help. The 82nd goes out, and the QRF goes out, but from what I understand, if you don't have the right information in 90 seconds, you're not going to get those guys.

I would have thought that a Brigadie. General could stop a buck, but I may be wrong. There are enough people, here, that have been told what's going on, that someone should be able to fix this problem. Related to these incidents, my personal feeling is, as someone who's been a cop for 10 years in the civilian world, if they had taken action on this back in August, it would have set the stage that prisoner abuse was not going to be tolerated.

We're a CS Company that was re-organized prior to deploying as an I/R Company. We changed our MTOE, when we left 1 year ago today. We went to our MOB Station, and we had time at our MOB Station, where [redacted] met with the Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants, and we sat down and developed a training plan. We set up Camp

Alpha. It was engineer tape, but it was a compound, and we rotated all 3 platoons through tower guard operations, through internal operations, and escort details, because, at the time, we didn't know what we were going to do. We looked at the METL Tasks for an I/R Company, and we knew there were a lot of things we could be doing. We tried to prepare for what we thought we were going to be doing. It's funny, because soldiers hated Camp Alpha, back in Indiana, but when we got on the ground up there, they were like this is just like Camp Alpha; this is going to be easy. Then, it turns out we were only going to be responsible for Tower Guard Operations, which made it easier.

I don't think you need to have training, to know that hitting someone in your custody is wrong. It's an issue of right and wrong. I've had many conversations with the MI folks after that, and I told them from the beginning, that I wouldn't tolerate that.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave [redacted] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq APO AE 09335

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2003/09/21[redacted]

3. TIME 0100[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
SFC/E-7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th Military Police Company

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I, [redacted]

On 20 Sep 03 at approx. 2145 a mortor attack was received in the vicinity of Camp Vigilant. At approx 2230 the IRF (internal Reaction Force) was called to the 320th BN TOC and advised that a mortor had laneded in the MI BN tent and there were approx. 15 wounded that were being medivac. We were told to stand by there and wait for further. Shortly thereafter we were told to go back to our living quarters and stand by to be called again. About 2330 we were called to responded to the ECP (entry control point). Once arriving we were told that the QRF was outside the wire attempting to stop a vehicle which they believed may be involved with the attack. We were told to stand fast and be prepared to be their backup should the need arise. They soon stopped the vehicle and transported it back to the ECP with the 2 occupants a male and female. Once arriving the vehicle was searched searched and the two in custody were taken over to the visitor tent where we responded and watched over the two. A few minutes later at approx 0030 21 Sep 03 a HMMWV pulled up with approx. 10 soldiers and came over to us. The first soldier wearing a desert camo flak jacket came up to the male prisoner and began screaming at him telling him eyes down and asking "what the fuck are you looking at". He then grabed him by the back of the head and pushed it down into the dirt [redacted] told him that was unnecessary and the soldier looked at him and told him "that he was the professional at this he knew what he was doing" [redacted] said that doesn't look to professional. I then said that I had never been taught that when I went through intergator school. At this point another soldier (a very large stocky soldier) came over and started yelling at him to get up. He grabbed him and yanked him up off the ground and secured his arms and began walking him back towards the vehicle. He continued screaming and forcefully moving towards the truck. As he passed me I told him to "at ease and calm down". He continued past me to the back of the truck. Once reaching the back of the truck he began striking the prisoner in the back of the head and back. He continued screaming at him to get into the truck. The soldier then forcefully slammed the prisoner into the bed of the truck. once the prisoner was in the bed of the truck he was struck a few more times and told to put a mask on. When the prisoner turned towards the back of the truck it appeared that he was bleeding from the lip, but I was unsure do to the poor lighting. At this point I asked the NCOIC what unit he was from and he told me the 519th MI. I then realized that these were soldiers from the unit that had been attacked. At this point the vehicle left and the IRF secured back to our living area. After arriving back in our area [redacted] was called by [redacted] and asked that both he and I responded to the TOC. Once arriving we introduced to [redacted] who is the 1Sg of the MI group. He told us that this had never happened and that had been doing these operations for 14 months in Afganistan and Iraq. He continued to apoligize and remind us that he had people that were wounded and everyone was upset. [redacted] told us that [redacted] had been told and she was very upset over the incident. We explained to them that during our many years of law enforcement that you never send a suspect back to a group of officers that were directly effected by an incident because you don't know what they might do and that this case was exactly the same. We were told by the 1SG that they would handle it and we advised that we were going to forward statements of the incident as well. [redacted] advised that he would forward that paperwork to the BN CDR so that action could be taken. [redacted] and I then responded back to the IRF barracks where we advised the team to complete statements of the incident and we advised them of what the 1Sg had told us. [redacted]

End of Statement

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

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STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN 2100 DATED 2004/02/10

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

////////////////////////////////Not Used/[redacted]//

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6(5)(4) UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMD[redacted]	[redacted]IME [redacted]	3. FILE NUMBER
Newport News, Virginia	2004/06/2[redacted]	0815	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS E-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 229TH Military Police Co., Virginia Beach, Virginia

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On June 24, 2004, I identified [redacted] from a photospread provided to me as being the unknown Captain described in my January 20, 2004 statement to CID Agent [redacted] This is the Captain that I witnessed beating a prisoner inside the hard site in late November 2003. I have nothing further to add to this statement [redacted]

Nothing Follows [redacted]

Nothing [redacted] Follows

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT [redacted] TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Newport News, VA DATED 2004 06 24 [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted]

Used

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE. [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24TH day of June, 2004 at Newport News, Virginia

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC. 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES [redacted]

PAGE 3. DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/27	1320 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th MP Company, VA National Guard, Virginia Beach, VA

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was at Abu Ghraib (AG) from late Aug 03 until the end of Mar 04. I had two week mid-tour leave in late October to early November 03. My primary duty at Abu Ghraib (AG) was as a member of the Internal Reaction Force (IRF). For a period of less than two weeks I also escorted detainees to and from interrogation sites. During my train up period after mobilization and prior to deploying to Iraq I did not receive any training in the Geneva Convention or on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I do not remember any training or familiarization on either at AG after my arrival. Other than the incidents which I reported to CID, I did not observe or become aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees, until towards the middle or end of January when there was a camp wide search for photos; everyone's property was searched and all computer hard drives were examined for unauthorized photos. There was vague gossip around AG about detainees wearing pink underwear, but I did not see it, nor did I hear of any specific instance where this occurred. On one occasion while in the scheduling building, I heard a MI SSG comment about OGA sometimes getting out of control while interrogating detainees. I told him that was something that would not occur while I was there as I would not allow it, nor would any other members of the 229th. I did observe a couple of OGA interrogations but did not see any abuse. Whenever we would hear yelling or other loud noises coming out of the interrogation areas, we would go over to see what was going on, just to make sure everything was OK. Other than what I reported to CID, I did not observe or become aware of any unauthorized use of guard dogs. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No. [redacted]
//END OF STATEMENT [redacted]

NOTHING

FOLLOWS [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT

USED [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE. [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of May 2004 at Springfield, Virginia [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted] *(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (JWP)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

'HORITY	Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
.NCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ABU GHRAIB PRISON, ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ	2004/01/20	1048 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229TH Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA (deployed to Abu Ghraib, Iraq)

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the day in which the Abu Ghraib Prison saw the prisoners riot for the first time, I, as a member of the Internal Reaction Force for the prison, was on stand-by for any future incidents. On that night we were called and instructed to go to the hard site and assist the unit running it. No other information was known until we arrived and were briefed by a senior enlisted soldier. We were told that a prisoner had gained access to a handgun and had fired at an American guard. We were instructed that the unit responsible for the hard site wanted our unit to conduct a search of every cell. We entered through the north entrance of the hard site and went to the first bay on the left. We went immediately upstairs and began to search the cells. I was on the top deck with other members of my team when I heard a man screaming from the first deck. I was on the south side of the bay and I looked back to the northwest corner of the bay, through the open center, and observed two soldiers and a prisoner. The prisoner was lying prone on his stomach, dressed in an orange jumpsuit, flex-cuffed behind his back with a sandbag over his head. The prisoner was not resisting in any way. One soldier was standing next to the left side of the prisoner's head with the barrell of his rifle pressed against the prisoner's head. I observed the other soldier kneeling next to the right side of the prisoner at approximately waist level. I observed this soldier begin to strike the prisoner in the small of the back with a closed fist. The soldier struck the prisoner approximately ten times. The soldier then stood up and kicked the prisoner in the right hip and right side approximately three times. I observed that this soldier was a white male with blond hair, cut very close on the sides with a flat-top style on top. This soldier was wearing a solid, olive-green vest with two pouches on the left and right sides at the rear, at the bottom of the vest. I [redacted] not able to identify this soldier until I observed him several days later in the dining facility and saw that he was a [redacted] I [redacted] not able to gain this Captain's name. [redacted] have since returned to the [redacted]

Q. Do you know the date of the incident?
A. No, sir I do not. I believe it was in Nov 03
Q. When were you assigned to the IRF?
A. Aug 03.
Q. Did you observe the detainee resisting at any time before, during or after the incident in question?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know who the soldier was with the weapon?
A. No, sir. He never looked up. I could not see his face.
Q. Can you describe the soldier with the weapon?
A. Other than white male, no sir
Q. Was there any other soldiers obseving this incident?
A. From my location I could not tell if anyone was observing what I saw
Q. Did anyone frm your team observe the incident?
A. I am not sure, sir.
Q. How long did the incident last?
A. No more than five minutes.
Q. What were you doing when this was going on?
A. Searching the south side of the second deck. I heard the screaming while conducting the searches, I looked down at the incident. I continued with the searches glancing down at the incident and at some point they had stripped the prisoner and moved him from my view.
Q. Did anyone say anything to this CPT?
A. Not that I saw
Q. Did you report this to anyone other than this office?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	[redacted]	

DITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

HE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

For official use only

Exhibit 2

A. Not officially. I discussed it with certain members of the IRF as a whole.
Q. Was the CPT striking the detainee with an open or closed fist?
A. Closed fist.
Q. Did you see what led up to this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. Could you hear what was being said to the detainee?
A. No, sir.
Q. Could you describe the detainee?
A. Male, dark hair and an orange jumpsuit.
Q. Where exactly was the detainee struck?
A. The detainee was struck in the small of the back by the CPT. He was using his right hand.
Q. After you finished your search did you see the detainee again?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see the CPT in the isolation area again?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you witnessed any other incidents of concern?
A. In September of 2003, when we first arrived at the prison complex, I observed that the prisoners at the compounds were receiving punishment in the way of being forced to kneel on gravel until their knees were bleeding. I stopped this punishment whenever I observed it and brought it to the attention of [redacted] the IRF commander. This type of punishment stopped. Also in September of 2003, I observed an MI soldier choke and strike a prisoner in the presence of [redacted] This incident was reported to my chain of command. Sworn statements were written and presented to [redacted] I heard nothing more from this incident.
Q. Do you know what action was taken on the second incident?
A. I was not present when it was discussed. I heard that MI personnel came over and apologized for their actions.
Q. Have you heard of any other incidents of maltreatment towards the detainees?
A. The same night the CPT struck the detainee, I heard one of the navy dogs had bitten a prisoner that was flex-i-cuffed and was not resisting.
Q. Do you know who witnessed this incident?
A. [redacted] was the dog handler whose dogs bit the detainee.
Q. Do you know the details of this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have anything else to add to your statement?
A. No, sir.///END OF STATEMENT///

For Official Use Only

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib Prison DATED 20 JAN 04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Jan 2004 at Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ANY LEGAL OFFICER

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

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AG0000351

A. Not officially. I discussed it with certain members of the IRF as a whole.
Q. Was the CPT striking the detainee with an open or closed fist?
A. Closed fist.
Q. Did you see what led up to this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. Could you hear what was being said to the detainee?
A. No, sir.
Q. Could you describe the detainee?
A. Male, dark hair and an orange jumpsuit.
Q. Where exactly was the detainee struck?
A. The detainee was struck in the small of the back by the CPT. He was using his right hand.
Q. After you finished your search did you see the detainee again?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see the CPT in the isolation area again?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you witnessed any other incidents of concern?
A. In September of 2003, when we first arrived at the prison complex, I observed that the prisoners at the compounds were receiving punishment in the way of being forced to kneel on gravel until their knees were bleeding. I stopped this punishment whenever I observed it and brought it to the attention of [redacted] the IRF commander. This type of punishment stopped. Also in September of 2003, I observed an MI soldier choke and strike a prisoner in the presence of [redacted]. This incident was reported to my chain of command. Sworn statements were written and presented to [redacted]. I heard nothing more from this incident.
Q. Do you know what action was taken on the second incident?
A. I was not present when it was discussed. I heard that MI personnel came over and apologized for their actions.
Q. Have you heard of any other incidents of maltreatment towards the detainees?
A. The same night the CPT struck the detainee. I heard one of the navy dogs had bitten a prisoner that was flex-i-cuffed and was not resisting.
Q. Do you know who witnessed this incident?
A. [redacted] was the dog handler whose dogs bit the detainee.
Q. Do you know the details of this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have anything else to add to your statement?
A. No, sir.///END OF STATEMENT///

Sep 2003
23. Aug 2003 ?? [redacted]

Initials [redacted]

For Official Use Only

Exhibit 2

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) [redacted] 2004/07/09	3. TIME [redacted] 0935	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ/04

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
6th Battalion, 98th Division (IT) Devens, MA

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 8 July 2004, I was interviewed by LTG JONES via telephone. The following are answers to questions posed to me by LTG JONES: My Background: I am currently the S-3 for the 6th Battalion, 98th Division (Institutional Training), Devens, MA. I deployed to Iraq from March 03 to November 03 and was the Watch Officer for the C2X, CJTF-7. I have been interviewed about this matter (Possible comments made by LTG SANCHEZ during a VTC) a couple of times about three weeks ago by Department of the Army Inspector General. I attended the CJTF-7 CDR's BUBs daily at 1845 hours from June to October 03. I was the C2X representative and attended on a daily bases until right before I departed. Toward the end of my tour, I began to skip a few because the C2X had too many representatives attending. ROE: What was my understanding of the ROE for combat Operations? I am pretty much aware of them. I know that if I am being fired back, I can return fire. We were given wallet size cards to carry at all times. Given the following circumstances, what would the ROE allow U.S. forces to do: US Forces are engaged by a hostile force: the hostile force is armed and has fired upon U.S. Forces. The hostile force is now maneuvering away from our forces, but has not laid down its arms and not indicated surrender in any way. What are the Options for U.S. Forces? That's a tough one because I know two ROEs. My civilian (I am a police officer) and the military ROE. In the civilian scenario, if an individual is running away and pose no threat, we do not fire. If fired upon, we can return fire but if there are civilians in the vicinity or there is a chance of bystanders being hurt, we have to make the call. In reference to this particular scenario, I would have to think about this. In reference to LTG SANCHEZ making the statement of "why are we detaining these people, we should be killing them." I never heard such statement from LTG SANCHEZ. That was a rumor that [redacted] and I discussed. We discarded it as hear say. It never came up the following day from anyone. There were so many people present during the BUBs and I never heard it from anyone else. All Divisions had representatives, the Coalition personnel were present, CJTF primary staff was present as well. For the C2, the representative was [redacted] initially and then MG FAST attended once she was on board as the C2. Most BUBs were focused on the operations and specific event in the AO. The number of detainees captured was briefed and I would brief the number of detainees captured for specific operations. I never heard such statement and I can't remember when [redacted] and I discussed it. It never stuck on my head [redacted]
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A. No. [redacted]
//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPS V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT _____ DATED

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT USED.....

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of JULY, 2004

at 370 Hoyt Street Brooklyn NY

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E O 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION: 94th RRC, Devens, MA
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/05/27 [redacted]
3. TIME:
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: MAJ/O-4
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 6th Battalion, 98th Division (IT), Devens, MA

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I am currently assigned as the S-3 (35E) Officer with 6th Battalion (BN), 98th Division (Institutional Training), Devens, MA. On 10 Mar 3, I was mobilized and cross-leveled to B Co, 325th MI BN, which had mobilized on 10 Feb 03 and was already processing and training at Fort Dix, NJ. I was only at Fort Dix for about two weeks when B Co, 325th departed Dix and arrived in Kuwait on 28 Mar 03. We were in Kuwait for about three to three and a half weeks waiting on our equipment via ship, creating and configuring the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs), and preparing to convoy into Iraq once the war began. On or about 27 Apr 03, we convoyed to Balad, Iraq, about 70 miles north of Baghdad, where I was transferred from B Co to the 325th battalion staff and served as the Counterintelligence (CI) Officer. My main responsibility as the CI Officer was to task and track the 325th THTs. About 10 Jun 03, I was transferred to the CJTF-7 staff and was assigned to the C2X shop working for [redacted] from the 221st MI BN, California Army National Guard, who was the CX2 until he departed on 18 Nov 03. [redacted] then became the C2X and [redacted] became the TFCICA. I would not say that I was part of the discussion concerning using Abu Ghraib (AG), but I was aware of the proposal to make AG a central detention facility. I did not think AG was a very good choice considering the AG's history and association with the Hussein Regime. Later on (date?) there was then discussion about making AG a central interrogation facility as well and concentrating detainees of intelligence value there. Up until this point, Camp Cropper was the facility for detainees of intelligence interest and I do not know why the decision was made to close Cropper and move security detainees to the criminal facility at AG. I assumed that LTG SANCHEZ and BG FAST made the decision, but I do not know. [redacted] also working in the CJTF-7 C2X shop went on a site survey of AG, but I really had no knowledge of the decision making process. As a C2X staff officer, I worked periodically with [redacted] and Camp Cropper and then at AG, and also [redacted], who was the Officer-in-Charge of the interrogation operations. Most of my communication with [redacted] and [redacted] was via e-mail and less frequently by telephone for time sensitive issues. Most of my communication was focused on inquiries about specifics detainees, as I had the responsibility of daily briefing the CJTF Command about the status of significant detainees and what information the interrogators had on them. I was not involved in the staffing process of the Interrogation Rules of Engagement request that was sent up from [redacted] at AG. I was a Battle Captain at the time and I was only tasked to find an interrogation SOP for modification and implementation. I tried to go to the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, but was unsuccessful in directly obtaining any assistance. I then contacted a colonel (I can't recall his name) at CENTCOM Headquarters and asked for his assistance in acquiring the GTMO SOP, but I never heard anything back from him. It was shortly thereafter that MG Miller's GTMO "Tiger Team" arrived to offer assistance at AG. I do not know who was staffing the IROE request, although it could have been the 205th MI BDE doing it, as COL PAPPAS had a strong interest in AG operations and was basically running his own little C2X shop at the 205th. I personally never saw the IROE request and was never consulted about it. On one occasion, I filled in for [redacted] and sat in on a Detainee Release Board that met once a week to determine which detainees would be released from AG. That Board also had BG KARPINSKI and BG FAST as members. I am a New York City police officer in my civilian job and, looking at the situation from a police perspective, I believed there were some problems with the retention and release policies and criteria at the Board. It appeared many detainees had been brought in and were being held without any real probable cause, often times being rounded up just because they were of military service age or were in the vicinity of a raid. As there were not enough screeners to properly categorize the detainees, a great number probably ended up at AG when they shouldn't have. I would estimate that only about 15 percent of the detainees were of any real intelligence value, and the retention of the others contributed to the overcrowding of AG. Additionally, because of what appeared to be a reluctance to release the security detainees, very few were released as a result of the board. There is nothing else I would like to add to this statement. [redacted] //END OF STATEMENT//

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Devens, MA DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of [redacted] Making Statement)

WITNESSES: [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of May, 2004 at 94th RRC, Devens, MA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/03 [redacted]	1210 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CJTF-7 C2X, Camp Victory, Bagdhad Iraq, APO AE 09342

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 5 October. My duties were site manager for CACI contractors and as an interrogator. Due to my duties as Site Manager I was only involved in two interrogations and observe a few others. It basically kept me from conducting interrogations due to the site managing duties taking up all my time. Before arriving in country, we in-processed through CRC and received and signed the CACI Code of Ethics (Copy has been furnished). Some contractors signed it in Iraq. There are two Code of Conducts. One for operations in other areas and one for operations in Iraq. The latter came in at a later time, dated 22 Nov 2003. Once on the ground at Abu Ghraib, We received training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and we signed the IROEs. Nothing we were briefed was out of the ordinary from the Interrogation Field Manual or what we had learned at the schoolhouse. I felt pretty comfortable with the interrogation procedures in place. I understood and believed the rest of the CACI contractors understood the IROE quite well. [redacted] briefed us on the concept of Tiger Teams (1 x interrogator, 1 x Analyst, 1 x Translator). We were given an orientation and tour of Abu Ghraib. After two weeks on the ground (around 20 October), two Mobile Training Teams came to Abu Ghraib to train us. The team from GTMO instructed us on Arab culture, the history plus other subjects and helped guide the JIDC with the GTMO Tigr Team Concept. The Team from Fort Huachuca focused on training; report writing, interrogation techniques plus other subject. I know that the Geneva Convention was covered during this training. [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE). [redacted] was in charge of Operations, and there was another operations officer but I don't remember him but he didn't really come to the site. I am not really sure who was in charge. There were many units and organizations on the ground. I didn't really interact with the MPs and do not know who was in charge of the MPs. Who was in charge of Abu Ghraib, until COL PAPPAS became the FOB commander, I do not know. COL PAPPAS was the commander for the MI units. Even though he didn't stay on site, his presence was there. The first recollection I have of [redacted] was sometime mid October. I would go to him when I had issues because he got things done. He was everywhere. He was the go to guy who made things happen. When COL PAPPAS took charge of the FOB that was good news because now we had one person in charge. My view is that MI Cdrs should focus on the MI mission and the MP Commander should be the one in charge of detainee operatins due to doctrinal MP duties and responsibilities. But it was good that one person was in charge. I was never made aware of or saw any detainee abuse, photos of detainees being abused or videos of detainees being abuse. The only incident I became aware of was the one with [redacted] mentioned it to me and I believe he is the one who reported it to higher. [redacted] was taken out of interrogation operations but I never heard of it again and it really wasn't discussed. I do not know of any disciplinary actions taken. I did hear of dogs being used but the use of dogs had to be approved by higher. I never heard or saw any dog bite a detainee. One of the problems I saw as sooo as we arrived was the lack of resources; not enough computers (ours did not arrive until November); the paucity of logistical and personnel suppor was a detriment to the mission. We were issued the majority our TA-50 at Fort Bliss, Kuwait or upon arrival in Iraq. There were also not enough MPs for escorting detainees, supervising detainees nor for Force Protection; Internal Quick Response Force (IQRF) or the External QRF. We had frequent mortal attacks in the evenings but then the attacks began to occur during the daylight hours in January 04. There was some concern about the safety of personnel since we were conducting some operations outside of hard sites. Most of the CACI contractors were concerned that they did not have a weapon to defend themselves. The International Community Red Cross (ICRC) came to visit Abu Ghraib about three to four times. I was never made aware of any issues that the ICRC had identified. There was a contractor named [redacted] who had personal issues with other contractors (was perceived to not play well with others). He was reassigned to 1 Armor Division Interrogatin Facility. He worked there for a while and return to Abu Ghraib where he worked in the Detainee Assessment Board. He and the Chief Supervisor had differences as to his screening techniques. The Supervisor [redacted] felt [redacted] screening techniques were too aggressive for the screening mission. [redacted] at times would go beyond using the direct approach, but there was never any abuse to detainees. On 21 December 2003 [redacted] left Abu Ghraib, CACI employment with hours of notice. I had a concern with Iraqi security Guards being used to guard the entrance to outside of the Isolation Area (the U.S. side). I brought this issue up during one of the morning meetings. At that point, I was told it was being addressed. A few weeks after that, the shooting in the prison occur. I was shown a few photos with military personnel, civilians, and detainees

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted]
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Camp Victory DATED 2004/05/03

[redacted]

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I was abel to identify [redacted] CACI contractor and [redacted] TITAN Linguist on three photos. I was also able to identify [redacted] TITAN Linguist [redacted] and [redacted] are on a photo with an individual who appears to be a [redacted] detainee who seems to be in a stress position. Possibly being interrogated. The other photos are photos of [redacted] in a regular pose with not detainees. The photo with [redacted] has a naked individual on the ground with other military person around. [redacted] is sitting on the floor leaning on the wall. Before the photos were shown to me, I had never seen any images of detainee abuse.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No [redacted]

//End of Statement//

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 03 day of MAY, 2004

at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD IRAQ

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
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ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
205th MI BDE HQ, WAAF Bldg 1031 Rm 104	2004/05/19	1530	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	O4/AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHD/205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE APO AE 09096 (USAREUR)

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

In response to a question about when I first became involved with Abu Ghraib and what was my role, I first became involved with Abu Ghraib when I assumed the position of Deputy Commander (DCO), 205th MI BDE at the end of July 2003. At that time, our Brigade had tasked the 519th MI Battalion to stand up the Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SFIF), a temporary facility in support of CJTF-7 Operation Victory Bounty in August. In September the CJTF-7 made the decision that all interrogation operations would be consolidated at Abu Ghraib and in October it was deemed an enduring Base camp. As the DCO, I had brigade staff oversight for many of the improvements the brigade was trying to make at Abu Ghraib. The S-4, [redacted] worked closely with the 800th MP Brigade S4 and the CJTF-7 C4 staff to purchase quality of life enhancements and infrastructure needs for the soldiers at Abu Ghraib; throughout the fall, the S-3 [redacted] and his staff were working on multiple actions related to standing up a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC): they worked with CJTF-7 on the Request for Forces (RFF) that would allow us to structure the JIDC along the lines of the GTMO organization; they worked with the C2 staff to request a GTMO Tiger Team to embed into operations and train the JIDC; they built the line and block chart and identified the required resources, where we had gaps and how we were going to overcome them; they developed the JIDC battle rhythm and the interrogation prioritization process. The S-2 [redacted] was focused on ensuring the soldiers and civilians in the JIDC either had Top Secret clearances or were being processed for them; establishing the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (TSCIF), and, establishing the intelligence architecture that would allow the JIDC to access JWICS and TS databases, which was a recommendation from MG MILLER'S visit. The S-2 also attended CJTF-7 Targeting meetings to ensure that the JIDC priorities were in concert with the CJTF-7 targeting priorities. The S-6, [redacted] and the Information Management Officer (IMO) [redacted] were focused on tactical communications for command and control throughout the brigade, information management support for the servers in Balad and Abu Ghraib that housed our intelligence databases, improving the intelligence architecture (in concert with the S2), and installing the MWR packages for Abu Ghraib and other brigade locations.

COL PAPPAS was working on a strategy for how we would implement the findings and recommendations from the MG MILLER report and the CJTF-7 CG's guidance from a briefing COL PAPPAS gave to LTG SANCHEZ on 11 September. In particular, COL PAPPAS was focused on aligning our operations with a GTMO-like model and on consolidating our three interrogation facilities at Camp Cropper (run by the 325th MI Battalion), Camp Bucca (run by the 323d MI Battalion), and Abu Ghraib (run by the 519th MI Battalion) into one. Placing the right staff out to the JIDC was a high priority. COL PAPPAS immediately placed [redacted] then the Assistant Brigade S3, at Abu Ghraib as the operations officer. The CJTF-7 CG, LTG SANCHEZ, told COL PAPPAS that the JIDC probably needed an O-5 on the ground to run the JIDC. The 205th MI Brigade did not have any O-5s available to fulfill this role. I was present for a conversation between [redacted] and COL PAPPAS reference placing [redacted] a newly arrived C2 staff officer, at the JIDC. If I remember correctly, [redacted] thought that based on [redacted] civilian experience, he would be a good candidate to run the JIDC. My understanding was that [redacted] was sent to the JIDC to serve as its director.

Part of standing up the JIDC included moving the Brigade's interrogation operations at Camps Bucca and Cropper to Abu Ghraib by the 1 October consolidation deadline set by CJTF-7. [redacted] was in charge of a small team of interrogators that had been operating at Camp Bucca for months. He was selected to be the JIDC operations officer because of his experience in Bucca. Upon [redacted] arrival on or about 25 September [redacted] transitioned his title to XO, second in charge to [redacted]

In response to a question about how it is possible that [redacted] saw their roles differently from the way COL PAPPAS did, it would not surprise me if [redacted] said he was the one in charge of interrogation operations at the JIDC. COL PAPPAS initially told him that he would be the "go to guy," prior to the C2 staff offering up [redacted] to run

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT WAAF Bldg 1031 DATED 2004/05/19

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

the JIDC. I think that [redacted] was very proud that COL PAPPAS had the confidence in him to make him the initial operations officer at Abu Ghraib and he worked very hard to make it work. Once [redacted] was placed in charge, there were numerous occasions when COL PAPPAS called out to the JIDC and [redacted] was readily available to answer any questions when often [redacted] was either not readily available or did not know the answer.

[redacted] then seemed more focused on resources and quality of life improvements than on interrogation operations. I had members of the brigade staff in Baghdad and members of the brigade at Abu Ghraib working on resourcing issues and I understood that to be the brigade's responsibility - COL PAPPAS held me responsible for infrastructure and resources [redacted]. [redacted] repeatedly brought supply and administrative issues to COL PAPPAS who redirected those issues, appropriately, to me to fix. At one point, I sat down with [redacted] at Abu Ghraib and told him that COL PAPPAS needed him to focus on interrogation operations and that the brigade would resource Abu Ghraib; and I asked him to trust that the brigade would get it done as fast as possible, given the constraints of being in Iraq. The brigade had already placed a lot of resources in the JIDC, to include an E-7 [redacted] to serve as the JIDC "Mayor" working quality of life issues as the mission expanded. [redacted] was there from late September to late October.

I suppose COL PAPPAS saw [redacted] role differently than [redacted] did because [redacted] what [redacted] was sent to Abu Ghraib to do, and [redacted] did weigh in on operational issues. I believe [redacted] was involved in developing the Joint Manning Document, establishing Tiger Teams, and he seemed to be involved in the handling of several incidents that happened out at Abu Ghraib. When asked if I could recall those incidents, I explained that I did not live out at Abu Ghraib and I was out of Iraq from 12 November to 5 December, but to the best of my recollection, the first incident [redacted] was involved in was identifying the A/519th soldiers who conducted inappropriate interrogations of a female detainee. The second incident was the International Community Red Cross (ICRC) visit in October. I do not think the facility was prepared for the visit and the JIDC did not know the ICRC was coming on that day. [redacted] had a disagreement with the ICRC concerning access to detainees on IA and that made the ICRC angry. The third incident was the shooting in IA on the 24th of November, during which time I was on leave. As it was related to me after I got back to Iraq in December, [redacted] and the MPs resolved this issue prior to bringing it to COL PAPPAS' attention. The last incident I recall was the alleged inappropriate treatment of a detainee by a female specialist attached to the 205th. [redacted] brought this to COL PAPPAS' attention and told COL PAPPAS that he would discipline and retrain the soldier. In response to a question about how frequently I went to Abu Ghraib, I responded that I traveled to Abu Ghraib once or twice in August and three to four times in September. Our headquarters was still in Balad at that time and it was dangerous to travel back and forth. Once we moved the brigade headquarters to Camp Victory in early October, I would travel to Abu Ghraib once or twice a week. Many high-ranking personnel visited Abu Ghraib and I would often accompany COL PAPPAS as he briefed them and walked them around Abu Ghraib. I was at the Hard Site at least half a dozen times and all of the visits except one were during hours of daylight. Once or twice I was there alone, but usually with a small group.

In response to a series of questions regarding my knowledge of the alleged abuses: I never saw any naked detainees - they wore jumpsuits or civilian clothes; I never witnessed or had any knowledge of any detainee abuse or photos or videos of detainees; I never saw dogs used during interrogations. I did see dogs at the front gate and saw the dogs being walked around the camp.

In response to a question about my observations of the atmosphere, morale and level of training at Abu Ghraib, I stated that the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib changed over time and it changed with every unit. Many of the soldiers in the 519th were upset because they were supposed to redeploy in August but instead were given the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib. I also think that as we transformed from the SFIF to the JIDC there were many changes from the MG MILLER report and from our own assessments that they either did not want to implement or didn't think were necessary - there may have been some bruised egos in the process. My impression was that the 325th soldiers were content to leave Camp Cropper, which was overcrowded, and they looked forward to the new mission. After the 20 September mortar attack that killed two and wounded about 11 soldiers, the soldiers' morale dipped. Then the JIDC began to take shape and had some successes with the intelligence they were producing. It seemed to me that at that point morale improved. In October and November, the JIDC received 25 additional interrogators from INSCOM; they were formalizing interrogation plans and holding weekly targeting meetings and JIDC update briefings with the Tiger Teams; the Magistrate Cell and medical team were in place and it started to look and operate more like a JIDC. In response to a question about whether I thought soldiers were disciplined or not, when I walked through the JIDC it seemed to me that soldiers were disciplined and adhering with Army policies, military customs and courtesies, etc. My expectations were that there were some variations across the board based upon the different units the soldiers came from.

In response to a question about whether it would surprise me to know that some MI soldiers were involved with detainee abuse, I said yes I was surprised. To the question as to how it could have happened I said I did not know - prior to consolidating operations at Abu Ghraib there were three facilities run by three battalions in the brigade and I believed that the soldiers were trained and that those facilities ran without incident. So I did not understand how the same soldiers could have behaved so differently after relocating to Abu Ghraib.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT WAAF Bldg 1031 DATED 2004/05/19

8. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

When asked if there was anything I wanted to bring up that the interview did not address, I explained my understanding that the MP Brigade retained control of the access in and out of 1A and 1B throughout the 205th's tenure at Abu Ghraib.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

This statement was taken by MG Fay, the procedure 15 Investigating Officer on Thursday May 13th at 1330 hours at the Darmstadt Legal Center, building 4006, Darmstadt Germany. I swore to the statement at the 205th MI Brigade Headquarters, building 1031, Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Wiesbaden Germany on May 19th at 1530 hours.

//////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////////

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19th day of May 2004 at BLDG 1031 WAAF [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART. 136 UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/1[redacted]	3. TIME 211[redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
302d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE 09102

9 [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib sometime in September. My MOS is 96B but my duty was to establish the SIPR and High side connectivity for the interrogators (System Administrator and Trojan SPIRIT Operator). When I first arrived there were only a couple of computers. This was a few days after the mortar attack that brought me there (to replace those wounded) , after which we started receiving a lot of computers. Our tasks were to set up the computers with the Trojan Spirit connectivity. We would back up the database (on which were photos that were not used for the detainee files that [redacted] had me delete as appointed local S-2). I never saw any photos of detainees other than those for the detainee folders. I was shocked to learn that everyone was operating out of the tents and they were getting hit with mortars all the time before I got there. After the big mortar attack where we lost some soldiers, we moved operations into the buildings. I did not receive any training when I arrived at Abu Ghraib (other than system administration from my experienced soldier). I did not get trained on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement, the Geneva Convention, what the dos and don't of the MPs were. The focus on the training was on the Tiger Teams at one point in November. Even after CID began their investigation the focus was still on the Tiger Teams. I did feel comfortable that if I saw something I would report it. I never saw any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainees or the use of dogs for interrogations We were told not to take photos. I sat in on an interrogation once with [redacted] A/302nd MI. [redacted] was brought to Abu Ghraib to interrogate a General When he arrived, he was told by some interrogators (don't know who) that the detainee was incapable of conducting an interview because they had just interrogated him for 10 hours and they stripped him naked, got him wet and cold and put him in the back of a truck. He was told he would see his son and that is the interrogation that [redacted] and I conducted. [redacted] was very calm and asked direct questions. The boy looked scared. He was 10 years old. I told the interrogators the boy should not be there because he was young and was scared of the older men in the camp I was told that the youngest age in the camp was 16 and therefore he belonged there. I went to the Hard Site one time because I was taken there to see what it looked like. What I saw was MPs constantly yelling at detainees. They were making one guy say his name over and over and over again. If he lowered his voice, they would scream at him. I heard that two interrogators from Fort Bragg had gotten drunk and went to the prison to take out a female prisoner and take their shirt off. The MP on duty saw it, reported the incident and CID began an investigation. The individuals were from the 82nd. [redacted] (analyst/interrogator) told me that dogs were being used to scare detainees. She said that the detainee had a hood over his head and that one of the MPs would bark like a dog to scare the detainee. The detainee got scared and ran into his cell. [redacted] thought it was funny. This incident happened in November or December. She told me in December. [redacted] and [redacted] also told me that two detainees who had raped a boy (the location of rape unknown) were made to strip down naked and handcuffed in certain contorted positions They did this themselves This was told to me in the T-SCIF. They stated the guy got what he deserved. When I returned from leave, [redacted] was telling a story while in the chow hall He was telling his friends (do not know who they were) about Abu Ghraib and how crazy it was. He said that MPs were using detainees as practice dummies. They would hit the detainees as practice shots They would apply strikes to their necks. And knock them out One detainee was so scared. The MPs held his head and told the detainee it would be all right and then they would do the same thing to the detainee. The detainee would plead for mercy. They all thought it was funny. When the CGS team arrived at Abu Ghraib, they were given a tour of Tier 1 A and B While they were there, the MI folks were told by MPs that they (MI could do what ever they wanted with the detainees They participated in a PT session where they would yell at the detainees. [redacted] told me this. She said she was disturbed by this and thought this might corrupt the MI folks. There was an older women (she is here in Germany) worked in the out-processing of the Interrogations Control Element (ICE). She has red hair and is in the Army Her story is that there was no accurate account of detainees being processed and that detainees were being lost in the system (some who didn't belong there in the first place). Detainees were being held too long and not being released. When the ICRC came to visit [redacted] gathered all the folks in the ICE, about 20-30 folks and told us not to worry about the ICRC concerns because the complaints were about food and general conditions. He said detainees had it better at Abu Ghraib now than when they were under SADAM HUSSEIN [redacted] as there plus [redacted] believe. I expressed to [redacted] that some of the things I heard and potential problems. The sentiment I got from them [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ *TAKEN AT* _____ *DATED* _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/11

[redacted]TEMENT (Continued)

[redacted] as acceptable. This happened after I came back from leave in January. [redacted] told me they had the detainees naked while interrogating them and made them put on [redacted] They would tell the MPs to do this. They told me that was well within their authorization. I was also told about [redacted] incident. Nothing was ever done it was kept hush - hush. [redacted] was relieved because he was too harsh with interrogations. (That is what I heard) [redacted] told me that one detainee was so embarrassed to be naked that he made a loin out of MRE bags. They took the MRE bags away from him. I did not report the above incidents because I didn't think I would be listened to or what was being done, though personally offendable, was OK. What I was being told was seemingly well known because of all the involvement and discussions that went on. I was also not acquainted with the Interrogation Operations. I did not know who I could go to. Other times I have reported incidents, I met either retribution or no concern for what I had to say. During the war (Mar-Apr) I reported my OIC for several things he had said and done to me to IG. Instead of the truth being testified to by witnesses, it was meticulously covered up, and ended with me as "the bad guy" (even though the same Battalion commander [redacted] who told me during his findings of the investigation that it was all in my head, told me the day after that he spoke with others and that indeed I was correct but that he was just glad it was over). Also, at Abu Ghuraib I reported to my Brigade S-2 a laptop that I discovered contained a database of SECRET/NOFORN from Afghanistan on it that had been connected to the world wide web (unclassified) for undetermined amount of months, but it was treated as nothing, and the only thing done in this very potentially compromising situation was the laptop being disconnected and placed in the T-SCIF. Also, I had a promotable soldier who just days after being in the same room as alcohol (neither possessing nor consuming) was flagged, told he would get an article 15, and that he would have to go to a removal board (when the situation was unclear). When I went to higher about how ridiculous this was, I was told among other things that I was also to blame. After defending him, the flag was lifted, the article 15 not to happen, but he did in fact go to this removal board, and despite his innocence had his status removed. After getting back from Iraq, me and the soldier went to JAG who directed us to EO who directed us to IG, who then told us they needed a PROPONDERANCE of evidence to do anything (something I was also told during my IG complaint with [redacted] my OIC during the war when I was Targeting NCOIC), and that in reality if someone of higher authority has in for me I am screwed because as long as they mask their actions through regulations, they are untouchable.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths this 11th day of MAY 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

File Number	: 0003-04-CID149-83130
Location	: Baghdad Correctional Facility, Baghdad, Iraq
Date	: 21 Jan 04 [redacted]
Time	: 1520 [redacted]
Statement of	: [redacted]
Grade/Status	: E5/RA [redacted]
SSN	: [redacted]
Org/Address	: A 302nd MI BN

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Around the middle to the end of October I was talking to a female from the Nevada National Guard MP unit that was stationed here. She was very skinny, she was white, but very tanned, she had black and gray hair, and she was old, I don't remember her rank, but she was made the unit armorer during this time. She told me that they were the first unit here, and they were the ones who started setting this place up. She was the oldest female among that unit. She was telling me about writing these journals that talked about all of her experiences here in Iraq and the wrongdoings she witnessed (and their cover up). In those journals she said there were killings, torture, you name it she said it. She was referring to all of the things that had been done here. She told me that the commander and the first sergeant hated her because she would voice opposition to them about the treatment of the people. She also told me that she mailed the journals home (to a friend or to herself) before they could be found so that the commander could not take them from her.

In late October [redacted] said that the MP's told her that these two detainees had raped a 14-year-old boy, so the MP's were handcuffing the detainees in contorted positions to each other and making it look like the two detainees were having sex with each other. I [redacted] told me that the detainees may have been naked at the time. She also said that the MP's made the detainees in isolation take their clothes off and wear women's underwear.

[redacted] the end of October I was just discussing with [redacted] about how there were some bad things going on, as far as the prisoners are getting treated. She said yeah and she told me about a detainee who had gotten his eye busted open. [redacted] said that she asked the MP how his eye got busted, and the MP replied that he fell down.

When I returned from leave in the middle of December I was eating at the cl hall at Camp Victory, when I overheard [redacted] and three other people talking about what's going on at Abu Gharib. He was telling them about th things that the MP's were doing to the detainees. He said that he was inv ed t join in on these things, so he did. The MP's were using the detainees as practice dummies, like they would show each other how to knock someone out knocking the detainee out. They did this while another detainee would wat when the other detainee would start to get scared, the MP's would calm him wn,

EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE . OF 3 PAGES

EXHIBIT 95

For Official Use Only

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 1520 DATED January 2[illegible]
2004 CONTINUED

and then hit him in some other way. He was also saying that the MP's were telling him how to hit the detainees so that you didn't leave a mark, and telling him what instruments to use so that they didn't leave marks.

After I came back from leave in the beginning of December I was talking to [redacted] and she was telling me how the guards would bring the dogs down to the cells and use them to scare the detainees. She told me that she thought it was funny because after they would take the dogs away, one MP would bark like a dog, and they would all watch as the detainees would run from him because they thought there was a dog in the room.

When the people from my unit came up here to fill slots and act as guards, they were taken on a tour of the isolation area, when they were down there the MP's would tell them that they could do whatever they wanted to the detainees. I was told that all they ended up doing is yelling at the detainees and make them do PT. [redacted] told me that he was worried about his soldiers being exposed to that kind of behavior and being encouraged to do so [redacted] were all present for that. [redacted] are not on the guard force; they are still doing an[illegible]sis

Q [redacted]
A: [redacted]
Q So you know anybody specifically who was abusing the detainees?
A Everything I know is what I've heard. all of these things take place down in isolation or in the booth.
Q Do you know if anybody has taken any unauthorized photographs?
A I know [redacted] had photos of the facility, but not of the detainees. I'm sure they were for sentimental value Those photos were on the common drive, and I was told by my chain of command to delete the photos, so I did.
Q Did [redacted] ever tell you if she was involved with the abuse of the detainees?
A Just being there for the dog incident. She seemed really apathetic every time I said anything about it. She thought it was really funny to see the detainees run back into their cells from the dogs.
Q. Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?
A: Every time I said something about how I was worried about the treatment of the detainees, they would either say, thy are the enemy and if I was out there they would kill me, so they didn't care I'm glad that something is finally being done, it's kind of shameful what's been going on
Q Do you have anything else [redacted] wish to add to this statement?
A No ///END OF STATEMENT/[redacted]

EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

For Official Use Only

EXHIBIT 95

0003-04- [illegible]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 1520 DATE [illegible]
2004 CONTINUED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oath this January 21, 2004, at Baghdad, Iraq.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
323RD MILITARY POLICE DETACHMENT (CID) (DSE
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136 UCMJ
(Authority to Administer Oath)

WITNESS

EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

3 June 2004

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Change Sheet Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 3 June 2004, the undersigned and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] LT, USA; assigned to the S1, 391st Miltary Police Battalion concerning his knowledge of Military Intelligence personnel involvement in the alleged detainee abuses at the Bahgdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF).

2. (FOUO) All of the MPs relieved from duty as a result of the alleged detainee abuses were assigned for duty within [redacted] Company. At the time, [redacted] was acting Company Commander. [redacted] only had contact with [redacted] and did not have any contact with the other soldiers. [redacted] had daily contact with [redacted] but did not discuss the alleged detainee abuse with him. [redacted] was unable to provide any information concerning Military Intelligence personnel involvement in the alleged detainee abuse.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]

Investigating Officer

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib)

4 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Change Sheet Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 4 June 2004, the undersigned met with following individuals concerning Change Sheet records [redacted] SFC, USA; NCOIC, Detainee Inprocessing Facility, Bahgdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), an[redacted] 1LT, USA; assigned to the S1, 391st Military Police Battalion. Both individuals indicated that the Change Sheets records were perishable, that is, the documents are not stored after use. The Change Sheets are filled out whenever a detainee is moved from one location in the facility to another, the moves are then annotated on the Change Sheets. There are so many generated that they are destroyed when completely full. There are no Change Sheets available during the time frame of 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

21 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of [redacted]

On 21 JUNE 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] was read his rights (Detainee abuse, failure to report that abuse, violation of the Geneva Convention and Dereliction of Duty) which he invoked. (DA Form 3881 provided).

[redacted]
MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION [redacted]
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/01/31
3. TIME [redacted] 11:25
4. FILE NUMBER 0005-04-CID062
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]
6. SSN [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS E-4/RESERVE
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS A COMPANY, 325TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, DEVENS, MA 01432
9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

While I was deployed in Iraq, I was assigned to the 325th Military Intelligence Battalion, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and I was working in Abu Ghraib. There was alredy an Iraqi prison locatedin Abu Ghraib and when US Forces moved into Iraq they took control of the prison. My job was an interrogator while I was assigned to the prison, I was interrogating Iraqi detainees, some of them were Syrian Iraqis, and I also performed interpretations of Russian speaking detainees. Each interrogation was different, my team leader would assign me a detainee to interrogate and I would perform planning and preparation for each one. When I was ready I would call one of the Military Police (MP) working inside the prison, the guards, I would tell them the number of the detainee that I wanted to talk to and they would bring the detainee into a tent, for about the first two or three weeks outside the facility, and then after the first couple of weeks they were brought into wooden booths outside the prison. Inside the tent or booth with me would be an interpretor, an analyst, and myself. Sometimes there would be two analysts, sometimes no interpretor because the detainee speaks English. When the detainees were brought to me they were in different conditions. Sometimes I would ask the MPs to bring the detainee blindfolded sometimes, handcuffed and for the first couple of weeks they sometimes would be brought without handcuffs but then that stopped and they were always brought handcuffed. I conduced the interrogations in different ways, sometimes we uncuffed them, sometimes not, sometimes we let them stands and sometimes we would let them sit.

Q. Were you ever present when any detainee was abused?

A. Yes, when I was walking through the isolation cells part of the prison, I saw prisoners being handcuffed to each other naked, having two inmates walking in the isolation section of the cells naked and handcuffed to each other. One of the MPs took a Nerf football and threw it at the detainees and another MP threw water at the detainees. I had never seen anything like that before. I only saw this take place once. It was between the middle and the end of October or the beginning of November. I saw three or four MP Guards in the same area. There were eight or nine Iraqi Police that saw it. All the other detainess appeared normal.

Q. Who were the individuals who abused the detainees?

A. The time that I spoke with one of the detainees, the same night that I saw the detainees handcuffed to each other [redacted] was working, [redacted] was in the female section, and a very overweight interpretor, a TITAN Contractor.

Q. Why were the detainees handcuffed to each nude on the floor and walking around?

A. The MPs were making these two detainees do exercises and "smoking" them. From what I understand these two detainees were in the same cell as a young boy when they came into the prison, the boy was fifteen or sixteen year old, and supposedly the two raped the young boy in the prison. There were also Iraqi guards inside the prison, the Iraqi guard saw it going on and told the MPs about it and the MPs ended up moving the boy to a juvenile cell. Then the two detainees who abused the boy were put in separate cells in isolation and "smoking" them, making them do push-ups and other exercises. After that incident, they didn't let us go to the isolation cells anymore and the MPs kept us out of there. Prior to that I could just go in there when I wanted but if I was going to do a full interrogation I had to let my supervisor know. Like one time when I wanted to bring a Koran into one of the detainees the MPs would not let me take it in and would not take it in for me.

Q. What was the purpose for you being present during this incident?

A. Myself and my interpretor and analyst were asking one of the detainees that was assigned to me questions through the cell door.

Q. What other ways were the detainees abused?

A. Once I saw a detainee being walked on their hands by and knees with a leash by an MP. The MP had a strap from a mattress or some cloth, he was an E-5 Guard, white male, 5'11", medium build, maybe 175 pounds, I'm not sure what unit he was in, he had dark hair, high and tight hair cut.

Q. Did you ever take any photographs of the detainees?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of anybody who took photographs or videotaped the detainees?

10. EXHIBIT | INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ___ TAKEN AT ___ DATED ___"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

EXHIBIT 35

For Official Use Only

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED 2004/01/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q. Have you ever seen any photographs of any detainees?
A. Not besides the photograph in their personal file.
Q. Have you ever seen anybody providing any photograhs to any other individuals?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see anyone with a camera taking photographs of detainees?
A. Many of the MPs had cameras but they would take pictures of themselves. I never saw any MP take pictures of any detainees while they were handcuffed.
Q. Did you ever see [redacted]
[redacted]ssault any of the detainees?
A. I saw MPs walking detainees on a leash and handcuffing them together. There were four of five MPs that were involved in these types of things.
Q. Describe where the two inmates that were handcuffed together naked walked?
A. They walked out of the isolation section, up onto the second floor, through the whole isolation section, then they went down to where the Iraqi police were and they went back to the first floor. They eventually uncuffed both of them from each other and then separately and that is the last time I saw them. After the two handcuffed detainees were handcuffed individually, there was a third detainee that came from over where the Iraqi Police were, I'm really not sure, and he was not in the isolation cell from the beginning, and he came. The same four of five MPs told the detainee to take his clothes off, he was naked and they made him do push-ups, low crawl on the ground. They were yelling at the detainee while he was doing this. There was no kicking or punching, if they wanted him to go the ground they would move the detainees arm to the ground and push them down.
Q. Did you ever see any of the listed suspects photograph or videotape any of the detainees?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever receive any photographs of the detainees from the listed suspects or other personnel working at the prison?
A. No.
Q. Did you receive emailed pictures of detainees or email pictures of detainees?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever throw a football at the detainees?
A. No.
Q. Who were the detainees abused?
A. I don't remember the two that were handcuffed One was about 6', very skinny, 140 or 145 pounds, black hair, beard, mustache, and the other guy was about the same build, about 5'7", black hair, beard and mustache. The guy that was on the leash I don't remember what he looked like, I just remember he was built for an Iraqi, he had a scar that was a couple of inches on the right side of his neck. He was about 5'8" and built, 150 pounds.
Q. Is is common practice to have MPs assist in interrogations?
A. It's not common but it happens sometimes.
Q Who told the MPs to conduct the interrogations?
A. No one, they aren't allowed to conduct the interroganons.
Q. What form of interrogation techniques were the MPs told to use?
A. We asked them if they could come in and randomly yell at the detainee, sometimes there would be MPs in the booth just to stay with the detainee while myself and my analyst would go outside and talk.
Q. Were any of the detainess injured during any interrogations by Military Intelligence (MI) with MP personnel?
A. No.
Q. Were any MI or MP personnel left alone with female detainees?
A. No. We only had three or four female detainees and I never had to interrogate one of them.
Q. Did you ever see a videoclip of [redacted] having sex with a female detainee or female at the prison?
A. No.
Q. Has anyone discussed with you any incidents that happened to the detainees at the prison?
A. I never heard anything about anyone hitting or having anything sexual to do with the detainees.
Q. Can you describe the four of five guards that were present for the two inmates being hancuffed naked?
A. There were three white males and a black male, that is all I remember.
Q. Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?
A. No detainees were abused or hurt in my custody.
Q. Do you have anything else you wish to add to this statement?
A. No. [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

EXHIBIT 135

For Official Use Only

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED 2004/01/31

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	FILE NUMBER
ABU GHRAIB FOB IRAQ	20040610	0946	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		O-3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
MAG CELL A IC . BAGHDAD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY FOB ABU GHRAIB IRAQ

9. _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I AM THE OIC OF THE MAGISTRATE CELL AT ABU GHRAIB. I HAVE WORKED IN THIS SECTION SINCE MID FEBRUARY 2004. DETENTION FILES ARE PICKED UP DAILY FROM INPROCESSING AND LOGGED INTO OUR DATABASE. THEY ARE PULLED APART AND RE-PACKAGED IN A UNIFORM ORDER. A DETENTION REVIEW AUTHORITY FORM AND TRACKING SHEET IS ATTACHED TO THE PACKAGE. THE FILES ARE THEN REVIEWED BY THE DETENTION REVIEW AUTHORITY, WHERE THEY ARE CLASSIFIED AND WHERE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO DISPOSITION OF THE CASES ARE MADE. FILES CAN BE CLASSED SECURITY INTERNEE, CRIMINAL SECURITY INTERNEE, CIVILIAN, MAJOR AND MINOR CRIMINAL. RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE INTERN, RELEASE OR REFER TO ICC (IRAQI CRIMINAL COURTS). AFTER REVIEW THE RESULTS ARE LOGGED INTO THE DATABASE. SECURITY INTERNEE FILES NOT ON MI HOLD ARE FILED AWAITING THE TJ BOARD. CURRENTLY THE FILES GO DIRECTLY TO THE BOARD AS THERE IS NO LONGER ANY DELAY IN BOARDING CASES. FILES CLASSIFIED AS MAJOR CRIMINALS ARE STRIPPED OF SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS AND PLACED IN A BOX AWAITING PICK UP BY OR DELIVERY TO MOJ REPRESENTATIVES. WHEN THE FILES ARE PICKED UP THEY ARE LOGGED OUT OF THE DATABASE. THE TJ BOARD AT SOME TIME WOULD ALSO DESIGNATE CERTAIN CASES AS MOJ CRIMINALS. THE FILES WOULD SHIP DIRECTLY TO MOJ AND WOULD BE LOGGED OUT OF THE DATABASE. FILES SCREENED AS MI HOLD AT INPROCESSING GO THROUGH THE SAME REVIEW PROCESS, BUT ARE THEN DIVERTED TO MI. AS FILE CAME OFF MI HOLD THE ORIGINAL DETENTION PACKAGE AND REVIEW SHEET WAS RETURNED TO THE MAG CELL. THE FILE WOULD THEN BE FORWARDED TO THE BOARD. SOME TIME IN APRIL OR EARLY MAY THE FILES STARTED COMING BACK WITH THE ORIGINAL DETENTION PACKAGE AND THE MI PAPERWORK AS WELL. ALL OF THIS IS NOW SUBMITTED IN TOTO TO THE BOARD. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement.
A: NO. _____ END OF STATEMENT _____

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT FOB Abu Ghraib DATED 10 JUNE 04

8. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted] USED

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June 2004

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

[redacted] *(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

1ARMT, 136 *(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

CJTF7-TF Fay 20 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

1. On 21 May 04, the undersigned conducted an telephonic interview of [redacted] SPC, [redacted] B Company, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, hereinafter referred to as Source, concerning his recent deployment to Abu Ghraib (AG). During the interview Source provided the following information:

a. Source arrived in AG, Iraq on 2 Nov 03, as part of a six-person team sent to support the 323rd MI Battalion as an analyst member of an interrogation Tiger Team. Upon arrival to AG, his team was broken up and sent to different interrogation teams. Source's duties included analysis of information, preparation of interrogation plans, transportation of detainees to and from the interrogation site and writing reports based on information obtained during the interrogations. Upon His arrival to AG, Source was briefed on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and signed a memorandum that stated he understood and would follow the IROE. The IROE was also published on the wall in plain view. Throughout the deployment, Source received "on the job" training.

b. Source was familiar with interrogation plans as his duties included input into these plans. On the interrogation plan form, there were two columns of procedures listed. The first column listed the less intrusive techniques like Fear Up, Incentives, Ego Up etc. These procedures could be approved by his team leader. The second column listed more intrusive techniques such as Adjusted Sleep Schedule, Diet Management etc. These techniques had to be approved at a higher level. Source related there was a lot of pressure to produce reports regardless of intelligence value. This could have contributed to interrogators taking short cuts during interrogations.

c. Source did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. Source heard rumors about possible improprieties, but nothing concrete. The rumors included an Iraqi General that was possibly abused, an interrogation by [redacted] CACI contract interrogator, that involved a four hour cold shower and placing the detainee in an isolation cell for 1.5 weeks and pictures taken of the detainees in various unflattering positions.

2. Source was stationed in Germany and unavailable for an in-person interview. A sworn statement was not executed for this interview

3. Point of Contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at Conn: [redacted]

[redacted]
15-6 Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDC3OPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BLDG AT-5636 Gorham St. Fort Bragg, NC 28310	2004/06/04 [redacted]	1800 hours [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From Aug 03 to mid Oct 03 I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97B Counterintelligence Agent who performed interrogations. My team's initial mission upon my arrival to AG was to set up for interrogation operations in support of special operation, maybe VICTORY BOUNTY. Prior to initial operations, [redacted] presented us with an Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. Shortly after my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the IROE and signed a memorandum stating I understood and would follow the IROE. In my opinion, the IROE was straight forward and clearly established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. All interrogations required an interrogation plan prior to the interrogation taking place. Every technique had to be approved. The vehicle for requesting the techniques was the interrogation plan. For example, Adjusted Sleep Schedule had to be requested through the interrogation team leader to the operations cell [redacted] The operations cell would get the approval and return the interrogation plan to the team. The plan would then be passed out to each team member so they would know when to conduct the interrogation. We were under pressure from the 205th command and staff to provide intelligence reporting. I have heard of [redacted] had conducted interrogations on occasion and on at least one occasion dictated to the interrogator his approach. [redacted] was not a trained interrogator and had no reason to be in the interrogation booth. In mid Sep 03, the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center stood up and 97B's were taken out of the interrogation rotation and reassigned. I was assigned to a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) in direct support to the MP's. My team screened workers for the MP s2 shop and conducted CI Force Protection Source Operations. I saw detainees being naked as they were being searched when they entered the hard site. I also witnessed detainees wearing pink underwear. I had heard the reason for this is the MP's had run out of men's clothing. I never saw any guard dogs or heard of guard dogs being used in interrogations. No one ever reported detainee abuse to me. During my time at AG I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never directed the MP's to abuse or maltreat the detainees, nor did I ever hear of it. The MP's never offered to abuse the detainees for me, nor did I ever hear of them offering to do so for other MI personnel. I departed AG in mid Dec 03.//
Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT?//
A: NO//
//END OF STATEMENT//

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 1800 hours [redacted] DATED 2004/06/04

8. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT USED

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] I, [redacted], HAVE READ ~~OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME~~ THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/04 [redacted]	3. TIME [redacted] 1534 [redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]	7. GRADE/STATUS 1SG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372ND MILITARY POLICE COMPANY, CUMBERLAND, MD (DEPLOYED TO IRAQ)

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 1 October 2003. I was and still am the first sergeant for 372th MP Company. I didn't really interact or had discussions with the Military Intelligence Leadership in regards to the prison, detainees or rules and regulations concerning detainees. My interaction was with my higher headquarters, 320th MP Battalion. I would interact with them to learn more about our mission since this was a new mission for us. My company had the Hard Site security, Camp Vigilant security, escorting of detainees. My company was divided into three groups. The 320th MP Bn gave us mostly rules on running the prison. They showed us how to extract personnel from their cells. My focus was on life support. There was a chain of command for operations and I did not fall within that chain. [redacted] was the officer in charge of operations in the Hard Site. He was the one who managed it and interacted with them. He departed on 19 December 03. I never saw or was aware of any MI personnel abusing detainees except for one incident when a general were pulled out of their cell. There was blood on the wall. [redacted] went to find out why there was blood on the wall. He was told that the general was giving them a hard time when he was suppose to go in and they pushed him in. [redacted] has statements of this incident. The only time I am aware of dogs being used was right after the shooting or scheduled hardsite shakedowns The dogs were used to conduct searches. I never saw or had any knowledge of any photos with MI personnel and detainee. It was not authorized to take photos of detainees. It was common knowledge and it was not acceptable. I have never known MI personnel to tell MPs to "soften up or give "the treatment" to detainees. COL PAPPAS was in charge of all the MI forces, but [redacted] was more visible. He attended the Battalion Staff morning meetings He mostly talked about what resources could help the overall FOB, MWR, Phones, internet. We didn't have enough personnel, resources, or training information to conduct all the tasks we had responsibility for. Our soldiers worked 12 hour shifs under some extreme and difficult conditions.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Camp Victory DATED 4 May 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of MAY, 2004 at Camp Victory Baghdad, IRAQ

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: [redacted]

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/07

3. TIME: 2100 HRS

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: Civilian

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 1624 12th Street, Oakland, CA 94607

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From early Oct 03 to early Dec 03, I was a member of a six person team sent from GTMO to Abu Ghraib (AG). The mission of our team was to bring our "lessons learned" from GTMO, evaluate techniques, provide guidelines and teach the TIGER TEAM concept. I am a trained Interrogator and CI Agent and have past experience in conducting interrogations in Kosovo and GTMO and have conducted over 200 interrogations. When we arrived at AG we spent a few days assessing operations. Operations appeared to be disorganized. After the first days I went to a team to train and mentor. I rotated through and worked with just about everyone there, providing training and mentorship. Everything we trained and observed was in compliance with basic human rights and the Geneva Conventions. We taught and they employed Interrogation plans which outlined all techniques to be used and were reviewed and approved b[redacted] Afer about the first six weeks I moved to a liaison team with [redacted] We handled requests and facilitated interrogations/support for Other Government Agencies (OGA). I never observed or heard of MPs, OGA or MI abusing detainees or doing anything outside the Geneva Conventions. I was aware that "short chaining" was used with some detainees and clothing removal could be employed. It would be part of the interrogation plan and approved by "higher." There was a lot of detainee nakedness at AG. In many cases it was because there was a lack of clothing at the facility. Those who cooperated got clothing first. I remember once telling [redacted] that one of "my detainees" needed clothes. Removal of clothing for interrogation purposes was a "questionable technique" that needed approval and was allowed in GTMO, but rarely occurred. I did see strip searches for security purposes at AG. I conducted random checks in the hard site almost daily and never observed abuse. I did hear lots ("brainstorming") of innovative techniques which were determined to either be authorized or deemed too aggressive through discussion and evaluation. Dogs were there for police enforcement and never used in interrogations to my knowledge. Cameras were not allowed and I'm certain if somebody were observed with one immediate corrective action would be taken by MPs or MI. Once an FBI agent was taking photos and within seconds I confronted and stopped him. OGA were professional and did not employ any illegal or unauthorized techniques to my knowledge. The litmus test for me is that nothing should be done to a detainee that an interrogator couldn't handle himself and nothing immoral. Sleep deprivation was not employed at AG. In GTMO we had "Project 21" where a detainee would be interrogated for 16 hours followed by 5 hours rest; repeated for 2-3 days.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement? [redacted]

A: No.

//NOTHING FOLLOWS//

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted]

TAKEN AT Oakland, CA DATED 2004/06/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of June

at 350 Hegenberger, Oakland, CA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION [redacted]	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/06/06	3. TIME 1413 [redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS E-5/NG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
72nd Military Police Company, 992 Troop Command, Army National Guard

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 21 or 22 May 03 to 4 Nov 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG). I was rotated and worked in every position within the facility as was the norm in the 72nd MP Company. In general, MPs maintained control of the detainee population by identifying the leaders within cell groups and then making them responsible for translating and maintaining control. If that did not work we would use isolation to improve cooperation. MPs never used physical force, withheld food, humiliated or otherwise abused detainees as a control measure. MPs were asked to provide security for interrogations and I observed MI interrogations both in the hard site (Tier 1A) and in tents in Camp Vigilant. I saw MI use stress positions (standing, arms outstretched) and believe this was an effective technique. I did not consider it to be abusive or employed excessively. MI also employed sleep deprivation and verbal assault (yelling) techniques. I never saw MI do anything I'd consider really "crazy." MI (both soldiers and Other Government Agencies (OGA)) did use clothing removal as an interrogation technique in Tier 1A. It was not common but it was routine and authorized by MI. Generally a detainee would only be without his clothing for a few hours. I never saw or heard of detainee being kept naked for extended periods. I was never on a shift where I personally saw or received a request for removal of a detainee's clothes. I observed naked detainees when I came on shift and was told MI had requested it. MPs never used clothing removal as a tool to control a detainee. MPs routinely used hoods when transferring detainees with the facility. This was done as a security measure. Hoods were not used as punishment or in interrogations I observed. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I never saw or heard of any photography of detainees. I was never asked nor heard of any other MP being asked by MI to abuse or humiliate detainees. MP's do not utilize humiliation as a form of control.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement? [redacted]
A: No.//End of Statement

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 | DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE | USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Henderson, NV DATED 2004/06/06

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

NOTHING FOLLOWS

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. [redacted]LLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004

at Henderson, Nevada

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
DEVENS, MASSACHUSETTS	2004/05/28	1630	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		O4/MAJ

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
6th MI BN, 98th Division (IT)

, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was mobilized with the 325th MI BN. My duty position was the Assistant S-3 (Plans). We reported to Fort Dix on February 22, 2003 and were there for about a month. We then deployed to Kuwait and were there for about a month. We crossed the Berm on April 26, 2003 and set up in Balad, Iraq. Sometime in May a tasker came down for personnel to work with in the C2 for CJTF-7. On 7 June, I was reassigned to the C2 Staff - in particular the C2X shop. My immediate supervisor was until replaced him. The first time I heard about Abu Ghraib, was when plans for Operation VICTORY BOUNTY were being developed. The operation was focused on a list of FEDEYEEN MEMBERS we had received. We had to identify a location to place personnel captured during the operation. CAMP CROPPER was not an option because they were overcrowded. I am not sure who selected Abu Ghraib, but this facility was good because it had been a maximum prisoner facility and it was being renovated already. came in and told me about the plan to use Abu Ghraib. Within 48 hours, he and I were traveling to Abu Ghraib to assist in the set up of Abu Ghraib as an interrogation facility. This effort was part of the staff process to develop an OPORD for the interrogation facility. I do not remember when VICTORY BOUNTY took place. It must have been sometime in August. When and I visited Abu Ghraib for the first time, the only personnel there were the MPs. Abu Ghraib was an overflow for civilian detainees identified as Iraqi on Iraqi crimes (Criminals). There was a huge pen with concertina wire around it already set up. The highest ranking individual I saw there was a major (I do not remember his name). There was another unit arriving and they were setting up. There were some detainees there already. They were all in civilian clothes but I did not see any abuse. A week later, both and I visited Abu Ghraib to firm up and try to solidify what facilities were available to use for VICTORY BOUNTY, including the newly refurbished cells inside the former maximum security prison. We took photos and also looked at potential sites to deploy a TROJAN to Abu Ghraib. By this time, the 205th was also conducting its leadership reconnaissance on the ground but I can't really remember who was present. I then began traveling to Abu Ghraib twice a month or so and would coordinate with the 519th and the 325th until the middle of October. I never observed any detainee abuse during any of my visits and nothing seemed out of the ordinary. The direct coordination I did with Abu Ghraib was primarily with or if she was not available it was with and . These coordination visits were not on a routine schedule; they increased when there was an operation going on and decreased when no operations took place. did coordinate with the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) on a routine basis because he had a daily report he had to submit to the command group. My conversations were focused on HUMINT Requirements. My responsibility was to focus and reinforce priorities and discuss interrogation results. I provided BG(P) FAST information on all data collected and a summary on HUMINT Operations. I spoke to to try to find out where interrogations were going, what information they were gathering and the production of the intelligence. I would go directly to because most of the information I was requesting from her was being requested by higher and they wanted it immediately so I hardly went to the BDE. I would try to keep the BDE or the HUMINT Operations Cell informed of our inquiries and requirements via e-mails. There was an extraordinary amount of pressure from the chain of command to get results. I was sensing this pressure directly from COL BOLTZ initially and then BG(P) FAST when was there. Once COL SUMMERS arrived, I was not as heavily relied upon by BG(P) FAST, although sometimes she tasked me directly. This pressure was occurring during the same time VICTORY BOUNTY was being planned and occurring. There was a concern we were not getting the feedback from interrogations and we needed to do better to fix it. We needed to find out a way to get more feedback. There was a sentiment that the CG and OSD were unhappy with the level of products coming out of interrogations. There was frequent expression of dissatisfaction. The CI/HUMINT mission took a back seat and we had HUMINT problems out in the field. The source handling was extraordinarily broken. The maneuver commanders were not adhering to the requirements in the umbrella concept for Counterintelligence and HUMINT Operations and were running sources. Untrained personnel were routinely tasking "informants" to collect information, in direct conflict with the requirements of the umbrella concept and long-established Army doctrine. The Division commanders would tell their G2X "this is how we're going to run it." In their views they were having success capturing a lot of folks, conducting raids

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED 2004/05/28

[redacted]. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

They would raid a house and take everyone. They refused to let anyone go due to the fear that the wrong guy might be let loose or they felt that they would simply be gathering this same individual the next day. By doctrine, this should not be done and sources could be placed in danger. The division commanders had the full authority to release detainees at their level. I would discuss this problem with the Division G2Xs and they would tell me that they knew about the problem, but their commanders didn't want to release anyone (they replied via phonecall). My e-mails to them were saved on my folder in the computer I had in Iraq. The computer was turned over to the individual who replaced me. The Divisions had Captains as their G2Xs. In the mist of all the pressure [redacted] 205th MI SJA, was tasked to come up with some Interrogation Rules of Engagement. [redacted] developed a memorandum for CG's approval. I remember seeing a memorandum with the CG's signature block, but I do not remember if I ever saw a signed memorandum. There were certain things that required the CG's approval, but all of the methods and techniques in the memorandum were contained in the FM (according to [redacted] was frustrated and stated that if we wanted her to do something different than the authorized doctrinal methods, she needed written guidance. She was not going to go out on a limb. She refused to budge from the standard methods without written guidance. Anecdotally, people talked about sleep deprivation and stressed positions but I never saw any requests. I never heard any discussions about baked detainees or humiliating detainees. During MG Miller's first visit, I was in BG(P) FAST's office. I was made the POC for the initial Abu Ghraib visit. I coordinated for a convoy and took the team out to Au Ghraib. We returned that same day after spending four hours on site looking at the facility and how operations were being run. We did not discuss interrogation techniques. Our focus was discussion of the Tiger Team concept. I did not go back to Abu Ghraib with the team. I did attend meeting with [redacted] I was also tasked to develop an extensive detainee database and I met with a GTMO who had built a database in GTMO. There was some controversy when the GTMO Team came. The GTMO team was supposed to go to Abu Ghraib and show the 519th and the 325th how to run operations. The 519th and the 325th were some of the most tactically experienced interrogators under combat conditions. They had conducted operations in Afghanistan and now there was a team coming from GTMO to teach them how to run operations - to make our operations like GTMOs operations. It did not sit well, having outsiders whom had not operated under fire critiquing their work. I did not attend the out-brief MG MILLER gave. No one from C2X attended. The briefing, I believe, was directly given to LTG SANCHEZ. I never saw a copy of the outbrief. The only violation of IROEs I was aware of was from Umm Qasar (Camp Bucca). I coordinated with OGA and felt like we had a good working relationship. There was an OGA LNO in the C2X and we shared resources. We discussed how we could share intelligence they gathered and intelligence we gathered to answer each other's requirements. I visited the Chief of Station once and met with another individual at another time. CJTF-7 established a release board whose members were [redacted] BG KARPINSKI and BG(P) FAST (chair). The recorders were [redacted] an MP Assistant Recorder and myself as an MI Assistant Recorder. BG(P) FAST was tasked by MG WOJDAKOWSKI (DCG) to resolve the prison overcrowding problem as it related to the MI Holds. Although the overcrowding of Abu Ghraib was an overall concern, the reason for the establishment of the board was a legal reason. The Geneva Convention required that a detainee's status be reviewed every six months. Since we were closing in on six months for the first detainees, [redacted] SJA, was tasked by [redacted] to come up with a procedure to release detainees. The recorders screened all detainee files. I would look for circumstances of capture and assess their intelligence value. If no intelligence value was identified, they were sent up to the release board for review. As time went on the Coalition Provisional Authority began to press us to more quickly deal with the backlog. We then began a two-tier process. [redacted] and I would sit on a mini panel and look at 100's of cases. We would do our best to try to identify something in the file that would assist the board in determining whether they stayed or were released. Since we had so many cases to review, the Release Board began meeting twice a week. The last week I was there, I reviewed over 500 cases. As part of my battle handoff, I extended the involvement of the C2X Section to include three additional MI personnel to help expedite the review of backlogged cases. CJTF-7 held a commander's VTC every evening (the Battle Update Brief, or BUB) in the Joint Operations Center. Each C2 section was required to send a representative, including C2X. Periodically, I attended the BUB as a C2X representative. The purpose of our attending was to get insight into current and ongoing operations in order to stay in touch with the operational tempo. As a result, it was intended that we would be able to anticipate short-term interrogation requirements. One evening, after a BUB (I did not attend this BUB), I overheard several officers (I do not know remember who they were) returning from the BUB discussing how the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had made some startling remarks during the BUB. They said that during the BUB, one of the subordinate commanders had reported the capture of a number of Iraqis during a raid. In response to this report, LTG Sanchez allegedly replied something to the affect of "Why are we detaining this people, we should be killing them." This type of comment contributed to a command climate that fostered an atmosphere where ill intentioned personnel could perceive circumstances where deeds not consistent with military standards would be tolerated if not condoned. I was ordered not to discuss this investigation with anyone else. Q. Is there anything you would like to add to this statement? A. No[redacted]

//End of Statement//[redacted]

Nothing [redacted] follows

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Devens, MA DATED 20040515/2X

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Not [redacted] used

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28th day of MAY, 2004 at Devens, Massachusetts

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
[redacted]	2004/06/06	1240 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
72nd Military Police Company, 992 Troop Command, Army National Guard

9. [redacted]

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 21 May 03 to late Oct 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), as an MP Platoon Leader for the 72nd MP Company. I was in charge of the night shift at the facility. I also had [redacted] on shift with me. My company's mission was to prepare the facility to accept detainees. I was one of the first soldiers on the ground and helped set up perimeter security while the rest of the unit convoyed to the location. The secondary mission for the facility was to train the Iraqi corrections officers to eventually take over the facility. During my shifts, I would walk through the facility to make sure things were running smoothly. At least once a night I would physically check on operations. Most of the interrogation activities occurred during the day; I never witnessed a night interrogation. I observed MI making detainees do Physical Training (PT) in the tents. On most occasions the MI folks would do the PT with the detainee. I also witnessed MI making detainees stretch their arms out for extended, but not extensive periods of time. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I was never asked nor heard of any other MP being asked by MI to abuse or humiliate detainees. I never witnessed any nakedness of detainees outside of inprocessing (I once participated in the search of an inprocessing female). If I would have been asked by MI to strip a detainee, I would have questioned the request. By doctrine MP's do not employ techniques to control or modify behavior above restraint and segregation. MP's do not utilize humiliation as a form of control.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement? [redacted]

A: No.//

//End of Statement//

[redacted]

Nothing follows

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT [redacted] TAKEN AT Henderson NV DATED 6 June 04

11 STATEMENT (Continued)

nothing follows [redacted]

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT BEGINNING ON PAGE 1 AND ENDING ON PAGE [illegible] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6TH day of June, 2004

at Henderson, NV

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7th day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/05/29[redacted]	0947[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SFC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/CO, 519TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, FORT BRAGG, NC 28310

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I. [redacted]

I arrived in Iraq on 11 Mar 03. I spent 2-3 days at Objective Bushmaster, 2.5 weeks at Objective Dogwood and 40 days at Cropper. On 12 May 03, during my time at Cropper[redacted]submitted a report thru normal MI channels (205th) and LTC CHEW stating the living conditions for the detainees were not up to standard as the facility was too crowded, many of the detainees should not have been arrested and the detainees were held too long. I arrived at AG on 25 Jul 03, where I served as the Interrogation NCOIC and then the 1SG of the first MI personnel on site. On 27 Jul 03, after setting up the facility, we began operations. During this period there were approximately 14 working interrogators on site. To the best of my knowledge there was not a formal Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) document but all interrogations were conducted in compliance with FM 34-52 and the established training norms of the Army interrogation school at Fort Huachuca, AZ. I did try to get a formal IROE published with[redacted]sent a draft copy to my higher headquarters, but did not get any response. Upon my arrival to AG, my supervisors were[redacted]. Overall, I was excited because the mission was supposed to last for three weeks and involved trying to obtain information on the Saddam Fadeyeen. This special status should have meant that there would be specific Source Directed Requirements (SDR's) and specific things we would be looking for during our interrogations. These never came. Around this time, there was a discussion concerning the centralization of facilities into a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Personnel in this discussion included MG MILLER,[redacted]. During this discussion I addressed my concerns over having the JIDC at AG, given the stigma of the torture chamber at the facility. Approximately six weeks after my arrival, the 325th MI Bn arrived at the AG. There was a shift in leadership which included COL Pappas being in charge of all interrogation activities[redacted]taking charge of the JIDC[redacted]becoming the Deputy under COL PAPPAS and A/519th MI Bn being dubbed to support company for JIDC. As the interrogation NCOIC I did extensive on-site checking to ensure quality control. As the logistical requirements increased, I shifted to a more administrative roll as 1SG. In Aug 03, as I fully transitioned to 1SG,[redacted] became the Interrogator NCOIC. On 20 Sep[redacted]and[redacted] and I addressed an allegation made by MP guards that[redacted]97E, A/519th MI Bn, deviated from acceptable interrogation practices when he allegedly picked up a detainee and threw him into a truck in what the MP observers described as "a little too rough." There were also allegations that[redacted]hit the detainee in the back of the head. I questioned all my NCO's who witnessed the incident including[redacted]. All four witnesses said the incident did not occur but all involved agreed[redacted]was yelling at the detainee during this time. I examined the detainee and found nothing to indicate the allegations. I also had a medic and a LT on duty examine the detainee and execute a sworn statement. All witnesses executed sworn statements which were given to[redacted]for action. Nothing resulted from the incident. In late Sep 03[redacted]conducted an unauthorized nighttime interrogation of a female detainee. I was notified by[redacted]three days after the incident took place. All three soldiers were given a Field Grade Article 15 by COL PAPPAS. While at AG, I did not witness or hear about any of the following: Physical abuse of detainees, unauthorized picture taken of detainees, unauthorized video taken of detainees or the unauthorized use of guard dogs. I was kicked out of AG on 25 Oct 03. I was given 48 hours to leave AG by COL PAPPAS and[redacted]strongly disliked me because I stood up for my soldiers and raised concerns when I felt they were getting mistreated (getting told to conduct short notice, middle of the night interrogations when it was not in the interrogation plan). I went to[redacted]as 1SG and then moved to Bayji in December where I worked on a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT). Concerning civilian interrogators, I was told by[redacted]who was considered the best interrogator in country, that[redacted]was the best civilian interrogator. The recent events most likely occurred because the JIDC lacked leadership, especially senior NCO's. In my opinion, the mixture of units and the addition of civilian interrogators and linguists caused the personnel to get a little "sloppy" and was also a direct contributor to the lack of discipline at the facility. I redeployed from Iraq on 22 Feb 04.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A: No[redacted]

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT SPRINGFIELD, VA DATED 2005/05/19

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19 day of MAY, 2004

at METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is OPCLA

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27[redacted]	1540[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 5 October 2003 work as a screener with in and out processed detainees. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib [redacted] gave us a briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROEs. I felt I was very knowledgeable of what I could or could not do. [redacted] was in charge of the MI folks and COL PAPPAS was in charge of the entire base operations. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse, any photos taken or the use of dogs.
Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27 Apr 04

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April 2004 at Abu Ghraib Correction Facility [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/04/2[redacted]

3. TIME: 1538[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: CPT/O3 USAR

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: OSJA, CJTF-7, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] made me aware that he discovered within the JIDC a thumb drive containing photos depicting dead anti-coalition forces and captured anti-coalition forces on the battlefield. [redacted] asked me if this was a violation of the UCMJ, Army Regulation 190-8, or international law. Based upon what he told me, I advised him that it was not. Based on what [redacted] told me, I gave him my opinion that the photos were not unlawful. Because there was no legal basis to seize the private property of a service member, I told [redacted] it was proper to return the thumb drive to its owner. I did not review the photos. I agree that I should have reviewed them prior to giving advice.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to the statement?

A. Yes. Since there was no violation of the UCMJ, Army Regulations, or international law, there would be no legal basis to seize property from a soldier under Military Rule of Evidence 316. [redacted] had no choice but to return them. I would never advise a commander or leader to seize personal property from a soldier without a legal basis to do so. As a matter of policy, I agree that it is inappropriate for service members to photograph bodies on the battlefield and persons detained during an action, however to my knowledge it is not illegal or violative of any regulations. [redacted] gave me a detailed discription of the photos and I based my advice on that discription. [redacted]

//End of statement//

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib Iraq DATED 27 April 2004

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

[redacted]

follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Correction facility

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 2, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE READY and FOB ABU GHRAIB
APO AE 09342

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

27 April 2004

AFVQ-JA

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Investigation Questions on Photos of Iraqis on the Battlefield

1. On 27 April 2004 MG Fay interviewed me in conjunction with the Procedure 15 investigation he is conducting on intelligence involvement with civilian internee abuse at FOB Abu Ghraib during October and November 2003. During the course of his investigation interviewees related that they had heard of photos being discovered in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) with "disturbing" images on it.

2. MG Fay questioned [redacted] the deputy director of the JIDC, and learned that LTC Foust had consulted me when the photographs kept on a "memory stick" were discovered in the JIDC and that [redacted] returned the memory stick to the soldier who owned it.

3. I informed MG Fay that I did recall the event and my conversations with [redacted]. The event occurred in either late February or early March 2004. To the best of my recollection the facts I was presented at the time were

a. The photos were not taken at Abu Ghraib but immediately after an engagement by coalition forces here in Iraq.

b. The photos depicted dead anti-coalition personnel and anti-coalition personnel detained on the battlefield and masked with empty sandbags.

c. The photos did not indicate that the bodies or the captured personnel were being abused or treated improperly, merely that their images were recorded by digital photograph.

d. That the identity of the person who owned the memory stick was, at the time, unknown.

4. [redacted] sought my advice on whether an offense under the UCMJ, a violation of international law, or a violation of Army Regulations occurred by the taking of these photographs. Based on the facts presented to me, it was and is my opinion that no conduct occurred in violation of law or regulation. Army Regulation 190-8, paragraph 1-5(d) prohibits non-official photography of persons in custody at US military facilities. Additionally, the third and fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibit making EPWs and CIs the subject of public curiosity or ridicule. The photographed personnel were not in custody at Abu Ghraib or at another US Military detention facility, so AR 190-8 was not violated. Additionally, no information was presented to me indicating that the persons photographed were made the subject of ridicule or public curiosity.

5. As to the question about whether the photos or memory stick should have been returned to the person who owned it, I can think of no legal grounds to seize the item. In my opinion, a violation of law or military regulations had not occurred. The threshold question for a

commander or a military magistrate prior to directing the seizure of the personal property of someone subject to the UCMJ is that there is probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. *See* Military Rule of Evidence 316, Manual for Courts-Martial of the United States 2002. The government has no right to seize private property without due process of law. Even erasing the digital photos in issue would amount to a seizure of personal property absent some authority to do so under law or military regulations (like the authority we have to seize contraband items like alcohol and illegal drugs. *See* CENTCOM General Order number 1a and CJTF-7 General Order number 1).

6. As to the question of whether the soldier's chain of command should have been notified of the facts and circumstances as presented, I agree. At the time, I understood that the identity of the soldier who owned the photos and, presumably, took the photos, was unknown. After [redacted] or one of his subordinate leaders determined ownership, the chain of command should have been notified. I did not advise him to do so at the time believing that any soldier working in the JIDC was subject to the authority of the JIDC.

7. Additionally, during my conversation with MG Fay, he agreed that given the facts presented, he also could not think of a violation of the UCMJ, Army Regulations, or international law resulting from the photographs in question under the circumstances as we understand them today.

8. I have sent a request to [redacted], chief of operational and international law at OSJA, CJTF-7 to have a consideration given to a FRAGO prohibiting personal photography of anti-coalition personnel under all circumstances.

9. Point of contact is the undersigned at [redacted]

CPT, JA
Command Judge Advocate

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
[redacted]	2004/07/2[redacted]	1353 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-4/ AR

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Co 325 MI BN, Waterbury, CT 06705

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I was assigned to Camp Cropper just after 4 July 2003. The units already at Camp Cropper when I arrived were from 519th MI BN, the B Co. 325th MI BN and an MP Co in which I do not recall exactly who they were. Personnel in charge of MI Operations at Camp Cropper were [redacted] (B 325 MI Bn company commander) and [redacted] (interrogation operations). At Camp Cropper I didn't receive any Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs). I was deployed to GTMO last year and didn't receive the IROEs there either, but was familiar with the term and meaning. I sat in on a few interrogations with [redacted] when I first arrived. We always conducted our interrogations outside the detainment area in a tent. While at Camp Cropper, I never saw or knew of any detainee abuse, Humiliation of detainees or anything out of the ordinary. On 15 September, I moved to Abu Ghurayb. The unit there, 519th MI BN, was not prepared to receive us so early. So they put us to work on the night shift from 2000 to 0800 in the morning, almost immediately, working around the detainment in a tent. No IROE had been given at this time. After a mortar attack on 19 September 2003, we were then given the space in the building to run the ICE. After the ICE was to a standard to work in, our shift was now moved to daytime hours to avoid any more injury or death during the daily evening attacks. It wasn't until a few weeks (date unknown) is when the IROEs were briefed and signed. I was not present for the first signing of the IROEs, however, there was a change to them and a second briefing was given and I signed the IROEs then. Before we moved into the "hard" building, I sat in on interrogations with [redacted] (97E/325th [redacted] (97E/ 325th) and [redacted] (97E/ 325th). The majority of the interrogations were outside in the interrogation tents. There were a few times when I had to go to the MI Holding area also called the "hardsite" with [redacted] to sit in on interrogations. The linguists we used were [redacted] The interrogation techniques mainly used by the interrogators in my team were the direct approach. [redacted] was very detailed when interrogating detainees and used repetitive questioning. [redacted] used the sympathetic technique, and [redacted] used the direct approach. I never witnessed nor heard any of my team physically abuse or humiliate a detainee. In reference to naked detainees: One time when [redacted] and I went to the Hard Site to pick up a detainee to interrogate, we found the detainee naked in the cell. The detainee was identified as a high level official. The detainee was not scared nor hurt, he was embarrassed because all he was a sheet that we provided him for the interrogation, and that there was a female in the cell with him and not having clothes. Detainees would tell us that they were beaten when they were initially arrested and they would show us their bruises. We would ask them if they were in pain and offer to send a medic to check them out. Often times the detainees that were beaten during arrest were quite relieved that they weren't being abused at the prison. One detainee that I recall admitted to lying to us because he thought that he was going to be beaten, and decided to talk after he found out the we wouldn't hurt him. As far as the naked detainee in his cell, we (myself and [redacted] asked the MP (I do not remember his name) to put his clothes back on. I do not know why the detainee was naked. His clothes were not in the cell, we actually waited about 10-15 minutes for the MPs to find his clothing, after they said that they didn't know which clothes were his because they were all together with other detainees clothing in a closet, we just got a sheet for the detainee to cover himself up with for the interrogation. We did leave him with the sheet when the interrogation was overThere were a quite a few others naked in the cell. I did not discuss this with anyone because it was known that the detainees were in their cells naked. It was a call by the MPs to keep them naked in the cells. This occurred during the night shift when we were still working outside in the tents. After we moved into the "hard" building, I continued to sit in on interrogations with [redacted] until I became part of a permanent tiger team with [redacted] and linguist [redacted] We were part of The Force Protection Section - Tiger Team 2 (I am not certain if team 2 was its or not) My team leader was [redacted], he was from the 519th. I did sit on interrogations with him at times as well, but for the most part I was with [redacted] everyday for at least one to two interrogations a day. I do know that she used stress positions but after we signed the IROEs, she seized using those. I did not sit in on any interrogations with her when she used a stress position. After the tiger teams became permanent, [redacted] and I would talk together about the detainee and information he might know. She would put together her interrogation plan based on any information that I needed to know and find out. Never did I see or hear of [redacted] abusing or humiliating detainees in public. [redacted] and I were assigned to a group of detainees that were being held in the "hardsite". We were down there practically everyday.

10. EXHIBIT

(1) DETAILS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED 2004/07/20

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

We would go down to the "hardsite", request the MP the open the door for the detainee we wanted to interrogate and the MP would bring the detainee either to the shower upstairs on the second floor in the juvenile side or the staircase on the MI Hold side. We always preferred the staircase but sometimes OGA would get there before us. [redacted] always had the detainee sit down either on the floor on a chair and never used stress positions then. We did interrogate on certain individual which was the leader of the group, more often than any other individuals. We asked the MP [redacted] on duty to strip him naked for us for the interrogation, in this instance, for this detainee we were always in the staircase. However, once the interrogation was done or when we led him out of the room, he was always, clothed. Never did he leave that room with nothing on. We would always ask the MP to escort the detainee for us back and forth from his cell to the interrogation room. If we used solitary, it was for a short amount of time, not more than 30 minutes in the hole, to scare the detainee because he was claustrophobic. At times [redacted] and I would request to do an interrogation in the early morning hours (0300-0400), we only did this twice. [redacted] would always start off her interrogation with the direct approach, depending on the turn of the interrogation use love of family and fear up mild and other approaches. The detainee that we interrogated naked was named [redacted] (I am unsure of the last name, but if I see his name or photograph I can pick him out) Some of the techniques requiring higher authorization when I first arrived at Abu Ghurayb were Sleep deprivation and eating habits. We could use stress positions without the approval of higher. My team did not request/conduct any sleep deprivation or eating habit changes. After the IROEs were given to us in mid-October(timeframe is uncertain), we could no longer conduct stress positions without higher approval. My team followed the techniques posted on the IROEs that were posted in the ICE. [redacted] would say that she always followed what was in the regulation and what was taught at AIT When the IROEs came out in mid -October, we had to sign them and then they were posted in the Interrogation Control Element (ICE). A team from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba came in to assess the operations run at Abu Ghurayb. Shortly after [redacted] from 519 went on as a CI Agent and [redacted] was our section leader. Other members of the Force Protection Section were [redacted] (97E), [redacted] (96B), [redacted] (97E), [redacted] and others that I do not recall at this time. The interpreter I used most often was [redacted] Interrogation plans had to be approved by the section leader and then higher. I do not know who approved it from higher. [redacted] was the one who wrote the interrogation plan with the techniques she would be using. If we wanted to use a technique that required commanding approval a memorandum had to written, explaining why and what type of information he could provide, it had to be given to our section leader and he then took care of it from that point on. When we first started , interrogation plans were not really done ahead of time. The analyst would talk to the interrogator and after we told them what we had found out, the interrogator would write down the plan right before going into the booth. [redacted] and I would plan and prepare the day before an interrogation and get the interrogation plan signed off the morning of. I do not know who signed off on the plan, after our section leader. I do remember one time I had to take an interrogation plan for signature and [redacted] was not around so I gave it to [redacted] to sign I do not remember what techniques were being requested on that particular interrogation plan. I don't create or write any interrogation reports or plans. I only brought it to [redacted] to get it signed because we were on a strict time slot to get into an interrogation. I do not recall who the interrogation plan was specific to, but [redacted] reviewed the plan and signed off on it. I then returned it to our team leader [redacted]. I can't say for sure that the operations personnel knew of our detainee being interrogated naked. I can only assume since they had to sign the interrogation plan. I departed Abu Ghurayb late October to early November soon after COL PAPPAS moved in permanently. We would see COL Pappas almost everyday walking around in our LSA where [redacted] worked and in the ICE area. He never spoke to us. I did walk the hard site every day but I do not remember seeing naked detainees other than at the beginning when I went to the hard site with [redacted]. As far as humiliating a detainee, I do not know of any incident other than when we had them stripped naked for our interrogation only. [redacted] would sometimes come by and check on us when we were interrogating [redacted] would also come by and check to see if everything was okay or if we needed him for anything. The only time that I saw any officers down in the hard site is when they were doing their "tours" to the Red Cross or visiting high ranking personnel I would see the CPT of the MP company down there most often. I know we had observers after we built the interrogation booths. I do not know who was there because the booth had a one way mirror. We went off of the IROE [redacted] and the ICE leadership, directed to us. I don't know who directed them to give it to us. In the beginning, a lot of the techniques and approaches were discussed verbally between people and approvals were given that way (but I can't name specifically who would talk to whom). Later on, they started backing down on a lot. I do not know specifically why. After being read the interrogation techniques from the power point slide, I am not sure what technique the naked interrogations fell under. It doesn't seem like it would fall under any of the IROEs listed. I never sat in on an interrogation where a detainee was told to sit against the wall. I never saw or was aware of any detainee abuse, humiliation, photos of detainees or videos of detainees. I had redeployed by the time CID began their investigation on the abuse. The only CID investigation I remember was the one after the mortar attack. I do not know of any other detainees being interrogated naked. I only heard rumors of it being done. [redacted]

Q: Is there anything else you wish to add to your statement?

A: No [redacted]

/// END OF STATEMENT ///

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

JUL-21-04 WED 03:25 PM ANMC RADIOLOGY FAX NO. 907 729 2339 P. 03

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT FT. Richardson/ [redacted] DATED 2004/07/[redacted]

8. STATEMENT [redacted]
NOT USED [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of July, 2004
at FT. Richardson, AK 99505

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ART 136(b)(4) UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1988

USAPA V1.00

JUL-21-04 WED 03:27 PM ANMC RADIOLOGY FAX NO. 907 729 2339 P. 04

05 JUNE 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of [redacted]

On 05 June I conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] The below statement is what [redacted] told me based on the questions I asked her. She is currently reviewing the statement and will send me a signed copy.

As [redacted] stated:

I was assigned to Camp Cropper right after 4 July 2003. The units already at Camp Cropper when I arrived were from 519th MI BN and the 325th MI BN. Personnel in charge of MI Operations at Camp Cropper wer[redacted] (company commander) and [redacted] (interrogation operations). At Camp Cropper id didn't receive any Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs). I had been deployed to GTMO before and so I knew the IROEs. I sat in on some interrogation with [redacted] We always conducted out interrogation outside in a tent. While at Camp Cropper, I never saw or knew of any detainee abuse, Humiliation of detainees or anything out of the ordinary. On 15 September, I moved to Abu Ghraib. The unit there, 519th MI BN, was not prepared to receive us. When I first arrived at Abu Ghraib, I did not receive any IROE training. We received the training after we moved into the hard site sometime after the mortar attack. The 325th was placed on the night shift from 0800 to 2000 hours. I sat in on interrogations with [redacted]. Our linguists were [redacted] The interrogation techniques mainly used by the interrogators in my team were the direct approach. [redacted] was very detail when interrogating the detainee and used repetitive questioning, [redacted] used the sympathetic technique, and [redacted] used the direct approach. I never witness or heard any of my team physically abuse or humiliate a detainee. In reference to naked detainees: One time when [redacted] and I went to the Hard Site to pick up a detainee to interrogate, we found the detainee naked in the cell. The detainee was identified as a high level official. The detainee was not scared nor hurt, he was embarrassed because all he was a sheet that we provided him for the interrogation, and that there was a female in the cell with him and not having clothes. Detainees would tell us that they were beaten when they were initially arrested and they would show us their bruises. We would ask them if they were in pain and offer to send a medic to check them out. Often times the detainees that were beaten during arrest where quite relieved that they weren't being abused at the prison. One detainee that I recall admitted to lying to us because he thought that he was going to be beaten. We asked the MP (I do not remember his name) to put his clothes back on? I do not know why the detainee was naked. The detainee's clothes were not in the cell, we actually waited about 10-15 minutes for the MPs to find his clothing, after they said that they didn't know which clothes were his because they were all together with other detainees clothing, we just got a sheet for the detainee to cover himself up with for the interrogation. We did leave him with the sheet when the interrogation was over. There

were a few others naked in the cell. I did not discuss this with anyone because it was known that the detainees were in their cells naked. It was a call by the MPs to keep them naked in the cells. This occurred in the night shift when we were still sleeping in the tents. Some of the techniques requiring higher authorization when I first arrived at Abu Ghraib were Sleep deprivation and eating habits. We could use stress positions without the approval of higher. I never sat in on an interrogation where stress position was used. My team did not request/conduct any sleep deprivation or eating habit. After the IROEs were given to us in Late September, we could no longer conduct stress positions without higher approval. My team followed the techniques on FM 34-52. When the IROEs came out in late September, we had to sign them and then they were posted in the Interrogation Control Element (ICE). This was around the time we moved our living area into the buildings. After the mortar attack on 20 September, we were no longer authorized to conduct interrogations at night. On certain occasions we would request to do interrogations in the morning (0300 or 0400 in the morning). Once the Tiger Team Concept was implemented, I was assigned to the Force Protection Team 3. [redacted] was the section leader and other members were [redacted] (97E), [redacted] and the interpreter was [redacted] There was also another individual from the 519th (I do not recall his name). [redacted] is who I would pair up with. She used the direct approach, fear up, love of family and on one or two occasions she interrogated a detainee [redacted] naked. This occurred in mid October. The technique had to be approved by the section leader and then higher. I do not know who approved it from higher. [redacted] was the one who wrote the interrogation plan with the techniques to be used. The day we interrogated the detainee naked, we went to the hard site and requested the detainee from the MP [redacted] The detainee was taken to the shower room to be interrogated. We asked the MP [redacted] to strip the detainee naked. Interrogating the detainees naked was authorized only during interrogations in the cell. I wasn't the only analyst [redacted]sed. When I first arrived, interrogation plans were not really done ahead of time. The analyst would talk to the interrogator and after we told them what we had found out, the interrogator would write down the plan right before going into the booth. This changed once we implemented the Tiger Team. When a plan had to be approved by higher, I do not know who signed off on the plan. I do remember one time I had to take an interrogation plan for signature and [redacted] was not around so I gave it to [redacted]o sign. I do not remember what techniques were being requested I don't create or write any interrogation reports or plans. I only brought it to [redacted] to get it signed because we were on a strict time slot to get into an interrogation. I do not recall who the interrogation plan was specific to, but [redacted] reviewed the plan and signed off on it. I then returned it to our team leader [redacted] I can't say for sure that the operations personnel knew of the detainees being interrogated naked, I can only assume since they had to sign the interrogation plan. I departed Abu Ghraib late to early November right when COL PAPPAS was spending the majority of his time at Abu Ghraib. I did walk the hard site every day but I do not remember seeing naked detainees other than at the beginning when I went to the hard site with [redacted] As far as humiliating a detainee, I do not know of any incident other than when they were stripped naked. [redacted] would come by and check on us when we were interrogating. [redacted] would also come by and check to see if everything was okay. The only

time that I saw any officers down in the hard site is when they were doing their "tours" to the Red Cross or visiting high ranking personnel. I know we had observer after we built the interrogation booths. I do not know who was there because the booth had a one way mirror. We went off on the IROE [redacted] and the ICE leadership gave us, I don't know who directed them to give it to us. In the beginning, a lot of the approvals were verbal (but I can't name specifically who would approve). Later on, they started buckling down on a lot of stuff. I do not know why. After being read the interrogation techniques from the power point slide, I am not sure what technique the naked interrogations fell under. I never sat in on an interrogation where a detainee was told to sit against the wall. I never saw or was aware of any detainee abuse, humiliation, photos of detainees or videos of detainees. I had redeployed by the time CID began their investigation on the abuse. The only CID investigation I remember was the one after the mortar attack. I do not know of any other detainees being interrogated naked. I only heard rumors of it being done. I was told by [redacted] that I am not to discuss this with anyone. If I get any e-mails pertaining to the Procedure 15, I will forward them to [redacted]

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

CJTF7-TF-FAY 9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] 72nd MP BN

1. (FOUO) On 6 June 2004, while conducting an interview of [redacted] Commander, 72nd MP Company, Henderson, NV, he identified a previously unknown "older, unit armorer who maintained a diary of abuse" as [redacted] was not the unit armorer and served in Abu Ghraib for a short period as an MP, her secondary MOS. She arrived in Abu Ghraib with the main body of the 72nd MP Company circa 21-25 May 2003. Within weeks of her arrival she had a "nervous breakdown" as a result of shootings she witnessed during a detainee escape and riots. She was referred to the 581st Combat Stress Team, underwent counseling and was reattached to the 400th MP BN at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). She redeployed with the 72nd MP CO circa November 2003 [redacted] advised that [redacted] had been identified by the Press as maintaining a diary of abuses (Associated Press Article-Attachment #1). She was interviewed and confirmed she maintained a diary but neither observed nor documented any detainee abuse. Subsequent to the Press interview the Nevada National Guard also sent a team to interview her regarding the allegation. She again denied knowledge or documentation of any abuse. [redacted] described [redacted] as emotionally distressed and unstable. She was no longer in the Nevada ARNG [redacted] provided her last known contact data (home phone and next of kin (son) (Attachment #2). The undersigned attempted contact at her home phone [redacted] Yerington, NV to confirm she had not observed or documented abuse. The number had been disconnected. The undersigned elected not to contact her next of kin [redacted]

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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May 14, 2004

ACT NOW

Nevada National Guard soldier says she reported no prisoner abuse

By BRENDAN RILEY
ASSOCIATED PRESS

VEGAS.com
Showbiz Weekly
Las Vegas Weekly
Las Vegas Life
Hotel Resorts

DROUGHT ALERT

YERINGTON, Nev. (AP) - A Nevada National Guard soldier said she complained after a prisoner at Iraq's notorious Abu Ghraib prison was shot and killed during a riot last year, but denied she documented abuse of inmates by her fellow soldiers.

Spc. Donna Menesini, 49, told The Associated Press on Friday that she was the "older female soldier" who was mentioned during an Article 32 hearing into prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib.

During the hearing, a special agent with the U.S. Army's criminal investigation command testified he was told about a Nevada National Guard member who was "afraid of her chain of command" and sent documentation of prisoner abuse to her relatives, according to transcripts obtained by various media outlets.

In an interview at her home, Menesini said she never documented abuses, but did keep a personal journal about her experiences in Iraq.

"There was nothing to document," Menesini said. "They made it sound like I knew something horrible. If I did know something horrible, I know I would have told the commander and he would have straightened it out."

"The journals I wrote are the journals of what I did

during the day," she said. "It had nothing to do with documentation because there was nothing to document ... It kind of kept me sane."

"I never got in trouble for keeping a journal."

Menesini, a grandmother of seven, was deployed to Iraq as part of the 72nd Military Policy Company, based in Henderson, Nev. The unit was stationed at Abu Ghraib from mid-May to early November 2003.

Menesini told AP that during her time in Iraq she was going through menopause, which triggered an emotional outburst after a June 2003 riot and escape attempt in which an inmate was killed and several others were wounded. Soldiers have said the slain inmate was about to attack another soldier with a tent pole.

"I had never seen bodies. It was really hard. I felt bad. I called them murderers," Menesini said in describing her outburst at fellow U.S. soldiers who quelled the riot. "After I calmed down and saw ... like the psychiatrist said, it was a flight-or-fight reaction on my part."

Menesini saw two military psychiatrists who wanted to ensure she was fit for duty. She said she was cleared for continued service, but was shifted from the prison to the Baghdad airport and later helped to guard military convoys until returning home.

Menesini emphasized the difficulty of going through menopause during a six-month deployment in Iraq, where she encountered temperatures as high as 120 degrees.

"I don't want people to think I'm nuts," she said. "I'm not nuts. Menopause is a very difficult thing to go through."

Menesini said she never saw anything similar to the humiliating photographs of Iraqi prisoners that have prompted international outrage.

Abuses of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib - notorious as the site of executions and torture during Saddam Hussein's regime - have caused a major scandal and damaged the credibility of the U.S.-led coalition.

AG0000406

In all, seven soldiers with the 372nd Military Police Company - the unit that replaced Menesini's company at Abu Ghraib - face criminal charges. An additional six have received official reprimands, which will effectively end their Army careers, and one was given an official admonishment.

"We weren't there to hurt people," Menesini said. "They were people that never had any power before in their life. And now they got power, and they went overboard."

The top general with the Nevada National Guard confirmed that Menesini had seen some "disturbing" incidents, but that they did not rise to the level of abuse.

"It's been way overblown," Air Force Maj. Gen. Giles Vanderhoof said. "Was there prisoner abuse? Did she try to report it? And was she reprimanded? None of those things are true."

The Nevada National Guard has received no inquiry into any of the state's guardsmen who served at Abu Ghraib, he said.

"(Menesini) considers the matter closed. From everything I have, I consider it closed," Vanderhoof said.

Menesini, a Yerington resident, remains with the guard as supply clerk assigned to a Carson City unit.

AP newswoman Christina Almeida contributed to this report from Las Vegas.

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Search terms highlighted: menesini

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E O 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
94th RRC, Devens, MA	[redacted] 2004/05/27	11[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	MAJ/O-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Military Intelligence Readiness Command, Fort Belvoir, VA

9. [redacted] I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am currently enroute to my new assignment at the Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC), Fort Belvoir, VA. I was the Commander of the 325th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), East Windsor, CT, from 1 Feb 03 to 2 May 04. The 325th MI BN deployed enroute to Iraq on 10 Feb 03. We conducted a home station mobilization at Devens, MA (A Co), East Windsor, CT (HHSC), and Waterbury, CT (B Co), with roughly 180 organic MOS qualified soldiers when we arrived at Fort Dix, NJ. A Co deployed to Fort Dix on or about 17 Feb 03, and B Co and HHSC deployed about the end of Feb 03. A Co contained Analysis Control Element (ACE), B Co contained Counterintelligence and Interrogation assets, and HHSC performed traditional headquarters functions and staff. While at Dix, my interrogators received generic, cookie-cutter training on the Code of Conduct, Law of Land Warfare, and Geneva Convention. Islamic, theater-specific cultural awareness, as well as traditional CTT, weapons qualification, etc. We did not receive as much interrogation specific training as we wanted than at the Northeast Army Reserve Intelligence Readiness Center (ARISC). I had about 10-15 organic MOS qualified HUMINT Collectors/Interrogators (MOS 97E), four or five being qualified Strategic Debriefers. The 325th MI BN was crossed leveled with approximately 140 personnel from 40 different units from 25 states. The 325th MI had redeployed three months earlier from Fort Bragg where we had worked with the 519th MI BN and the 525th MI BDE. We started deploying on 27 Mar 03, but had to leave about 40 troops at Fort Dix to finish their mobilization processing. The 325th had 303 soldiers when it deployed. On 27 Mar 03, A Co arrived in Kuwait and was immediately attached to the 302nd MI BN, 205th MI BDE, where they remained until we redeployed in Dec 03. B Co and HHSC arrived in Kuwait on 29 Mar 03. We remained in Kuwait until the end of Apr 03 when we crossed into Iraq in two serials. A Co departed on about 24 Apr with the 302nd and B Co and HHSC crossed on 29 Apr 03. Initially, my interrogators were assigned with Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) and, with the exception of one soldier [redacted] who was assisting the Command because she spoke fluent Arabic. B Co and HHSC were located at Balad, Iraq, were setting up battalion operations. In Jun 03, B Co moved to Camp Cropper. Sometime in the late Aug/early Sep 03 timeframe, after the General Miller visit, my 97Es starting moving to Abu Ghrayb (AG) and were integrated into interrogation Tiger Teams at AG. I visited AG on three occasions. My first visit was sometime in Aug 03. My understanding at that time was that [redacted] of the 519th MI BN was in charge of interrogation operations at AG. I had a couple of conversations with [redacted] about how her interrogators were doing the interrogation piece and soldier accommodations. [redacted] was my B Co Commander and lived at Camp Cropper. My second visit to AG was sometime in Sep 03 when I sat in on an interrogation meeting where we discussed the interrogation facilities, but never discussed any interrogation techniques. At that time, [redacted] was in charge of the interrogation operations and no longer [redacted]. He appeared to come in from out of no where and I don't really know what he was. My third visit was later in Sep 03, the day after [redacted] was killed at AG in a mortar attack. [redacted] was still in charge and COL PAPPAS (205th MI BDE Commander) had not yet shifted to AG, although he spent an awful lot of time there. Word was that the 205th MI BDE would be moving from Balad to AG. I had discussions with [redacted] who resided at AG, about soldier issues because he had a good grip on what was going on with them, but I never had any operational discussions with him. Our discussions also involved dissemination of finished reports. I never saw any detainee abuse, nor did anyone ever report it to me, nor did I ever hear of such abuse. I never saw any unauthorized photographs or videos of detainees, nor did anyone ever report such photos/videos to me, nor did I hear of any such photo or videos. During my visits to AG, I saw detainees dressed in "normal Arab" dress, who were housed in open, wired areas, in tents. I walked through the "hard site" on one occasion on tour. All the detainees I saw were fully clothed either in their personal clothing or prison clothes. I never saw any naked detainee and I never heard of any incidents that detainees were stripped for humiliation purposes. I never saw any military working dogs, nor did I ever hear of dogs being used in for interrogation purposes. I was never aware that there were dogs at AG. I did not know Specialists [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Devens, MA DATED 2004/05/27

[redacted] STATEMENT (Continued)

very well, and knew them by sight, but can not comment on their character. The soldier in the lower left corner of digital photograph "23 MARK4" appears to be [redacted] at 97E cross-leveled to the 325th at Fort Dix from a reserve unit that I can not remember. [redacted] worked for COL PAPPAS within the Interrogations Operations Cell. MG FAY has ordered me not to discuss details of this inquiry with anyone not directly involved in this inquiry. I have nothing further to add to this statement. //END OF STATEMENT//

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of May 2004

at 94th RRC, Devens, MA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

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PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Alexandria, VA	2004/06/04	1455 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-6/USAR

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
3401st Strategic Military Intelligence Detachment, Gaithersburg, MD

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was a member of the Guantanamo TIGER TEAM (TT) which deployed from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) to Abu Ghraib, Iraq from early October 2003 until mid December 2003. I am a US Army reserve solider assigned to the 3409th Strategic Military Intelligence Detachment, Gaithersburg, MD. I was activated from January 2003 to December 2003 and other than my time in Iraq functioned as an analyst in GTMO. My TT was tasked to train personnel in Abu Ghraib on the GTMO TIGER TEAM concept. My team was led by [redacted] and consisted of [redacted] and myself. We arrived at Abu Ghraib circa early October 2003 (exact date unrecalled) and departed circa the middle of December 2003. We were the second of two groups sent from GTMO to Abu Ghraib. The first visit included MG Miller and focused on assessing interrogation and detention operations in Iraq and formulating recommendation for changes/improvements. [redacted] were part of this first team. Our team arrived about 2 weeks after the first had departed to assess the status of implementation of MG Miller's recommendations and how well the TIGER TEAM concept was being assimilated into operations. Almost immediately on arrival our team was split up operationally. [redacted] worked primarily with the command/leadership at Abu Ghraib and didn't get involved with [redacted] and I were assigned to one or more of the five operations/interrogations within Tier 1A. [redacted] interrogation teams and for the duration of our time there did not work together directly. We all were; however, billeted together and saw each other on a daily basis. We all worked on the day shift from 0600-0600. We convened ad-hoc meetings at least every two to three days where we discussed our experiences, observations and recommendations and then we "briefed" (discussed) these with [redacted]. All of our observations/discussions concerned how well the GTMO TIGER TEAM concept was being integrated or employed. We were not at Abu Ghraib to teach interrogation; simply to implement the TT concept. I don't recall our team ever discussing specific interrogation techniques employed, abuse, or unauthorized interrogation methods. My job was as an analyst. I worked with two different teams and rotated between their analysts. Sometimes I'd spend only a day with one analyst and sometimes several. At times I accompanied the analyst (as part of the TT) into interrogations and at times I only helped focus and prepare the analyst prior to an interrogation. I didn't actively involve myself in the interrogation process or preparation other than its link to analysis. I observed about 1-2 interrogations per week. Interrogations were conducted in the interrogation booths or the stairwell or shower room of Tier 1A. I did observe the interrogators providing plans for review and approval before their interrogations. These went to [redacted] for approval. She would review, discuss as necessary with the interrogator and then initial the plan signifying her approval. I don't ever remember a plan coming back disapproved. Interrogation techniques I observed included mild "fear up" and "ego down." These were all verbal in nature and involved no humiliation or physical abuse. I never observed detainees who were naked although I once heard from an MP (name unrecalled) about a detainee in Tier 1B who had been stripped down and of another detainee who was often shackled in his cell naked because he spread feces on himself and/or ate it. I never heard or saw anyone physically abuse a detainee. Sleep deprivation was a technique I saw employed. It was approved by [redacted] and would not exceed a 36-48 hour period. I'm not certain of the specifics as it was an interrogator responsibility but I do know that there were limitations (NFI) on this techniques and it was also used in GTMO. I never observed dogs in Abu Ghraib. They were used in GTMO during in-processing. I think it was a "fear up" technique. I had no involvement in the "shooting incident." I heard about it after from [redacted] as the interrogators had been called to assist. I never saw or heard about anyone taking photos in Abu Ghraib. The only stress positions I observed or heard about were to make a detainee stand and if he was uncooperative to make him sit/stand/sit repeatedly. On occasion I did see MPs and interrogators touch a detainee but it was never abusive; usually a hand on a shoulder or arm to guide. Overall, my impression of interrogations (techniques) at Abu Ghraib was that they didn't differ much from GTMO.

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement? [redacted]

A; No.

////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Metro Park DATED 04 Jun 04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004 at Metro Park, Alexandria, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

CJTF7-TF-FAY 9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephonic Interview [redacted] DIA

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview with [redacted] DIA. [redacted] was deployed to Baghdad as a debriefer with the Iraqi Survey group (ISG). His team, comprised of both military (DIA) and Other Government Ageny (OGA) personnel, routinely coordinated with CJTF7 and conducted debriefings of detainees at Abu Ghraib. Their Points of Contact were [redacted] and two Sergeants, names unrecalled, who ensured detainees were available and brought to the interrogation facility for ISG. All of the ISG debriefings he was knowledgeable of occurred in the interrogation site known as "wood," outside the cell blocks [redacted] was never in the Hard Site. [redacted] never observed or heard about abuse of detainees. The ISG conducted "debriefings" vice interrogations and no coercive methods were employed. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement he was provided and signed were compliant with the Army FM and Geneva Conventions as he recalled [redacted] could not recall any names (or nicknames) of his OGA co-workers.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

25 June 2004

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IS BASED ON A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN [redacted] S-3, 28TH COMBAT ARMY SURGICAL HOSPITAL (CASH).

On 25 June at approximately 1500hrs, I phoned the 28th CASH to request a list of all medical personnel tasked to support Abu Ghraib prison. [redacted] stated the 28th CASH had no personnel assigned to Abu Ghraib but that they did support prisoners form Abu Ghraib when they were transported to their facility to receive medical support. He provided a list of all PAs or doctors assigned to the CASH form Mid November to Mid December. Document is attached.

[redacted]

Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD, VA

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2004/06/01

3. TIME
1430 SR

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Titan Corp, with Duty Iraq

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on 24 or 25 October 2003. In processing consisted of orientation of the facility and training on the IROE and Geneva Convention, presented by [redacted] I had to sign a statement that I had received training on them. We also received training on a monthly basis on the IROE's. These monthly sessions were presented by [redacted] and [redacted] told us that any request for measures listed on the IROE would have to be routed to her and passed up the line for approval. I was initially assigned to the Detainee Assessment Board for two days and then assigned to work with two different interrogation teams until after Saddam was captured on 14 December. One team included [redacted] and a military analyst whose name I do not recall. I usually worked in the interrogation sites, but on one occasion, I did go out with [redacted] and [redacted] the other had [redacted] I worked one time with [redacted] on the operation which took down Saddam. After Saddam's capture I was moved to the Special Operations Team, working with [redacted] I went into Block 1A on occasion to pick up or return a detainee. Sometimes we conducted interrogations in the shower area or stairwell of 1A; we also used the "wood site" and the "metal site". I did not see or hear about any instance of abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about the use of dogs for interrogation purposes. I did hear dogs barking as they were being used by the MPs to search cells the night of the shooting, but did not actually see them in use. I did not see or hear about detainees being stripped and kept naked in cells, nor did I see or hear about detainees having to wear women's underwear. I had heard about sleep management where in a detainee would only be allowed an hour or so sleep in a 24 hour period. I do not recall sleep management being used on any interrogation team to which I was assigned. I do not recall any instance of a detainee being thrown to the ground from a vehicle and/or dragged on the ground. I do not have any knowledge of OGA personnel doing any unauthorized interrogations. I was reassigned from AG on Feb 8th 2004. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A. N[redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

Initials

Follow [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/06/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

No. 7

USE [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL [redacted]

(Signature o[redacted])

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of June 2004 at Springfield, VA [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2004/05/[redacted]	1525[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
302nd Military Intelligence Battalion, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in mid October 2003. I am a 96H and when I arrived at Abu Ghraib I was assigned as an Assistant Interrogation Analyst to work with Interrogators. My focus was Extreme Fighters. The first day we received a tour of the site. We were shown interrogation booths, where CAMP Vigilant and CAMP Ganci were. [redacted] an Analyst worked with interrogators. The interrogators I worked with were [redacted] Every interrogator had his way of using an analyst. Some allowed you to ask questions which were relevant to the interrogation plan. Other interrogators did not allow you to ask questions they just wanted you to take notes and do the research. We also received some general information on the Geneva Convention but no classes on it. We received the Interrogation Rules of Engagements (IROEs) and I signed a couple of iterations of the IROEs. I was not taught what was acceptable or not acceptable. But the section leader [redacted] discussed it with us. I understood that I was not to touch a detainee. I remember one time when I was dropping off a detainee after an interrogation. I went upstairs to TIER 1 to drop off the detainee to the MPs while [redacted] stayed below to do something else. I handed the detainee to the MP and they asked me if how come the detainee was in shackles. I told them that the detainee had been untruthful. The MP (I do not recall who they were just that he was a male, not an NCO and had a brown T-shirt) took the detainee and jerked him toward the wall. The detainee hit the railing. When the MPs took the bag off, I noticed the detainee had blood on his head. I was not aware what the MPs were allowed to do. [redacted] They reported it to either [redacted] I told [redacted] and I believe [redacted] as well and maybe even [redacted] I do not know what they did. This occurred sometime in November after we took over escorting of detainees. On another time I saw the MPs making two detainees do PT. These two detainees had raped a boy. The MPs could make them do MP but we were not allowed. No one ever suggested that it was okay for MPs to abuse detainees but we knew they could use the necessary force hen detainees got out of control. I never saw or had any knowledge videos of detainees or dogs being used for interrogations. I did see [redacted] (who always had a camera) take photos of detainee once. She took a photo of a detainee who was standing next to [redacted] This is the only time I knew of anyone taking photos of detainees. The MPs had cameras and computers in the Hard Site. I knew photos were not allowed in the interrogation area but I did not know of the Isolation Area. [redacted] NCOs were there and they saw her so I just assumed they allowed to since the NCOs didn't say anything. I knew there were detainees delivered by Other Government Agencies (OGA) but I never dealt with them. [redacted] (Tall civilian with black Goatee) dealt with them a lot. OGA never shared any intelligence they obtained from the detainees even when they belonged to us. There was a time when two female OGAs went in to the cell with weapons. I didn't notice the weapons until after they had walked out. I notified [redacted] and stated it was wrong. Do not know what happened after that. We had a shortage of clothing for detainees. We did not have enough blankets, jumpsuits, shoes, or other items. I saw a naked detainee who was thrown in the black room (the Hole). The detainee was a troublemaker and had gotten violent with a female MP. I was told that the MPs policy when placing a detainee in the Hole was to put him in the cell naked. I never heard or was aware of any MI personnel tell MPs to "soften-up" or give "the treatment" to detainees. One stressed position I witnessed only once was when we had a detainee handcuffed to the floor but we only did it for a short period and kept watch on him. We would check his fingers and hands to ensure he had good blood circulation. This was in following with the interrogation plan. When I first arrived, there were rumors of prostitution and alcohol but [redacted] stopped that. Two of our soldiers were caught with alcohol and they received Article 15s and lost rank [redacted] I didn't really know [redacted] about his analyst was [redacted]

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No [redacted] END of STATEMENT

Continued

Follows S[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/11

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

follows [redacted]

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH CONSISTS OF PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS
STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of MAY 2004
at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority to Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BLDG AT-5636 Gorham St. Fort Bragg, NC 28310	2004/06/04	1500 hours	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

9. _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From the end of Jul 03 to early Oct 03 I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97B Counterintelligence Agent who performed interrogations. My team's initial mission upon my arrival to AG was to set up the work and life support areas to be used to conduct interrogation operations for detainees gathered during operation VICTORY BOUNTY. Prior to initial operations [redacted] with interrogator input, an Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. Shortly after my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the IROE and signed memorandum stating I understood and would follow the IROE. The IROE in Iraq was similar to the one used by the 519th in Afghanistan. A difference in the two documents was the IROE for Iraq was more detailed. This was done to preclude questions concerning limitations. In my opinion, the IROE was clear and adequately established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. Certain techniques contained in the IROE had to be justified and approved. The vehicle for requesting these techniques was the interrogation plan, which had to be done for every interrogation. For example, Adjusted Sleep Schedule had to be requested through the interrogation team chief to the operations cell [redacted]. The request included a detailed proposed schedule and justification. Once approved the operations cell would pass the authorization through the team leader back down to the interrogator. Someone in the operations cell would then take the schedule to the MP's who were supposed to ensure the schedule was followed. I do not know the methods the MP's used to ensure the detainees were awake at the proper time. The 72nd MP's kept a three ring binder in cell block 1A, it's contents were unknown. On several occasions the instructions we gave the MP's concerning detainees were not executed. [redacted] told me of one such occasion in which an interrogator moved a detainee outside without shade for an approximate period of 15 to 20 minutes for an unknown reason. The interrogator told the MP guarding the detainee to look after his welfare during that time. [redacted] circulated the guard changed during that period and the instructions were not relayed to the relief, nor executed. A medic discovered the incident and scolded [redacted] for allowing the incident to occur. One to two months into our operation of interrogating these detainees our facility started to receive other detainees from various detention facilities in Iraq after it was decided to make AG the centralized location for detainees. Due to the chaotic nature of the detainee transfers, many detainees arrived without documentation. [redacted] and elements of the 325th MI Bn and detainees those personnel were interrogating arrived in mid September. COL PAPPAS and [redacted] were under intense pressure from LTG SANCHEZ to provide intelligence reporting and [redacted] methods and processes, to include the actual questions in interrogation plans. On occasion [redacted] conducted interrogations themselves. One interrogation occurred at the request of LTG Sanchez in the middle of the night. It seemed COL PAPPAS was not experienced in interrogation operations and was more concerned with reporting than proper interrogation techniques. On approximately 29 Sep 03, I overheard someone making a statement about a detainee dying while being interrogated by an Other Government Agency (OGA) official. The OGA then packed the detainee in ice and placed him in a local taxi. The taxi driver was paid to take the body away. I was not sure if I had heard correctly until [redacted] confirmed the statement was made by [redacted]. I am not sure if it was a joke or a true story. [redacted] allowed OGA to house their detainees at the AG facility in "ghost cells" in block 1A and allowing them to interrogate our detainees at their discretion. I heard rumors [redacted] received cigars and liquor from the OGA as gifts for letting these activities occur. During the course of interrogation operations I once received a detainee wearing only pink underwear. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross were present at AG during this incident. I did not request this to be done and was told the reason for the women's attire was the MP's were experiencing a supply shortage and the women's underwear were all that was available for the detainees. I informed my chain of command of the incident. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I never directed the MP's to abuse or maltreat the detainees, nor did I ever hear of it. The MP's never offered to abuse the detainees for me, nor did I ever hear of them offering to do so for other MI personnel. After the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center was established, COL PAPPAS kept the 519th MI Bn 97E's and removed the 519th MI Bn 97B's from the interrogation facility and put them on Tactical HUMINT Teams. I departed AG in early Oct 0[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] 1500 hours DATED 2004/06/04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT?

A: NO//END OF STATEMENT//

[redacted]
SPC 96B
366-94-4697
B Co, 321 MI Bn
Dallas, TX

I understand my rights as read and told to me. I wish to waive my rights with the understanding that I can invoke them at a later time if I so desire.
I was assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) on 15 September 03, after staging through Kuwait and a short-term assignment at Balad and the Cropper Interrogation Facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). During my train up time immediately after mobilization and initial assignments in Kuwait and Iraq I did not receive any training or instruction in Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), the handling of prisoners or detainees, or in the Geneva Convention as it pertains to the above. However during my assignment at the Cropper facility [redacted] my supervisor and I had conversations about the do's and don'ts of what we were allowed to do and what not to do in interrogations. At the Cropper facility it was well known that detainees who were brought into the facility complained of beatings from members of Seal Team 5 and TF 20 personnel. While at Cropper I did not see any instances of abuse or humiliation. These instances of beatings were photographed and documented by [redacted] After I was assigned to AG, as part of my orientation and in processing, I was given a pamphlet to read which contained detailed instructions and definitions of IROE. This was later modified through a new listing of IROEs that reflected various authorities required for approval. I had to sign a memo indicating that I had read and understood the IROE. I was assigned as an analyst working in support of interrogations and later integrated into a "Tiger Team" [redacted] was in charge of the interrogators [redacted] came shortly after wards. I believed [redacted]s role to be that as a liaison officer, but he was very instrumental in getting better living and working conditions for the Soldiers (sports equipment, computers, etc). During the first month or so I was limited to observing interrogations and taking notes. Later on, as a Tiger Team member I took a more active role in the interrogation of detainees. When I first arrived at AG, it was common practice to use sleep deprivation and sleep management with the detainees. I do not know how it originated or who approved it, but it just seemed to be common practice. It was also common that the detainees on MI hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given clothing as an incentive to cooperate with us. The detainees in the tent area were clothed. I am not sure how the decision was made or by whom to make it a common practice to keep some of them naked. I felt it was a MI decision, not a MP decision and seemed to be made by [redacted] in screening, who was on an ego trip. The section I was in seemed to handle the "ash and trash" and we functioned more as secondary screeners to determine intelligence value.
My first interrogation session was in Block 1B; the detainee was brought to us by the MPs and was wrapped in a sheet [redacted] were the interrogators, and [redacted] was the interpreter. About a week later, after the mortar attack, I participated in my second interrogation. This detainee was also naked, but clothed in a sheet. [redacted] did it in the shower area [redacted] was the interpreter. Right after this the second version of the IROE came out – the detainees were no longer kept

naked and sleep deprivation/sleep management had to be requested and approved. I know that the MPs had started to get more detainee jump suits and sandals flowing in through the supply system, where before the supply had been somewhat limited. During this time I became aware of incidents of possible abuse of detainees, reported to me during interrogation sessions by the detainees themselves. The first involved a Syrian named Hussein. He informed me that one of the MPs who pulled his 9mm pistol and put it to the detainee's head. The other detainee, an Iraqi named [redacted] reported that [redacted] one of the interpreters for the MPs hit him, cutting his ear to the extent that it required stitches. I saw the injury and asked the MPs about it and was informed that the detainee had fallen in his cell. [redacted] told me this while I was with [redacted] told [redacted] to document it in his interrogators notes. I do not know if he did or not. [redacted] was notoriously bad in report writing. Another possible incidence of abuse occurred immediately after the shooting incident. I was scheduled to have a night interrogation session with a detainee we referred to as "Trigger" who was given a gun in his cell by one of the Iraqi policeman. When the MPs went to seize the gun there was a shooting incident. For a time right after, it was chaos in the area. [redacted] and I were in a meeting in the mess hall and [redacted] came in and indicated they needed every available interrogator and analyst to assist and asked for "volunteers" (I figured the Army volunteered me). He indicated there was a sense of urgency to get information about the incident and get it tonight. [redacted] said COL Pappas had given us blanket approval for harsher methods for that night. A couple of days later [redacted] said COL Pappas had instructed us to use whatever techniques we had to in order to get the required information that night. We got to the cellblock area later and saw that 15 – 20 of the Iraqi policemen had been stripped and lined up and were being interrogated. The MPs showed us the cell where the shooting had occurred. I heard a dog barking and when I went towards the barking, I could se[redacted] in a cell, interrogating one of the Iraqi policemen and a dog was also in the cell. Later on [redacted] had a team meeting and then went to interrogate one of the IPs. [redacted] used this interrogation session as a training session with [redacted] in how to employ the "fear up" technique. I did not see COL Pappas, [redacted] in the vicinity, other than seeing [redacted] in the mess hall earlier.

The GTMO team did limited training for us – more discussions on interrogation procedures. [redacted] gave a class on the role of the analyst in interrogations. A team from Huachuca came in after the GTMO team and gave us three days of classes, including Rules of Engagement and the use of sleep deprivation and sleep management. Our process for using sleep management was for the interrogator to request it in writing and submit the request with the interrogation plan. The memo would stipulate sleep and wake schedules, meals, etc., and could last for no more than72 hours. Once it was approved, a memo was given to the MPs showing the schedule. I do not know how the MPs kept the detainees – I suppose they went by the cells and yelled or noise to keep them awake. [redacted] commented that the MPs could do what was done to them in basic training (physical training, etc). I brought it up th[redacted] that the MPs appeared to have no ROEs of their own. The MPs seemed to have no NCOs or officers on duty at night.

Shortly after the shooting incident [redacted] told me that she had an uncooperative detainee that she stripped naked and walked from the conex area to the Camp Vigilant

area. It was cold that night, maybe about 30 degrees. [redacted] called [redacted] and the other individual on the carpet over this incident and wanted both given an Article 15. [redacted] indicated he handled the matter himself. I do not know what punishment was given, but know that both were removed from interrogation duties. I knew about a previous incident involving two interrogators from the 519th that had been drinking and went to get a female detainee from the 1B area and made her remove her shirt. The MPs saw this and reported the matter. The two were relieved from interrogator duties. We had a change interrogator rules after this – when a female detainee was interrogated, there had to be another female present.

It was common knowledge th[redacted] used sleep deprivation and dogs while he was on his special projects, working directly for COL Pappas after the capture of Saddam on 14 Dec. .It would not surprise me i[redacted] told the MPs how to treat detainees. I know that he had told the MPs that some of the detainees he was interrogating were "bad" – they had used IEDs and killed Soldiers. I do not know what he expected when he told the MPs that, but he might have been suggesting that they yell at them, or such things. However, he might have known exactly what the MPs would or would not do. I saw him use a dog on one other occasion (other than the night of the shooting). [redacted] and I were interrogating a female detainee and heard a dog barking. The female was really afraid of dogs and we had to return her to her cell. I went to see what was going on and saw a detainee in his underwear on a mattress on the floor with a dog standing over him. [redacted] was upstairs giving directions to the MP, telling him to "take him back home". The detainee was one o[redacted] but I did not see an interpreter in the area. The MP wa[redacted] (Photo 196 that I viewed is a picture of this incident) [redacted] would come into our office at times, every other day or so, and tell us about detainees – who was sick, etc. He also told us about dogs being used while [redacted] was there. [redacted] and other MPs used to refer to the "doggy dance" sessions. [redacted] were close. [redacted] was [redacted] interpreter. I was with him and [redacted] on several occasions and I never saw them do anything out of the ordinary while I was working with them. [redacted] was well liked by the interrogators and interpreters and seemed quiet and shy [redacted] used interesting tactics a lot, but was not abusive. He used the "fear up" technique a lot and thought all detainees were guilty.

[redacted] came to me one morning and said he had to tell me something. The night before [redacted] had come into the office and took to the 1A area to show him something. When he got there he saw two prisoners naked and on the floor. [redacted] was there and they were all yelling at the detainees and making them crawl around on the floor [redacted] became disgusted over the matter and left after a few minutes. I told [redacted] that I would take care of it. I could not find [redacted] and went to tell [redacted] saw me and I think I told him I was going to tell [redacted] something but not what it was about. [redacted] saw me and said he would go with me. I spoke to [redacted] in private, as I did not wan[redacted] to hear what I was telling [redacted]. I told [redacted] about the incident and that in the future if he saw any MI personnel in the vicinity of anything like that, he should tell them to leave immediately. [redacted] said he would tell his NCOIC about it. He left and came back later and told me it had been taken care of. I did not tell MI about it, as MI was not in charge of the detainees, the MPs were. I felt that by telling the MPs about it, it would be fixed. I probably should have told [redacted] about, but felt that by telling [redacted] about it would be taken care of at the lowest level. In hindsight maybe I should have told someone in MI

about it. Within a couple of days I mentioned it to [redacted] so did [redacted] This was more in confiding in a friend than reporting an incident. The three of us were close and confided in each other [redacted] later heard that I had told [redacted] about the incident and asked if I had specifically told about him. I think that I mentioned that it was just three MI folks, but did not name names.

After the capture of Saddam, our team was given special extended authority from COL Pappas to use harsher techniques. We would still have to request authority by memo, but COL Pappas would approve it. My team never did request any of the harsher methods. Other than what I described above I did not see or hear about abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about unauthorized photos or videos. The NCOs, [redacted] particularly the section chiefs, did not condone abuse – this was especially true of [redacted] I did hear about one occasion in which an Iranian detainee was bitten by a dog, but do not know the circumstances or who was involved.

Concerning Photo 23, File Mark 4: The individual leaning against the wall next to [redacted] is possibly [redacted], who was part of the 325th, but worked for COL Pappas at the 205th Headquarters.

Q: Is there anything you wish to add to this statement? A: No

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Coroapolis, PA	2004/05/25 [redacted]	1620 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Co, 321 MI Bn Dallas, TX

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I understand my rights as read and told to me. I wish to waive my rights with the understanding that I can invoke them at a later time if I so desire [redacted]
I was assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) on 15 September 03, after staging through Kuwait and a short-term assignment at Balad and the Cropper Interrogation Facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). During my train up time immediately after mobilization and initial assignments in Kuwait and Iraq I did not receive any training or instruction in Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), the handling of prisoners or detainees, or in the Geneva Convention as it pertains to the above. However during my assignment at the Cropper facility [redacted] my supervisor and I had conversations about the do's and don'ts of what we were allowed to do and what not to do in interrogations. At the Cropper facility it was well known that detainees who were brought into the facility complained of beatings from members of Seal Team 5 and TF 20 personnel. While at Cropper I did not see any instances of abuse or humiliation. These instances of beatings were photographed and documented by [redacted] After I was assigned to AG, as part of my orientation and in processing, I was given a pamphlet to read which contained detailed instructions and definitions of IROE. This was later modified through a new listing of IROEs that reflected various authorities required for approval. I had to sign a memo indicating that I had read and understood the IROE. I was assigned as an analyst working in support of interrogations and later integrated into a "Tiger Team" [redacted] was in charge of the interrogators, [redacted] came shortly after wards. I believed [redacted] role to be that as a liaison officer, but he was very instrumental in getting better living and working conditions for the Soldiers (sports equipment, computers, etc). During the first month or so I was limited to observing interrogations and taking notes. Later on, as a Tiger Team member I took a more active role in the interrogation of detainees. When I first arrived at AG, it was common practice to use sleep deprivation and sleep management with the detainees. I do not know how it originated or who approved it, but it just seemed to be common practice. It was also common that the detainees on MI hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given clothing as an incentive to cooperate with us. The detainees in the tent area were clothed. I am not sure how the decision was made or by whom to make it a common practice to keep some of them naked. I felt it was a MI decision, not a MP decision and seemed to be made by [redacted] in screening, who was on an ego trip. The section I was in seemed to handle the "ash and trash" and we functioned more as secondary screeners to determine intelligence value. My first [redacted] tion session was in Block 1B, the detainee was brought to us by the MPs and was wrapped in a sheet [redacted] were the interrogators, an[redacted] was the interpreter. About a week later, after the mortar attack, I participated in a second interrogation. This detainee was also naked, but clothed in a sheet [redacted] did it in the shower area [redacted] was the interpreter. Right after this the second version of the IROE came out - the detainees were no longer kept naked and sleep deprivation/sleep management had to be requested and approved. I know that the MPs had started to get more detainee jump suits and sandals flowing in through the supply system, where before the supply had been somewhat limited. During this time I became aware of incidents of possible abuse of detainees, reported to me during interrogation sessions by the detainees themselves. The first involved a Syrian named [redacted] He informed me that one of the MPs [redacted] pulled his 9mm pistol and put it to the detainee's head. The other detainee, an Iraqi name[redacted] reported tha[redacted] one of the interpreters for the MPs hit him, cutting his ear to the extent that it required stitches. I saw the injury and asked the MPs about it and was informed that the detainee had fallen in his cell. [redacted] told me this while I was with [redacted] I told [redacted] to document it in his interrogators notes. I do not know if he did or not. [redacted] was notoriously bad in report writing. Another possible incidence of abuse occurred immediately after the shooting incident. I was scheduled to have a night interrogation session with a detainee we referred to as "Trigger" who was given a gun in his cell by one of the Iraqi policeman. When the MPs went to seize the gun there was a shooting incident. For a time right after, it was chaos in the area. [redacted] and I were in a meeting in the mess hall and [redacted] came in and indicated they needed every available interrogator and analyst to assist and asked for "volunteers" (I figured the Army volunteered me). He indicated there was a sense of urgency to get information about the incident and get it tonight. [redacted] said COL Pappas had given us blanket approval for harsher methods for that night. A couple of days later [redacted] said COL Pappas had instructed us to use whatever techniques we had to in order to get the required information that night. We got to the cellblock area later and saw tha[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Coraopolis, PA DATED 2004/05/25

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] 5 - 20 of the Iraqi policemen had been stripped and lined up and were being interrogated. The MPs showed us the cell where the shooting had occurred. I heard a dog barking and when I went towards the barking, I could see [redacted] in a cell, interrogating one of the Iraqi policemen and a dog was also in the cell. Later on [redacted] had a team meeting and then went to interrogate one of the IPs. [redacted] used this interrogation session as a training session with [redacted] in how to employ the "fear up" technique. I did not see COL Pappas, [redacted] or [redacted] in the vicinity, other than seeing [redacted] in the mess hall earlier.

The GTMO team did limited training for us - more discussions on interrogation procedures [redacted] gave a class on the role of the analyst in interrogations. A team from Huachuca came in after the GTMO team and gave us three days of classes, including Rules of Engagement and the use of sleep deprivation and sleep management. Our process for using sleep management was for the interrogator to request it in writing and submit the request with the interrogation plan. The memo would stipulate sleep and wake schedules, meals, etc., and could last for no more than72 hours. Once it was approved, a memo was given to the MPs showing the schedule. I do not know how the MPs kept the detainees - I suppose they went by the cells and yelled or noise to keep them awake. [redacted] commented that the MPs could do what was done to them in basic training (physical training, etc). I brought it up to [redacted] that the MPs appeared to have no ROEs of their own. The MPs seemed to have no NCOs or officers on duty at night.

Shortly after the shooting incident, [redacted] told me that she had an uncooperative detainee that she stripped naked and walked from the conex area to the Camp Vigilant area. It was cold that night, maybe about 30 degrees. [redacted] called [redacted] and the other individual on the carpet over this incident and wanted both given an Article 15. Jordan indicated he handled the matter himself. I do not know what punishment was given, but know that both were removed from interrogation duties. I knew about a previous incident involving two interrogators from the 519th that had been drinking and went to get a female detainee from the 1B area and made her remove her shirt. The MPs saw this and reported the matter. The two were relieved from interrogator duties. We had a change interrogator rules after this - when a female detainee was interrogated, there had to be another female present. It was common knowledge that [redacted] used sleep deprivation and dogs while he was on his special projects, working directly for COL Pappas after the capture of Saddam on 14 Dec. It would not surprise me if [redacted] told the MPs how to treat detainees. I know that he had told the MPs that some of the detainees he was interrogating were "bad" - they had used IEDs and killed Soldiers. I do not know what he expected when he told the MPs that, but he might have been suggesting that they yell at them, or such things. However, he might have known exactly what the MPs would or would not do. I saw him use a dog on one other occasion (other than the night of the shooting). [redacted] and I were interrogating a female detainee and heard a dog barking. The female was really afraid of dogs and we had to return her to her cell. I went to see what was going on and saw a detainee in his underwear on a mattress on the floor with a dog standing over him. [redacted] was upstairs giving directions to the MP, telling him to "take him back home". The detainee was one of [redacted] but I did not see an interpreter in the area. The MP was [redacted] (Photo 196 that I viewed is a picture of this incident). [redacted] would come into our office at times, every other day or so, and tell us about detainees - who was sick, etc. He also told [redacted] about dogs being used while [redacted] was there. [redacted] and other MPs used to refer to the "doggy dance" sessions. [redacted] were close. [redacted] was [redacted] interpreter. I was with him and [redacted] on several occasions and I never saw them do anything out of the ordinary while I was working with them. [redacted] was well liked by the interrogators and interpreters and seemed quiet and shy. [redacted] used interesting tactics a lot, but was not abusive. He used the "fear up" technique a lot and thought all detainees were guilty.

[redacted] came to me one morning and said he had to tell me something. The night before [redacted] had come into the office and took to the [redacted] area to show him something. When he got there he saw two prisoners naked and on the floor. [redacted] was there and they were all yelling at the detainees and making them crawl around on the floor. [redacted] became disgusted over the manner and left after a few minutes. I told [redacted] that I would take care of it. I could not find [redacted] and went to tell [redacted] saw me and I think I told him I was going to tell [redacted] something but not what [redacted] saw me and said he would go with me. I spoke to [redacted] in private, as I did not want [redacted] to hear what I was telling [redacted]. I told [redacted] about the incident and that in the future if I saw any MI personnel in the vicinity of anything like that, he should tell them to leave immediately. [redacted] said he would tell his NCOIC about it. He left and came back later and told me it had been taken care of. I did not tell MI about it, as MI was not in charge of the detainees, the MPs were. I felt that by telling the MPs about it, it would be fixed. I probably should have told [redacted] about, but felt that by telling [redacted] about it would be taken care of at the lowest level. In hindsight maybe I should have told someone in MI about it. Within a couple of days I mentioned it to [redacted] so did [redacted]. This was more in confiding in a friend than reporting an incident. The three of us were close and confided in each other. [redacted] later heard that I had told [redacted] about the incident and asked if I had specifically told about him. I think that I mentioned that it was just three MI folks, but did not name names. After the capture of Saddam, our team was given special extended authority from COL Pappas to use harsher techniques. We would still have to request authority by memo, but COL Pappas would approve it. My team never did request any of the harsher methods. Other than what I described above I did not see or hear about abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about unauthorized photos or videos. The NCOs, particularly the section chiefs, did not condone abuse - this was especially true of [redacted]. I did hear about one occasion in which an Iranian detainee was bitten by a dog, but do not know the circumstances or who was involved. Concerning Photo 23, File Mark 4: The individual leaning against the wall next to [redacted] is possibly [redacted] who was part of the 325th, but worked for COL Pappas at the 205th Headquarters."

Q: Is there anything you wish to add to this statement? A: N[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Coroapolis, PA DATED 2004/05/25

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

Follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of May 2004, at Coroapolis, PA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form AR 190-45; the proponent agency is Office of Th p. Chief of Staff for Personnel

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Camp Cropper RIAP	12 Feb 04	1202 Hrs	

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [redacted]

GRADE/STATUS: E-4

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: D Co 325 MI BN

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] came to me the morning after the incident to tell me about what happened. He said that [redacted] had taken him drinking to [redacted] him something [redacted] the MPs had stripped them [redacted] detainees naked & tied them together. [redacted] the MPs also made the detainees crawl along the floor & do other forms of PT [redacted] said he only spent about 7 minutes in isolation & became disturbed & left. He came to me because he didn't know what to do about it. I then told [redacted] that I was going to talk to the MPs about it & he [redacted] I went to [redacted] privately & told him what [redacted] had said about the night before. I also told him that if our interrogators were trying to become involved with their ship department to pick them out [redacted] said he'll speak with his NCOIC & get the problem taken care of. [redacted] also spoke with [redacted] privately.

Q. Do you know the date of this incident?

A. I don't know

Q. Do you know what MPs were there?

A. I don't their names.

Q. Was there anyone else there other than who you have ID?

A. No one else besides the MPs

Q. Did you physically see the abuse?

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, 1 JUL 72 — SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

EXHIBIT

STATEMENT OF [redacted] | TAKEN AT Camp Cropper BIAP | DATED 12 Feb 04 | CONTINUED

A. No

Q. Did [redacted] say anything about a foot ball?

A. No

Q. Did [redacted] say what [redacted] did exactly?

A. No, not exactly, he just said they were PTing the detainees

Q. Is this a common interrogation technique?

A. No

Q. Do you know if they took pictures of the incident?

A. No

Q. Have you seen any pictures or videos of detainee abuse?

A. No

Q. Have you seen or heard of anything similar towards the detainees within the board site?

A. No

Q. Do you have anything else to add to your statement?

tell
ih
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d
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Q. Do you know the situation continued after you talked to [redacted]

A. [redacted] on nightshift after the incident [redacted] time is limited with the MPs

Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?

A. No /// END OF STATEMENT ///

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: HMJ

PAGE 2 3 PAGES

AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by [redacted] to administer oaths, this 12 day of Feb, 20 04

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority to Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERS[redacted]MENT

[redacted]

[redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27 [redacted]	1340 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in October 2003 to work as an interrogator. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received an orientation from personnel with the 205th MI BDE. I believe I received some Geneva Convention training. I received a briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (ROE). I was told what we could and could not do. when I arrived, COL PAPPAS was in charge and I believe [redacted] was the Deputy Commander. I saw an MP shoot a detainee. with a rubber bullet. The his chain of command took care of it. I have no knowledge of MI personnel telling MPs to "soften up" a detainee or telling them to give them "the treatment." I have seen the dogs and have heard the dogs being used but do not know who used them. Last month there was a soldier who came in to the office and told me he found [redacted] thumb drive. The next day I gave the thumb drive t[redacted] but she said it wasn't hers. We looked at the drive to find out who it belonged to. When we opened the file, we saw photos of detainees in terrible positions. There were some dead detainees, some naked detainees. There was a photo of a soldiers with live detainees who had their heads covered with a sand bag. [redacted] used to socialize a lot with MPs. I noticed that one of the MPs on the photo with a detainee was one of [redacted] friend because she had stated his name a previous time. I believe the thumb drive belonged to [redacted] She was in one of the photos. The [redacted] photo was a regular photo, but I believe there was a file that stated it was her drive. We gave the drive to [redacted] and I wrote sworn statements. There was another time wh[redacted] was disciplined for walking a prisoner naked. She was pulled off interrogations and placed in operations. She used a technique that was not approved. I consider her actions to be abusive.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

[redacted]

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghr 2 DATED 27 APR 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 [redacted]

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
DEVENS, MASSACHUSETTS

2. DATE (YYYYMM
2004/05/27

3. TIME
1425

FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
800th Military Police BDE

9. , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib o/a 22-23 November 2003. As a 97B, I took over as the 320th MP S-2 shop in support of the GANCI counterintelligence mission. The mission was passive collection. Each compound had MPs/detainees who would tell me what was going on with the detainees. During the 2nd week in December, the 519th was pulling out and the Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) 120 was also departing. I was told to take over the mission of THT-120. The other agents on the team were one from the 320th MP BN and two from the 205th MI BDE. I took over nine sources. They were mainly personnel working in the camp and outside the wire. We were also screening the local nationals working on site. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I did not receive any Interrogation Rules of Engagement training. I was given a tour of all the facilities and were there. This place was like the frontier in the wild, wild west. Although I was still part of the 800th, I reported to at the HUMINT Operations Cell. They were located next to the ICE and were part of the 205th MI BDE. I conducted some interrogations while at Abu Ghraib. Most of the interrogations were conducted in the interrogations facilities. My interrogations were related to CI matters and when I wanted to hand them over to the ICE, they didn't want them. I worked with one of the Tiger Teams, (CAC and another CACI interrogator-a black male, about 210lbs, bald head, 5-8-6'0). The team leader would schedule time with me to interrogate my detainee. I would at times, interrogate with the team and other times, they would interrogate and give me a copy of the interrogation. My approach was no stress positions or beating. It was mostly a mind game. One of the detainees we had was from an Al QEADA cell who was operating in our camp and gathering information to help break out who was being detained. I never witnessed or had knowledge of any detainee abuse. We did use the dog one time. The interrogators, CACI and another CACI interrogator-a black male, about 210lbs, baldhead, 5-8-6'0, told me they had requested the use of dogs. In about two to three days later, the dogs were approved (By who, I do not know). We went back in the booth in and interrogated the detainee. I told the dog handler to bring in the dog and keep him away from the detainee so that the dog not hurt the detainee. The dog came into the booth, but was at the far side of the booth and simply barked. I did not know if the dog had to be muzzled or not and I probably told the dog handler to have the dog unmuzzled. The dog was a small brown dog. I did not interrogate anyone at the Hard Site. I did go to the Hard Site on several occasions and at all hours of the day/night to speak to the MPs on several issues they might have had i.e., supply issues and force protection issues. CPA did not provide funds for us; we were at the bottom of the priority list. When we asked for help, CPA and CJTF-7 would tell us to deal with it. At no time while in the hard site or any other site did I witness any detainee abuse. The MPs had an office in the Hard Site and in the office they had a board where they kept track of all detainees and what their plan was if they had any. There were details on sleep plans, who should have a blanket and such. The instructions were very specific. We had over 6,000 detainees in and it was built to handle 4,000 detainees. Force Protection was an issue. The 165th was there but they were only guarding two of the towers, the 320th was busy escorting prisoners from one facility to another. When COL PAPPAS took over as the FOB Commander, we didn't see any changes. I had two interrogators who worked with me worked with me during the day and at night, he worked in the hard site with the MPs. At my reques assisted me with the writing of this sworn statement. I have nothing else to add to this statement.

Q. Is there anything you would like to add to this statement? A. No

//End of Statement//

Not used

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT O[redacted] TAKEN AT Devens, MA DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

[redacted]FIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of MAY, 2004

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

INITIALS OF P[redacted] STATEMENT

PAG[redacted] OF 2 [redacted]AGES

USAPA V1.00

10 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview [redacted]

On 10 May 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] CACI employee. Due to the time constraint, the statement was written after the interview was completed. The statement is based on answers [redacted] gave to questions asked of him. The statement below is currently being reviewed by [redacted] in Iraq. He was on leave and had not had a chance to review it. Once he signs it, it will be sent to our office for record.

The following is a [redacted] Statement.

[redacted] arrived at Abu Ghraib on 16 December. He was assigned as an analyst. When [redacted] first arrived, they were given the rules for CJTF-7 and told they could not take any photos. [redacted] was also told what he could and could not do. [redacted] did not have any questions reference what he was told. COL BARFAS was in charge of the Site and [redacted] He has never witnesses, or heard about any photos or videos of detainees, the use of dogs during interrogation, or abuse of any detainee. He was not aware of any humiliation done by an interrogator to a detainee. [redacted] worked with [redacted] and three British Interrogators. He has never had any problems with the linguists/interpreters. [redacted] never heard or saw any problems with any of the interrogators.

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility			

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS
CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, Abu Ghraib

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 16 December. I was assigned as an analyst. When I first arrived, we were given the rules for CJTF-7 and told we could not take any photos. We were also told what we could and could not do. I did not h[redacted] what we were told. COL PAPPAS was in charge of the Site an[redacted] have never witnesses, or heard about any photos or videos of detainees, the use of dogs during interrogation, or abuse of any detainee. I am not aware f any humiliation done by an interrogator to a detainee. I worked wit[redacted] and three British Interrogators. I have never had any problems with the linguists/interpreters. I never had or saw any problems with any of the interrogators.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARtiCLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Devens, Massachusetts
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/05/2[redacted]
3. TIME: 1326[redacted]
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: SGT
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: A Company 325th Military Intelligence Bn

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was mobilized with the original member of the 325th MI BN. We mobilized at Fort Dix and were there for about a month and a half. We then deployed to Kuwait. While in Kuwait, I was working in the V Corps ACE as part of the 205th MI BDE. We crossed the Berm sometime in March. Once the Analytical Control Element was reestablished in Baghdad, I was selected to be a member of the Deployable Intelligence Support Element. We would deploy and support the 4ID and the 3ACR intelligence sections (S-2s). We rotated back and forth from 4ID and 3ACR until sometime at the end of July when I deployed to Abu Ghraib as part of the 325th. I began to work with the 302nd MI BN as a liaison between the Intelligence Control Element and the C2X. When I first arrived [redacted] was in charge of interrogation operations. I was given the Interrogation Rules of Engagement; I signed them and I understood the general procedures for interrogations. I had already worked with the 519th in Afghanistan and Fort Bragg that I knew some of the personnel. I aided the members of 519th with interrogation [redacted] and myself were responsible for providing the number of detainees at Abu Ghraib and number of interrogations back to the C2X. Between July and September, I conducted no more than ten interrogations. My primary role was as an analyst, but on a few occasions I was given the opportunity to ask questions. I worked with [redacted] a couple of times, but I assisted several other interrogations. When I arrived, the Hard Site was barely being developed. Interrogations in the Hard Site began three weeks prior to my departure. I personally never conducted any interrogations in the Hard Site. All the interrogations I participated in were held in the tents. I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee abuse. I did walk through the Hard Site on some occasions while being shown the area. I never witnessed any detainees naked. They were all wearing their jumpsuits and civilian clothes. I never heard any discussion of the clothing of detainees. I never witnessed any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees being abuse or of detainees with the exception of the regular in-process photo for their dossier. Q. Is there anything you would like to add? A. No [redacted]

//End of statement//

Nothing [redacted]

follows

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT 1 TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT O[redacted] TAKEN AT Devens, MA DATED 2004/05/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Not [redacted]

used

[redacted] FIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28th day of MAY, 2004

at Devens, Massachusetts

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted] *(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STAT[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Metro Park Springfield, VA

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004 [redacted]

3. TIME: 12:00 [redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: E8

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Det 1, B Co, 141 MI Bn, 300 MI Bde, Utah National Guard, St George, UT 84790

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) from 12 November 2003 until the end of January 2004. For the first few weeks my duty assignment was the 1SG of the HHC as a fillin for the 1SG who was on leave. I was then assigned to my permanent duty as the 1SG and NCOIC of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. In that capacity I observed interrogations, developed supplementary training for the interrogators and oversaw operational support for aspects of the interrogators. I observed and/or sat in on JIDC interrogations at least three times a day. I did observe an occasional interrogation conducted by OGA personnel. I did not observe, know about or hear of any abuse or humiliation of detainees at AG. I did not see or hear about any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. My Soldiers did not report any instances of the above to me.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to add? A: No. [redacted]

//End of Statement//

Follows [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USAPA V1.00

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/24

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing Follows [redacted]

[redacted] AVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May 2004 [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

AG0000440

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2004/05/04	1204	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		SFC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372ND MILITARY POLICE COMPANY, CUMBERLAND, MD (DEPLOYED TO IRAQ)

9. _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 1 October 2003. I was the platoon sergeant for 4th platoon that was part of the 372nd MP Co. When we first arrived to Abu Ghraib, our focus was to get the logistical Support Area up. Our living area had been destroyed. We also conducted a right seat ride with the 72nd MP CO. I didn't have any involvement with MI personnel until I became the Hard Site NCOIC. I interacted with the MI personnel reference detainees. The MI personnel would tell us what detainee number they wanted. We would ask them if they wanted the detainee handcuffed in the front, back or not at all. Did we need to place a sand bag over their heads when we took them out? The reason for the sand bag we were told was to prevent detainees from seeing who was coming in and out and who was being held. MI did not tell us what treatment was acceptable. A month into the job, I met with I asked her what she expected the MPs from MI. She was going to get back with me with Rules but she went on leave and never returned. COL PAPPAS was in charge of the MI unit, but I dealt with on any issues I might have had. He was the Liaison (not sure if he was the liaison officer) between the MPs and MI. I also went to Both got things done. He would come to the Hard Site to check on detainees (juveniles, women reporter) who were sort of considered under the witness protection to make sure they were being taken cared of. I never saw any MI personnel abuse a detainee in any way. I heard something about an MI person taking a female detainee to the wood shack where they interrogated personnel but I did not have the specifics and I do not remember who told me. This incident occurred before we took over the Hard Site during the 72nd MP Co's time. I have no knowledge or ever saw MI personnel use dogs during the interrogations. I don't know of any MI personnel taking photos or videos of any detainees. No one came directly to me about MI telling MP personnel to "soften up" or give "the treatment" to detainees but I heard rumors about it. I do not remember whom I heard that from. The only incident I know about is when Other Government Agency (OGA) personnel brought in a detainee who appeared to be beat up. The OGA personnel stated that Apparently this detainee was resisting arrest and was sitting on a pile of explosives. The detainee came in pretty beat up. The detainee was placed in the shower (where interrogations occurred). His hands were handcuffed to his back to the window. The window went about half way up to his back. The detainee died in the cell. An autopsy was conducted and it was confirmed that the detainee died due to a blood clog in his head. There was an investigation conducted by CID. The entire command knew about this incident. MI OGA CID were all there and aware of the situation name might be spelled different) is the one who knows about this event. There were detainees who were stripped to their underwear but that was their choice. If it were too hot, they would strip themselves down to their underwear. Once it got cold they would put on their clothes. When we took over, the only underclothes we were provided by CPA was women underwear. If detainees didn't have anything to wear, we would give them the women underwear to wear because that was the only thing we had available. We had a delivery of men's boxers arrive one time but only 100 were delivered for approximately 600 detainees. Other MPs who worked in the Hard Site and might know or have witnessed what happened down in the Solitary Wing are A NCOIC night shift (after accused transferred to road duty), 1A NCOIC day shift NCOIC dayshift, 1A/1B Guard dayshift, A/1B Guard on Medical leave right now, A/1B Guard has been REFRAD - nightshift NCOIC when was off. Unless specified MED or REFRAD, all other soldiers should be at Bucca/Anaconda with the 372nd MP Co.

Q. Do you have anything else to ad to this statement?
A. No.
//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT O[redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/04

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted]. HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1. AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of MAY, 2004

at CAMP VICTORY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3; DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	12 June 2004	1350	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC/USA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On an unrecalled date in December 2003 [redacted] told me that the white board in Teir 1, Baghdad Central Corrections Facility had a the following hand written statement behind an unrecalled detainees ISN: "Strip cell per MI." This meant that everything was out of the cell and the detainee was either naked or clothed only in underwear. I do not recall if he was naked or dressed only in underwear. She asked me if this was right given the recent International Red Cross visit. I told her I did not know but subsequently checked wit[redacted] a MI Warrant Officer assigned at the prison. He told me it should not be happening and that everything, to include clothing, needed to be returned to the detainees cell. I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] on the right of the photograph. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing to the left of the [redacted]. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] detainee. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: N[redacted] END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.10

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12th day of June, 19 04

at Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	[redacted]	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPPC V1.10

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Doha, Kuwait

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/04

3. TIME: 14.0[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: E4/Reserve

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 325 MI Bn

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Gharaib (AG) from the end of August/first of September 2003 and remained there until circa the first of March 2004. I had a five-day R&R to Qatar in December and a two-week leave to CONUS in Jan. I was mobilized from my contractor position in Kuwait (contractor with Northrop-Grumman at Camp Doha, Kuwait). I was assigned as part of a cross leveling action and staged thru Ft Dix, NJ to Kuwait and then to Iraq. I served as an interrogator at AG and at various times worked for and with the following personnel: [redacted] When I processed into AG interpreters - [redacted] there did not seem to be a coherent organization or process in place and it was up to most of us to develop them as we went along. It was not clear who was in charge. After [redacted] arrived he seemed to take care of beans and bullets type measures but was not involved in interrogation operations. [redacted] and [redacted] seemed to be in charge of interrogation operations. The MPs had their own system and their own chain of command. Even after the frago giving COL Pappas command of the FOB, it seemed to be confusing. At one time I heard that BG Karpinski was in charge of the FOB and at the same times COL Pappas was supposedly in charge. We all were given IROEs to read and had to sign statements that we understood them and the Geneva Convention. We were told that it was the MPs job to insure the safety and security of the interrogators and the detainees both. It seemed pretty straightforward to me, it was clear from our training how we were to proceed and what we were not to do. It seemed that we were pretty much limited to direct questioning techniques of detainees. Any harsher methods and procedures required higher levels of authority. I was made aware of the changes in IROEs and levels of authority as they came out, but cannot remember exactly when those changes came into being. I understood that the process for obtaining approval was to submit a written request along with an interrogation plan to my section chief. From there it would go to operations [redacted] and then up the chain from her. I requested sleep management approval on a couple of occasions and submitted the request as directed. I did not see any written approval but was informed orally by [redacted] that it was approved. There was an excel spreadsheet that was kept by operations on any of the sleep management/sleep deprivation procedures that were requested and/or approved. It was my understanding the if sleep management was approved for use and was to be implemented, [redacted] would inform the MPs and a schedule would be drawn up and then the MPs would implement it. I understood that that MPs would time the amount of sleep and would waken the detainees at specified intervals by banging on the cell door, making loud noises, etc., to waken and/or keep the detainees awake. I do not know how the MPs worked it for the detainee for which I had obtained the approval for sleep management. There was general talk among the MPs about detainees having women's underwear and one particular MP, whose name I cannot recall mentioned that he felt bad about the detainees having to wear women's underwear, but that was all they had to issue for a period of time. I never saw a detainee wearing women's underwear. I also heard that for very short periods of time some detainees were wrapped in a sheet or blanket, but that was only because their civilian clothing was ripped or torn to the extent that the civilian clothing was not wearable and there were nothing to issue on an immediate basis. I never say any detainees being kept in the nude or having clothing withheld until they became cooperative with the interrogators. I remember that MG Miller visited AG and that later on a team of interrogators from GTMO came in to work with us. I think there might have been a team from Ft Huachuca along with the GTMO team, but am not certain. I think the GTMO team came just before a visit from [redacted] office. I don't think the GTMO visit accomplished much as there were too many differences between AG and GTMO - they were better resourced and had a strategic mission, where we had a tactical, short fused mission. After the GTMO visits I heard that dogs would be brought to AG, but I never used dogs or knew any of the dog handlers. I did not hear of or see dogs being used by any of the other interrogators. I knew that the MPs kept a "trouble makers list" and would not be surprised if the MPs would shout at the detainees or use physical training as a discipline measure to settle them down, but do not know of any abuse by any of the MPs. It was fairly common knowledge that the MPs had problems with violation of General Order 1 and unauthorized use of alcohol. On a couple of occasion[redacted] would [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

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STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Camp Doha, Kuwait DATED 2004/06/04

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

[redacted] all us all together and talk about alcohol abuse or some activity about prostitution. I heard about the incident with [redacted] and [redacted] making a detainee walk naked around the area but other than that I did not see or hear about any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about any use of dogs in conjunction with interrogation of detainees. I did not see or hear about any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. In reviewing the photos, I did recognize [redacted] Some of the other personnel seemed familiar in that I remember seeing them around AG but do not know their identities. Q: Is there anything you would like to add? A: No[redacted]

Nothing follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of June 2004, at [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieva

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia [redacted]	2004/06/03 [redacted]		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CW3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Co, 260th Military Intelligence Battalion (Florida National Guard), Miami, Florida

9 [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] am currently a CW3 in A Co, 260th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN) (Florida National Guard), Miami, FL, currently on Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) at HQ USSOUTHCOM, J2 Ops, Miami, FL. I am an Interrogation Technician, MOS 351E, and I have been in the MOS for approximately 13 years. I was on ADSW with USSOUTHCOM when I was deployed to JTF-170, Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, as part of the effort to establish the detention facility there. I was there for about 30 to 45 days and then returned to USSOUTHCOM, where I monitored GTMO reporting and processing detainee assessment packets. JTF-170 was the JTF responsible for intelligence exploitation of the detainees, and JTF-160 was the JTF responsible for detainee operations. Due to politics, conflicts, and inefficiency, the two JTFs were eventually merged into JTF GTMO, which allowed for a better working relationship between the two previously separate functions. The result was more efficient and productive operations and is the current model at GTMO. I was there at the very beginning of interrogations operations at GTMO and know that techniques employed there were FM 34-52 driven. The Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) which included several other government agencies, also contributed to an environment of openness and accountability. Over the history of GTMO, the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) changed and evolved in response to lessons learned. SOUTHCOM has created a "timeline" which delineates what policies and procedures were approved and on what dates, when they were amended, and when rescinded. I will try to provide a copy of timeline to investigating officers. In Jan 03, I was mobilized on federal orders to go back to GTMO. I went to Fort Huachuca, AZ, and attended a three to four week "Tiger Team Course" intended for interrogators deploying to GTMO. I then deployed to GTMO on 14 Feb 03. At GTMO I served as an interrogator and then as a team chief. In the Aug 03 timeframe, I was selected as an interrogator subject matter expert (SME) for an assessment visit. I was not provided any background data and the word that we were going to "the box" trickled down through the chain, and I initially had no idea why we were going or for how long. About the 28th of August (about a week after I was told that I would be going) we departed GTMO and flew to Charleston, SC. It was at Charleston that we rendezvoused with some DIA folks who were part of the team. Three team members from DIA that I recall were [redacted] who was responsible for assessing the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) and TF-20, and [redacted] a retired Air Force LTC who was a former ICE Chief at GTMO who headed up the interrogation piece of the team. It was on the airplane at Charleston that I first heard MG MILLER discuss the mission. I recall that he described it as an assessment of the intelligence mission in Iraq. He provided the gist of the mission, but not a lot of details, and I wasn't sure what the tasking was. The assessment was looking at the whole piece of their intelligence mission and the team encompassed all disciplines, such as legal, military police, ICE, databases, and Criminal Intelligence Task Force (liaison with law enforcement agencies). My lane was the interrogation Tiger Team. We only looked at Corps assets at Cropper and Abu Ghraib (AG), and we did not look at Division and Brigade assets, probably because there was not enough of time. We were originally supposed to look at Camp Bucca too, but I don't know if that ever happened. I met with my AG counterparts and OICs. Basically we discussed things like "what are you doing with this?", "what are you doing with that?", "what are you doing with the information", and things like that. Every day we went out, met with counterparts, and came back together to discuss problems and recommendations within the GTMO Assessment Team- essentially a daily After Action Review. Those discussions were then consolidated and incorporated into the final Assessment Report, although I did not see the final product. There was a belief that intelligence gathered in Iraq in general was being "stove piped" and not getting out. Information was flowing to National level from operations at GTMO, and it was starting to flow out of Afghanistan, but was not from Iraq. We were conducting a systems analysis, and were looking at if they had analytical support for the interrogators, what kind, how timely, does it help in the interrogation Plan. This "Tiger Team" concept of teaming up an analyst with the interrogator was developed from the GTMO experience and was found to be very efficient and effective. We were not looking at specific interrogation techniques because the operational environment of Iraq and GTMO were so different. Iraq situation was under fire, fluid, and tactical, where GTMO was isolated, secure, and strategic- they were two different animals. We were concentrated on such things as where reports went, dissemination of information, had operations evolved from day one or had they remained the same despite the changing environment, etc. I recall that the databases were not communicating with each other, and that the "left" and the "right" didn't know what the other was doing. It appeared things were relatively OK at the interrogation level. They were reporting [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/06/03 [redacted]

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] information gathered and it appeared from the reporting that I saw that they were questioning well (I never actually witnessed an interrogation), but the information wasn't getting out to the National level. The collector passed the information to the HOC (HUMINT Operations Cell), who determined further distribution and releaseability. It appeared the reporting was getting bogged down in the HOC, perhaps because the HOC was more focused on the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) than the Interrogations. Conditions at both Camp Cropper and AG were severely overcrowded and there was minimal screening occurring due to that overcrowding and the constant transfer of detainees from one detention facility to another, and the information wouldn't follow with them. Both these points were already identified by the local interrogators and they had communicated the problems up their chain. The maneuver commanders were wrapping up detainees and forwarding them to Cropper and AG, but were not screening them. After about two weeks of assessment in Iraq, we departed on about 12 Sep 03 and returned to GTMO. I was then notified that I would be returning to Iraq as part of a Tiger Team not to exceed 90 days, to assist CJTF-7. It was not until we arrived at CJTF-7 that we were informed by CJTF-7 (I can't recall specifically by whom) that we would be going to AG. On or about 4 Oct 03, we arrived at AG. My team included three interrogators and three analysts, organized into three teams, with one interrogator and one analyst on each, which is the GTMO Tiger Team concept. The GTMO personnel included me as the team leader [redacted] US Marine Corps [redacted] (analyst, equivalent to 96B), and [redacted] (96B). I met with COL PAPPAS who was the interrogation operations senior officer. I asked COL PAPPAS if he wanted my Tiger Team to engage and interrogate detainees or build up the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center (JDIC), and he chose the later. I understood my mission to be to set up the JDIC and once that was done, we would return to GTMO. My mission, as I discussed it with COL PAPPAS, was to identify solution and provide recommendations for the JDIC. I was concentrated on establishing the staff elements of the JDIC, with particular emphasis on CM&D (Collection Management and Dissemination), which would hopefully alleviate many of the problems information dissemination that we had identified on our first visit. I personally did not conduct any interrogations at AG. Although my personnel may have participated in a few interrogations, it was not an ongoing involvement. I did not discuss specific interrogation techniques in any specifics. I did discuss more general policies and procedures with [redacted] who ran the AG ICE [redacted] who was the JDIC Operations Officer, [redacted] who basically responsible for administrative support, and COL PAPPAS. [redacted] was short when we arrived, so I didn't have much contact with him. I mainly worked with [redacted] on routine matters, but I had ready access to COL PAPPAS. He told me "anything you need, you let me know", and it was obviously that he really wanted the JDIC to succeed. We provided these four officers copies of the GTMO policies and SOPs, the SECDEF letter concerning detainee treatment, and other organizational and procedural documents. In discussion about the policies, I recall explaining the need to establish the purpose of the Interrogation Plan is to show the need for chops from higher authority to conduct certain techniques beyond 34-52 techniques. Military Police did not maintain a log or blotter or central tracking system to account for the detainees. I did not have any conversation with MG MILLER about developments at AG during my second trip, other than to discuss general progress on setting up the JDIC, but I never discussed specific interrogation techniques or problems. I don't recall the exact IROE power point slide that [redacted] created, and I never discussed it with COL PAPPAS or [redacted]. However, the ICE had a bulletin board with policies and procedures clearly posted, and [redacted] was very detailed when in-processing new personnel to ensure they understood those policies. Looking at the slide, "Dietary Manipulation" may have come from GTMO. Records related to detainees were kept in both electronic and hardcopy. When I departed AG on 2 or 3 Dec 03, the hard copy files were stored in filing cabinets located against the back wall of the JDIC. Electronic files may have departed on the hard drives of computers when units redeployed to the US and took their equipment with them. Screening and interrogation efforts at AG were focused on answering requirements from both higher headquarters and tactical intelligence. The ICE would have to cancel or alter its plans to accommodate directions from higher. I recommended using "KBs" (Knowledgeability Briefs) which would have allowed interweaving strategic and tactical requirements, but this recommendation was not well received by [redacted]. I don't know where AG got the idea of using nudity, and I never saw it. Sleep Adjustments were discussed and we had used them at GTMO. The detainee was kept awake by moving him from cell to cell, walking him around, or altering his meal time. I don't know if or how it was being done at AG. We weren't looking at those aspects and were not "in the weeds". I went to the hard site during the day on my first assessment trip to AG. I never saw anyone naked. On my second trip, I visited the hard site on a few occasions, but never saw any naked detainees and never saw anything out of place, although I questioned the vetting process of the Iraqi Guards. I heard about the shoot out in the hard site, but I did not respond to the incident, nor, to the best of my knowledge, did any of my personnel. I was not aware that military working dogs were present at AG at that time. I believe they had been requested and I recall kennels being built, but I never saw dogs. At GTMO, dogs were not used in interrogations and were only used to patrol the perimeter. I never discussed the issue of using dogs in interrogations with [redacted] or anyone else. I never saw military working dogs while at AG and I never heard of them being used in anyway, to include during interrogations. I never saw, nor heard of, any physical abuse of detainees. I never saw, nor heard of, any unauthorized photographs or videos of detainees. I never saw naked detainees, nor heard of detainees being held naked. I never saw, nor heard of, any detainee being forced to wear women's underwear. I never saw stress positions being used and don't recall of any specific instances where stress positions were used. I can't recall that [redacted] ever reported to me an incident which he witnessed in the hard site in which a detainee was hand-cuffed, laying on the floor of his cell, whimpering, with a hood over his head. [redacted] is an excellent soldier and if he reported this incident to me as he stated, I don't remember it. If he had, I would have reported it to [redacted] or COL PAPPAS. I simply don't remember such a report. The issue of hooding detainees was brought up for discussion separately, but not as part of this incident. I also do not recall the entire incident which [redacted] stated he reported to me regarding an interrogation in which [redacted] instructed a detainee to [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 2, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

AG0000448

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfiled, VA DATED 2004/06/03 [redacted]

[redacted] STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]psuit to his waste and the interpreter refused to continue as a result. I recall that the inte[redacted]d out of an interrogation, but I remember it as bei[redacted] "cultural difference". I don't recall the part abou[redacted]rolling down the detainee's jumpsuit. If [redacted]said that he reported it to me and said that I said I would report it to COL PAPPAS. then I took it to COL PAPPAS u[redacted] understand that MG FAY has directed that I not discuss details of this inquiry with anyone other than those investigators I know to be directly involved in this inquiry. I have nothing further to add to this statement.

END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3rd day of June, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

WITNESSES

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia	2004/06/06	1305	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		CW3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Co, 260th Military Intelligence Battalion (Florida National Guard), Miami, Florida

9. , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

been asked to provide further information to revisit and clarify statements I made to investigators on 3 Jun 04, regarding the reporting of two incidents involving detainees at Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility, Iraq. As I previously stated, I was the team chief for a Tiger Team from the Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detention Facility with the mission of providing advice and assistance to assist CJTF-7. My team included three interrogators and three analysts, organized into three teams, with one interrogator and one analyst on each team. The GTMO personnel included me as the team leader, US Marine Corps (analyst, equivalent to 96B), and (96B). Upon arrival at AG, I met with COL PAPPAS and asked if he wanted my GTMO Tiger Team to and interrogate detainees or build up the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center (JDIC), and he chose the later. and I were totally focused on setting up the JDIC which included the Fusion Cell, the Detainee Assessment Board, Collection and Management and Dissemination, and other staff functions. My other four team members were task-organized with the AG Interrogation Control Element (ICE) under working interrogation Tiger Team issues. I was the Team Leader from a GTMO team perspective, but while working issues in the ICE, the four GTMO team members fell under the command and control of the ICE. If one of my GTMO team members didn't get an answer command, then they would have brought their issue to me. During my interview on 3 Jun 04, I was asked ever reported to me about an interrogation in which instructed a detainee to roll down his jumpsuit to his waste and the interpreter refused. I have thought long and hard about it, and I can't really recall any more details about this incident or if reported it to me. I clearly recall that he told me an interpreter walked out on an interrogation, but I recall it being discussed in terms of similar problems we had encountered at GTMO where interpreters disrupted and interrupted interrogations. I recall we had a discussion, but I can't recall the face to face interaction or the circumstances and conditions of the discussion. But I don't remember the conversation related to the part about rolling down the detainee's jumpsuit. I'm working hard to try to remember, but I can't recall it. If he gave me that information, I would have reported it. I did report the problem with the interpreter walking out, but I can't recall to whom I reported it. I think I told a CW2 who ran interpreter assignment issues, but I can't recall his name. During my interview on 3 Jun 04, I was asked if ever reported to me an incident which he witnessed in the Hard Site in which a detainee was hand-cuffed, laying on the floor of his cell, whimpering, with a hood over his head. Again, since I last met with investigators on 3 Jun 03, I have been working hard to try to remember anything about it, but I can't remember. I'm not saying didn't say anything, I just can't recall the conversation. If he had reported it to me, given the severity of would have reported it immediately and not waited until the next day. I would have reported it to COL PAPPAS or to some other officer in the AG chain of command. I simply don't remember the conversation. I was sick for a long time while at AG. At one point in late Nov I was laid out on my back on quarters for about a week. This was the time that the shooting incident took place at the Hard Site. I now recall that I was on quarters sick when three of my team members returned to the barracks from the shooting incident at the Hard Site. I had heard earlier that there was a shooting, but it was not until and returned to the barracks that I learned that they had responded to the Hard Site. I understand that MG FAY has ordered that I not discuss details of this inquiry with anyone other than those investigators I know to be directly involved in this inquiry. I have nothing further to add to this statement.

END OF STATEMENT

NOT USED

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

USAPA V1.00

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA [redacted] DATED 2004/06/06 [redacted]

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT

[redacted]

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004 at Metro Park Springfield Virginia

[redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

21 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview o[redacted]

On 13 MAY 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] was read his rights (making false and deceptive statements) which she waived. (DA Form 3881 provided). The interview was completed and a sworn statement was written by [redacted] based on the information [redacted] provided. [redacted] returned back on the afternoon of the 13th of May and based on counsel form her lawyer, refused to sign the statement. I have included the DA FORM 2823 and a memorandum for record on wha[redacted] said.

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2004/05/13		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th Military Intelligene Group, Heidelberg, GE APO AE 09102

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was called for a follow up interview. I was read my rights and signed a waiver. I was asked about y previous interviews with CID. I do not remember what I said in the canvass questionnaire. When I was questioned by MG Fay the first time, I had forgotten about the [redacted] incident. I was asked if I had ever witnessed any abuse and I had answered no. At the time I saw [redacted] slap the detainee, it did not appear abusive or overly violent. I though[redacted] was trying to get the detainee's attention. I didn't know what the MPs were allowed to do. I was told on numerous occasions that the MPs did not have an SOP. When asked w[redacted] didn't report the screen saver of a pyramid of naked detainees I saw on the MPs computer, I stated that I probably had spoken t[redacted] about it since he was the NCOIC. I did think they were gross and wrong. I don't remember what he said. I believe he said something like "oh yeah you are MI. Better watch out for MI." I never reported it through MI channels because I never saw it again. I didn't discuss this with the investigators the first time because I was nervous, I had never spoke to a two star before and I was too focus on leaving Abu Ghraib. The atmosphere was very different. I have no excuse for not reporting it. When I first arrived, the 325th MI BN and the 323rd MI BN interrogators were there. Everyone was very focused on getting the information and getting it out. A lot of us had never done real interrogations before. We picked up the methods of those who were already there. We sat in on one interrogation when we arrived and were interrogating the next day. We didn't have interrogation plans or discussions on interrogation techniques with section leaders when I first arrived. It was very much up to the interrogator to do the interrogation. It wasn't until GTMO personnel showed up that we began briefing our interrogation techniques. At night these detainees were very bad guys. The information we could get was extremely important. The approaches we were told we could use were sleep deprivation meal management and pride and ego down. We were encouraged to be creative and use different techniques. It was a mission focus and get the information. It was up to us to try to get the detainee to speak. We saw many detainees come in all heat up and one one cared. And it was a stressful environment and we were working long hours and getting burn out. There wasn't much supervision and things didn't click real quick in your head because we were so tired. When I saw the photos, I spoke to the MP about it but didn't tell MI. This was not a good time in my life when I first arrived I do not remember who my linguist that day. This happened in November before I moved to Operations. The MPs took pictures. We took group pic[redacted] and my linguis[redacted] When I went to the hard site, I was usually with my analyst [redacted] It was common to see detainees in cells without clothes or naked. The MPs ran the hard site. No one ever said that [redacted] naked detainees was a violation. I brought it up to [redacted] She said that was different in the cell because they were not being humiliated or in front of other detainees. She said that is the detainee's doing you need to be concerned with what you do. The nakedness was a combination of not enough jumpsuits for everyone or it could have been for discipline by MP personnel and it was one of our approaches. I had two detainees in the hard site. A[redacted] would walk the area at night should have seen the detainees naked. I never discussed this with my section leader, [redacted] because she had a lot of Administrative things to do. [redacted] was a civilian who worked at night. He was helping me. We worked for about one to two weeks and I spoke to him about interrogations, detainees, approaches. He was in the hard site a lot because that's where his detainee was. The MPs would wake up detainees on sleep management by yelling at them, making them stand, playing loud music and getting them wet. I didn't see them wet detainees. I do believe that getting them wet when it was cold is wrong. I tried to feel out how best I could do my job. It was a complex environment and The MPs did not have an SOP and I told them what my IROEs were. I am not the same [redacted] that was at Abu Ghraib.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Darmstadt, GE DATED 2004/05/13

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13th day of MAY 2004 at OSJA, Darmstadt, GE

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/04/2[redacted]	3. TIME 1715[redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 21 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a tour of the site. There was training provided by personnel from GTMO on the Iraqi culture and interrogation approacheS. We had database and report format instructions. I don't remember the training on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) but I probably did sign them. I do not remember receiving any Geneva Convention training until the 504th MI BDE took over. I never witnessed or knew of any abuse to detainees. I found out about the abuse when CID began the investigation. No inappropriate techniques were used by interrogators because we were beat up about it all the time. In December, the command started cracking down on some techniques used. I was never involved in any detainee abuse. I interrogated until I was taken out of interrogations and placed in operations. There were some issues with the section leader about my interrogation techniques. My section leader felt I was not specific enough on my interrogation plan. I wrote on my plan that I would use the Pride and Ego down approach. The detainee I was interrogating was being arrogant and my analyst and I placed him against the wall. The detainee pushed my analyst. [redacted] I told the detainee that if he touched my analyst again, I would have him take off his shoes. He again made physical contact with my analyst. I then told him if he touched my analyst again i would have remove his shirt. He again made physical contact with my analyst. I then told him if he touched my analyst again i would him remove his blanket. He again made physical contact with my analyst. I then told him if he touched my analyst again i would have him remove his pants. He again made physical contact with my analyst. At each interval the detainee stated that he understoud what i was saying and always promised that he would stop making physical contact with my analyst. I then decided that the detainee was completely uncooperative and I terminated the interrogation. This entire process was stretched out over the course of an hour. I do not feel this was detainee abuse. It was an approach strategy designed to emphasize the seriousness of the detainee's situation. [redacted] investigated the matter and decided to counsel me. I recieved remedial training, and worked extra duty. I was moved from interrogations and placed in Operations, where I worked liasion with OGA (Other Government Agencies). [redacted] was the Deputy for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center. I moved back to the ICE (Interrogation Control Element) after 2 months of working OPS.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//////////////////////////////End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27-Apr-04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE [redacted] INDUCEMENT [redacted]

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Correction facility

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)
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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq	2004/01/21	1949 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, WURZBURG, GM APO AE 09244 (DEPLOYED TO ABU GHRAIB PRISON)

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Whe i I began working the night shift I discussed with the MP's what their SOP was for detainee treatment. They informed me that they had no SOP. I informed them of my IROE and made clear to them what i was and wasn't allowed to do or see. I made clear to them that their prison was their prison and they can handle buisness how they see fit, however i follow different rules and i asked them to respect the fact that i have to follow those rules. I am good friends with the MP's that work at this detention facility and they trust me. I also am very specific with those MP's as to what level of knowledge i want to have concerning this detention facility. I didn't see any acts of torture or mistreatment. The MP's did prepare prisoners prior to interrogations by haveing them do physical exercises and yelling at them. The interrogators would verbally discuss, with a MP, a detainee and his cooperativeness and various methods to deal with a detainee such as physical exercise at random hours of the night and yelling. I was aware that some MP's were taking pictures of detainees and had them on their computers. I have seen detainees naked. When a detainee threw his feces, the MP's had him take a cold shower then roll in the dirt outside then stand until he was dry then they showered him in cold water again. When the detainee was naked he was laughed at and yelled at. I have seen an MP slap a detainee. When a detainee was doing physical exercises as punishment then refused to continue after given a rest a MP encouraged him to continue.

Q What does IROE?
A Interrogation Rule of Engagement
Q What shift did you work on?
A. When I first got here I worked day shift for the first week. After that we moved to night shift.
Q. How much time did you spend in the Isolation area during the night shift?
A It depended on how many detainees we had in the isolation area. On average it would be two hours. Some nights longer depended on the interview
Q Where did the interrogations occur?
A In the showers, stair well, or property room.
Q Was there any MP's present during the interrogations?
A. No
Q Were the detainees clothed or unclothed during the interrogations?
A During all mine they were
Q Is removing the clothing of the detainee a MI interrogation tactic?
A I used it on one interrogation and my Team Leader did not approve of it. She thought it shoul dhave been more specified. Statements were taken and it was brought up to [redacted] and [redacted] Time frame
Q What was the outcome of?
A I was moved out of the Tiger Team and placed in Operations.
Q What is a Tiger Team?
A It is an interrogator and an analysist.
Q Who were the MP's that worked on the night shift?
A [redacted] These are the ones that I saw mostly working.
Q Who was the MP that struck the detainee?
A [redacted]
Q Who else was present when this occurred?
A Two other detainees [redacted] might have been there. I can not remember who else was there. I am really unsure if [redacted] was even there.
Q How many times did [redacted] strike the detainee?
A Just once with a open hand
Q Who was the detainee?

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

A. He had a beard and dark hair. I did not know his name or NDRS #.
Q. Did you see [redacted] strike, push to the floor, punch, kick or slap any other detainee?
A. No.
Q. Did you see [redacted] posing detainees in sexual positions at any time?
A. No.
Q. Did you see [redacted] engaged in sexual intercourse with detainees in the isolation area?
A. No.
Q. Did you see [redacted] engaged in sexual intercourse with anyone else in the isolation area?
A. No.
Q. Was there anyone in the isolation area that was not authorized?
A. No
Q. What time did you shift start in the isolation area?
A. It started about 2200 to 0800.
Q. Were pictures taken of the detainees in the isolation area?
A. Yes, I believe so. I never saw anyone, but there were cameras in the area. I know they took pictures of me in the area
Q. Did you ever see [redacted] strike, kick, punch, push to the floor, and/or slap detainees?
A. No.
Q. Were you present at any time when detainees were beaten?
A. Other than the one slap, No.
Q. Did you punch, slap, kick, push to the floor, and/or jump on detainees?
A. No.
Q. Did you see anyone else punch, slap, kick, push to the floor, and/or jump on detainees?
A. Just the slap and then they are transporting detainees.
Q. What was the uniform for your team in the isolation area?
A. We would were DCU's without nametags.
Q. Did you observe pictures of the detainees in sexual positions?
A. I saw a screen saver for a computer that was up in the isolation area. The screen save had detainees naked in a pyramid.
Q. Do you know who took the picture?
A. No
Q. Do you know whose computer it was?
A. No.
Q. Do you know who the detainees were?
A. No. All you saw was Asses.
Q. Did you see other soldiers who were not MP's in the isolation area after hours?
A. Just other MI soldiers.
Q. Were you involved in any abuse of the detainees?
A. No.
Q. Were you present for any of the abuse against the detainee?
A. Only the slap.

Initials [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/27	1235	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th MP Co, VA National Guard, Virginia Beach, VA

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was at Abu Ghraib (AG) from 21 Aug 03 until 29 Mar 04. I had two week mid-tour leave in October 03. During our train up prior to deploying to Kuwait and Iraq we had some training in PW/detainee handling measures, and it was all according to the training manual It did not entail Geneva Convention; however, I am aware of Geneva Convention guidelines from previous training At AG we did not have any formal introduction, orientation or training provided by personnel already there However, we did continue some of the train up that we had previously conducted in CONUS and in Kuwait. I was not required to read any Interrogation Rules of Engagement, however, after I was there for a while I did hear that some rules had changed and required some sort of specific approval My primary duty at AG was on the Internal Reaction Force (IRF). At one point, during a period when we were exceptionally short of MPs, I spent just under two weeks doing escort duty to bring detainees to and from interrogation sites Other than the two cases of abuse for which I provided a statement to CID, I did not observe or become aware of any instances of abuse or humiliation of detainees I did not see or become aware of any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. I did see several instances of both MPs giving physical training sessions to detainees as a punishment measure, to include what is called "rocking" whereby the detainee is made to kneel on gravel or rocks as a control measure. For a while after I arrived, I also observed both MPs and MI personnel yelling at detainees. I don't consider either the physical training or yelling to be abuse, however personally and professionally I do not feel that it either is necessary. The yelling is definitely wrong for the MPs, but I do not consider it to be abuse. It might be an approved or accepted interrogation technique, but seemed excessive in that the interrogators always had interpreters there to translate exactly what was said and yelling should not be required. We continuously reported the yelling and handling procedure incidents to our chain of command and after a while it seemed to stop, or at least I was no longer observing it The IRF folks quickly got a name for ourselves because we continuously reported it and the other folks did not want much to do with us. Q. Is there anything you wish to add? A: No [redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Not

Used [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INTERCEPT. [redacted]

[redacted] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of May 2004 at [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 33

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45. The proponent agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq	20 Jan 04	1919 [redacted]	0005-04-CID146 [illegible]

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-5 / VANG

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th MP Co , deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

I, Gregory A. Spiker want to make the following statement under oath:

Approximately 23 August 2003, I was assigned to the Internal Reaction Force. On various occasions the team is required to respond to various types of situations at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilance, and the Prison. Our mission is to quell inmate disturbances and to stand guard while the compound MP's search the inmates. In September Camp Vigilance was attacked by enemy mortar fire. Some soldiers were seriously injured. At approximately 2100hrs, IRF was called out to assist the QRF (Quick Reaction Force). Upon arrival at the south wall where the base exit is located, the team was staged approximately three hundred meters east of the exit where there were two GP medium tents set up. The QRF turned over two Iraqi citizens, one male and one female. I was told that the two suspects may know something about the mortar attack. [redacted] and a [redacted] was also present. I was assigned to look over the male suspect to await the Military Intelligence personnel (MI). Before MI arrived I took my flashlight and shined it in the male suspects face. I wanted to see who I was guarding. The suspect appeared to be scared. At approximately 2115hrs, Military Intelligence arrived to take over the suspects. An unknown person from MI went straight to the male suspect and started to yell profanity at the male. The MI person hit the male in the back of the head with a closed fist causing the suspect to fall forward. The suspect was handcuffed, on his knees and a towel wrapped around his head. The MI soldier kept yelling eyes down, get up while knocking the suspect back down and repeated verbal abuse towards the suspect. Another MI soldier came to assist the first MI soldier. The second MI soldier put an arm lock around the suspects neck pulling the suspect from the ground. While pulling the suspect from the ground by the neck, the MI soldier was twisting left and right yelling at the suspect while the first MI soldier struck the suspect in the mid section of the stomach. [redacted] (IRF Commander) approached the soldiers and asked if this treatment was necessary. The MI soldier told the LT that he is a trained professional and to let him handle the situation. The LT reminded the soldiers that these suspects maybe innocent. The MI soldiers continued their verbal abuse and excessive force. [redacted] stated to the MI soldiers that this behavior is not necessary. The MI soldiers ignored the LT and continued to verbally abuse the suspect and drag the suspect off by the neck. The LT approached [redacted] and asked the Major if he was going to let this continue. The Major said nothing. The LT stated that he was not going to allow this abuse to continue. The LT went to the MI vehicle and wanted to know who was the NCOIC. I was then ordered back to the vehicle that I arrived in. There was a lot of loud talking between the LT, [redacted] (IRF NCOIC) and the MI personnel. MI drove off with the suspects. This same night I wrote a statement on the events and turned them into [redacted] In November at an unknown time and date, the IRF responded to the prison site because of a shooting. We were informed that an inmate shot a soldier. Our mission was to assist the guards in searching the prison for more weapons and the possibility of hand grenades. I assisted the dog [redacted] During the searching I saw a soldier dragging an inmate by a chocking hold. The [redacted] I then went to the top tear to assist searching rooms. On the top tear, I had a view of the [redacted] throwing the inmate against the wall. The inmate fell to the ground. The Captain began kicking the inmate in the mid section yelling at the inmate. At this time I assisted [redacted] becaus [redacted] was asked to assist MI personnel to interrogate a prisoner [redacted] was instructed by MI to let the dog scare the inmate for some information. The MI person told [redacted] three different times to let the dog in on the

23 Aug ???
Sep 2003 - ??? [redacted]

Page 2 of 5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Exhibit

Statement of [redacted] taken on 20 Jan 04, at the Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

with the searches.

Q. Regarding the incident at the ECP, do you know if the situation was ever handled by unit personnel?

A. I was never present when the MI chain of command discussed the issue with [redacted] I was aware it happened, but not the outcome. I was told that I may be talked to about it, but to this date no one has approached me.

Q. Do you know who the MI personnel were?

A No not at all. We tried to get a name, but were unsuccessful. Everyone one that was at the incident provided sworn statements, and are maintained wit[redacted]

Q Do you recall the date of the second incident?

A. It was the day all the riots occurred There was a lot of rock throwing at the towers

Q Why were you called to the hard site?

A Because of a shooting We were briefed an inmate had shot a guard with a pistol We were called to assist in the searching of the rooms for suspected grenades. We were working both sides of the wings upper and lower tiers.

Q Where were you when you observed the CPT striking the detainee?

A As I proceeded to the top tier, I observed this CPT with a chock hold on a detainee He was dragging the detainee to the shower room on the lower level. I proceed to the upper tier, and observed the detainee come out from under the tier and the CPT approached him and kicked several times in the mid section. The detainee was screaming while this was going on. The CPT stated "you like hurting my soldiers". The kicks were full force into the detainee.

Q Were their any other soldiers assisting with this assault?

A No, not that I saw

Q Describe the detainee?

A Approx 5'7, small frame, short dark hair, and a jump suit. The detainee being drug had a sandbag covering his head and I can not be for sure he is the same detainee being assaulted by the CPT When he was in the shower room he was naked.

Q What is the time frame between being drug to being kicked?

A Approximately 10 minutes

Q Did you see anyone else assaulting this detainee?

A No I heard people but did not see anything.

Q Approximately how many people (soldiers) were in this area at the time of the incident?

A I would say about 10

Q Describe the CPT?

A. About 5'8-5'9, white, thin but fit, athletic type, mid 30's, dirty blonde flat top style haircut, clean cut I was later told he was a CPT.

Q. Have you this CPT since the incident?

A Yes, at the chow hall.

Q Do you know his name?

Initial [redacted]

FOUO Office use only

Exhibit 2

A No
Q Did you report this to anyone?
A Yes. [redacted] We always have an AAR to discuss the mission.
Q Do you know what actions he took after being notified?
A No.
Q Describe the incident with the K-9?
A The MI person (tall, dark hair, possible Asian appearance) kept calling the K-9 handler and the K-9 into the cell The MI stated to the K-9 handler to allow the dog into the cell as a method of obtaining information. The dog would go into the cell for about a minute, and then MI would call them out. I saw the dog during this strike the detainee. The detainee was bound and could not move, and the K-9 handler would allow the K-9 to approach within inches his face, and one time the dog bit the detainee's arm When I saw the detainee later it appeared the detainee was bitten multiple times The K-9 handler stated he did not think the dog could be used in this fashion and we departed the area. During the time I was in the cell the detainee never resisted The MI was calling the dog into the cell as a scare tactic to gather information
Q Do you know if this was report to anyone?
A Other than the AAR, I do not know
Q Has anyone approached you regarding this incident?
A No, other than [redacted]
Q Where did the dog bite the detainee?
A Upper right arm.
Q Do you know who the detainee was?
A No
Q Do you remember the cell this occurred in?
A Wing 1A and it was either the second or third cell on the upper tier.
Q Was there anyone else there that witnessed this incident?
A A male interrogator, female interpreter and [redacted] (K-9 Handler).
Q Describe the female interpreter?
A Dark hair, shoulder length, and she was approximately 5'4, thin and possibly Iraqi.
Q How many K-9 handlers were present on the Wing?
A Just [redacted] There were two others on the other Wing.
Q At any time did you observe the detainee resist the CPT?
A I did not see any resistance, but I did not see the entire altercation.
Q At any time did you see the detainee in the cell resist or provoke the K-9?
A No, I did see the entire incident
Q What was the MI interrogators reaction to the K-9 biting the detainee?
A He did not seem concerned for the detainee, he entered the cell and continued his interrogation and again he would call the K-9 in. This went on approximately three times.
Q Was medical aid rendered to the detainee?
A. At the time there was no medical attention I know when the interpreter was bitten they attempted to get medical aid for her on the spot

Q Did you witness any further assaults this evening?
A. No.
Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?
A. No.///END OF STATEMENT///

Initials [redacted]

Exhibit

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 5 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 20 DAY OF Jan 04

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Walter D. Worth [redacted]

(Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136 UCMJ

(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted] PAGES 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA Form 2823 (AUTOMATED)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Exhibit 1

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is [redacted]SOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Their social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/04/27[redacted]

3. TIME: 130[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib in early October 2003. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I was given a pretty good orientation of Abu Ghraib. [redacted] briefed the Interrogation Rules of Engagements (IROE) and we all signed the IROEs. I do not remember receiving any training or information on the Geneva Convention at the time of arrival. After the one day orientation, I conducted a one hour right seat ride. One of the tactical HUMINT Teams had to depart and I was thrust to work I felt a level of discomfort being thrown into interrogations immediately after my arrival and made a point of taking asenior level interrogator into the first several interrogations for observation..After the first seven CACI contractors arrived, the situation changed with thrusting personnel into the job. I really do not know who was in charge of Abu Ghraib.I know that COL PAPPAS was in the area but I was not aware of his role or who was in charge. I knew that [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element. It really wasn't an issue as to who was in charge overall until COL Papas permanently relocated to Abu Ghraib. [redacted] who was at Abu Ghraib when I arrived, worked in the area but I did not know what his specific duties were. [redacted] thought he made a lot of things happen, but the JIDC warrants made things happen from an operationa perspective in the ICE. Things were a mess when I first arrived. The living conditions were horrible, the morale was low, we worked long hours, we really didn't have enough support equipment like computers. In November, COL PAPPAS became the FOB Commander. I found out by word of mouth. I have witnessed a report of MI soldiers abusing detainees. Sometime in November, at 0100hrs, at Camp Vigilant, a detainee escorted by [redacted] was stripped downwhen being return to Camp Vigilant andonly had a blanketthat was held in his hands. I noticed this as the detainee was being escorted from the HardSite to Camp Vigilant. I reported the incident and the commander took disciplinary action. I believe she received an article 15but not sure what the out come of the sworn statements that were provided. There was a time when I and the lead interrogator heard a suspicious sounds coming from the detainees cell after the completion of an interrogation and the detainee was in positive control of the MP's. The lead interrogator and I confronted the MPs and they seemed very agitated for being questioned about what we had heard. I presented this to the chain of command, [redacted] who both work in the ICE/OPS. I found out there had been photos taken of detainees during the investigation conducted by CID. I don't know who specificly took the photos or who was responsible for the actions. I have never known of any MI personnel tell the MPs to "Soften up" a detainee. There was special treatment conducted this was sleep management or give them a showeron a regular basis due to poor hygen standards. The approved sleep management program was provided to the MPs for implementationand the MP's were continously reminded that they need to make sure that they adhere to there rules of engagement. The sleep management was approved by COL PAPPAS The interrogation plan had to be approved by the ICE. Anything outside of the IROE had to be approved by COL PAPPAS and JAG and then sent up for approval to the general officer level. There was a time when dogs were used during an interrogations but it wasn't planned or requeste. The MPs were inspecting the cells in the segregation area and the dogs were accompanying them and as a result of a detainee not liking the military working dogs, the detainee was aske a couple of questions and nothing amounted as aresult and the MP's continued on with the cell inspection. I requested the use of dogs once for the special projects teams, but it was never approved and the interrogation never occured. There were really no mutual rules of engagements for the MPs and MI andstill do not know what the rules of engagement were forthe MP's during that period of time!.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement? [redacted]

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27 APR 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136 [redacted]

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DAMPS

LOCATION	DATE	Time	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	27 JAN 04	1209	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
			CIV

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

I want to make the following Statement under oath:

Incident with hearing unusual sounds coming from the Segregation Hole in isolation wing alpha, around or about 20 DEC 03. After the conclusion of an interrogation that included (term) in the stairwell of Segragation. The detainee was returned into MP custody of After the detainee was received by the two MP's, the interrogation team walked ahead of the MP's and detainee. The detainee was being placed into the Segregation Hole according to the approved interrogation plan and the sound of the detainee falling or possibly being struck was heard. The interrogation team looked back and the MP's were coming out of the facility and closed the door. Both and I looked at each other and asked what was the sound as we walked up the steps to the MP office area. Both of us and felt very uncomfortable with what we had heard and when the two MP's returned to the MP office area, located on the second deck, in between section alpha and bravo, we confronted the MP's. The reaction of was that he was agitated with the comment or suggestion did reply to our questioning, but I can't recall the exact words of his statement, other than he was not happy. Explanation of an approved interrogation plan. When an interrogation plan outside the approved Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) is requested by an interrogator, the plan must be reviewed and approved by Col Tom Papus and the Jag Officer. However, in some circumstance, this approval must go up to the office of General Sanchez for direct approval. In response to questions by the investigator and the special treatment of a detainee. The following is a description of the process of an ongoing interrogation. A detainee that I am actively interrogating was placed on an approved Sleep Meal Management Program. This program, has very specific and detailed rules required for implementation. In terms of what I have used recently over a 25 day period of time to interrogate the detainee. In this case, the detainee is provided with 4 hours of sleep per 24 hour period. The configuration of this sleep/wake program can be divided in any configuration and needs to be written out in detail for each day and approved through the appropriate chain of command, OIC, COL Papus and Jag. In this example, the final approving authority was COL Tom Papus. To elaborate on a typical 72 hour program recently used, the sleep/meal management portion cannot continue more that 72 consecutive hours. At which point, a 12 hour uninterrupted sleep session is mandatory before the program can continue. During a typical SMMS program, the MP's are responsible for administering the written program provided by the interrogator. A copy of the detailed, written program that they receive and keep on record in the office, during the duration of the session. In all cases, the NCO managing the alpha wing or responsible for the section are verbally briefed about the program, the details of the program, the detainee and intelligence value of the detainee (background). In addition, the MP's are advised that during the awake time period of an approved SMMS program, the MP's are allowed to do what is necessary to keep the detainee awake in the allotted period of time as long it adheres to approved rules of engagement an

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF___ TAKEN AT__ DATED___ CONTINUED" THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE___ OF___ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72

U.S. Government Printing Office 1993 - 342-027/80494

proper treatment of the detainee. For example, this current detainee does not like to conform to proper grooming standards. So, I've referred to the MP's to give the detainee his special treatment. This is to include, showering of the detainee (not excessively) daily if necessary, having the detainee brush his teeth and the maintaining of short hair and no facial hair. Hence, the MP's are not directed when and how this is to be administered, but that it can be used to keep the detainee awake when the detainee is more prone to sleep.

Q. Have you ever had an incident where one of your detainees was bruised or complained of being assaulted by any of the guards?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever verbally requested one of the guards to assault one of your detainees?

A. No.

Q. Have you seen or heard any other type of suspicious incidents that would indicate abuse of the prisoners besides what you have listed in the above statement?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any type of pictures that show abuse of detainees?

A. No

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement concerning the matters under investigation?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

[redacted]

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT, WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OR BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by Law to administer oaths, this 22nd day of January, 2004 at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136, UCMJ or 5 USC 303

(Authority to Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

10th Military Police Battalion (CID)

Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09335

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1993 – 342-027/80494

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/07[redacted]	2009[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police Company

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib 1 October 2003. I worked in all areas, the Tiers, General Population and medical. I was mainly working in the general population and the medical area. I really didn't work in the MI Tier, Tier 1A. I was never aware or witnessed any abuse by MP or MI personnel, any photos or videos of detainees or dogs being used during interrogations. The only time I am aware that dogs were used was during riots. I never heard of MI encouraging MPs to give "the treatment or physically abuse a detainee. Supplies were limited and the only thing we had to give the detainee was a jumpsuit. We didn't have laundry set up so detainees washed their jumpsuit and hung it in their cell. I never saw detainees with women's underwear. They had boxers on. I was aware of "ghost" detainees. These detainees were brought in by OGA. They were not accounted for or kept tracked off. I had no knowledge of OGA abusing detainees.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No!

//End of Statement//[redacted]

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 (MS). I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT MS

PAGE 2 OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
CAMP VICTORY

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) [redacted] 3. TIME [redacted] 4. FILE NUMBER
2004/05/07 [redacted] 1935

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police Company

9.
I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib 1 October 2003. I was initially placed as an escort officer but because I was a correction officer in my civilian job, I was assigned to the prison. I began working in the office with [redacted] was the NCOIC of the Hard Site. My responsibilities were to help setup a tracking systemto track all detainees. I was also a filler for guards in all the Tiers. When a guard went on leave, was off or had to go to chow, I would fill in for them until they came back. I worked in all the Tiers. My interaction with MI was limited to getting the detainee for them and placing the detainee back in the cell when they finished with them. I never witnessed or had any knowledge of MI or MPs abusing detainees. I was not aware of any photos or videos of any detainees. I never heard MI tell MPs to "soften-up" or give "the treatment" to a detainee. If MI asked us to do anything out of the ordinary, like sleep management, we asked them to give it to us in writing and they would. We were suppose to monitor the detainee's sleep but we were so busy with other tasks that we often were not able to follow the sleep management. As far as humiliation, I never knew of any MI using underwear to humiliate a detainee. I know we were short of so many supplies, underwear, jumpsuits, towels, and health items We had no control over Tier 1A and so we asked MI to get some supplies for the detainees held there. They brought in underwear, female hygiene stuff and shaving supplies. Women's underwear was all we had sometimes. I was aware of "ghost" detainees These detainees were brought in by OGA. They were not accounted for or kept tracked off. We were only supposed to house and feed them. We started keeping track of them by numbering them OGA1, OGA2 and so forth for an accurat count of people in the prison OGA never asked us to mistreat or abuse detainees. I was present when OGA (a heavy individual about 5'2 or 5'3 and a very tall not clean shaven individual who reminded me of the Russian in the movie Rocky who spoke Arabic) brought in a detainee. It was about 0430 when I was notified that OGA was bringing in a detainee Two MPs and the two OGA guys brought the detainee and took him to the shower room. About 30-45 minutes late, I was called to come get the detainee When I arrived, the individual appeared to be dead. I applied pressure to his chin and nothing happened. I was holding him and he was dead weight. He still a sandbag over his head and I took it off. I checked for his pulse and he had none. I called for the medical personnel and my chain of command. I took the handcuffs off. [redacted] and COL PAPPAS arrived and so did medical personnel. CID called me about mid March to interview me in reference to this event. I never had any knowledge of dogs being used during interrogations. I did hear that a dog had bitten a detainee during a search. I od not know who or what happen[redacted]

Q Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. Not No[redacted]

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10 EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

foll[redacted]s

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATE[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] 2 OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 USAPA V1.00

Annex B [redacted]

NO COPY OF STATEMENT BY [redacted]

[redacted] IS PRESENT ON THE CD COPY OF

THE JONES-FAY-KERN REPORT

29 June 2004

CJTF7-TF Fay

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

1. On 17 June 2004, the undersigned interviewed [redacted] hereinafter referred to as Source, concerning his knowledge of detainee file locations and procedures. Source provided the following response in a separate Word document:

Q: Where are the DAB assessments? Where are the detainee files?

A: From September 2003 through March 2004 I was the C2X of CJTF-7. As such I had responsibility for staff oversight of all interrogation operations in Iraq. From November 2003 through February 2004 I replaced MG Fast as the president of the Article 78 Board (Security Internee Appeal and Review Board.) From February to the time of my departure I participated as an MI rep (twice a week) on the standing release board.

Of the entire detainee population in Iraq, only a small percentage was considered as "MI holds." These "MI hold" detainees were physically kept at Camp Vigilant at the Abu Ghuraib prison complex, and they were interrogated at the JIDC. The remaining detainees were considered as "security holds" or "criminal holds." These security and criminal detainees were kept at separate camps within the Abu Ghuraib prison complex. Of the total number of "MI hold" detainees, only a small percentage were ever assessed by the DAB. Specifically, the DAB only assessed those detainees who were being considered for release from "MI hold" status. This typically occurred once they had been fully exploited and had no further intelligence value. When the DAB declared a detainee was of "no intel value" and no longer a "MI hold", the detainee was physically moved from Camp Vigilant over to Camp Ganci (general security hold population) within the prison complex.

SJA personnel out at the Abu Ghuraib prison complex maintained hard copy dossiers on each security internee. The assessments produced by the DAB were added to these hard copy detainee dossiers as appropriate. The dossiers of "security hold" detainees were considered by the release board. (Note: The board never considered any "MI hold" detainees for release.) Each week [redacted] from SJA would make arrangements to have the hard copy dossiers of "security hold" detainees physically transported to Camp Victory, so they could be considered by the release board.

At Camp Victory the CJTF-7 C2X shop had an interrogation operations management section (comprised of about five to seven personnel). This section

was physically located in a trailer located immediately behind the HQ building (before the HQ moved to the Al Faw Palace. [redacted] was the head of that section from about November 2003 through February 2004. [redacted] replaced him and is presently in charge.

Within the interrogation operations management section there were a couple of NCOs who were responsible for supporting the release board. (Note: While I was there, these NCOs included [redacted] They worked closely with [redacted]

The SJA developed the docket for the upcoming boards. The NCOS from the interrogation management section ran name traces on the dockets through the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC). The NCOs from the interrogation management section would also physically review each hard copy detainee dossier prior to the release board and annotate on a checklist in each file that the detainee was not considered an "MI Hold." (Note: In preparation for the boards a CID officer would also review the dossiers and annotated on the checklist whether the detainee was on "CID hold.") Once MI and MP had done their respective reviews, the dossiers were then handed back over to SJA [redacted]

From September 2003 through November 2003 the release board was comprised of MG Fast (MI), BG Karpinski (MP), and [redacted] In November 2003 I replaced MG Fast, an MP LTC replaced BG Karpinski, and a JAG MAJ replaced [redacted] We met twice a week and reviewed an average of 100 files total per week. In February 2004 a USMC JAG COL from Camp Lejeune arrived and established a standing release board. The MP representative was a LTC and the MI representative was a COL (a duty rotated between four COLs in the C2 section.) The standing release board considered about 100 files per day, six days a week.

2. Source did not execute a sworn statement.

3. Point of Contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at Conn [redacted]

[redacted]
15-6 Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/27	1024 hrs	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	02

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229TH MP Co, VA National Guard, Virginia Beach, VA

9. [redacted] _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) from 18 Aug 2003 until 12 Mar 2004. I was a MP Platoon Leader and primarily responsible for the Internal Reaction Force (IRF) which provided a quick reaction capability for the AG complex. Part of our orientation and training for the deployment included training on the Geneva Convention, but there was no training on what the duties would be of MI personnel interrogating detainees. Part of my in processing at AG involved an orientation tour of the complex. I made a "leader's recon" after than and met for a short time with [redacted] but did not really get into specifics of MP interface with MI interrogation operations. For the most part MPs and MI kept apart; there was some sense among the e MPs that most of the MI folks were not pulling their fare share around the facility. I had Navy dog handlers attached to my unit, but they were used for MP operations not related to interrogation operations. After I returned to AG from Thanksgiving leave, two Army dog handlers were assigned to the facility [redacted] I don't know their first names, but believed they came from Ft Bragg. Both wanted nothing to do with duties associated with MP operations and the IRF. They worked with MI but I don't know what they did, or about the use of dogs in interrogations. Other than what I reported to the Taguba Panel, I did not see or become aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or become aware of any unauthorized photographs of detainees. I had informed my Soldiers as to how we were to work and if they observed or became aware of any unauthorized activity they should report it to me immediately. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No [redacted] END OF STATEMENT

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

N.T

USE

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted]. HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of May 2004.

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

On 10 February 2004, a team of officers, at the direction of Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

[redacted] MP, CFCC – PMO, **Interviewer**
[redacted] JA, CFLCC – SJA, **Interviewer**
[redacted] 705th MP Battalion, **Interviewer**
[redacted] 229th MP Company, **Respondent**

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [redacted] I'm a First Lieutenant with the 229th MP Company, Virginia Army National Guard, currently located at the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility at Abu Gharib. My social security number is [redacted] I'm in charge of 3rd Platoon, and we've been tasked to organize at Abu Gharib. Our mission is to run the Internal Reaction Force, and to provide escort guards within the confines of the facility. I enlisted in 1985. I was infantry active duty for 3 years After an 11-year break in service, I went to the National Guard, and to OCS. I've been with the 229th MP Company, since 2001.

My commander is [redacted] We've been at the BCCF, since August 2003. I was TDY in Saudi Arabia, prior to that. The rest of my company was at Camp Doha, Kuwait.

We did some confinement training, at the MOB Station. It was anticipated, that we would have that mission when we arrived We did customs when we arrived, but our mission at the prison is pretty much a no-brainer.

It seems, being a National Guard Company, we do a lot of things on our own, when we should have more help from the battalions. A lot of questions we've had, pertaining to movement, I've had to go outside the chain

Our living conditions aren't that bed. We have a hard roof, over our heads, MRE's, and water, so I can't complain.

We are way short of personnel. When we're short, we suck it up, and work longer hours. I'm in charge of the Internal Reaction Force. I've got 10 guys that are on call 24 hours a day. Since I have 2 missions, I've been able to sacrifice my escort mission. Anytime I lose somebody due to REFRAD, or injury, I'll pull them to my mission. My numbers are okay, but the other 2 platoons are steady losing people, and have to put support personnel to work in the towers.

As far as equipment's concerned, we have just got a brand new conex full of stuff that came with the 16th Brigade, less than lethal capabilities, and we're in the process of digging through that. We hadn't had that. We deployed with clear face shields and some clear riot shields. I'm a SWAT Team Leader on a civilian police department, so I've been on raids, and I know the clothing and tools that we need to do the job. I've asked for those things, when we first got there. We didn't get them, so we've made do with what we've had. For instance, collapsible batons are great for that environment, because you don't have to stand there with a stick in your hand. To me, standing there with a stick in your hand, automatically escalating to force. It's unnecessary, if we go in there to hold the prisoners, while they're going in there to do a compound search. We can stand there with our shields, and, quite often, we stand at rest, but we don't even have baton holders. So, we took our riot batons, and sawed them in half, now they're our short batons. Little things like that we've had to improvise.

Talking from my slice of the pie.. The new Brigade Sergeant Major came out, last week, and actually spent time with the troops in the towers. He came out and talked to me, and went through our living areas. He seemed like he had a genuine concern for a lot of the things that soldiers brought up I wasn't at the NCO meeting, but I know a lot of the stuff that was brought up, like uniforms, haircuts, and Army standards. The soldiers told him, "We would love to do those things, Sergeant Major, but we don't have a barbershop or alterations out here," little things like that, and he took a genuine concern to that, and he seemed like he will make something happen.

I never met the Brigade Commander. I've never worked in a brigade setting. I was a grunt, when I was on active duty, and I never met my Brigade Commander, then either.

Sir, the truth of the matter is, I write SOP, and send it up to them. They asked me, when I came back off leave. They said, "We need an IRF SOP," for the oncoming battalion, so I did an SOP. This isn't unique to this battalion It happened in Kuwait, as well, and at MOB Station. They ask for us to do these SOP's, which I don't know if that's protocol, or not. They do not provide the commander's intent.

[redacted] eads a sworn statement made by [redacted] responds as follows:

[redacted] was there at the site, but I can't answer to whether he saw the abuse or not. It was dark out there. When this happened, and the MI soldier said, "I'm a professional," and they started to get out of hand, in my view, I went over to [redacted] and said,

"Sir, you gonna let this happen," and he looked at me. I don't know whether or not he knew what I was talking about. I was mad, maybe a little unprofessional, and said, "I'll do something about it, then." I walked over to where the MI people were. They had already dragged the guy back there. I didn't witness the abuse in the back of the truck. My platoon sergeant did. I asked who was in charge, and everything kinda de-escalated from there. So, whether he saw what was going on, I don't know. I don't remember the MI person's name, but he was an E6. I think I asked him what his rank was. When I asked, "Who's in charge of this crew here," he said, "I am," and I asked, "What's your rank?" But, whether I asked him or his 1SG, later, I know he was an E6.

That was my only dealing with MI. My opinion is - they just had a couple of their friends killed by a mortar. They were really emotionally amped up, and to bring these guys over here, whether they were guilty or not, it was a bad call. I can say that my escort team escorts prisoners from the various camps, to the MI interrogation cell. They say it gets loud in there, but according to the rules they have posted, there was no abuse going on. They have their rules posted in their TOC, not in the interview area. As I lost people, I pulled my people off that duty, so they're now doing their own escort. The rules state that you can yell at a person...

[redacted] present [redacted] with the 205th MI's Interrogation Rules of Engagement, asking, "Like this?" [redacted] responds as follows:

That's the same thing. We're not given that. That was one of my only dealings with MI, but I don't believe they behave that way all the time. That's the first time I saw those rules. You have to understand, Sir – My LSA is probably about 200 - 300 meters from their LSA, and I never had any reason to go over there, until my guys started doing escorts for them. I was very apprehensive about my soldiers working with their soldiers in such a short time span, after this incident had happened. It was made clear, that if we saw anything like that again, then we were to report it.

I can't remember putting out information about Geneva Hague. We've gone over General Order 1A, and the Rules of Engagement, but specifically reading the Geneva Convention rules of mistreatment... We went over that in MP School. Recently, there was a memorandum put out about things you're not supposed to do. I don't know if that was a knee-jerk reaction to something that happened, but it specifically says things in there about mistreatment, photography, and contraband, stuff like that. My platoon, they know me, and they know my platoon sergeant and me won't stand for that, and we try to set a good example. I know they would report anything to me.

I was there when the abuse happened, and my soldiers looked at me. Well, the first thing that happened was a guy walked up to the prisoner, and shoved his face toward the ground. A couple of my guys said they hit him, but it look like they shoved his head toward the ground. Right there, the flags went off, like this wasn't going to go well - the cursing and the yelling, tempers and everything. That's when I tried to diffuse it by saying, "Hey, that's not professional." That's when the guy fired back at me, that he was

a professional. So, I went ahead and tried to nip it in the bud. I didn't know who the person was, but I felt like it was my responsibility, since I was the ranking person. The prisoner posed no threat to anybody there, and that's just basic rules of engagement. I think the person was bound, and he had a shirt over his head. I don't have a problem with that, but when you start shoving someone around, and screaming and cursing at them in English, I got a problem with that.

I know the chain of command through battalion, but within the last couple of months, COL Pappas, who was the MI Commander, was the FOB Commander, but I don't think the MI had any control over the 320th. The 320th answered straight to the 800th.

I know the mission comes first, but you really got to look out for your troops. You got to be willing to go into conflict to enforce the standard. You can't be afraid to do that. Right now, the way the prison is run it's dangerous. They've been working soldiers on 12- hour shifts, since August. I think somebody needs to put their foot down, and say, "We need to staff that." It's not good for the soldiers to be working in that environment, taking fire, and working 12 hours a day. I'm blessed. We're working 24 hours, but we may only get called twice a day for only an hour at a time. It's not bad for my guys, but when they start pulling cooks to do MP duties... You know.

When you don't have tools to do the job, you got to be willing to push it farther than the person that told you no. If I'm a battalion commander, and you're my brigade commander, and I need X number of troops, to do a mission, and I know they're out there, and you say well we haven't got time, but we've got a week in advance, I'm gonna keep coming at you with that question I'll say, "Hey, my guys are working 12 hours a day. We're supposed to have X number of soldiers to work all of these camps. What do you mean, 'No.'" This can't happen Soldiers are gonna start dying. They're gonna start sleeping on the job. Prisoners are gonna start escaping. We're gonna look like a bunch a idiots out there

The panel stopped, to discus[redacted] statements.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave[redacted]a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY.	2004/05/14 [redacted]	1900 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	MAJ

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HQ USAREUR - G3 EXERCISE, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Kuwait in January 2003. We were sent to Camp Virginia. I was the Assistant S-3 for the 205th MI BDE. We had several units who were under the 205th MI BDE: 519th MI BN, 165th MI BN, 323rd MI BN, 325th MI BN, 302nd MI BN, 1st MI, and a company minus from the 141st MI BN. The 205th changed command from COL PARRISH to COL PAPPAS the 1st of July 03. When COL PAPPAS took over, we had interrogation operations in 3 locations in IRAQ. At some point a decision was made to consolidate all operations in one location. This locate was Abu Ghraib. Initially, [redacted] BDE S-3 was supposed to go down to Abu Ghraib and be the deputy commander for Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC). But [redacted] had to go on another mission to Florida and I was sent by COL PAPPAS to be the deputy because we were getting pressure to set up the JIDC now and not wait. Apparently, LTG Sanchez was not happy with the intelligence coming out of interrogations. I was still the Assistant S-3 and my OER Support Form did not change. I basically added JIDC Deputy role to my OER even though I left a captain with the 205th MI BDE to assume my Assistant S-3 role. COL PAPPAS did not tell me to check on the well-being or care of detainees. He didn't tell me to ensure everyone was in compliance with the IROEs or the Geneva Convention. I do remember seeing the policy that specified that LTG SANCHEZ had to approve certain interrogation techniques. I do not remember a FRAGO referencing the treatment of detainee, however. I do recall the FRAGO categorizing detainees. After [redacted] returned from Florida, I remained as the JIDC Deputy. MG MILLER visited Abu Ghraib facility and recommended the Tiger Team concept be implemented. COL PAPPAS and the [redacted] told me to implement the concept. The concept I was told was 1xinterrogators, 1xlinguist, 1xreport writer, and 1xanalyst. My orders were to go to Abu Ghraib and set up the Tiger Teams to conduct interrogations. This was a vocal order not written on paper. When I first arrived at Abu Ghraib, there were a number (I do not recall the exact number) of personnel from the 519th MI BN. [redacted] was the Interrogations Control Element (ICE) OIC and [redacted] was there as well. The 519th were already conducted interrogations operations and had a system in place. When I relayed to [redacted] what COL PAPPAS' plan was; they were initially opposed to it. [There were some tension between 519th and 325th MI (325th arrived the same time I did). The issue between both battalions was who was better than who. When the 325th was mobilized, they had to go through validation with the 519th. The battalion was validated twice. Then there was a Brigade field exercise and the 325th was the battalion who had to set up all their equipment and run the ranges. The soldiers even had to pull parachute detail. When the 325th asked if some of their soldiers could go to airborne school, they were told no. There were several congressional from both soldiers and officers from the 325th. The complaint was that they were not doing their mission. This angered the Brigade Commander, therefore, the 325th soldiers were sent to Afghanistan before the soldiers of the 525th MI BDE. Plus, the Brigade commander decided he would demobilize the battalion. The 325th was demobilized only to be brought back on active duty shortly after we were demobilized.] At Abu Ghraib, the MPs were in charge of security of the place and moving the prisoners around. The MPs control the entrances to the prison (Hard Site and Tiers). MI was responsible for interrogation operations. The quality of life was not good. We were operating out of tents and 325th soldiers were living in the old Laundry room. 519th were living in tents erected in the building with the 700th MP BN. Both MPs and MI had their own Living Support Areas. We were being attacked with mortars frequently and had attempts to breach our site often. Even though we were attacked regularly, we were operating out of tents. Not until we had a mortar attack that killed some soldiers did we move operations to buildings. COL PAPPAS gave me daily guidance and I would send my correspondence to COL PAPPAS, [redacted] S3, 205th MI, and [redacted] (Deputy Commander, 205th MI). When a FRAGO came out specifying interrogation operations, I would pass that [redacted] who passed it to [redacted] then on to the soldiers. When I arrived, I recall [redacted] telling me what we were allowed to do or not do with detainees. The first week we focused on methods while the 519th continued their interrogations. As we discussed the Tiger Team concept, I tried to explain t[redacted] Team reorganized. Meanwhile, [redacted] that COL PAPPAS wanted this implemented. It took us about a week to get the Tiger Team reorganized. Meanwhile, the soldiers were complaining that the concept made no sense. I told them to just do it because that is what the BDE Commander wanted. Once GTMO representatives arrived on site and explained to everyone the concept and make up of the team, [redacted] understood it. The concept was actually an interrogator, a linguist, and an analyst with the support of a report writer [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/14

D. STATEMENT (Continued)

I wanted to integrate both the 325th and 519th soldiers, but we agreed that the 325th would have the night shift and the 519th [redacted] would have the dayshift. We discussed the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. I discussed this with [redacted] told me that all the 325th were aware of them and had signed the IROEs. [redacted] said the same for the 519th soldiers. I do not recall any Geneva Convention but in the reserves, one is required to get annual training on this. [redacted] and the NCOIC brought all the interrogators together and explained to them how the interrogations were going to be conducted and that they must do the right thing. When I first arrived, I was in charged. I was the Deputy for the JIDC. [redacted] arrived in early September. I assumed he was going to be the Director but COL PAPPAS told me that [redacted] was going to work with me and that he, COL PAPPAS was still the director and I asked [redacted] what his role was and he said, I guess I am an LNO for CJTF-7 and report to [redacted] and MG FAST. COL PAPPAS never spoke to me and told me what [redacted] role was. When we had operational meeting and we could not agree, he would provide guidance and make recommendations but he was not the guy we would go to for operations. He kind of took over mayoral duties. He worked issues such as getting a gym established, ensuring that soldiers had their personal equipment: weapons, flak vest, and helmet. We had soldiers who would show up without their [redacted] soldiers went through the 205th RSOI cell in Camp Doha, Kuwait before coming to Abu Ghraib. I would go to [redacted] with these problems and he would say he would handle it. [redacted] saw no action so he would talk to [redacted] also became our link with brigade. [redacted] told me to get [redacted] out of the mayoral business. [redacted] for assistance the MPs. He would attend the daily meetings held by the MPs for all units on site. We went to [redacted] when we needed it. He did make things happen. He wasn't really involved with interrogations. He was one of the reviewers for the target folders along with [redacted] and me. Once [redacted] arrived, he took over the as the operations officer and I remained the Deputy. When brigade would call on specific interrogation issues, they spoke to [redacted] never mentioned to me that one of his roles was to ensure the intelligence flow was operational and went up to C2. In reference to detainee abuse, I once saw a detainee with only part of his head shaved. I told the individual to either shave it all off or don't shave it at all (I do not remember who the individual was). Another time, three interrogators and a linguist went to the prison and requested that two of the female detainees be handed to them for interrogations. They took the detainee into a cell and made her take her shirt off. We found out the following morning. COL PAPPAS was notified and requested that the soldiers be segregated and a CID investigation was initiated. The three soldiers invoked their rights, but before one of them invoked their rights, he said he had nothing to do with this incident or the death of the detainee in Afghanistan. (I know nothing about the Afghanistan issue). When [redacted] and I first questioned the linguist, he denied he was there. Not until the MP identified him did he confessed being there but said he was outside the cell and didn't see anything. We requested from his language manager for his removal and he was sent to another location. I do not remember the name of the linguist. We sent a five page SIR because we wanted to make sure we had all the specifics. [redacted] told me to tell [redacted] that he did not have to send a five-page report. We had a formation and [redacted] and MYSELF stated that under no circumstances will we tolerate any such incident. No night interrogations were authorized and no male to female interrogations would occur unless you had another female in the booth. I cannot honestly verify that all personnel were there (the admin and system guys). The CACI contractors did not arrive until after [redacted] arrived and the Joint Manning Document was completed. How soon after that, I do not recall. The Joint Manning Document was developed by [redacted] and myself. GTMO personnel helped us develop it. Once it was complete, I sent it up to COL PAPPAS. [redacted] The JMD did not specify military from civilians. It simply had X number of Interrogators and X number of linguist etc. I did not get feedback from Brigade on the JMD. They just accepted it. I believe it then went up to [redacted] CJTF-7 Plans Officer. He is the one who worked on getting it filled by military or civilians. I had no say so on that. The first few CACI contractors who arrived were approximately seven. One was returned because he did not have all the personal equipment. I spoke to their Manager informing him that the linguist were supposed to get their equipment prior to coming out to our location. We relayed that no linguist will be delivered to Abu Ghraib without his or her equipment. When they arrived on site, [redacted] and Myself would Question them on their background to get an idea where they would work. They were assigned as screeners or interrogators. Maybe some got assigned as analyst. I do not know how trained they were on the IROEs or Geneva Convention. We trained them and I believe [redacted] briefed them on the IROEs and they signed the IROEs. I do not know if the Interpreters were also trained on the IROEs. I did see the ICRC in the hard site unsupervised. This happened three or four times. The MPs were supposed to sponsor them. The ICRC that came to visit, report that detainees were wearing women's panties. COL PAPPAS said that it better not be happening and this was not to happen. We brought everyone together and told them to ensure they followed the IROEs. There were no specifics given and no investigation was initiated. In reference to clothing of detainees, the detainees were wearing orange jumpsuits and later on some were wearing blue jumpsuits. This became a problem because some of the Iraqi civilian workers were also wearing the same colored jumpsuit. I notified the MP S3 [redacted] and S [redacted] that this was a force protection concern. [redacted] stated he would handle. I never saw any detainee with women's underwear or saw any women's underwear. I took trips around the detention facility but never saw any detainees totally naked. There were one or two detainees who had only underclothes on. Other Government Agencies (OGA) would come and drop off their detainees in our facilities. The 519th told me they had a problem with this because the detainees were not being accounted for. OGA would drop off detainees without prior notice, they would not let us sit in their interrogations, and we never received any intelligence they might have gathered from the interrogations. I told this to COL PAPPAS and he told me he needed to meet with their boss. I am not sure who I spoke to but [redacted] their boss showed up at an arranged time. [redacted] is about 5'8, Caucasian, well built, hair longer than a military haircut and about 45 yrs. He would show up every now and then. COL PAPPAS told us we would work [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/14

[redacted]. STATEMENT (Continued)

with OGA and allow them to bring detainees and not process them. I was told they did not want us to know who they were. I advised COL Pappas that we should in process them under an assumed name, this way we would have their finger prints, retina scan and medical screening. Also, advised him we needed a memorandum of agreement because you do not want a detainee to die on us and they are not in processed. Who would take responsibility? He said "I will", "I will." Nothing changed. COL PAPPAS said that OGA did not want our interrogators to sit in their interrogations because this would open our interrogators to liability. He said that OGA would share the intelligence gathered with us. OGA would give us a verbal on what they gathered and stated that a report would follow but they never did. There was no Joinuess in our operations. The JIDC was an Army and civilian run operations. One morning during the morning staff update, [redacted] came in and told us that a detainee had died. Both LTC PAPPAS and I were shocked COL PAPPAS said to get [redacted] in and that he was not going down alone on this. OGA did not want to just take the dead body. They placed the body in a body bag and placed ice in it. [redacted] secured the area. The next day the body was taken away on a stretcher to make it seem as if the detainee was ill. I was told an autopsy was conducted, I was not privy to the result. I did not have to interview to anyone reference this incident. I never saw or had knowledge of any photos or videos of detainees. I never saw any cameras in the hard site when I toured. One night while walking around I saw an Iraqi Police (IP) talking to a couple of our interpreters in the IP area. We stopped that and told the interpreters that they were not allowed in the IP area unless authorized by [redacted] his supervisor or me. The MPs controlled the detention facility. We provided the MPs a list of personnel who had access. [redacted] told interpreter personnel that if he saw any linguist talking with the IP after duty hours in the IP area, we would recommend they be fired. I never saw any guard dogs used during interrogations, they were not there when I was there. We had a very tough situation There were three battalions on the ground and they all reported to someone different not to [redacted] or MYSELF I accidentally heard [redacted] state that several personnel were going to be going on leave and I had no idea. Personnel were coming and going and I had no control over them. I was supposed to be running an operation and yet I had no control of the personnel working in the JIDC. I sent a message to Bn Commanders and BDE commander soliciting their support. I could not run the mission if I had no control of the personnel and I did the best I could. We had a situation where a male and female were cohabitating. I told their 1SG that one of them had to go and for him to decide. He complaint to his command. [redacted] called me very upset and said that the battalion was telling him I had no decision as to who left the area. I told him to hear my story. After he heard my story, he supported me. I spoke to the S-3 about the issue with control of personnel but nothing changed [redacted]

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No [redacted]

//////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of MAY, 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center	2004/06/06	15:00	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC/RA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Correction Facility, Iraq

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed various photographs of the alleged detainee abuses and identified the following: In photograph 3b5b8beda01ac4d6ffd e62916523fdb9.jpg, the male with black shirt, standing in the background and leaning towards a detainee, was a CACI contractor [redacted] the male in a black shirt was also [redacted] named [redacted]. In photograph [redacted] the male on the left in a black shirt was also [redacted] In photograph labeled [redacted] the male in the black top was also [redacted] In photograph labeled [redacted] depicts the cell of the detainee that was shot after The scene in photograph labeled [redacted] firing at an MP in November or December 2003. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: No.

----------END OF STATEMENT----------

NOT [redacted] USED

10. EXHIBIT

I. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT JIDC, BCCF, Iraq DATED 2004/06/06

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 06 day of June 2004
at JIDC BCCF Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136 (b)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1991

AG0000487

04 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Telephonic Interview of [redacted]

On 04 June 2004, I conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] The below statement is what [redacted] told me based on questions I asked her. She had reviewed the statement and stated it is accurate. She is now waiting to see the JAG Officer at Fort Richardson.

[redacted]
SSN: [redacted]
Unit: A/325th MI BN

I arrived in Kuwait on 9 April 2004. On 28 April we convoyed to Iraq into Balad. While in Balad, I was placed on a Tactical HUMINT Team as part of the 18th MP BDE at Camp Victory. I stayed on the THT until the first or second week of August 2004 when I was transferred to Camp Cropper to conduct interrogation operations. At Camp Cropper, [redacted] was in charge of interrogation operations and [redacted] was in charge of MI personnel from the 325th MI BN. When I arrived at Camp Cropper, we received a briefing on operations from [redacted] I conducted around 70 interrogations at Camp Cropper. Screenings were conducted in the warehouse next to the area where the detainees stayed. We also had a few interrogation booths inside the warehouse and in our office building. While at Camp Cropper, I never saw or was aware of any detainee abuse, or humiliation of detainees. At Camp Cropper I did not interrogate with any particular individual or linguist we would rotate linguists and sometimes interrogate with other interrogators. On 15 September, I relocated to Abu Ghraib. I didn't conduct any interrogations the first week I was there. We were taken on a tour of the facilities and were told by 519th personnel [redacted] on what was going on. There really was no right seat ride because we began interrogating at night and the 519th MI personnel were interrogating during the day. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) was not briefed to us when we first arrived, because we were not working yet. We did get them later the night we started interrogations and when new personnel would arrive on several occasions. Sometime when [redacted] arrived, we received the IROEs. When I first began interrogations, I fell under the supervision of [redacted] and the linguist [redacted]. Later [redacted] became my team leader. [redacted] was our team analyst. I conducted interrogations with [redacted] After the structure changed again, we were put into tiger teams where it was I and [redacted] and linguist [redacted] Our interrogation plans would go to [redacted] who would then submit it to higher. I am not sure who would sign off on it. I know that [redacted] would sign some of them. I submitted an interrogation plan to interrogate a detainee naked. [redacted] stated "we're going to have to get this

signed." I do not recall who from operations signed and approved the interrogation plan. At the beginning the interrogation plans were not really written. My team [redacted] and myself) were a little more organized and wrote the interrogation plan a couple of days before or sometimes the morning of the interrogation depending on what we had obtained from the previous interrogation. Those approving the Interrogation Plan were either [redacted] I never placed any of my detainees on sleep deprivation. I did use a stress position, at first they did not have to be approved, but later they did. I believe I did request Isolation for one detainee. I do not remember who approved it. I believe the individual I requested Isolation for was [redacted] but he was already in isolation when I received his file, so I had to request to keep him in isolation. We wanted him in isolation to separate him from the group of individuals who he had been captured with. After [redacted] was transferred to another team [redacted] became mine an[redacted] team leader. There were times when we would go to the Hard Site and found the detainees naked. It wasn't unusual to see them naked. If you simply passed by the hallway by the isolation area you would not see the detainees naked. You had to go up to the cell to see that detainees were naked. I can't remember seeing the Operations leadership down in the Hard Site, but I didn't spend too much time there. I do remember seeing [redacted] there when he was delivering feminine products to the female MP that he had collected from use for the female detainees If others were at the hard site, I didn't pay much attention I was too bogged with my work I usually worked form 0800 to right before it got dark. I was only on the night shift for about a weeks and we worked from around 2100 to 0900 I never went to the isolation area during this time period. I only did interrogations outside in tents, while we were being attacked by mortars nightly. I departed Abu Ghraib around 15 November 2004. I never witness or was aware of any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainee abuse or humiliation of detainees. I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee with women's underwear. I have advised by [redacted] that I do not discuss this with anyone because discussing this with anyone could jeopardize the investigation. I have also been told by [redacted] at if I receive any e-mail from anyone reference the PROCEDURE 15, I should forward them to her [redacted]

Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27[redacted]	1830[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 15 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received an orientation on Iraqi culture like Ramadan and the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) on what you could or could not do but I did not receive any Geneva Convention training. We did receive it later. I was really surprised on the ground level rules. We had rules but the MPs had no ground rules on how to conduct detainee handling. We really didn't know what they could or could not do to a detainee. I don't really know who was in charge of the MPs but COL PAPPAS was in charge of MI. I think COL PAPPAS was in charge of the site. I saw [redacted] around and believe he was the JIDC Commander. He was doing the same jo[redacted]s currently doing. I never witness detainee abuse. I did see naked detainees. I think it happened one night in December. I was picking up a detainee to take him to the stairwell room to interrogate him. I believe anytime there was a new detainee in the segregation area they were stripped of their clothes. I asked the person (MP) with the naked detainee if that was approved. That individual told me to stay out of it. I told them that we were not allowed to do that. I reported it to my NCOIC [redacted] She told me that was a problem between MI and the MPs because there was no written SOP for the MPs. I heard there was the use of dogs but I never saw it. I can't remember who told me. It wasn't until CID began the investigation that I learned that there were allegations of detainee abuse. the only time i new of any possible foul play was when i found ou[redacted] was disciplined for walking a naked detainee back to his camp. We were allowed to interrogate by the stairs in the segregated area and the shower room. The command was aware of this

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////////[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 | DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE | USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu-Ghraib DATED 29 APR 2004

STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at [redacted] Correction Facility

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 U.S.C. Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Fort Huachuca MID, Fort Huachuca, AZ	2004/06/10	1037	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: Civilian

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: E Co, 309th MI Bn, Fort Huachuca, AZ

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 7 - 21 Oct 03, I was at Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq as part of a five person Mobile Training Team (MTT) from Fort Huachuca, AZ. The mission of the team was to provide an overall assessment of interrogation operations, training and advice and assistance. My focus was interrogation operations. I spent time with the interrogators during interrogations observing and providing immediate feedback. Upon our arrival at AG, we were greeted by [redacted]. We were also provided a tour of the facility. The team spent the first couple of days setting up, conducting an assessment of the operations and establishing a training schedule based on the assessment. The training lasted five days and encompassed various aspects of interrogation operations. Throughout our time at AG the interrogators remained open and receptive to the training and subsequent advice and assistance. The training included the TIGER TEAM concept which had been very effective in interrogation operations at GTMO. When we got there, the interrogators had already started to employ this technique as the analysts participated in the interrogations. After the training, I spent the rest of the time with the interrogator teams. I sat in on approximately four interrogations and indirectly observed several more. Throughout our time at AG the MTT would get together at night to discuss findings and recommendations. We also continued to enhance the training schedule as there were several civilian contract interrogators scheduled to arrive at AG. The Intelligence Rules of Engagement (IROE) was posted and was very similar to the IROE used in Afghanistan. During my observation of interrogation operations, the 519th demonstrated experience and dedication to the mission. I did have concerns with the newly arriving contract interrogators. We did not have the opportunity to work with them or provide any training. Some interrogators were not actively using approaches, they more or less utilized direct questioning and when that did not work, they gave up. The interrogations were not conducted in a timely manner. In some cases when an interrogator picked an approach, he would not plan it out and get guidance from the team leader prior to the interrogation. They were also not using their interpreters effectively. There was a set level for approval on the various approaches and techniques. Most techniques required a very specific written plan with a schedule and parameters. The MP's appeared to be in control and professional. I did see detainees in various states of dress to include nakedness and detainees wearing towels. The MP's used segregation and stripping as a way to keep the detainees under control and to keep them from talking. On one occasion, I participated in an interrogation wit[redacted]. When we entered the cell, the detainee was wearing a towel around his waist. After the interrogation, I aske[redacted] he was going to get the detainee his clothes back [redacted] told me he would talk to the MP's. [redacted] appeared to be a motivated and enthusiastic interrogator who seemed to understand the concept of intelligence interrogations. I never saw him lose control of his emotions during an interrogation and he took advice and assistance well. On one occasion, I had a conversation with [redacted] concerning the IROE and interrogation approaches. I gave him examples of approaches including Pride and Ego Down where and interrogator took a Koran, threw it on the floor and stepped on it and Fear Up Harsh where the interrogator had a dog trained to bark on cue if the interrogator thought the detainee was lying. I also explained sleep deprivation. I told him that in Afghanistan the interrogators could use an adjusted sleep schedule for detainees. The conversation was meant to explain why these activities were prohibited or restricted. [redacted] appeared to understand. There was intense pressure from the command to provide intelligence reporting. During my time at AG, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee. I never witnessed nor heard of any MP offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations. I never witnessed nor heard of any guard dogs being used during interrogations.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No. [redacted] End of Statement

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Fort Huachuca MID DATED 2004/06/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH [redacted] ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

[redacted]

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June

at the Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Detachment

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

From [redacted]
Sent Monday, June 21, 2004 8:09 am
To [redacted]
Cc
Bcc
Subject Regarding our conversation

[redacted] the following are statements I made to [redacted] during one conversation where he approached me asking for ideas as to how to get these prisoners to talk:

I talked briefly about the approach ROE. Then I told him that I'd heard that dogs had been used successfully and that they could be intimidating. I told him the story about the dog that was trained to bark on cue and suggested that he talk to the MPs about the possibilities. I told him that the basic approach strategies would be most successful within the first few hours of capture, because that's when a prisoner's stress level was highest and once they become accustomed to the environment, their stress level decreases and their resistance increases. I told him that these prisoners are captured by soldiers, taken from their familiar surroundings, blindfolded and put into a truck and brought to this place; and then they are pushed down a hall with guards barking orders and thrown into a cell, naked; and that not knowing what was going to happen or what the guards might do caused them extreme fear. I told him that he should explain to the guards how this fear works to his adva
ntage and tell them not to get friendly with the prisoners, or try to converse with them or give them cigarettes and stuff. I told him that the guards should appear as though they could be harsh, abrasive and ... I used some extremely harsh words to describe the level of fear that the prisoner should feel. I told him that this fear, the guards, this place all come together to create a harsh environment and that this sets the stage for the interrogator. I told him that he should be the first friendly face the prisoner sees, and that the prisoner will want to talk to relieve his fear. I suggested he have someone take some pictures of what seemed to be guards being rough with prisoners, so he could use them to scare the prisoners. I also described what I thought was a formal, professional prisoner in-processing as I observed it in Bagram.

I did not intend for any prisoner to get hurt My only intent was for the prisoner to imagine what could happen.

[redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Fort Huachuca MID, Fort Huachuca, AZ
2. DATE: YYYYMMDD 2004/06/30
3. TIME: [redacted] 0830
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: Civilian
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: E Co, 309th MI Bn, Fort Huachuca, AZ
9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] am making this statement as an addition to the statement executed on 10 Jun 03 at 1037. This subsequent statement relates a conversation I had with [redacted] and relevant background information. From 27 Sep to 5 Oct 03 I was deployed to Afghanistan to observe interrogation operations and offer advice and assistance. We provided suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of interrogation planning, approaches, questioning technique, reporting and the use of interpreters. Our training was limited to small group discussion as the operations were already established and the interrogators were conducting interrogations around the clock. While there, I observed the inprocessing procedures for incoming detainees. The operation was very efficient and professional. The whole process took less than one hour from initial reception to the time the detainee was seen by an interrogator. This had an advantage as the detainee was still disoriented from the capture and would be more likely to answer questions posed by the interrogators. On 7 Oct 03, I arrived in Abu Ghraib (AG) to assess interrogation operations and conduct the training I referenced in my previous statement. After observing [redacted] conduct at least two interrogations, and prior to the start of the training, I had an offline conversation with [redacted]. He approached me asking for ideas as to how to get "these detainees to talk", referring to those who were believed to know the source of the incoming mortars. During the conversation, I told [redacted] about the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) to ensure he knew of their existence. I told [redacted] of a story I heard in Afghanistan of a dog used during an interrogation. The dog was trained to bark on cue and would bark any time the interrogator had reason to believe the detainee was lying during the interrogation. I told him that this would probably not be allowed, but that the presence of barking dogs in the prison might be effective. I told him of a story of an interrogator using a Pride and Ego Down approach. The interrogator took a copy of a Koran and threw it on the ground and stepped on the Koran, which resulted in a detainee riot. I explained to him that an adjusted sleep schedule was used on detainees in Afghanistan. The process was closely monitored and used to disorient the detainee. Subsequently, I explained that basic approach strategies would be most effective within the first few hours of capture and that they needed to do timely interrogations. The more comfortable a detainee gets with his surroundings, the stronger his resistance becomes. I described the fear that I imagined a detainee might experience in that environment. I also said that the MP's need to understand that this fear works to the interrogator's advantage and that the MP's shouldn't get friendly with the source by trying to converse or offer cigarettes and the like that the interrogator might use as incentives to establish rapport. This type of friendly MP interaction was claimed to be a hindrance to interrogation in Afghanistan. I also suggested the possibility of showing the detainees pictures of what appeared to be MP's in intimidating positions with detainees. I did not describe pictures of MP's actually abusing detainees. If the MP's were actually allowed to abuse the detainees, there would be no reason to have the pictures. The purpose of the pictures was to allow the detainee's initial fear to persist until the interrogator relieved that fear and established rapport. At this point, I described detainee inprocessing as I observed it in Afghanistan. I never personally witnessed the above incidents, but heard about them from other interrogation facility personnel. I encouraged [redacted] to attend the upcoming training. I also made sure [redacted] knew that any interrogation approach or technique outside the techniques had to be included into the interrogation plan and had to be approved by the chain of command. I am sure that [redacted] understood that no technique could be used outside the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and required chain of command approval prior to implementation. [redacted] only attended portions of the training that we provided at AG. I did not participate in or hear about any other member of the MTT participating in any other offline conversations with the assigned interrogation facility personnel. I never advocated the physical abuse of detainees and I am sure that [redacted] understood that my intent was to only take advantage of the detainees pre-existing fear [redacted]

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No.

End of Statement

10. EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Fort Huachuca MID DATED 2004/06/10

6. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ [redacted] TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE [redacted] AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June [redacted]
at the Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Detachment

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/[redacted]	1411[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SSG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police Company

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib in early October. I was assigned as the Dayshift Supervisor of Tier 1 through 3. I had between 13-18 soldiers at any one time. And we had several responsibilities at Abu Ghraib. Tier 1A belonged to MI for detainees of intelligence value and Tier 1B belonged to MPs for disciplinary from either Camp Ganci or Vigilant or for detainees that where suspected to have a mental disability and could not cope with other detainees in general population of the hard site. [redacted] was the Nightshift Supervisor an[redacted] was the NCOIC of the Tiers. I never witnessed or was made aware of any detainee abuse, any photos or videos of detainees until I saw them on TV. I have no knowledge of dogs being used as a tool during interrogations during the day shift or night shift. Canine were used for search during the handgun incident. Dogs were brought in and stood on the side and were barking. The day of the handgun there were many people in the hard site. I sa[redacted] who I had never seen before there. There were many folks with civilian clothes. One day a dog handler came in and asked if he could walk the dog through the hard site. I told him fine but not to go where the prisoners were and stay in the hallway. As far as interrogation techniques used, I saw a lot of yelling but never any hands laid on a detainee. MI liked [redacted] because he would get in the detainees face, but I never witnessed or heard of him touching a detainee. During the night of the handgun incident ICOs (Iraqi Correction Officiers) where gathered up and suspected corrupted ICOs where identified by Military Police and where stripped search in the Iraqi Police supervisor office. This event happened during the night shift and I had no say so during this shift. I didn't really interact with MI due to the fact of other obligations and MI showed only to pick up or drop off a detainee. The only things out of the ordinary that I can recall were about the "ghost" detainees dropped off by Other Government Agencies" (OGA). These detainees were dropped off but were not given a detainee number or logged in. The personnel dropping them off had no name and brought them in at about 0400 in the morning. One day as I was walking the hard site, I saw in Tier 1 on the second floor, a two detainees on the ground facing down with only his shirt, a bag over his head and naked below his waist. I told my MP to cover him up and a blanket was placed over the detainee. I spoke to the OGA there and the detainee was taken to the interrogation room in one of the showers. The OGA there was wearing civilian clothes, had no facial hair, Caucasian, medium built, name unknown. The interpreter on site was a short round man with reddish beard. This occurred in mid December. The other incident I witnessed was when the ICRC was visiting and I was escorting them. There was a tub in the middle of the hallway with wires coming out and going into a cell. I picked up the tub and there was a transformer there. I opened the cell and there was a huge radio and a naked detainee in the cell. The detainee was not in the open and was alone. I asked someone who the hell place him there but no one knew. When I would make my rounds in the morning I would find detainees in Tier 1B without clothes. I would ask why they didn't have any clothes and I was told that they were that way before shift started. No names were given. I would have the MPs give them clothes. In the beginning, I did see detainees in the MI side with women's underwear and one with a suit covering his private parts with two MRE containers. I did not understand it because when they came in from Vigilant, Ganci, or other places, they were clothed. I was told it was MI's way of making an uncomfortable environment in which helped with interrogations. (This event occurred during the Company's OJT process with the 72nd MP CO wit[redacted] and the NCOIC (unable to remember name) prior to taking over as shift supervisor). I never witnessed or was aware of MI asking an MP to "soften-up" or give "the treatment" to an MP nor do I feel that they would of ask me due to possible refusal of an unlawful request. MI would tell us to take certain articles of chlothes (jumpsuit), the mattress, or put them in sleep deprivation. They were always left with some clothing. [redacted] a civilian interrogator, stands out in my mind. He never spoke to me and avoided me. When the chain of command was relieved and we changed personnel in the night shift, I recommended [redacted] to replace [redacted] on tier 1. [redacted] went to [redacted] and asked tha[redacted] be removed from the night shift. [redacted] had called for a medic to see a detainee claiming to have chest pains during a sleep management schedule in which the medic prescribed medicine and the detainee was taken off of the sleep plan. This detainee was known to have a heart condition. [redacted] got mad because he said that [redacted] interrupted the sleep plan. My impression was tha[redacted] did not want [redacted] on the night shift becau[redacted] would not do wha[redacted] wanted. There were some tensions between MPs and MI. Tier 1A fell under MI control but we had to monitor the sleep plans and implement MI's plan's with detainees. They should have been the ones who monitored their prisoners. The only two MI personnel that I really dealt with were [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF ___ PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/07

[redacted] STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] They would come in and check on detainees. The interpreter that I can remember the most was [redacted] He would come by the Hard Site about three times a day. He was the one we could use to speak to the security detainees because he had a clearance. We had an impression he was a homosexual. We really didn't know what MI's procedures were. (MI meaning OGA and military). I had asked for the Interrogation Rules of Engagement and a MI liaison to work side by side with MP on the tier but I never got them. Once the new unit came on board. Things got a lot better between MI and MPs MI placed a liaison [redacted] who would notify us of detainees' arrival and departures and would keep the MPs up to date with security detainees status.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1. AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted] PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DAMO-ODL

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Building AT-5636 Gorham St; Fort Bragg, NC 28310
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/15
3. TIME: [redacted]
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-4/AD
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

[redacted]

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From the end of Aug 03 to 13 Feb 04, I deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97E interrogator. I did not arrive with the other 519th MI Bn personnel as I was on emergency leave during the initial move into AG. Upon my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. On at least two occasions as the IROE changed, I signed a memorandum stating I read, understood, and would follow the IROE. The IROE made it necessary to get authorization to do certain techniques and approaches. I sat in on a couple of interrogations before I conducted interrogations on my own. I was not with the unit in Afghanistan, so I can not site any differences between the AG IROE and the IROE used in Afghanistan. Certain techniques had have written approval. The mechanism for this approval was the interrogation plan, which had to be done and approved prior to any interrogation. The interrogator would request an approach in the interrogation plan and then submit it to their team leader who would ensure the plan was approved. Over time the authorization process evolved into requiring special written permission use special interrogation methods like sleep deprivation. I have had several requests to be interviewed by the New York Times concerning the possible MP abuse of several Iraqi Generals. In approximately Nov 03, I conducted an interrogation of an Iraqi General. Upon my initial meeting with the detainee, it was obvious he had been physically abused. I asked the detainee how he had sustained his injuries and he told me the MP's had beaten him up. He also said there were other Generals who were beaten up at the same time. I checked his information and found that he had been in the facility long enough that the injuries had to have been sustained during his time as a detainee. I reported this information to my higher headquarters as well as included the incident in the interrogation notes. I also conducted another interrogation of an Iraqi General who also appeared to have been physically abused by the MP's. In both cases, the detainees did not know the names of the MP's involved in the abuse. Although I did not interrogate any other abused Iraqi General, there were reportedly three other Generals who claimed to be abused by the MP's. I reported this information to the Criminal Investigative Command (CID) in Jan 04. I have been contacted by the New York Times on several occasions to provide additional information. I have discussed this with my chain of command and have been advised to refer all inquiries concerning AG to the Army Public Affairs Office. In Dec 03 I did witness the authorized use of a guard dog in an interrogation. The dog handler would let the guard dog get in close proximity of the detainee possibly without a muzzle so the dog could bark and frighten the detainee. I suspected they were not muzzled because of the volume of the barking. Although I was not a direct witness as the incident occurred in an interrogation booth, I did hear the dog in the booth with the interrogators and the detainee. I did hear the MP's make general comments from time to time something to the effect of "give me five minutes with the detainee and he will start talking." I believe this type of comment to have been made only for humor value. On at least four occasions I witnessed detainees in the nude. On these occasions I would go to the MP's and request a detainee for interrogation. Upon arriving at their cell, they were naked. On one occasion, the detainee had his clothes in his cell, but did not have them on when I went to interrogate the detainee. [redacted] assisted me in this interrogation. After our arrival at the cell, the MP's instructed the detainee to put on his clothes and he was then escorted to the interrogation tent. On three occasions, the MP's had taken the detainee's clothing away and the items were not available. Twice the detainees were given sheets to wear during the interrogations and the other time an orange jump suit was provided. Instead of making the detainees walk across the facility, we conducted the interrogations in the building. One interrogation was conducted in the shower area on the second level and the others were conducted in the in the stairwell on the first floor. The detainees were at times stripped during their inprocessing and subsequent screening. [redacted] was the NCOIC of the screening section and may have ordered the detainees to remain stripped as a form of humiliation. It was a practice, especially for MI holds to take their clothes in a possible attempt to renew the "capture shock" of detainees who had been in US custody for an extended period of time or were transferred from other facilities. I did hear rumors that [redacted] may have gotten a little too physical with a male apprehended as a possible suspect for the 20 Sep 03 mortar attack which killed four US soldiers and injured several more. Other than the incidents discussed above, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee. I never witnessed nor heard of any MP seriously offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Fort Bragg, NC DATED 2004/06/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No.

END OF STATEMENT

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR [redacted] TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 15th day of June, 2004

at Fort Bragg, NC

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

51 S.C. 936

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieva
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION 99th Regional Readiness Command, Coraopolis, PA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/25	3. TIME 1700
4. FILE NUMBER		
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SSG/E-6
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 1st Engineer Battalion, 3rd Combat Support Brigade, 95th Division, Fort Leonard Wood, MO		

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I a HUMINT Collection Interrogator (MOS 97E) currently assigned to the 1st Engineer Battalion (BN), 3rd Combat Support Brigade (BDE), 95th Division, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. I also hold MOS's 95B (Military Police (MP)) and 51M (Firefighter). I am also a Tagalog linguist. I was granted MOS 95B on 22 Nov 96, and I had not actively worked the 97E MOS since then. I was mobilized in MOS 97E for Operation Iraqi Freedom on 20 Feb 03, and was crossed level to B Co, 325th Military Intelligence (MI) BN. I reported to the B Co, 325 MI Bn at Fort Dix, NJ, on 20 Feb 03 and remained undergoing pre-deployment training and integration into B Co, 325 MI Bn. I received classes on interrogations techniques, interrogation approaches, report writing, combat operations, reaction drills, and weapons qualification. I departed Fort Dix on 21 Mar 03, and arrived at Camp Virginia, Kuwait, on 23 Mar 03. I remained at Camp Virginia until 29 April 03 when we convoyed to Balad Airbase arriving at Balad Airbase on 30 April 03. At Balad Airbase, I was busied with routine details and I did not participate in any interrogations or other operational matters. On 17 May 03, I went to Camp Cropper at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) where I worked predominately in screening and interrogation operations. The 519th MI BN had already set up operations there by the time I had arrived at Cropper. There was only one interrogation incident that I witnessed at Cropper that I thought was a little odd. 519th interrogators were interrogating a detainee who they believed was a Wahabbi extremist. The interrogators had the detainee in a stress position down on his knees with his arms stretched out to both sides. I asked interrogators of the 519th and of the B/325MI about it, but they stated that this was a normal technique, and I didn't think more of it. Other than this incident, I never saw any unauthorized interrogation techniques or abuses. However, while at Camp Cropper, I was concerned about some detainees that were brought in by SEAL Team 5 and Task Force 20 that appeared to be very severely beaten. When we would inquire about their wounds, the SEALs/TF-20 members would provide a general "they resisted" response was responsible for recording theses injuries and wrote reports, I believe, on all such incidents. I don't recall unit, but I believe it was an Army Reserve unit from South Carolina, and I recall that he worked for the Charlotte (SC) Police Department. On 12 Sep 03, about 15 members of the 325th transferred to Abu Garayb (AG), and I followed them arriving at AG on 5 Oct 03 after closing down my operations at Cropper. When I arrived at AG, I, as well as all other personnel, received classes on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and a statement acknowledging that they had received and understood the IROE. It appeared to me that attached from the 66th MI Group as the ICE NCOIC, had a clear training program for newly assigned MI personnel. trained personnel on a very clear IROE and she clearly instructed that interrogation techniques beyond those authorized in FM 34-52 would not be used and that if someone witnesses unauthorized techniques, they should report it. It appeared there was no room for misunderstanding of the IROE. When I arrived at AG, I was teamed up with the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center (JDIC) Operations Officer who was already at AG. I worked special projects for created and maintained targeting lists, and performed various other functions in the operational area. I never personally participated in any interrogations at AG, although I did observe a few in the booths, but I never saw any problems. When the organic assets of the 325th departed AG on or about 15 Nov 03, I replaced the departing and became the JDIC Operations NCOIC, still working for arranging interrogation facilities/booths and detainee availability, overseeing the various JDIC sections (CM&D, Fusion Cell, Detainee Assessment Board (DAB), and tracking the status of detainees in Isolation and any requests for extensions of those detainees past the 30 day limit. When the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Officer-in-Charge (OIC) would submit any requests for authority past those granted in FM 34-52, she would "carbon copy" me on those requests and I would track the status of Isolation detainees. My understanding was that sent the requests directly to COL PAPPAS, the 205th MI BDE Commander, after mid Nov 03 when he moved permanently to AG, and possibly straight to CJTF-7 for LTG SANCHEZ's signature, prior to COL PAPPAS' residency at AG. I never saw any requests from the ICE for the use of military working dogs, and to my knowledge, the use of dogs was never approved while I was at AG. While I do recall seeing some requests for "Sleep Deprivation", I do not recall seeing any approvals for its use. However, only provided me a couple of approvals from COL PAPPAS or CJTF-7, and it was not a routine practice or procedure that I would have received them. While at AG, I never saw any physical abuse of detainees

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Coraopolis, PA DATED 2004/05/25 [redacted]

[redacted] STATEMENT *(Continued)*

nor did anyone ever report any such abuse to me. I did hear rumors of one incident involving three 519th male interrogators who entered Cell Block 1B and conducted a late night "unauthorized interrogation" of a female inmate who was not an MI Hold. Following the incident, [redacted] reviewed the IROE, but nothing was really put out to the Command about the incident. This is the only incident of physical abuse of which I heard. In Jan 04, I was approached by CID during the course of their investigation into detainees abuses at AG and showed me photographs and videos of detainees and soldiers and asked me to identify individuals in the photos/videos. Prior to that CID presentation, I had never saw any unauthorized photographs or videos of any detainees, nor did I hear of any, nor did anyone ever inform me of any. I never saw military working dogs being used during MI interrogation operations. On only one occasion, I saw a detainee completely naked in the hard site, but he had just finished showering and he was not on display for humiliation purposes. I never saw any inmate in women's underwear, nor did I ever hear of anyone discussing it, nor did anyone ever report it to me. [redacted] an MP NCO, once told me that one of the detainees in Cell Block 1A, second tier, like to wear women's underwear, but I personally never saw any inmate dressed in female clothes. There was only one incident that I heard of concerning stripping a detainee. [redacted] an interrogator, and [redacted], an analyst, were conducting an interrogation of a detainee in the hard site. The detainee apparently was not cooperating with [redacted] and she had him strip down, I believe to his underwear, and then walked him in his underwear to the Camp Vigilant portion of AG. It was sometime in Nov 03 and it was very cold. I heard that both [redacted] received oral reprimands from [redacted]. Both were permanently removed from interrogation duties; [redacted] came to work for me in Operations (I was on "R & R" leave from 22 Nov to 15 Dec 03, and [redacted] was assigned to Operations by the time I had returned) and [redacted] was moved to the Fusion Cell. [redacted] told me about the incident, inquiring if I thought he would get in trouble over it. I told him I thought he would, since he had participated in an unauthorized technique. Regarding [redacted] I am shocked by their involvement in these abuses. Because [redacted] had been involved in the "stripping" incident in Nov 03, it did not surprise me as much as [redacted]'s involvement was really a surprise since we worked fairly close together. I didn't really know [redacted], so I was neither surprised nor not surprised. I was not as surprised about him as I was about [redacted]. When I arrived at AG, things were pretty squared away; [redacted] seemed to have things under control. I didn't ever see anything out of control. To answer MG Fay's question about "what was going on at AG", I don't really know why things went wrong. I am surprised; shocked, and troubled with the incidents of abuse and the fact that some MI soldiers did not report incidents they had witnessed. There is no doubt in my mind that all soldiers in the JIDC were briefed on the IROE numerous times and the recourse if the IROE was violated and not reported. I departed AG on emergency leave on 22 Jan 04 and never returned there. I have nothing further to add to this statement.//END OF STATEMENT//

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield	2004/05/24	1800 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	O4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Human Resources Command, OPMD, Alexandria, VA 22332

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was the S-3, 205th MI Bde, V Corps from 10 June 2002 to 31 March 2004. I was in Kuwait from Nov 2002 until Dec 2002. I deployed back into Kuwait on 14 Feb 2003 and went into Iraq with the forward element of the 205th in April 2003 and remained in Iraq until 6 Feb 2004. My rater was the Brigade DCO - first [redacted] and then [redacted] My senior rater was the Brigade Commander - first [redacted] then COL Thomas Pappas. The 205th has 3 organic battalions consisting of approximately 850 personnel. P[redacted] execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the Brigade grew to seven battalions and had a strength of 1650 personnel. At first we had no organic or attached interrogation capability and very little organic CI in theater. We relied at first on the 513th for both interrogation and CI support. Later on (APR/MAY 2003) the Bde's attached elements of the 519th, 323rd and 325th arrived in theater and provided the Corps with a robust interrogation capability. Our original planning for the initial portion of the campaign envisioned 100s of detainees/PWs which would be handled in stages in a tiered approach. They would be screened and initially processed by Bde and Div elements and then moved successively thru Corps detention facilities ending up with the 513th theater detention facility. Initial planning called for two Corps facilities - 519th, which had Balkans and OEF experience would be forward and the 325th (with limited Afghanistan experience) handling the rear. However, the rapid rate of the maneuver advance and the deployment timeline of our attached interrogation assets prevented this plan from coming to fruition. Our planning called for approximately 10 to 15% of the detainees having intelligence potential for exploitation. As the maneuver units brought more and more detainees to the detention center in central Baghdad (vic Baghdad International Airport (BIAP)), overcrowding became a issue. The Brigade's focus was on screening the newly arrived detainees to determine if they had intelligence value and then the interrogation of those who were assessed to have value. Those who were assessed with no intel value were then detained by the MPs in general population holding areas. In addition to receiving targeted individuals, the detention center also received a large portion of detainees who were in the target area. While limited numbers of some of these detainees had some intelligent value, most did not. Initially, regardless of circumstance (target vs in the target area), none of these detainees were released from detention. Generally, the maneuver units thought they were a threat and should not be released (they would face them in combat action or other hostile incidents). As CJTF-7 stood up, it established a board system in which MI, MP, and JAG had "votes" on release of detainees. The MI brigade and Maneuver Units provided input to the board. The Brigade's focus on detainees was to process, interrogate and exhaust them of intelligence value and then coordinate for their placement into a general population holding area. On rare occasions MI would also nominate a detainee for release. The 205th conducted its initial detainee planning with the 18th MP Brigade, organic to V Corps. We did not initially coordinate with the 800th as they were TPFFDed to directly support CFLCC. We did not begin a working relationship with the 800th until CJTF-7 was established and the 800th became one of its subordinate units. Pre-conflict planning called for coordination between MI and the MPs on lanes in the road and responsibilities - the "how, when and what to co" in regards to detention and interrogation operations. This coordination and planning continued throughout the operation. While the locations of initial Corps detention centers were planned, their actual locations were ultimately determined by ground operations, rather than deliberate planning. Early-on detention operations and interrogation operations at Corps generally followed a model of tiered support. The maneuver brigades and divisions each conducting their own interrogation operations, but initially the Corps and Theater (CFLCC) operations were intertwined. CFLCC established interrogation operations at the Theater Internment Facility at Camp Bucca with the 323rd MI Bn, and a forward interrogation facility initially at Life Support Area (LSA) Bushmaster and subsequently at Camp Cropper (vic BIAP) with elements of the 202nd. The 205th initially had elements of the 519th (attached to the Brigade from the beginning of the war) imbedded into these early interrogation operations. As CJTF-7 established (14 Jun 03) the 205th took control of the 323rd and the interrogation operation at Camp Bucca. The 519th initially took full control of the interrogation operation at Camp Cropper, conducting both screening and interrogations. The screening operations became increasingly important and cumbersome as we initially experienced problems with most of the capturing units not providing capture tags or capture tags not filled out properly. COL Pappas and I talked to the Bn S-3s of 3ID and 4ID to get the Bn and Bde cages to do their job properly and after while there were improvement[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 5 [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/24

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

In late July/early August CJTF-7 planned for a major operation aimed at capturing members of the Saddam Fedeyeen (SD). A lists of thousands of names, occupations and addresses of suspected SD personnel was translated and Operation Victory Bounty was planned to round them up. Planning called for placing these SD detainees at a location other than Cropper and to establish a concentrated interrogation effort which would specialize in obtaining detailed information on the SD. This resulted in the Brigade establishing a third interrogation effort at Abu Ghuraib (AG), which would be operated and manned by the 519th. The 325th took responsibility for continuing the operations at Cropper. During Operation Victory Bounty more than just suspected SD personnel were rounded up. Apparently maneuver elements corralled just about everyone in the vicinity of a SD suspect. After the personnel were sent to AG for screening and interrogation, we received a high amount of requests for information from CJTF-7. We very rapidly realized that we needed to send CJTF-7 a tailored daily report to address the high volume of information requirements. To ensure we were able to assist in answering one of CJTF-7's top PIR, it was nearly mandated that we stay on a script of questions, centering on whether or not there was a planned and centrally controlled insurgency working against us. We kept records and forwarded information to CJTF-7 of the number of detainees, the number screened, the number interrogated, the number determined to be SD as well as statistics on production. I kept copies of the reports in a folder titled "Victory Bounty" on my computer. This computer was turned over to the S3 of the 504th, which replaced the 205th in Iraq. The ACE might be another place where the information might be retained. When we moved elements of the 519th into AG, it was already partially occupied by other activities. There was a CPA controlled and operated civilian prison for Iraqi criminals and a CJTF-7 operated military internment facility which would process and hold personnel and then move them on to Bucca. CPA had begun to refurbish portions of the old Iraqi AG prison complex. The area being refurbish included two wings of 50 cells each which were suitable for isolation of detainees. We requested 50 of those cells for our use for Victory Bounty detainees. We eventually got use of the 50 cells, and later received CPA authorization to use both wings. The 205th and CJTF-7 both considered consolidation of interrogation facilities of the three widely spaced interrogation facilities into AG. This was driven for the most part by a need to achieve operating and manpower efficiencies. Overcrowding at Cropper and a plan to close Bucca also factored into the consolidation plan. In late Aug or early Sep at a meeting involving LTG Sanchez, COL Pappas and I, the decision was made to conduct the consolidation of the coalition interrogation facilities. The base plan involved the 800th MP Brigade conducting detainee operations and providing the detainee guard force. LTG Sanchez was informed that the consolidation plan would improve the interrogation process and increase intelligence output. In early Sept 03 [redacted] who was my Assistant S-3, and I met with the S-3s of the 519th, 325 and 323 to begin planning the consolidation. While I was TDY later in Sept, a decision was made to establish the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at AG. This decision was made to reflect the realities of what was actually occurring at AG - it was already a JIDC in everything but its name - there was an overriding mission set that in effect dictated what it was to become. The debriefing portion of the name was key, even if it reflected a capability if not an actuality. However, AG personnel were already accomplishing debriefings at locations other than AG and it was envisioned that debriefings as well as interrogations would be executed at AG in the future. What we conceived actually came into being. I suspect that LTG Sanchez may have been considering what was being done at GTMO even before MG Miller visited Iraq. I sense that in at least one conversation between LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas at which I was not present (I was TDY back in the States), the GTMO process was explored and discussed. MG Miller's visit and the follow-on assistance team from GTMO certainly cemented it. Based on the information obtained from the GTMO assistance team visit, we had additional discussions with MG Fast in which we looked at GTMO and how they were structured. We felt that we did not need the full GTMO infrastructure (mostly analytical and requirements management) support staff as that could be provided by the Coalition Analysis and Control Element. We submitted a request for forces (RFF) in order to establish a premier interrogation facility, which would include MPs for running the detention portion of the facility, a dog team to support MP operations, a behavioral science team, collection management and reports section, and additional analysts. We pursued the establishment of Interrogation "Tiger Teams" consisting of an interrogator and an analyst, supported by a linguist. The Tiger Teams were designed to be able to draw out information from detainees, process and report, analyze internally, and conduct research for further exploitation. We initially decided that we did not need a Bn structure at the JIDC. However we wanted a field grade officer to set the JIDC up and to serve as the operations officer. COL Pappas chose [redacted] to execute these responsibilities. I was in contact with [redacted] several times a day to discuss plans, requirement and other operational aspects of interrogation operations. He was informed that elements of the 519th, 325th and 323rd would be there to conduct interrogation operations but that there would not be a full staff; the Brigade HQs would provide staff support. By collapsing the other two interrogation facilities we were able to pull in all the subject matter expertise from the other locations into one place. Later on in late-Sep, [redacted] was selected to "run" the JIDC. As I understand how the situation developed, COL Pappas and the DCO met with MG Fast and [redacted] and a decision to place an O5 at the JIDC was made and MG Fast told [redacted] to assign [redacted] to COL Pappas for the purpose of running the JIDC. We eventually stood up a JIDC Headquarters Company to facilitate having a company commander on the ground responsible for the health, welfare, morale and discipline for the soldiers at the JIDC. The company was formed around personnel from the 323rd, who was also given responsibility to assist the company at the battalion level. The 323rd, however, was never put in charge of running the JIDC. [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

Statement of [redacted] Taken at Springfield, VA Date 2004/05/24

[redacted] Human Resources Command/OPMD, Alexandria, VA 22332

[redacted] was supposed to run the JDIC. The soldiers saw [redacted] as the OIC and [redacted] as the Ops Officer. I spoke with [redacted] about his duties a couple of times, although the conversations mainly ended up being about soldier support issues (his initial effort centered around wanting sports equipment). I primarily dealt with [redacted] on the ops side of the house. As I understand it, [redacted] has a Civil Affairs/PSYOPS background. I am not aware if he had an interrogation/JIDC background. I had to speak with him a couple of times about what his job was and what he should be doing – I had to tell him where his focus should be. I informed him that the Brigade Staff would take care of the soldier support things he seemed to be occupied with and to get on with running the JIDC. I soon realized that [redacted] was probably not the right officer for running the JIDC and mentioned that to COL Pappas. In hindsight, I did not express that strongly enough. [redacted] was sent to run the JIDC because the alternative would have been to have COL Pappas run it, which would have meant he would have been spending a disproportionate amount of time on an organization that represented about one eighth of his span of control. For a time there was consideration to move me out there; in fact I made a couple of visits for 24-48 hours at a time to work on some operational problems. [redacted] and I had frequent contact on the ops side and we felt we could make it work. [redacted] understood the Commander's intent. I did not have the authority to remove [redacted] and in fact he represented the J2, not the 205th. I don't want to suppose what COL Pappas was thinking initially, but I know that he eventually had his own concerns about [redacted] and eventually took action to coordinate his removal from the JIDC In a session with LTG Sanchez there was a realization that the JIDC was still not where the CG wanted it and LTG Sanchez directed COL Pappas to move to AG. LTG Sanchez's reason for putting him there was to insure that interrogations were done LAW proper procedures – I assess that LTG Sanchez determined that he would feel better if COL Pappas, a Brigade Commander, answerable to him, was there overseeing interrogations, the Brigades #1 mission as specified by the CG. There was some turmoil at the JDIC We realized that there were some disciplinary problems on the MPs side of the house which needed fixing. There was a struggle on the interrogation ops side of the house but we made it work. Some of the interrogators were upset at being extended in theater, at the ever changing mission, overcrowding at the facility, poor living conditions and the increasing threat from mortars and other attacks. There was poor discipline on the MPs side of the house, folks out of uniform, and disarray in the living and work spaces Consideration was made to move the Brigade Headquarters to AG, but that would have meant the Bde Hqs would have spent most of the time running the JIDC at the cost of seven battalions--their operations, and their personnel. We attempted to balance the location and focus of the Bde leadership by having the Brigade Commander and a small TAC move to AG, while the DCO and I stayed at Victory to assist the commander in running the rest of the Brigade and to facilitate coordination with the CJTF-7 staff. COL Pappas had a good understanding of the situation, and understood what needed to happen in regards to moving to AG and taking over as the FOB Commander. The place was too vulnerable. COL Pappas had to take control and secure the facility. I took my Ops SGM there for a review the day afte[redacted]

Initials of person making statement [redacted] Page 3 of 5 [redacted]

the FRAGO giving us the FOB came out. During that visit we took note of several security concerns--unauthorized folks having access, and local workers being too close to the JIDC work and life support areas for example. The FRAGO directed that COL Pappas have TACON of all tenant units at AG, provide force protection and security for the detainees. I understood that security for the detainees was essentially the same as providing force protection for the soldiers and US Government civilians and contractors. I did not assess that there was a specified or implied task for the 205th to run MP operations. In other words, the FRAGO did not entail the internal aspects of the confinement facility, the movement and control of detainees, care and feeding of the detainees and prisoners, or telling the MPs how to do their job in running the confinement facility. I think COL Pappas also had the same understanding. I never saw the FRAGO as meaning the 205th and COL Pappas were to be in total control of all internal aspects of AG. We were not MPs and not in their operational chain of command. I don't feel we usurped the MP Commander's responsibilities or authorities to train, manage, and conduct MP operations. If we took or directed action on certain aspects for force protection it was because they were not doing it, we sensed a void and needed to fill it in order to maintain security and force protection for all of the soldiers, civilians, and detainees located at AG. We had discussions with BG Karpinski, Commander of the 800th MP Bde. Prior to COL Pappas being given the FOB, our units had been TACON to the 800th MP Bde, but they wanted us to do their job in guarding the facilities, force protection, etc. We did not have the manpower to do so and simultaneously execute the interrogation mission--CJTF-7 agreed. When COL Pappas was given the FOB, 800th became TACON to us and we expected a lot from them. We sent the 165th MI Bn to AG to assist COL Pappas in running the FOB and to assist with FP. As we saw a greater need to take control of some of the MP operations to improve FP, we asked CJTF-7 for OPCON of the 800th MP assets at AG, but [redacted] (CJTF-7 DC3) said no – you don't need that – take charge of the FOB – I will talk to the Cdr of the 800th. I had continuing dialogues with BG Karpinski about differences between doctrine requirements and actual manpower. I also spoke to her Bde S3 about how we could improve FP, and on providing MP escorts to detainees being interrogated. We also discussed what TACON authorities we had been given and what was expected of them. It boiled down to them not having enough manpower. We jointly worked an RFF and the C3, MG Miller agreed to support getting contractors to do some MP functions for security and force protection, guard and escort detainees. None of the existing contracts allowed for that, so we had a new Statement of Work written; it was not approved before I departed the theater. [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/24

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

There were two aspects of 205th taking over the FOB - insure that interrogation ops could be conducted in a safe and productive manner and running the physical plant of AG. We had always done the first and had to assume some of the second, but it did not entail telling the MPs how to do their MP functions. The MG Miller visit came while I was TDY. I never met or spoke with him. COL Pappas had a vision resulting from his discussions with LTG Sanchez and MG Miller. When the assistance team was there we mapped out a strategy, courses of action and an organizational design of what we needed for the JIDC and how to get there. We realized there were several differences between GTMO and AG. They had a consolidated MP and MI data base system which covered all aspects of controlling and exploiting detainees and fed into a National system. We did not, but needed a similar system. We started getting involved on the ops side and worked in getting the assets we needed-both systems and personnel, and getting to the JIDC for integration. I was involved in a couple of discussions on interrogation methods and concepts with MG Miller's folks but nothing out of the ordinary. The discussions raised nothing that we would que[redacted]hey centered around items right out of the manual and standard, accepted doctrine. My involvement in these discussio[redacted]ed on ensuring the efficient execution (meeting the commander's intent) of the entire[redacted] of JIDC OPS of which interrogations was just one (albeit the most critical) part. At first there were no approved IROEs unt[redacted] put them together, based on experience in Afghanistan. It resulted in 205th and CJTF-7 approved IROEs. I really did not get involved in the requests or approval for exceptions for the IROEs except for one time when I was the acting DCO. My experience had been limited to assisting in processing several 30-day extension of isolation, mostly while serving as the DCO. I knew that interrogators had to get permission to use dogs and to use sleep deprivation. I never saw a request or an approval for anything but isolation extension. As stated, however, they were not generally routed through me or the Bde S3 shop. I did not see, observe and was not informed of any abuse or humiliation of prisoners, pictures or videos, or use of dogs against detainees. I know that CL Pappas was reviewing some pictures that had been taken but was excluded from his office area while he was doing so. I was generally not involved in disciplinary matters. I was aware of the Article 15 given to the three soldiers over the drinking and interrogation incident. I was informed of the shooting incident immediately after it happened and knew that in the aftermath there were changes in our security procedures. I worked some of the resource issues for enhanced security. The OIC of the JDIC or the Ops Officer would decide who could get into the hard site [redacted] kept a status board on detainees that we were working for interrogation and was supposed to control who went into the cells. However, the MPs often used our cell areas that were unoccupied for "trouble makers" from other areas, without our permission. OGA put their detainees in our area without fully identifying them to us - we knew they were there, accounted for as "OGA 1" or "OGA 2" etc. We tried to work a MOA with OGA and CJTF-7 about their use of our area and doing interrogations under our rules, but it was never accomplished. There was some sharing of intelligence from their interrogations, and our interrogators at times worked with them on interrogations. [redacted] and I discussed some of this and he gave me a comfort level that an appropriate level of coordination and oversight was taking place. I did not really get involved in the internal aspects of interrogation operations but dealt mainly with requirement, priorities, and resources. There was training and orientation for all incoming personnel - soldiers, civilians, contractors. It was aligned with training at GTMO and included ROEs, Geneva Convention and the like. We did not QC the contractors, but assumed that the SOW was sufficient for the company to provide quality, experienced and capable interrogators. We felt that the company did the vetting. [redacted]

Q Is there any thing else you would like to add [redacted]

A No not at this time [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL COMMITMENT. [redacted]

[redacted] *(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of May, 2004 at North Rosslyn, Springfield VA [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(GMJ, Article 136) *(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES [redacted]

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is [redacted]

LOCATION Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	DATE [redacted] 12 June 2004 TIME 1347	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]	GRADE/STATUS SPC/USA
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq		

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labeled bac2d823af8949afbfa088 6e66f746c9.jpg depicts a Titan linguist whose first name is [redacted] the left. I do not recall his last name. The individual on the right is [redacted] Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing on the left of the photograph. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing to the right of the handler in a tan cap. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing to the left of the detainee [redacted] standing to the right of [redacted] The individual standing behind the bars on the left side of the photograph is an Iraqi Policeman, who name is unknown to me. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: NO [redacted]

— END OF STATEMENT —

NOT USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.10

CJTF-7-TF FAY 28 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted]27 MAY 2004 TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW

On 27 May 2004 the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview from our offices located in Metro Park, Alexandria, VA with [redacted]n Fort Huachuca, AZ. The purpose of this interview was to clarify details included in her 21 May 2004 sworn statement.

[redacted]reiterated she personally saw no detainees in Abu Ghraib who were nude or stripped of their clothing. She did not generally observe the in-processing of detainees but the few she did observe did not involve stripping of detainees. To her knowledge, such methods were not part of the in-processing protocol and "pat-down" searches were the standard. While stripping newly arrived detainees to facilitate the search for contraband and weapons was the norm in Afghanistan she opined it was not employed at Abu Ghraib because the job would have been too overwhelming, they didn't have sufficient numbers of prison uniforms to issue the detainees, and there was not sufficient space or resources to securely accomplish the task. [redacted]did not observe any detainee nudity associated with interrogations. Question: Did you observe any nudity at Abu Ghraib? Answer: "I don't think so...unless it was used as an incentive (interrogation) to get clothes back. I don't recall and didn't see any (nudity). She added that the Interrogation Rules of Engagement made it possible to strip a detainee but would have to be requested and any such request would go through her or her Operations Officer, [redacted]and she never saw any. Her interrogators had also been instructed not to make any direct request or give any directions to the MPs; all requests from MI to the MPs were directed to go through [redacted] [redacted]worked for [redacted] He conducted initial MI screening of detainees during in-processing to Abu Ghraib to determine MI interest and recommend detainees for MI hold status and interment in Tier 1A. He worked with CACI linguists conducting screenings of paperwork to "narrow the field" and then quick interviews to further narrow those designated as MI hold. [redacted]voiced no objection to additional questions and provided her cell phone [redacted]nd office phone [redacted]

[redacted]

LTC, MI
TF-FAY, CJTF7

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/21[redacted]	1945[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A/304TH Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Huachuca, AZ

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I have been assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN) since 01 May 2000. I deployed to Afghanistan for six months with A Company, 519th MI BN on 20 Jul 02. I served as the Operations Officer of interrogation operations at a facility in Bagram until I redeployed on 28 Jan 03. I then deployed to Kuwait on 12 Mar 04, with HHS, 519th MI BN where I served as the Battle Captain/Assistant S-3. I crossed into Iraq on 4 Apr 04, first arriving at LSA Bushmaster, to conduct initial coordination with the 720th Military Police (MP) Battalion who was establishing a detainee facility or "cage". I remained at Bushmaster for approximately 12 days. I then moved forward to LSA Dogwood, where the 720th MP BN established a second cage, and I remained there for 10 days to two weeks at the end of Apr 03. I moved to Camp Speicher (North Tikrit) where the 519th MI BN established its Headquarters. From early May to early June, I served as the 519th MI Bn Liaison Officer to the 4th ID for Tactical Humint Operations. During the June timeframe, I served at the Camp Cropper detention facility as the Senior Intelligence Officer and battalion level representative for the 519th. In early July, I returned to Camp Speicher as a Battle Captain, and it was shortly after returning to Speicher that the 519th received the Warning Order to establish interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib (AG) in support of the upcoming operation Victory Bounty. On or about 23 Jul 03, I was a member of the 519th MI Bn site survey team to conduct an assessment of the AG facility and then returned to Camp Speicher. Due to the overwhelming requests for updates, [redacted] requested additional higher level assistance from the 519th MI Bn so that he could focus on his company command duties and to provide much necessary life support. I arrived at AG on 4 August, and my position was as the Interrogation OIC responsible for supervising the interrogation operations and personnel. I was responsible for screening, interrogations, and reporting of intelligence information. I departed Iraq on 4 Dec 03 on "Rest and Relaxation" leave and unexpectedly received redeployment orders while on leave. I returned to Kuwait to out-process on 24 December 2003 and departed Kuwait 25 December en-route to Fort Bragg. I never returned to AG. While at Camp Cropper, I had various conversations with my two warrant officers, [redacted] interrogation ops, and [redacted] the Operations Officer. All were frustrated with the overcrowded conditions at the Cropper detention facility. For example, the facility was intended to house approximately 200 detainees, and there were anywhere from 700 to 1,000 detainees. Many of the detainees were brought to Cropper for minor infractions, and most of the detainees were "low value detainees". Several detainees were what was referred to as "50 meters detainees", because they had been in the general vicinity of the target of a US raid and had been picked up essentially for being in close proximity. The "low value detainees" did not warrant long term interrogation effort or retention, and Cropper lacked facilities for proper interrogation operations. The conditions were similar at the facilities at Bushmaster and Dogwood. Bushmaster and Dogwood did not have sufficient logistical support - for example there were no tents for detainees and water was rationed. Cropper, however, had tents, which were routinely overcrowded [redacted] voiced his concerns with the overpopulation and the disgruntled mood of the detainees with no response. He published an Information Intelligence Report (IIR) in an effort to alert leadership of the situation and the problems within the facility. I am prior enlisted and served for ten years as an interrogator/HUMINT Collector (MOS 97E) and am qualified as a "Strategic Debriefer". As a Commissioned Officer, I have served in various positions involving tactical HUMINT Collection Operations. I served as a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) Leader in Bosnia-Herzegovinia for six months (SFOR-8), as an Analysis and Control Team (ACT) leader in Bosnia (SFOR 9), and as an Interrogation operations officer in Afghanistan with the 519th MI BN for six months. I consider myself very knowledgeable of Interrogation Operations and techniques. With the exception of what I discuss below, during my time in Iraq, I never witnessed any interrogation methods or operations that were outside normal procedures and observed nothing contrary to Army Field Manuals, Regulations, Doctrine, or the established curriculum presented at the 97E MOS producing school at the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, AZ. The interrogation environment in Iraq was challenging because the current US Army interrogation training and doctrine is rooted in and geared toward a conventional, cold war threat and not toward the Arab mindset. When I arrived at AG, there were approximately 50 to 150 inmates being held on criminal offenses. The 72nd MP Company was manning AG and was significantly undermanned and under resourced. The 519th received the mission for AG in late July, when AG was designated as the detention facility for individuals detained during Operation VICTORY BOUNTY (OVB). OVB was a nation-wide sweep to pick up approximately 1,80[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____."

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

[redacted] the 320th MP Battalion started operations there about the same time. While the military constructed a mass holding area (Holding area GANCI), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was simultaneously renovating the hard-site within AG prison. There was no suitable location to establish an interrogation facility and operations area. The 519th established the interrogation and administrative area in the vicinity of Holding Area VIGILANT, using a ARFABs, DRASH tents. The 205th MI BDE coordinated with the CPA to utilize 10 cells of cell block "1A". As a result of the renovation effort, Iraqi National workers employed for the CPA sponsored renovations utilized the courtyard immediately next to cell block 1A as a center of gravity for their welding and construction operation. The 519th initially used the outside portions of AG, not the hard site, due to the ongoing renovation project. The 205th MI BDE, specifically [redacted] COL PAPPAS, [redacted] were Bde battle captains and constantly requested updates.) kept pressuring the 519th to utilized the hard-site, but the site was not acceptable for use until about three weeks after our arrival (3rd week in Aug 03) because of the following reasons: the proximity of the construction workers could allow communication with detainees, insufficient numbers of MPs to guard detainees housed in the area, the MPs did not have locks, and the wing did not have electricity or running water. Camp Ganci was constructed within the confines of AG as an outside, main holding facility intended to hold up to 4000 "criminal detainees". Camp Vigilant was an outside facility intended to house general population of "security detainees". Although AG had been designated as the repository of the OVB detainees, we received only approximately 180 OVB detainees. Of those, approximately 62 were on the original list of 1,800, and only about 20 provided information, and that information was not particularly "actionable intelligence". About two weeks into OVB, AG started receiving "security detainees" from operations other than OVB and mission creep began as AG started becoming a general security detainee facility and eventually became the central, consolidated detention facility. I did not believe AG was the best place to use as a central facility, and during a meeting focused on consolidating assets on at AG in late Aug 03 with [redacted] (Co Cdr, 325th MI Bn), and [redacted] (325th MI Bn Commander), I voiced concerns about the defensibility of the facility, man-power shortage, location, and the stigma attached to AG. On or about 2 Sep 03, MG Miller and representatives from the Joint Task Force (JTF) at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, arrived at AG. It appeared that LTG Sanchez was not satisfied with the amount of actionable intelligence resulting from the interrogation operations at AG, and he had requested MG Miller review and assess the AG operations and provide recommendations learned from the detention facility at JTF-GTMO. I had discussions with MG Miller on a couple of occasions and these conversations centered on renovations and improvements of the facilities, challenges of interrogation operations, and the need for increased MP/MI cooperation. Specifically, I recall he discussed the implementation of dedicated MP support to MI. The purpose of dedicated MP support, for example, was to transport detainees to the designated interrogation booth, observe detainees while in holding and provide feedback to the interrogators. I never discussed specific methods or techniques with MG MILLER. The JTF-GTMO focus was more strategic than the tactical screening and operational environment of Iraq, and I believed the JTF-GTMO model could not be replicated in the Iraqi environment and experience. Although I attempted to express the concept, I do not know if MG MILLER understood my position and he appeared to press forward with his JTF-GTMO recommendations. I recommended a central facility could be constructed at Camp Speicher rather than AG, however I understood the reason behind the decision was an immediate demand for a facility. I never saw the final Miller Report, no[redacted]

[redacted]eceived any direct feedback as a result of the visit. The only feedback I saw was from the 205th following the recommendations from MG MILLER's visit. I do believe that the Miller visit propelled AG to become a "mini-mo". Shortly after MG MILLER departed AG, [redacted] arrived at AG on approximately 10 September, approximately the same time as the 325th MI Bn personnel. He was the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) to AG. I believe [redacted] role was to be the 205th representative at AG, provide guidance, and implement a mandate from COL PAPPAS and [redacted] to replicate the JTF-GTMO model in the form of the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center (JDIC) at AG, beginning with the introduction of the Tiger Team interrogation concept and strategic level collection (knowledgeability briefs, for example). Prior to [redacted] arrival, I had one chief warrant officer and approximately 12 active duty HUMINT collectors (97E, 97B), an analyst and a Trojan communications team working for me. I continued to send operational reporting through the 519th MI Bn Tactical Humint Operations (THOPS) to the 205th MI Bn and COL PAPPAS. It was at this time (10 September) that the interrogator personnel from the 325th MI began arriving and the process of merging the 519th and 325th MI assets began. The 325th initially sent five "Tiger Teams", with one interrogator and one analyst per team. Because I needed leaders for the new arrivals, I pulled one NCO from the five teams to act as a section leader. To facilitate the integration of the 519th and 325th, I then broke up the original teams and merged the personnel of the two units. As the 519th did not have analytical assets, the reorganization benefited the collection mission. The resulting structure was four sections with an NCO in change of each, and at least one analyst per section. This organization did not follow the "GTMO Model" and I receive pressure from the 205th leadership to maintain an interrogator/analyst structure. I believe the structure implemented (two collectors per team and analytical support to the entire section) was more efficient and effective for our operational working environment and available manning. After the close of Cropper (approximately 5-7 days later), the 325th provided additional personnel who became the Operations section. [redacted] arrived at AG on or about 15 Sep 03 and I understood him to be the "new boss". His original title was "Chief of JDIC", but he stated that he did not like the title and changed it to "Director of JDIC". I understood that [redacted] was in charge of the JDIC at AG. [redacted] was fairly uninvolved with interrogation operations within AG and never provided interrogation guidance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or directives, probably because he was not overly familiar with interrogation operations. At the end of Sep 03 (I do not recall the exact date), the first of the CACI contracted civilian interrogators [redacted] arrived. Although I had been told to eventually expect contract augmentees, the three CACI contractors arrived out of the blue. I never received official guidance or perimeters from higher as to how to employ them. I briefly interviewed each contractor, provided in-brief information, and standards of conduct and interrogation rules of engagement and paired them up with a military interrogator since I knew my soldiers capabilities but did not know that of the contractors. At this time I created a three to four page initial counseling statement which each contractor signed. The statement essentially covered the standards of conduct, performance expectations, informed them of the military chain of command and to whom to report any incidents, operational security awareness. About five days later, seven more CACI contractors arrived, and then one's and two's arrived periodically over the next couple of months. I presented each CACI contractor with a new arrival briefing and had each sign an initial counseling statement and acknowledge his understanding of the operation and IROE [redacted] a contractor who arrived in the second group of sever[redacted]

[redacted] contractors, was the CACI "site manager" at AG, and became my POC for CACI issues and personnel. I relied heavily on [redacted] to manage the CACI personnel and I did not personally interview each contractor individually and knew very little about their qualifications, trusting that higher echelons had validated their qualifications. Most contractors had prior military or police experience. I basically would rely on [redacted] my military section chief, [redacted] feedback from section leaders and interrogations to judge a contactor's abilities and qualifications. I had only one performance issue with a CACI analyst [redacted] the analyst continually interjected and attempted to dominate the interrogation. I discussed this issue with [redacted] and the analyst was relocated to another section within the JIDC. [redacted] 323rd MI Bn (I believe his original unit is within the Utah National Guard), arrived approximately 30 Sep (very unsure of the date, after the mortar attack on 20 Sep and about the same time we began using the hardsite room for interrogation operations) after [redacted] and [redacted] had arrived. He had been the OIC/SIO at Camp Bucca. When Camp Bucca closed its collection mission, the 205th brought 323rd asserts to AG as part of the centralization process. The majority of 323rd personnel became the Command and Control/staff/headquarters element and were not used in interrogation operations. [redacted], 323rd MI, became the screening OIC and [redacted] became the CM&D NCOIC. [redacted], (originally from the 141st MI, Utah National Guard) attached to the 323rd MI BN, became the Headquarters Commander. [redacted] became the Operations Officer and I worked closely with him. [redacted] and [redacted] worked closely together. I took most guidance from [redacted] who provided oversight to the interrogation operation. During this time period, COL PAPPAS's visits increased from visiting every week or two, to 2-3 visits a week, to occasional overnighting, until late mid Nov mid he moved out to AG. At the beginning of Nov 03, LTG SANCHEZ and MG FAST visited AG for a briefing and to assess the situation. This was the second visit to AG LTG Sanchez made following the 20 Sep mortar attack. The first was on approximately 30 September, when LTG Sanchez's focus was primarily the force protection and defensive posture of AG. LTG Sanchez toured the entire facility, to include a short brief on interrogation operations, which took place in the building recently aquired for use by the JIDC. LTG Sanchez expressed concern about the interrogation operation to COL PAPPAS and indicated that the issue would be further discussed "later". Shortly after the second visit in November, LTG SANCHEZ issued a FRAGO on 19 Nov 03, which appointed COL PAPPAS as the FOB Commander, giving him responsibility for all assigned at AG. In discussion with COL PAPPAS, it was my opinion that this was not a good situation and that there should remain a clear delineation between MI and MP, and that COL PAPPAS should recommend against the appointment. I believed that MI should not become involved in detainee or prison operations. As a result of the OPORD, my understanding was that COL PAPPAS would take control of AG security and force protection, but not "warden responsibilities". After the OPORD, COL PAPPAS assigned AG Force Protection responsibility to [redacted], 165th MI BN Commander. [redacted] was a good choice because of his tactical knowledge, and he brought in fragments of the 165th Long Range Surveillance (LRS) Company to provide a more robust force protection posture and guidance than the MP could provide. The MPs had had many breaches of security and poor installation access control, and frequently allowed private vehicles and taxis on the base without escort. The FRAGO generated tension between MI and the MPs. The MP chain of command pulled the MP detail dedicated to MI for transportation of detainees between their holding area and the interrogation booths. By this time, Camp Vigilant and the hard site (Block 1A and 1B) were overcrowded, so security [redacted]

[redacted]tainees and MI Holds were put in to Camp Ganci and thus scattered throughout all three AG sites. By the time of my departure, the AG population had swollen to about 6,500, and locating and rounding up detainees for interrogation became problematic. With the pulling of the MP detail, the interrogators had to track down and transport the detainees themselves, wasting a considerable amount of valuable time. The MPs also pulled the MP overwatch from the interrogations, putting the interrogators at greater risk. For clarification purposes, a "Security Detainee" was an individual perceived to be a threat to Coalition Force, i.e. detained for weapons possessions, IED involvement, etc. An "MI Hold" is anyone of interest to MI and can include a Security Detainee. This category would also include Al Qaeda types, individuals possessing information regarding foreign fighters, infiltration methods, or pending attacks on Coalition Forces. A "Criminal Detainee" is, as the name indicates, an individual simply involved in criminal activities unrelated to Coalition Forces. All three groups were treated equally. Our interrogation approaches and selected techniques were driven by the individuals circumstances of capture and placement/access, and not determined by their status as one of these categories.

The "hard site" consisted of Cell Block "1A" and "1B" as two man cells, and several other wings which were utilized as they became available, which were 4 or 8 man cells. The hard site, like the rest of AG, was under MP control. MI had no say so or influence over inmates or activities in Cell Block 1B, which primarily housed criminal female and juvenile inmates or any of the 4/8 man cell wings. Cell Block "1A" was primarily designated as the holding area for "Security Detainees" and "MI Holds". While the MPs controlled "1A", MI requested and had influence over who would be placed and housed in "1A". "1A" consisted of 40 cells, situated on two levels, with twenty cells on either side of a central corridor. Each cell had two bunks, but efforts were made to have only one detainee at a time in each cell. No detainee could be kept in "1A" longer than 30 days without LTG Sanchez approving an extension. If I, or one of my interrogators, wanted a detainee to remain in "1A" longer than 30 days, the interrogator would write up a justification and request, forwarded from the section leader to myself, which I would forward up through the 205th MI BN for LTG Sanchez's approval. We maintained an electronic dossier folder on each detainee of MI interest, and I placed the approval request and final approval documents in the affected detainee's e-file. The final signed copies were placed in the detainee's paper dossier. Although "1A" was primarily designated as an MI holding area, on occasion, the MPs placed other detainees in "1A". These might include unruly or "problem" detainees and detainees of interest to CID or OGA. However, "1A" was never so crowded that we could not get a cell for an MI detainee. I did not, nor did any other MI personnel to my knowledge, track non-MI detainees for status or release after 30 days, as they were not my responsibility. The MPs were the "inn keepers", specifically an M[redacted] We began interrogation operations at AG using accepted Field Manual 34-52 norms and techniques. We were moving from a tactical to an operational or insurgent environment and it increasingly felt to me like my experience in Afghanistan. I did not want my folks to loose sight of their boundaries and their left and right limits. I saw the situation moving to the "Bagram" model. Pressures were increasing from overpopulation, the mission creep from bona fide Security Detainees to others who probably really didn't need to be detained for a long period, and the realization that Iraq was evolving into a long standing mission. I increasing felt the need to draw on my experience in Afghanistan. We had used "sleep adjustment" and "stress positions" as effective techniques in Afghanistan. Although I never saw written authorization, the techniques had SJA and CJTF-180 C-2X / C2 review and approval on a case by case basis. Because we had used the techniques in Afghanistan, and I perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the sam[redacted]

[redacted]perational environment as Afghanistan, I used my best judgment and concluded they would be effective tools for interrogation operations at AG. Because the winds of war were changing, and the mounting pressure from higher for "actionable intelligence" from interrogation operations, I requested more options that FM 34-52 provided. [redacted] acquired a copy of TF-121 IROE and essentially "plagiarized" it, changing the letterhead on the MFR, incorporating some general editing, and then submitted the IROE MFR for approval through the 519th MI BN to the 205th MI BDE for approval. [redacted] never received a response. Shortly after my arrival, I resent the IROE MFR request to the 205th, cc'd the 519th MI Bn. I received no response and again sent out the document to the CJTF-7 C-2X shop. I discussed the issue with [redacted] at the C-2 shop, and he opined that the approval should be sent up through command channels rather than intelligence channels. While the MFR was being staffed, we continued to use FM-34-52 procedures, as well as sleep management and stress positions from our experience in Afghanistan, as I believed these to be reasonable, given the similarity of the situations. However, at AG, sleep management was requested only a few times, and it never exceeded the limit of 72 hours. Stress positions were used a little more frequently, but always in a very controlled manner. All usages of these techniques were documented in Interrogation Plans. Due to the fact the interrogations were conducted in open tents, anyone could observe the actions conducted therein. Concerning administration of the sleep management prior to the actual interrogation, the MPs implemented the procedure. The MPs would keep the detainees awake by saying "stand up" or "wake up". I did not, nor did any MI personnel to my knowledge, have a conversation or provide written instruction to the MPs as to how to exactly implement the procedure. No MP ever inquired of me as to how the procedure should be implemented. Concerning the administration of stress positions, interrogators could not utilize a stress positions for more than a total of 45 minutes within a given four hour period (meaning the total time a detainee could be in any stress position could not exceed 45 minutes. That did not mean one position could be held for 45 minutes, then move to another position for another 45 minutes.) The time keeping was the responsibility of the two interrogators in the booth, so I can not say for certain that these limitations were not exceeded. However, I never received any reports of excessive use of the technique. The next milestone in the effort to have the IROE approved. On or about 25 Aug 03, two Coalition lawyers [redacted] (Australia)) (I am not 100% sure of the US SJA rep's name.), came to AG as a result of providing the IROE draft to [redacted] and requesting assistance and feedback. They came to AG to review operations. The lawyers informed me that my IROE MFR seemed to be within legal purview and authority, and the Australian lawyer even commented that the techniques were rather soft. They indicated the IROE MFR would be pushed higher for CJTF-7 review. The Miller Tiger Team arrived at AG on 2 Sep 03, and remained at AG for three to four full days. On the second day, I participated in a meeting with several members of the Miller Team, COL PAPPAS, and mayb[redacted] It was during that meeting that the Team had a copy of my IROE MFR and someone from the team stated that it was a "good start", but that CJTF7 should consider something along the lines of what's approved for use in CJTF-170, although no specific tools or techniques were discussed. Shortly thereafter, on 10 Sep 03, the CJTF-7 MFR providing IROE (possibly the result of my MFR and the CJTF-170 approved IROE) was signed. I do not recall seeing a copy of the 10 September, however was provided a copy of the 14 September IROE. At about the same time, on or about 10 Sep 03, the 325th MI BN arrived and I began the integration of the 519th and 325th personnel. During a shift change meeting which included both 519th and 325th personnel, I handed out copies of the 14 Sep IROE approval MFR [redacted]

[redacted]terrogators took turns reading the MFR aloud as others followed along. I am 90% certain that all interrogators and analysts read the IROE MFR, while it is possible due to sick call or some other reason, that some might have missed the meeting. I had each soldier sign a roster stating that he or she had read and understood the IROE. I also created a slide which synopsized the 14 September IROE and posted the IROE in numerous locations throughout the working area as a constant reminder. This original slide contained three columns – the first column general interrogation techniques IAW FM 34-52. Techniques outside of the FM were place in a second column which I titled "OIC approval required prior to use", this was to ensure the interrogators did not have 'carte blanche', and sought guidance with more involved approaches. The third column was titled "CG's approval required for use on EPW's". After the subsequent IROE MFR was signed by LTG Sanchez on 12 Oct 03, I created a second slide to reflect the changes from the 14 September to the 12 October IROEs. Within the body of the main memorandum, it stated that any approach not listed in the policy required the CG's signature. It was explained to me (I cannot remember by who, but the guidance was from higher) that those approaches removed from the 14 Sep version were not necessarily out of reach, that they had to be approved by the CG prior to use. I therefore placed those approaches which were removed were placed under the title "Requires CG's approval in writing". In retrospect, the phrase "all other approaches require the CG's approval" would have been better verbage. This slide was posted about the interrogation operations room about the same time as the CACI contractors arrived. Following the incident involving three soldiers conducting unauthorized activities within 1B, I drafted a "memorandum of understanding" in MFR format (approximately 20 Oct) which not only outlined the approaches approved for use, but also added that all interrogations will be conducted in a humane manner, interrogations involving female detainees required another female's presence, detainees will not be maliciously humiliated, detainees will not be touched in an unwanted or malicious manner, cultural boundaries will be respected, unscheduled interrogations will not be conducted and the understanding of these rules and the requirement to report any violations of these rules to the OIC. I had each member of the JIDC who was in contact with detainees, which included interrogators, analysts, contractors and interpreters, read the MFR and sign indicating their understanding. The IROE has always applied to other agencies as well and I mandated that if other agencies wished to use AG facilities, they were required to follow US Army IROE. Other agency reps were requested to also sign the IROE prior to any interview beginning approximately the beginning of November. COL PAPPAS told me that the CJTF-7 CG delegated to him the authority to approve sleep deprivation and sleep management, but I do not recall if he specifically stated he had received authority to approve use of stress positions. The IROE slide was posted prior to COL PAPPAS's arrival at AG on 16 Nov 03 (in preparation for taking command of the FOB on 19 Nov 03), and there was a conflict between the IROE slide, which stated these techniques required CG's approval, and COL PAPPAS's claim that he had the authority to approve such techniques. COL PAPPAS never stated to me the basis of that authority other than to state that the CG had delegated it to him. I never saw anything in writing granting that authority. Regarding my experience with OGA, I first had limited contact with OGA while at Cropper. It was during the end of Aug 03/beginning of Sep 03 timeframe, everyone started shifting their operations to AG. OGA occasionally coordinated for interrogation space. I instructed OGA representatives that they must abide by the Army IROE while at AG. Most of my contact was with an individual we knew only as [redacted] who appeared to be in charge of the OGA interrogation operations. I never endorsed the practice of "overnight parking" of OGA "ghost" detainees and expressed my disapproval to COL PAPPAS [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] but I was overridden. [redacted] and [redacted] then authorized several interrogations be conducted without the presence of Army interrogators and I did not have visibility or knowledge of what transpired during those interrogations. At the beginning to mid Oct 03, [redacted] as one of my interrogators sat in on their interrogations. This responsibility was picked up by the operations section, and any other agency requesting to conduct operations at AG coordinated with OPS. It was shortly thereafter that an incident occurred in which an OGA "ghost" detainee died during the course of an interrogation. JIDC personnel were not present during this interrogation. I have no knowledge of any OGA abuses or violations. The practice of housing "ghosts" continued and was still in practice at the time of my departure on 4 Dec 03, and I do not know if LTG Sanchez was aware of the practice or no[redacted]

NOT

USED [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/21

[redacted] STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] the first officer in the "interrogation chain". I was comfortable that my subordinates knew their boundaries and believed they would have informed me of any violations or infringements of the IROE or any abuses they might witness. I did not have any concerns about any specific subordinates. The first incident of abuse of which I was aware was the "unauthorized interrogation" incident in early Oct 03. I was notified the following morning and only have second hand knowledge. Three soldiers [redacted] were involved in an incident at about 0200 when the three soldiers conducted an unscheduled interrogation of a female criminal detainee in Cell Block "1B", who was not an MI Hold. CID investigated the incident, but I never saw the report. All three soldiers were immediately removed from JIDC duties, received Article 15 punishment under UCMJ and were reduced in rank. [redacted] immediate corrective action was to call a mass formation the next morning at which all personnel were present. He informed the formation that there had been an "altercation" and "unauthorized interrogation". He stated that "such action won't be tolerated", and reiterated the JIDC mission. The second incident of inappropriate actions during interrogation of which I was aware involved [redacted] during the first or second week of Nov 03. She had submitted an Interrogation Plan in which the primary approach was the "direct approach", but I do not recall her secondary approach plan. I gathered that [redacted] viewed the detainee as having a flippant attitude in response to her questioning, perhaps not cooperating because she was female. She then decided to strip the detainee and apparently did so down to his underwear. [redacted] who was the analyst sitting in on the interview passed a note to [redacted] which he asked her "are you sure [redacted] lives". After the interrogation, the inmate was escorted semi-naked back to VIGILANT. [redacted] overheard MPs talking about the incident and inquired as to what happened and immediately reported the incident to [redacted] section leader, so confronted [redacted] claimed that she did not know she had [redacted] wrong. [redacted] notified me, and I in turn informed COL PAPPAS and [redacted] I recommended a [redacted] Article 15 to both COL PAPPAS and [redacted] but she merely received a written reprimand from [redacted] the interrogation NCOIC, recommended she be returned back to her parent unit for the non-compliance. [redacted] were immediately removed from interrogation duties and re-assigned within the JIDC. I was [redacted] of abuse involving [redacted] I was not personally visited by the International Red Cross. I heard after the fact that they had visited, but I have no knowledge of the results or findings of those visits. Such visits would have been coordinated with the MPs. I was unaware of any incident involving administering cold showers to detainees, or the throwing of cold water on naked detainees, possibly in support of sleep deprivation efforts. I was unaware of any incident in which a naked detainee was forced to stand on a box with a hood over his head holding bottles in outstretched hands. I walked through the hard site, more often during the day or early evening hours than in the late hours of the night, but I never saw or heard of any naked detainees or any incidents involving women's underwear.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 9 [redacted] LLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21 day of MAY, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/06/01	1245 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted] | 6. SSN [redacted] | 7. GRADE/STATUS ES

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
1 MI Bn, 205 MI Bde, Wiesbaden, GE APO AE 09096

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I arrived in Abu Ghraid, Iraq on 7 Nov 04 as a member of a five person analyst requirement from the 1st MI Bn, 205th MI Bde, Weisbaden, GE. Upon our arrival, we were given a tour of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). We were also briefed on the Rules of Engagement (IROE) and the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) by the head of the JIDC [redacted] We were told that anything above the IROE was against the Geneva Convention. I also signed a memorandum stating that I understood the IROE. The next day, the 1st MI Bn personnel were assigned to their positions. I was first assigned the to Force Protection section and subsequently to a Special Project Team, which ultimately consisted of up to 10 Tiger Teams. During my deployment I worked with three interrogators [redacted] (a CACI contract interrogator) and [redacted] (DJ) (a CACI contract interrogator). On around 14 Dec 03, immediately following the capture of Sadaam Hussein, I was moved to the Special Project Team (SPT). The mission of the SPT was to interrogate important Iraqi personnel. Around 15 or 16 Dec 03, the Tiger Teams were called together about 2100 - 2130 by COL Pappas who told us that anything listed on the IROE has been "pre-approved" by LTG Sanchez From the time I was moved to the SPT till the time I left Abu Ghraib, I worked with [redacted] An Iraqi general [redacted] was assigned to us for interrogation. On one occasion, we were in the process of transferring [redacted] from his cell to the shower facility. It was decided to transport [redacted] from his cell to the shower facility (which was just upstairs from his cell) in the nude. [redacted] resisted the MP's when they tried to handcuff him and was wrestled to the ground and forcibly handcuffed. Nothing else of note happened concerning this situation. On another occasion, when I went to the 1A block to sign out [redacted] I observed four or five detainees, hooded with sandbags, handcuffed and lying on the floor outside of cells. I asked what they were doing and was told by the MP guard that they were new arrivals who were awaiting cell assignments. As I was standing there, one of the detainees tried to adjust the sandbag on his head so he could see. The guard moved the detainee's hand aside and told the detainee "How many times do I have to tell you to stop trying to move your hood. If you do it again, you are really going to hate me." The guard mentioned that they were going to "break these guys in properly" and did I want to "watch the show". I did not know what he meant and did not think anything about it. I did not observe any abuse of the prisoners at that time; nor did I know the names of the MPs Although I heard rumors, I never personally witnessed an interrogator using a dog in the interrogation booth. Our team would occasionally walk a detainee past the MP desk where the dog handler would be stationed. This was not pre-coordinated with the MP dog handler as the MP and dog were already stationed at the point. I understood that in order to use this or any other procedure listed in the IROE, you had to have permission Our team would discuss which procedure we were going to use, fill out a form, and submit it to the section leader. The section leader would then secure the appropriate level of authorization and then give us the authorization to proceed. I think the authorizations would go through COL Pappas to LTG Sanchez for approval. Our team used sleep deprivation on occasion; we were informed by ICE operations that the procedure had been approved, but I do not know at what level. After getting the approval, the MP's were in charge of making sure the sleep deprivation schedule was maintained. The methods the MP's used to keep the detainees awake included making them stand up while handcuffed to the cell door. The MP's would also on occasion play loud music in the cell to keep the detainee awake. I was in the 1A and 1B sections of the facility at least twice a day during by time at Abu Ghraib and I never witnessed any physical abuse or humiliation. I heard that on one occasion a detainee was walked naked between camps as a form of humiliation, but I did not witness this first hand. [redacted] once told a detainee if he did not cooperate during the interrogation that he would move him to an isolation cell and make him wear pink underwear. This did not occur and I did not observe any detainees wearing women's underwear. However from the way [redacted] mentioned it to the detainee, I sort of had the impression that it might have been done at some time or another. [redacted] had the reputation of being a harsh interrogator and would give the detainee the impression that they should not mess with him. He would start the interrogation process with new detainees by having them sit on the floor and tell them that they had to earn the privilege of being allowed to sit in a chair by cooperating. I never saw him abuse or humiliate a detainee. I never saw him use dogs in an interrogation. I left Abu Ghraib on 7 Feb 04. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/06/01

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

NOT

USED

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of June 2004

at Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

CJTF7-TF-FAY

9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephonic Interview [redacted]

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview with [redacted] was a surgeon assigned to Abu Ghraib from mid December 2003 to March 2004. He was the chief of the medical team responsible for treatment of security detainees. [redacted] explained there were three separate medical teams at Abu Ghraib. An Iraqi medical team was responsible for the criminal detainees, an Air Force team was responsible for the MI Holds, and his Army team was responsible for security detainees. While housed in the same facility there was no mission cross-over [redacted] visibility of or interaction with other teams, their physicians, or staffs. [redacted] Air Force counterpart (MI Hold) was [redacted] an Army CPT who was promoted to Major while there. [redacted] arrived in late December 2003 afte[redacted] could not recall the names of any other medical personnel. He never observed or heard of any detainee abuse or saw any injuries which he suspected as abuse. He opined that most medical files would be quite "thin." Few records were kept and everyone was overworked. Additionally, the 28th Combat Army Surgical Hospital (CASH) assigned their own hospital number to track their patients vice using the detainee's ISN, making it difficult to match medical treatments to detainee intelligence files.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned

[redacted]

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 5 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Negative Results Photograph Identification

1. (FOUO) On 5 June 200[redacted], SGT,USA; SS[redacted] currently assigned to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC), Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq; reviewed the photographs of alleged detainee abuse. [redacted] was assigned to the JIDC from 18 October 2003 to present [redacted] was unable to identify anyone depicted in the photographs.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Metro Park, Springfield, VA

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2004/05/23[redacted]

3. TIME
1359[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
E-5/USA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
500th Military Intelligence Group, Camp Zama, Japan

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib circa 18/19 October 2003 and am currently assigned there. During this period (18 Oct 2003 - 22 May 2004) I took rest and relaxation leave from 5-20 April 2004. From 18 October 2003 to 5 April 2004 I was assigned as an interrogator in the Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB). My duty in the DAB was as an interrogator. We served as the last part of the interrogation process, conducting reviews of detainee interrogation files to evaluate detainees for release or continued interrogation. As part of our review we would conduct detainee interviews as a final "check" before making a recommendation. Unlike interrogations, our interviews consisted of direct questioning. If a detainee was uncooperative he would not receive a recommendation for release. Upon my return from leave circa 20 April 2004, until present, I was reassigned to the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) to conduct detainee interrogations. I am a trained interrogator (97E); my military occupational specialty for the past four years. Since my arrival in Abu Ghraib I received no formal training on local interrogation methods/policies, interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) or proper detainee treatment. I do not recall receiving any training in Abu Ghraib on the Geneva Conventions. I did receive a listing of IROE shortly after my arrival which I was asked to review and sign a statement acknowledging I read and understood them. I was not provided any additional clarification on the IROEs. I fully understood the IROE and that detainees should be treated humanely. While assigned in the DAB I observed one incident where I believe an interrogation technique was inappropriate. I was teamed with a civilian CACI employee, [redacted]. As a team, [redacted] and I took turns serving as the primary interrogator and observer. I don't recall his last name or any additional details regarding [redacted]. [redacted] arrived at the DAB circa December/January 2003 and was partnered with me. I only worked with him for 2-3 days until he was reassigned to another interrogator in the DAB and the following week [redacted] departed Abu Ghraib. I believe that [redacted] first arrived in Abu Ghraib circa July 2003 and was assigned to the Joint Interrogation Detention Center (JIDC) as an interrogation screener before being moved to the DAB. During my second or third day of working with [redacted] HE was conducting an interrogation and I was observing. I observed [redacted] grab a detainee on the shoulder to move him within the interrogation cell. While his action did not harm the detainee it concerned me as I had been trained it is inappropriate to touch a detainee. At the conclusion of the interrogation I raised my concern with [redacted] however, he had a strong character, didn't believe I had any supervisory role over him, and didn't listen. While I can't recall his exact words [redacted] told me something to the effect that if I was a real American I wouldn't think his action was inappropriate. I subsequently reported his touching of the detainee to my chain of command [redacted] NCOIC, DAB [redacted] OIC, DAB) which I believe resulted in HIS movement to a new partner the following day and his departure from Abu Ghraib the following week; however I can't be certain. [redacted] had me prepare a statement and she prepared one herself documenting our conversation regarding [redacted]. Both statements were provided to [redacted]. I was later told by [redacted] that [redacted] had been counseled and the IROE explained to HIM; however, HE still did not agree his actions were inappropriate. I don't know if our statements were sent forward from [redacted]. I believe, but am not certain, that both [redacted] reported to [redacted]. Other than the one incident with [redacted] I never observed improper treatment or photos of detainees. I did overhear conversations of abusive behavior toward some detainees. Principally this occurred in a break area where CACI employees often congregated. I was not part of these conversations and do not recall who I overheard discussing the abuse or the specifics of any incident. It was general conversation which I recall concerned harsh physical treatment (beating, placing in uncomfortable positions). I have no knowledge of MI encouraging MPs to "soften up detainees."

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A: No. [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/23

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2/2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23rd day of May, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT FROM [redacted]

1. Here is a verbatim copy of the sworn statement provided by [redacted] taken at 1325, 5 June 2004, at the US Army Detention Facility, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. I was not allowed to take a computer into the detention facility, therefor [redacted] repared the sworn statement in his own handwriting. Following is verbatim, direct quote from the handwritten statement:

" 1. To the best of my recollection the individual in the BDD'us in the photo is [redacted] 372nd MP 3rd PLT. Former Marine Corps, Inf.. Normally assigned to [redacted] convey escorts. He was a friend and former team member o [redacted] Always had is K-bar knife on him.

2. I heard from [redacted] that the death of the detainee was from integration from MI. She told me it was listed as a heart attack but she knew the is was something else.

3 [redacted] told me that MI and OGA said that they were to keep doing what they were doing to the detainees because they were talkling faster than ever.

4. The night of trhe 7 detainees there was no one at the time I was there from MI. The photo tha [redacted] howed me I did not know the no MP's that was there.

5. I did not see or to my knowledge know of MI taking photo, making detainees wear woman's underwear, abusing detainees, or use of dogs for interrogation. Other than paragraph 3 I don't know of MI telling the MP's to abuse or soften up the detainees.

6. I was assigned to the ABU Grahib around 1 Oct. 2003 to 4 Feb 2004. I went on leave from 9 Nov 2003 to 30 Nov 2003.

7. I was told that the MP's had to give the woman's underwear because that is all they had.

8. Referance to paragraph 2 [redacted] efence something else was the cause of death.
Q. Did she tell you what is? A. She told me that he had been beaten.

9. Q. Is there anything else you wish to add. A. No."

[redacted]

GG 15

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Arifjan Kuwait
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20041026
3. TIME: 1325
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: PVT/E-1
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 529 MP BN DET 5 Camp Arifjan Kuwait APO AE 09366
9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] To the best of my recollection the individual in DD's in the photo is [redacted] 372ND MP 3RD PLT. Former Marine Corps, Inf. Normally asigned to convoy ESCORTS. He was a friend and former team member of [redacted] Always had is K-bar Knife on him.

2. I heard from [redacted] that the Death of the Detainee was from interogation from MI. She told me it was listed as a heart attack but she knew that is was something else. JCS

[redacted] 3. [redacted] told me that MI and OGA said that they were to keep doing what the were doing to the detinees because they WERE talking faster than ever. JCS

[redacted] 4. The night of the 7 detainees there was no one at the time I was there from MI. The photo that [redacted] showed me. I did not know the no MP's that was there JCS

[redacted] 5. I did not see or to my knowledge know of MI taking photo, making detainees wear womens underwear, abusing detainees, or use of dogs for interogation. other than paragraph 3 I dont know of MI telling the MP's to abuse or soften up the Detainees. JCS

Nothing Follows [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USAPA V1.00

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted]

a1

7. I was
woman's —.
had. yes
[redacted] 8. Reference to paragraph 2 [redacted] Refence something else
was the cause of Death. Q. Did she tell you what is?
A. She told me that he had been Beaten.
9. Q. Is there anything elese you wish to add?
A. NO [redacted]

Nothing Follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____ I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFU [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of June 2004

at [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

AG0000527

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; The proponent agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Baghdad Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib Iraq	[redacted]	15[redacted]	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC/AD Reserve

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd MP Co Cumberland MD 21502 JTF-8

I [redacted] want to make the following statement under oath:

I would like to make the following statement about things that I have participated in or witnessed while I have been stationed at Abu Ghraib correctional facility. Sometime about the end of Oct 03, I was on generated detail and [redacted] me by and asked me to come down to the hard site with him. He said that they had some new detainees come in, and wanted me to come bullshit with him. We got to where the detainees were at a holding cell, and I asked [redacted] he wanted me to escort one of them to the tier and he said go ahead. So I took one of the detainees down to the tier. After we got to the tier, they put the detainees in a pile on the floor. The detainees were tossed in the middle of the floor together. That is when [redacted] an across the room and lunged in the air and landed in the middle of where the detainees were. I believe this is when [redacted] o come in and "get him some". Meaning to come in and be apart of whatever was going to happen. I believe [redacted] an across the room a total of two times and landed in the middle of the pile of detainees. A couple of the detainees kind of made an AH sound as if this hurt them or caused them some type of pain when [redacted] would land on them. After [redacted] had done this [redacted] en stumped on either the fingers or toes of the detainees. When he stumped the detainees they were in pain, because the detainee would scream loudly. I know this happened to at least one detainee; maybe it was a second one as well. I know after [redacted] had done this, [redacted] ld him that was enough, and [redacted] stopped, and that was when [redacted] ft as well Next [redacted] had the detainee's strip. [redacted] was the one who told them to strip in Arabic language. During this whole time the detainees had sandbags over their heads The detainees did not want to take their civilian clothes or jumpsuits off, and were hesitant to strip There may have been one or two that had a jumpsuit on. [redacted] would take one of the detainees aside, tell them to strip, and they would strip. After the detainee was stripped, [redacted] ould put a sandbag over the head of the detainee, and he would have the detainee sit down. At one point after a couple of the detainees were stripped, and I do not know what provoked [redacted] t [redacted] knelt down to one of the detainees that was nude and had the sandbag over his head [redacted] put the detainees head into a cradle position with [redacted] rm, and [redacted] punched the detainee with a lot of force, in the temple [redacted] punched the detainee with a closed fist so hard in the temple that it knocked the detainee unconscious. I walked over to see if the detainee was still alive, I could tell that the detainee was unconscious, because his eyes were closed and he was not moving, but I could see his chest rise and fall, so I knew he was still alive. [redacted] ecked on him as well once or twice to make sure he was still alive as well. I do not recall [redacted] saying anything. I do remember [redacted] ying, "Damn that hurt", referring to [redacted] hurting his hand when he punched the detainee. After about two minutes the detainee moved for the first time, like he was coming to. After [redacted] had done this he went over to the pile of detainees that were still clothed and he put his knees on them and had his picture taken. I took this photo. [redacted] bout this point struck one of the detainees in the chest with a closed fist. The detainee was standing in front of [redacted] and for no reason [redacted] unched the detainee in the chest The detainee took a real deep breath and kind of squatted down. The detainee said he could not breath. They called for a medic to come down, to try and get the detainee to breath right. [redacted] said he thought he put the detainee in cardiac arrest. I also tried to show the detainee how to breathe slowly. It was if

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF __ TAKEN AT __ DATED __ CONTINUED " THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE __ OF __ PAGES " WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM

DA FORM 2823 (AUTOMATED)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342	2004/02/11	1800	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	COL/O-6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHD, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, APO AE 09096

9 [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was interviewed by Major General Taguba, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer from CFLCC, on 9 February 2004 concerning detainee operations at CJTF-7 and allegations of detainee abuse at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib. The purpose of this statement is to provide a written record of that conversation by highlighting and amplifying key areas of discussion including command and control, the nature of detainee operations, and the relationship between intelligence and military police at the FOB. As a caveat, the instances of detainee abuse under investigation occurred before I assumed command of the FOB. This statement must be understood from that perspective.

Command and Control at the FOB was a complex intermingling of four distinct essential tasks under the command of two separate brigades, the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the 800th Military Police Brigade. These essential tasks included: detention operations and monitoring, the conduct of operational and strategic interrogations of key coalition detainees, providing assistance to the Iraq Bureau of Prisons in establishing and running a maximum security prison, and enhancing force protection for the approximately 1000 service members and civilians assigned to Abu Ghraib. Detailed information about the forward operating base and its tenant units is provided in the attached briefing (enclosure 1). In light of mortar attacks where both soldiers and detainees were killed, the FOB had tactical control (TACON) of forces limited to two specified tasks: force protection and detainee security (enclosure 2). The 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (Bn) was charged with executing detention operations at the FOB. This included assignment of detainees to internment camps, the establishment of standards for internment facilities, the training and regulation of guards, transportation of detainees throughout the theater, and the establishment of policy and procedure relative to resettlement operations. Likewise, they had the responsibility for reporting of detainees through the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and the forward of Serious Incident Reports (SIR) concerning detainees. The CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate Magistrate's Cell was charged with developing systems to review the status of detainees, ensure they were given appropriate hearings, Article 78 appeals, and status reviews. The CJTF-7 SJA had the lead in facilitating visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) through the 205th MI Bde, was charged with executing interrogations at the FOB. The Commander, CJTF-7 set forth the operating parameters of the JIDC (enclosure 3). Prioritization of interrogations was determined by the Interrogation Targeting Board and sent directly to the JIDC by 205th MI Bde.

In a very real sense, everyone working at Abu Ghraib is involved in "detainee operations." Abu Ghraib, also known by MPs as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF), currently holds over 6500 detainees. Over 5500 of these are in direct U.S. custody. Just over 1500 of these are of intelligence interest to the coalition. The FOB exists to house these detainees and facilitate interrogations. There are three basic components of "detainee operations" that include detention, interrogation, and release. Staff supervision of these functions is provided by the Provost Marshal, the C2 and the Staff Judge Advocate respectively. Unfortunately, this split responsibility for detainee operations increased the pressure at lower levels and blurred lines of responsibility. Although command of the FOB provided me knowledge of all aspects and limited input, as laid out in the discussion on command and control, policy and task execution was conducted along functional lines through functional commands. As a result almost all of my experience in detainee operations comes from the interrogation perspective. The details of this perspective are provided below.

Policies and procedures established by the JIDC relative to detainee operations were enacted as the result of a visit by MG Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. During his visit General Miller focused on four key areas: intelligence integration, synchronization and fusion; analysis; interrogation; and detention operations. During his visit he rendered a written report, which is provided in this statement (enclosure 4). I have also provided his in-brief (enclosure 5), his out-brief (enclosure 6) and a draft update for the Secretary of Defense (enclosure 7). The key findings of his visit were that the

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 | DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Victory Base, Iraq DATED 2004/02/11

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*
interrogators and analysts, develop a set of rules and limitations to guide interrogations, and provide dedicated MPs in support of interrogations. As a result of his visit the task force formed a JIDC. The requirements for manning were laid out in a request for forces (RFF) and a joint manning document (JMD). All recommendations were implemented with the exception of dedicated MP support.

The basic rules for interrogation operations are contained in Army Regulation 34-52, Interrogation Operations. The standards for the conduct of interrogations are outlined in CJTF7-CG Memorandum dated 5 October 2003, Subject: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (refer to enclosure 3) that were staffed with United States Central Command. These rules provide the left and right limits for interrogators.

Despite the articulation of clear rules, there were two violations of these standards that were brought to my attention prior to my assumption of command of the FOB and the incident that precipitated this investigation. The first of these was reported to me by the MPs in early October. The incident involved two female detainees and three male interrogators. The three soldiers accused of detainee abuse were removed from their interrogation positions and I asked CID to investigate because of the potential explosive nature of the incident. The investigation was unable to show beyond a reasonable doubt that detainee abuse occurred However, it did show that these interrogators failed to follow established procedures for interrogation, constituting dereliction of duty. Each of the three soldiers involved was given punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (enclosure 8). Punishment was imposed by me. The second instance involved a female interrogator. It was reported to me by the then JIDC Deputy Director, [redacted] I cannot recall the specifics of this incident but the interrogator was removed from her position as an interrogator and remanded to [redacted] for additional training. Long after the fact, I was made aware of some additional allegations of abuse in an ICRC report (enclosure 9). These allegations track closely with some of the allegations brought to my attention by CID in January

After the first allegations of abuse, the leadership at the JIDC decided to implement a more aggressive policy of ensuring that their personnel were aware of all the limitations surrounding interrogation operations. All soldiers who conduct interrogations are required to sign a memorandum that they understand the rules and agree to abide by them. A blank copy of the agreement is provided (enclosure 10) Additionally, prior to starting work at the interrogation facility each person assigned undergoes training to familiarize them with the facility and operations at Abu Ghraib. This training is conducted by the section leader. A copy of the training slides is provided as well (enclosure 11). Finally, to have a reminder of the interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) as well as other important information the JIDC created a wall with a blow up of the IROE and applicable memorandums signed by LTG Sanchez. Every person entering the JIDC passes by these items as they enter and leave the JIDC facility. Pictures of the wall are provided (enclosure 12).

The complex and sometimes confusing command and control inherent in detainee operations makes the inter-relationships among organizations extremely important and contentious. Despite a genuine commitment on the part of seniors at brigade-level to make the relationship work, there were several areas of friction between 320th MP Bn and the JIDC. There were significant differences in standards between the two units in major areas, such as allowing local nationals to live in the billets, uniform standards, and the saluting policy.

In conclusion, in response to a request of the investigating officer, I would make two recommendations as a result of my experience and the incidents that occurred. First, ensure that MPs supporting the interrogation mission are attached to the JIDC so they can be better sensitized to the rules of interrogations and provide additional value added to the interrogation process Second, if the desire of the task force is to put detainee operations under the purview of one commander at Abu Ghraib, that commander must have training in detention operations, interrogation operations, and detainee release procedures. The command relationship between the FOB commander and subordinate units should be OPCON, the officer should not have additional command responsibilities and the level of responsibility probably necessitates a General Officer. NOTHING FOLLOWS ////////
//

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Victory Base, Iraq DATED 2004/02/11

9. STATEMENT (Continued)
NOTHING FOLLOWS

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HQ, CJTF-7
Baghdad, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of February, 2004

Baghdad, Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 1044
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

AG0000531

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/02/11
3. TIME: 1800
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: COL/O-6
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HHD, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, APO AE 09096
9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I was interviewed by Major General Taguba, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer from CFLCC, on 9 February 2004 concerning detainee operations at CJTF-7 and allegations of detainee abuse at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib. The purpose of this statement is to provide a written record of that conversation by highlighting and amplifying key areas of discussion including command and control, the nature of detainee operations, and the relationship between intelligence and military police at the FOB. As a caveat, the instances of detainee abuse under investigation occurred before I assumed command of the FOB. This statement must be understood from that perspective.

Command and Control at the FOB was a complex intermingling of four distinct essential tasks under the command of two separate brigades, the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the 800th Military Police Brigade. These essential tasks included: detention operations and monitoring, the conduct of operational and strategic interrogations of key coalition detainees, providing assistance to the Iraq Bureau of Prisons in establishing and running a maximum security prison, and enhancing force protection for the approximately 1000 service members and civilians assigned to Abu Ghraib. Detailed information about the forward operating base and its tenant units is provided in the attached briefing (enclosure 1). In light of mortar attacks where both soldiers and detainees were killed, the FOB had tactical control (TACON) of forces limited to two specified tasks: force protection and detainee security (enclosure 2). The 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (Bn) was charged with executing detention operations at the FOB. This included assignment of detainees to internment camps, the establishment of standards for internment facilities, the training and regulation of guards, transportation of detainees throughout the theater, and the establishment of policy and procedure relative to resettlement operations. Likewise, they had the responsibility for reporting of detainees through the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and the forward of Serious Incident Reports (SIR) concerning detainees. The CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate Magistrate's Cell was charged with developing systems to review the status of detainees, ensure they were given appropriate hearings, Article 78 appeals, and status reviews. The CJTF-7 SJA had the lead in facilitating visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) through the 205th MI Bde, was charged with executing interrogations at the FOB. The Commander, CJTF-7 set forth the operating parameters of the JIDC (enclosure 3). Prioritization of interrogations was determined by the Interrogation Targeting Board and sent daily to the JIDC by 205th MI Bde.

In a very real sense, everyone working at Abu Ghraib is involved in "detainee operations." Abu Ghraib, also known by MPs as the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF), currently holds over 6500 detainees. Over 5500 of these are in direct U.S. custody. Just over 1500 of these are of intelligence interest to the coalition. The FOB exists to house these detainees and facilitate interrogations. There are three basic components of "detainee operations" that include detention, interrogation, and release. Staff supervision of these functions is provided by the Provost Marshal, the C2 and the Staff Judge Advocate respectively. Unfortunately, this split responsibility for detainee operations increased the pressure at lower levels and blurred lines of responsibility. Although command of the FOB provided the knowledge of all aspects and limited input, as laid out in the discussion on command and control, policy and task execution was conducted along functional lines through functional commands. As a result almost all of my experience in detainee operations comes from the interrogation perspective. The details of this perspective are provided below.

Policies and procedures established by the JIDC relative to detainee operations were enacted as the result of a visit by MG Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. During his visit General Miller focused on four key areas: intelligence integration, synchronization and fusion; analysis; interrogation; and detention operations. During his visit he rendered a written report, which is provided in this statement (enclosure 4). I have also provided his in-brief (enclosure 5), his out-brief conclusions (6) and a draft update for the Secretary of Defense (enclosure 7). The key findings of his visit were that the

1. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE OF PAGES

AT HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED

[illegible] ORIGINAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PA[illegible] NUMBER [illegible]

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STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Victory Base, Iraq DATED 2004/02/1

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

interrogators and analysis, develop a set of rules and limitations to guide interrogations, and provide dedicated MPs to support of interrogations. As a result of his visit the task force formed a JIDC. The requirements for manning were laid out in a request for forces (RFF) and a joint manning document (JMD). All recommendations were implemented with the exception of dedicated MP support.

The basic rules for interrogation operations are contained in Army Regulation 34-52, Interrogation Operations. The standards for the conduct of interrogations are outlined in CJTF7-CG Memorandum dated 5 October 2003, Subject: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (refer to enclosure 3) that were staffed with United States Central Command. These rules provide the left and right limits for interrogators.

Despite the articulation of clear rules, there were two violations of these standards that were brought to my attention prior to my assumption of command of the FOB and the incident that precipitated this investigation. The first of these was reported to me by the MPs in early October. The incident involved two female detainees and three male interrogators. The three soldiers accused of detainee abuse were removed from their interrogation positions and I asked CID to investigate because of the potential explosive nature of the incident. The investigation was unable to show beyond a reasonable doubt that detainee abuse occurred. However, it did show that these interrogators failed to follow established procedures for interrogation, constituting dereliction of duty. Each of the three soldiers involved was given punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (enclosure 8). Punishment was imposed by me. The second instance involved a female interrogator. It was reported to me by the then JIDC Deputy Director [redacted] I cannot recall the specifics of this incident but the interrogator was removed from her position as an interrogator and remanded to [redacted] for additional training. Long after the fact, I was made aware of some additional allegations of abuse in an ICRC report (enclosure 9). These allegations track closely with some of the allegations brought to my attention by CID in January.

After the first allegations of abuse, the leadership at the JIDC decided to implement a more aggressive policy of ensuring that their personnel were aware of all the limitations surrounding interrogation operations. All soldiers who conduct interrogations are required to sign a memorandum that they understand the rules and agree to abide by them. A blank copy of the agreement is provided (enclosure 10). Additionally, prior to starting work at the interrogation facility each person assigned undergoes training to familiarize them with the facility and operations at Abu Ghraib. This training is conducted by the section leader. A copy of the training slides is provided as well (enclosure 11). Finally, to have a reminder of the interrogation rules of engagement (IROE) as well as other important information the JIDC created a wall with a blow up of the IROE and applicable memorandums signed by LTG Sanchez. Every person entering the JIDC passes by these items as they enter and leave the JIDC facility. Pictures of the wall are provided (enclosure 12).

The complex and sometimes confusing command and control inherent in detainee operations makes the inter-relationships among organizations extremely important and contentious. Despite a genuine commitment on the part of seniors at brigade-level to make the relationship work, there were several areas of friction between 320th MP Bn and the JIDC. There were significant differences in standards between the two units in major areas, such as allowing local nationals to live in the billets, uniform standards, and the saluting policy.

In conclusion, in response to a request of the investigating officer, I would make two recommendations as a result of my experience and the incidents that occurred. First, ensure that MPs supporting the interrogation mission are attached to the JIDC so they can be better sensitized to the rules of interrogations and provide additional value added to the interrogation process. Second, if the desire of the task force is to put detainee operations under the purview of one commander at Abu Ghraib, that commander must have training in detention operations, interrogation operations, and detainee release procedures. The command relationship between the FOB commander and subordinate units should be OPCON, the officer should not have additional command responsibilities and the level of responsibility probably necessitates a General Officer. NOTHING FOLLOWS ////////

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Victory Base, Iraq DATED 2004/02/11

STATEMENT (Continued)
NOTHING FOLLOWS

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Witnesses:

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HQ [illegible]
[illegible]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11TH day of FEBRUARY, 2004

at BAGHDAD IRAQ.

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 1044
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

[redacted]

FAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E O 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2004/05/14 [redacted]

3. TIME
[redacted]

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
LTC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 1 July 2003, I assumed command of the 205th MI BDE in Balad, Iraq. My rater was MG WOJDOWKOSKI, Deputy Cdr, CJTF-7 and my senior rater was [redacted]. I submitted an OER Support form to MG WOJDOWKOSKI within the first one to two weeks. I do recall discussing the OER support form but I can't remember specifically what we discussed. A copy of the support form is provided at enclosure 1. At the time I took command, there were eight battalions under my command. Under previous agreements made pre-dating my arrival, I did not rate any commander not organic to the brigade with the exception of the reserve component battalion commanders.

Battalions subordinate to my headquarters were located as follows: the 165th, the 223d, the 224th, and the 325th in Balad; the 302d was located at the Palace on Camp Victory working for V Corps and CJTF-7; the 323d resided at Baghdad International Airport; the 519th was located at Camp Speicher, near Tikrit; and the 1st MI Bn remained in Wiesbaden. Some elements of the brigade were located at Camp Bucca as well. The mission of the brigade was to conduct intelligence and electronic warfare operations in support of V Corps and CJTF-7. The Brigade had numerous intelligence collection activities ongoing in support of this mission. There were UAV operations at two different locations, Balad and al Assad Airbases. The Brigade had an aerial SIGINT mission ongoing with Guardrail. The CJTF-7 had the Prophet Hammer organic to the divisions. Upgrades were ongoing with Guardrail as well. The Brigade's focus was primarily on HUMINT. There were 48 Tactical HUMINT Teams dispersed throughout Iraq. The Brigade was also heavily involved with the Mujhadeen E Khalq (MEK) mission. The focus with MEK was maintaining surveillance and conducting initial screenings. CENTCOM and the CJTF-7 wanted to register them with the Biometric data systems in order to identify whom the terrorists were. The MEK mission proved more challenging than expected because of arrangements made during the initial phases of combat operations. As a result, only the biometric screening had been accomplished when the Brigade departed theater in February 2004. The 205th MI Bde no longer had organic interrogation assets, because they had been eliminated from the MTO&E sometime between 1993 and 1995. However, there were three battalions task organized to the brigade with interrogation capability. The Brigade's interrogation operations were initially conducted at Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper, and Camp Ashraft. Approximately two or three weeks (mid to late July) after I took command, BG HAHN directed me to provide LTG SANCHEZ a briefing on how the Brigade conducted interrogation operations from the lowest to highest levels. LTG SANCHEZ was not satisfied that the CJTF-7 was getting information from interrogations which could be turned into Actionable Intelligence. Representatives from the 325th MI Bn, the 519th MI Bn and I briefed LTG SANCHEZ, as well as representatives from the Military Police and CJ2 on the process that was in place at that time. LTG SANCHEZ expressed concern over the system in place for conducting interrogations and exploiting information derived from them. During the briefing that LTG SANCHEZ directed the Brigade to establish an interrogation site to exploit actionable intelligence from a list of approximately 3000 to 6000 Saddam Fedayeen members that had been provided to the CJTF-7 from 1st Armored Division. At the briefing all parties decided to conduct this operation at Abu Ghraib that facility offered some segregation capability, an appropriate guard force and the ability to house large numbers of detainees. This was despite the inherent dangers of Abu Ghraib caused by its location in the Sunni Triangle. I directed the 519th MI Bn to establish operations there after discussing the situation with [redacted] the Battalion Commander. We conducted a site reconnaissance and [redacted] laid out a general plan to conduct operations. My first impression of Abu Ghraib was "holy mackerel." Not only was the place a decrepit prison, but there were significant force protection concerns and an apparent lack of standards being enforced by the supporting Military Police. Especially troubling was the lack of uniform standards including soldiers walking around the prison in civilian clothes. I approved the plan laid out for me by [redacted] to conduct the Saddam Fedayeen interrogations. I never spoke to MP personnel on the ground regarding the conduct of the specific operation or the matter of standards. I left on-site coordination to the 519th MI Bn. During the initial phases of the operation the 519th left a field grade officer on site, but eventually left the mission in the hands of [redacted] an experienced interrogator. The operation was not as successful as had been hoped. The CJTF did not get the number of Fedayeen members that the list indicated would be captured and the through C2 channels the Brigade was informed that LTG SANCHEZ was not happy with the quality of reporting. This viewpoint was confirmed when LTG SANCHEZ directed that I provide him an update on interrogation operations toward the end of September [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/14

STATEMENT (Continued) [redacted] and I went to the CG's office on a Sunday to lay out what we had collected [redacted] Brigade's S3, [redacted] during the Saddam [redacted] what we thought was needed to improve the quality of interrogations throughout my areas of responsibility. LTG SANCHEZ expressed dissatisfaction from the information collected, was dubious about some of the suggestions made to improve interrogations and directed that the Brigade link up with MG MILLER during his assessment visit to IRAQ to determine a way ahead for interrogation operations. MG MILLER conducted his assessment from 31 August to 9 September 2003. The purpose of his visit was to discuss the ability of CJTF-7 to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. The team focused on three areas: intelligence synchronization, integration and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. Various members of the team spent around 3-4 days at Abu Ghraib. The Brigade's involvement with the team was in regards to interrogation operations. MG MILLER spent time with BG KARPINSKY and her staff regarding detention operations. As his team made recommendations, I took notes and began to contemplate how to implement some of his recommendations. Essentially, the team's recommendation was for the CJTF-7 to create an interrogation facility along the lines of that which MG MILLER was running at Guantanamo Bay Cuba. The decision was also made to centralize all interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib as a result of MG MILLER's visit. Although the force protection challenges of Abu Ghraib remained, the fact that segregation facilities offered an available guard force, the requisite real estate to establish interrogation facilities was present, and CPA was funding construction there led MG MILLER, MG FAST, COL BOLTZ, BG KARPINSKI and I to support the Abu Ghraib facility. Other facilities although considered were discarded because of their distance from Baghdad or the lack of adequate resources. I cannot recall any specific discussions of force protection at Abu Ghraib during this time. LTG SANCHEZ had the final decision. However, I don't know if he was given a decision brief on Abu Ghraib by anyone in his staff. On 11 September, LTG SANCHEZ again called me to his office and wanted to know what my plan was for implementing the recommendations of the MG MILLER report. It was at this time I showed him some initial design configurations for a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. He asked me how I was going to source that organization and I showed him my plan for consolidating interrogation facilities and using people from the Brigade. He told me that filling these slots was not only the Brigade's problem, but a "national one" and directed me to draft a request for forces (RFF) within 48 hours. Another key development that came out of the MG MILLER assessment was the need to have specific written guidance on interrogation policies and authorities. MG MILLER'S worked with the CJTF-7 legal team on developing a CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy along the lines of the rules approved by the Department of Defense for Guantanamo Bay. Prior to the drafting of the Counter-Resistance policy, as the MILLER assessment noted, there was no written guidance addressing interrogation policy and authority for the entire CJTF. Individual units used internal SOPs at each facility. At Abu Ghraib that was the SOP of the 519th MI Bn. I believed their SOP was adequate from the lack of complaints about interrogations, my confidence in their commander [redacted] and their experience in Afghanistan. However, the SOP's tactical focus made it inadequate for the conduct of operational/strategic level interrogations that the Brigade was directed to perform. On 14 September, the CJTF-7 SJA published its first Interrogation and Counter-resistance policy signed by LTG SANCHEZ. This policy was revised on 12 October because of objections from CENTCOM. The 12 October policy eliminated several techniques that were previously approved by LTG SANCHEZ. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) was a JIDC published poster based on the 12 October policy created so soldiers and civilians working in the JIDC could have an easy to follow set of rules. It was meant to provide an unclassified reminder that emphasized approved approaches in accordance with the 12 October counter-resistance policy. The IROE was never intended to be, nor was it in fact an approved CJTF-7 policy on the conduct of interrogations. The legally binding document was the approved 12 October policy. To my knowledge, nothing in the IROE violated the 12 October policy. Although the Miller Team had a broad mandate with regard to their assessment, visits to the Brigade did not focus on care and well being of the detainees. Rather, they focused primarily on turning the results of interrogations into actionable intelligence. Discussions on the well being of detainees were discussed with BG KARPISNIKI and the 800th MP BDE as part of the discussions on detention operations. I know that MG MILLER spent time with her and units in the 800th. BG KARPISKI had mentioned to me that they had a very nasty discussion on his findings relative to detainee operations and I believe this included the welfare of detainees. In my opinion, MG MILLER saw many things that had to be done to meet his mandate; improvement to interrogation operations was one of them. I believe that it was MG MILLER'S intention that the person responsible for synchronizing would be located at the CJTF-7 level. I also believe there was pressure from the Department of Defense to produce actionable intelligence from the thousands of security internees the CJTF-7 was capturing. I base my assessment on the discussions with the C2 staff that indicated a tremendous amount of interest in what we were receiving as well as an ever increasing number of "high level" visits to Abu Ghraib. The 205th was given the mission to stand up a joint interrogation and debriefing center as the result of the 11 September meeting. Three critical tasks were involved: completing work on the Request For Forces (RFF), training, and the collapsing of three interrogation facilities into one at Abu Ghraib. The Brigade finished the RFF in concert with the C2 and C3 staff and sent the document out within 72 hours. Training was arranged with Fort Huachuca and TF Guantanamo to begin in October. GTMO would assist with implementing the Tiger Team concept from 5 October through 3 December and Fort Huachuca sent a mobile training team for 21 days in early October to help train soldiers to conduct strategic level interrogations. The movement of personnel to the JIDC was an iterative process because of the need to close old facilities and bring new assets, such as analysts, into the facility that had not been traditionally part of the Brigade's tactical intelligence capability. Initially, [redacted] was designated as the senior MI Officer at Abu Ghraib. We discussed his roles and responsibilities, though I do not recall the specifics. The CG had been specific in his direction to me at the 11 SEP meeting that we needed a LTC to run the facility. I went to [redacted] and told him I needed a LTC to run operations at Abu Ghraib. ([redacted] to the Brigade to perform that mission [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATE 2004/05/14

[redacted] I spoke with [redacted] about my concept for operations and intent on the evening of 20 SEP. A mortar attack interrupted our discussions. There was no doubt in my mind that [redacted] was the Joint Interrogation debriefing Center (JIDC) OIC. I know that [redacted] understood this because he sent an e-mail out which specified that [redacted] was the JIDC Chief and that he was the JIDC Operations Officer. Other organization charts that I received from the JIDC always had [redacted] as the person in charge at Abu Ghraib. Commanders maintained their command authority over their soldiers assigned to their units. The arrangement would be somewhat analogous to an Analysis and Control Element in today's intelligence doctrine. [redacted]

[redacted] Until the middle of November when I went to Abu Ghraib on a permanent basis, I saw [redacted] as my guy on the ground and I though [redacted] was pretty clear on what he was supposed to do as well. After I became engaged in day to day operations of the JIDC and [redacted] Commander of the 165th MI Bn ,came down to assist in force protection and security, [redacted] did take on more of a liaison role. I did not rate him because he belonged to CJTF-7 and I assumed he was being rated by the C2 chain. This was a similar arrangement to that which was described earlier in this statement for LTC-level commanders. [redacted] would attend the daily meetings with the MPs and the other tenant units. I was under the impression that he was satisfied with the way the MPs were running things on Tier 1A and in generally supporting the interrogation mission. There were other things like relations with MPs in the LSA and post security where there were concerns. However, I was led to believe that he had most of these issues under control. [redacted]

[redacted] also identified equipment shortfalls with the JIDC organization. The Brigade staff worked to fill these needs but as in trying to stand-up any operation without an already established MTOE, there were shortfalls. [redacted] provided information concerning soldiers showing up without their personal equipment. I believe that they took corrective action on the ground and the Brigade followed up with the Battalions of these soldiers. I do not recall [redacted] discussing with me any issues [redacted] had relayed to him on equipment although I do recall several discussions with the DCO. [redacted] I was not aware that [redacted] had told [redacted] to stay out of operations; in fact I thought the exact opposite to be the case [redacted] and [redacted] would be in a better position to discuss answer your questions on this issue. [redacted]

[redacted] Ultimately, the JIDC was to be filled primarily from a Joint Manning Document (JMD) based on the RFF that was developed as a result of [redacted] visit. The work of writing and filling the JMD was being done by [redacted] from the Brigade and [redacted] from CJTF-7. CJTF-7 was responsible for managing and filling this document. Although the JIDC was technically a joint operation, most of the JMD remained unfilled throughout my tour in Iraq. Specific exceptions included some Air Force medical personnel and some Navy personnel, but these arrived much later. The JIDC was essentially an Army run operation [redacted] with soldiers and civilians. The decision to use civilians was made because the Brigade [redacted]

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENTS PAGE 3 of 7 PAGE

[redacted] had no more assets that it could provide to fill the slots. I was consulted concerning this decision and provided favorable feedback. The Brigade S3 and DCO worked with the CJTF-7 headquarters in developing specific requirements. I am unfamiliar with the specifics of the contract and do not recall when the first contractors arrived. However, two requirements were to have a clearance and to have experience. I received positive feedback on the contributions of the contractors from [redacted] and other members of the JIDC. I was never given reason to doubt their competency and no issues were brought to my attention. [redacted]

[redacted] the first week of November, the CG paid a visit to Abu Ghraib and he was still not happy with operations. In private discussions with the CG and MG FAST I decided to move to Abu Ghraib. My actual movement to Abu Ghraib was sometime in the middle of November. Closely following my movement MG Fast visited me and expressed concerned about the level of force protection at the facility. She indicated that because I was now the senior commander on the ground I might have to take additional responsibility for the force protection mission. The 205th MI Bde was named Forward Operating Base commander on 19 November. Although I didn't ask for the job, I did not fight it because I realized that unless the Brigade assumed this role, things would never get better. The 19 NOV FRAGO designating the Brigade with FOB command responsibility gave TACON of the 320th MP Bn for force protection and security of detainees as well. The FRAGO did not delineate any responsibilities. My understanding of this FRAGO was to protect all personnel from external threats. To me this meant that the MPs would continue to run confinement and security operations in the prison camps and facilities, while the JIDC would continue to perform interrogations. I brought the 165th MI Bn to oversee base security operations, assist with the implementation of base security policy, and provide forces to enhance perimeter security and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance outside the walls of Abu Ghraib. After the 19 NOV FRAGO my discussions with [redacted] Commander of the 320th MP Bn were positive. He expressed the opinion that his unit would be able to focus their efforts on confinement operations. This FRAGO did nothing to alter the mission of the MPs to maintain control over all of the detention facilities located at Abu Ghraib, even those where internees of intelligence value were housed. At some point, near the end of November the MPs decided to stop escorting detainees between the CAMP VIGILANT, CAMP GANCI and the interrogation facility. Military Intelligence took over this function. [redacted] were to ensure that a group of intelligence soldiers were trained on escorting duties and to my knowledge this was done to standard. As a result of the 19 NOV FRAGO I became more involved with base operations at Abu Ghraib. As always, I relied on battalion commanders and the Brigade staff to assist in daily operations of the Brigade. [redacted]

[redacted] discussed earlier in this statement, the JIDC created and posted IROE on their bulletin board. The IROE identified presence of working dogs and sleep management as requiring CG approval. However, the 12 October Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy General Safeguards (enclosure 2) allowed that dogs present at interrogations were to be muzzled and under the control of a handler. Likewise the Brigade Staff Judge [redacted] Advocate opined that sleep management could be permitted at the JIDC as long as [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [illegible] DATE 2004/05/14

[redacted]tainees were allowed adequate sleep. Adequate sleep was defined as "4 hours in a 24 hour period" based on conversations with personnel from Guantanamo Bay. Any sleep of less than 4 hours in a 24 hour period would have required [redacted] signature. We did submit requests concerning interrogations to [redacted]. I believe these were mostly requests for segregation of detainees in excess of 30-days, but I cannot recall the total number or specifically what they were. The requests were kept on file at Abu Ghraib until January when they were maintained on softcopy. [redacted] would know where they were kept. As for sleep management, the interrogators had to write down their plan and then give it to the MPs who would maintain and implement it. Additionally, these plans were to be monitored by our resident doctor. I do not know what the MPs did to implement the plan. I do not know of any training that was provided to the MPs on what MI could do with detainees or if MI trained on what MPs could do with detainees. 20/20 Hindsight, it should have been done. [redacted]

[redacted] and that they not have to go through [redacted] could tell you the normal inprocessing procedures. [redacted] about my concerns over this arrangement and more. I went to speak to [redacted] asked if we were going to continue this. He said yes to facilitate their request. They would drop off detainees without notifying us. I do not remember any staff officer voicing any concerns about OGA concerning these practices although they may have. In fact I was under the impression tha[redacted] established good relations with this organization and that the problem had been reduced to a manageable level. With regards to the specifics of a dead detainee I can relate the following: AN OGA rep and [redacted] notified me that a detainee was dead; we reported this information to the C2. I Was informed by the OGA representative on the scene that the detainee died during an interrogation while an OGA interrogator was yelling at him. The detainee apparently collapsed while he was being interrogated The body appeared to have been in a fight. [redacted] told me that the detainee received the injuries during the take down in operations the night before. The operation was a combination of [redacted] I saw injuries to the left side of the head. It was decided that the body would be placed in a bag and iced to prevent rotting. The body was removed that evening/next day quietly making it appear as if a detainee was injured in order to prevent unnecessary panic among the other detainees. OGA investigated the incident and decided that they would comply with inprocessing requirements after the [redacted] advised them to do so. Likewise when TF-121 asked to use our facility months later I recall we required them to follow established policy as well. [redacted]

[redacted]have no knowledge of any MI person abusing detainees by pushing them off a truck or on the ground. I would think that if a 1SG in my Brigade knew about the use of excessive force, he would let me know No one ever told me about such an incident. [redacted]

[redacted]he International Community Red Cross (ICRC) visited Abu Ghraib twice. Once before I was FOB commander and once after. They did not meet with me the first time. I did receive a copy of the results and noted there were allegations of maltreatment and [redacted] detainees wearing women underwear on their heads. I did not believe it. I felt some[redacted]

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENTS

[redacted]ainees just simply wanted to get some sympathy. I truly believed our guys were not doing this. I recall I might have relayed to the staff that this stuff couldn't have been happening. I cannot specifically recall telling the staff this stuff better not be happening, but I might have said words to the effect. When the ICRC came by the second time, the FOB invoked GCIV/Article 143, for eight detainees to prevent them from talking to the ICRC while undergoing an active interrogation. [redacted]nformed me that I had the authority to do this. Before I became FOB commander, I was told there was a shortage of jumpsuits, but I was never told about the women's underwear issue. I [redacted] occasionally walked down Tier 1 A and 1B and I never saw any naked detainees [redacted]

[redacted]he training on IROE was established at Abu Ghraib after we had an incident with A/519th soldiers on or about 6 OCT. It was reported to me that three male soldiers had gone in to interrogate a female detainee and had some sexual motives and had touched the females. I told [redacted]we needed to suspend the individuals from interrogation operations and remove them from contact with detainees. A CID investigation was initiated but there were not enough evidence to prosecute them for detainee abuse or sexual misconduct so I gave them Article 15s for dereliction of duty. Two soldiers were reduced in rank and fined and another was fined and taken away from interrogation operations. I was told that a TITAN Linguist was also involved, but that he did not participate. [redacted]hought there were some initial problems with the linguists statement and went back to clarify the situation. When he came back [redacted] told me we had a true statement and I took the recommendations from my staff as to the disposition of the three soldier interrogators. We did not fire the linguist and [redacted]

NOT USED [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENTS

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT DARMSTADT, GE DATED 2004/05/14

[redacted]. STATEMENT (Continued)

do not know what happened to him after he transferred. Everyone was brought eventually together and the IROEs were reiterated. I had no suspicion that the incident went beyond these individuals or that night. Another time, it was reported to me that an interrogator had inappropriately taken the clothes from a detainee and led him back to the compound. I spoke to [redacted] and he recommended the individuals be suspended form interrogations, orally reprimanded, counseled and given [redacted] training. I concurred. I didn't think this presented a pattern. We had many interrogations take place between the two incidents without any notification of problems. I believe that the entire chain of command and supervision believed this was an unusual occurrence; and that suspension and retraining would send the appropriate message to everyone. The shooting in the Hard Site was brought to my attention when BG KARPINSKI called to tell me about it. She asked if I knew there had been a shooting in Tier 1A. After [redacted] I went down to the hard site and my immediate concern was to check on everyone and notify higher headquarters. [redacted] walked me around and explained to me what happened. There was a Syrian detainee who had a handgun. Another detainee had told someone of the presence of the weapon. When I arrived, MPs were conducting a "shakedown" of the Iraqi Police and preparing for a cell search of the Cell Block 1A. I recall witnessing a small part of the cell search. The detainees would be taken out of their cells and the dogs would go in the cell to search for weapons. This was done one by one. As far as I could tell, the guard dogs were being led by their dog handler. An MP captain was in charge of the search. I am sure there were some MI personnel there but I do not remember who they were. [redacted] told me that our MI personnel were interrogating the Iraqi Police in support of the MPs. I didn't see it. I do not remember any civilians at the site. At no time did I see dogs being used during interrogations. I was not aware that a dog might have bitten a linguist. The first time I found out about it was when I read the CID report. If this happened, someone should have told me. I never witnessed any detainee abuse. I was satisfied with the level of knowledge MI personnel had and that they were in compliance with the policy on counter-resistance, IROE and the Geneva Convention. [redacted] was very competent as the ICE Chief and had implemented a system to train personnel coming into the JIDC. I also had the GTMO assistance visit from early October through the beginning of December looking at all facets of operations and they never reported anything inappropriate. During our Fort Huachuca MTT we did a left/right seat ride and was provided only positive feedback about the ongoing operations. I had seen nothing to doubt that things weren't being done right. I was able to identify one of the linguists in one of the photos shown to me [redacted] is standing in one of the TIERS with several soldiers around a naked detainee on the floor. I was also able to identify a female linguist with a civilian (did not recognize him). They were with a detainee who appeared to be in an unauthorized stress position. Taking the photos was a violation. If an NCO did not report an incident he was aware of, there was a break down. There is no justification for any abuse of detainees and the leadership did not condone it. In all cases where abuse was brought to my attention I took action to discipline soldiers. I believe that the vast majority of leaders and soldiers were acting in good faith to do the right thing and that prudent actions were taken to conduct training with teams from GTMO and FT Huachuca. However, clearly a more rigid inspection of operations, less confidence in civilians working in interrogation, and closer attention to ICRC report of abuse may have enabled earlier detection and prevention of some of this. I also believe that the difficult conditions of Abu Ghraib, the lack of established doctrine and little collective training for JIDCs, as well as the Army decision to migrate the Brigade's interrogators into the Reserve Components after Desert Storm were all contributory factors to the situation that occurred at Abu Ghraib [redacted]

Q. Do [redacted] have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No [redacted]

//End of Statement// [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of MAY, 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: MNF-I HQ, Iraq
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004 06 20
3. TIME: 1130 hrs
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: O-8/USA
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: MNF-I, DCS-OPS
9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] arrived in Iraq, early August 2003, possibly the 4th or 5th. I did not discuss the consolidation of operations at Baghdad Central Correctional Facility with General Sanchez at that time. We did not discuss interrogations until mid to late October, I don't recall sitting down with either General Fast or General Sanchez to discuss interrogations until that time. I was more involved with the force protection aspect of the correctional facility, concentrating on the quick reaction force and the counter battery fire, things of that nature. Myself and General Wodjakowski had numerous conversations concerning the security of the facility. As for General Sanchez being frustrated in the October time frame, I did not see that. The first sign of frustration that I witnessed was not until the January time frame, General Sanchez was frustrated at the cloudy picture as a whole. The picture of, "who is my enemy", was not being articulated to him to his satisfaction. However, interrogation and detainee operations were only part of that frustration and not the sole reason for it. In mid January 2004, General Sanchez, at a staff meting voiced his frustration with the overall detainee operations situation and said something on the order of, "so who in the staff is bringing all this together?" Our [redacted] stated that he had staff responsibility, and I followed up by saying that since I supervised the PMO that I would oversee the issue. Approximately one week later I e-mailed General Ryder and requested his assistance because I felt we did not have the proper expertise on the staff with regards to detainee operations. This resulted in two formal requests: (1) dated 16 January 2004, for a Mobil Training Team for military corrections specialists, and (2) dated 29 January 2004, requesting a detention operations cell to augment the PMO staff. General Sanchez never spoke to me about the counter resistance policy, nor did we discuss military intelligence implications as far as interrogations is concerned. The 4th Infantry Division was extremely active, they were conducting very aggressive offensive operations. The volume of detainees being collected by them was high, that being said, they were conducting operations in a very hostile environment and their operational tempo was one of the highest in theater. I have never heard of the, "50 meter rule", concerning the 4th Infantry Division or any other unit. I recall that from mid October on, there were discussions concerning the slow release of detainees. General Sanchez was concerned that maybe the procedures were not what they should be as for the release of the detainees. Generals Fast and Sanchez discussed the, "board issue" on a number of occasions. Some of the problem seemed to be that the division holding areas were becoming too full and needed the detainees to be moved out, that meant to the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Another problem was that when a detainee was released the commanders in that particular sector did not want them to be released in their area of operations. As for the force protection posture at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, I don't believe that there was more of a threat there than in any of the forward operating bases and every reasonable step to provide security for the troops and the detainees was taken. The tactics being used in that area were constantly looked at and adjusted to the changing situation. One example was the extra radar coverage in the area. This and other steps were taken to secure the [illegible] attention was given to the facility. I do not know who made the decision to use that particular facility. [illegible] Do you have anything to add to this statement? [redacted] ////////////////////////////////

NOT USED [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE — USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT MNF-I, HQ, Iraq DATED 20 Jun 04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted]

USED

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20th day of June 2004 at MNF-I, HQ, IRAQ

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER

LOCATION
NMF-I HQ, Iraq

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
[redacted]

GRADE/STATUS
0-8/USA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
MNF-I, DCS-OPS

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Iraq, early August 2003, possibly the 4th or 5th. I did not discuss the consolidation of operations at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility with General Sanchez at that time. We did not discuss interrogations until mid to late October, I don't recall sitting down with either General Fast or General Sanchez to discuss interrogations until that time. I was more involved with the force protection aspect of the correctional facility, concentrating on the quick reaction force and counter battery fire, things of that nature. Most of these discussions were with General Wodjakowski, Myself and General Wodjokowski had numerous conversations concerning the security of the facility. As for General Sanchez being frustrated in the October time frame, I did not see that. The first sign of frustration that I witnessed was not until the January time frame General Sanchez was frustrated at the cloudy picture as a whole. The picture of, "who is my enemy" was not being articulated to him to his satisfaction. However, interrogation and detainee operations were only part of that frustration and not the sole reason for it. Sometime after the new year, General Sanchez talked to me directly at a staff meeting and voiced his frustration with lack of results concerning the entire detainee operations and asked, "who is bringing this together?" Th[redacted] responded by saying that he was the guy, and I told General Sanchez that I was the PMO's supervisor and therefore I would look into it. In mid January I talked with General Ryder concerning detainee operations and said that I needed someone senior in charge. This happened just before the incidents became known. I told General Ryder that we needed help with detainee operations because we didn't have the experts. We needed an 0-6 or and 0-7 and a Mobil Training Tteam; [redacted] did not have the experuse. General Sanchez never spoke to me about the counter resistance policy, nor did we discuss military intelligence implications as far as interrogations operations is concerned. The 4th Infantry Division was extremely active, they were conducting very aggressive offensive operations. The volume of detainees being collected by them was high, that being said, they were conducting operations in a very hostile environment and their operational tempo was one of the highest in theater. I have never heard of the, "50 meter" rule, concerning the 4th Infantry Division or any other unit. I recall that from mid-October on, there were discussions concerning the release of detainees. General Sanchez was concerned that maybe the procedures were not what they should be as for the release of the detainees. Major General Fast and General Sanchez discussed the "board issue" on a number of occasions. Not enough of the detainees were being released. General Sanchez seemed to be frustrated at the lack of progress with the situation. Some of the problem seemed to be that the division holding areas were becoming too full and they needed the detainees to be moved out, that meant sending them to the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Another problem was that when a detainee was released the commanders in that particular sector did not want them released in their area of operations. As for the force protection posture at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, I don't believe that there was more of a threat there than in any of the forward operating bases and every reasonable step to provide security for the troops and the detainees was taken. Given the dynamic nature of the population in that area of Iraq and the hostility towards coalition forces it is no wonder that there were a number of attacks. There are not enough resources to protect every facility 100 percent of the time, the tactics being used in that area were constantly looked at and adjusted to the changing situation. One example was the extra radar coverage in the area. This and other steps were taken to secure the facility. Constant tactical attention was given to the facility with General Wojdakowski being personally involved. The Division was given more battle space to better support the area, someone was always working it. I do not know who made the decision to use that particular facility.(Baghdad Central Correctional Facility). //

Do you have anything to add to this statement? _____

EXHIBIT _____ INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT _____ PAGE 1 OF 0 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 . SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V2.00

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, 19____ at

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPPC V3.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Carlisle Barracks
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20040505/17
3. TIME:
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: WOJDAKOWSKI WALTER
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: MG
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany

9. I, Walter Wojdakowski, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 3 September 2002, I became the deputy commander for V Corps. On 15 June when V Corps became CJTF-7, I became the Deputy Commander for LTG SANCHEZ. The 800th MP Brigade was placed TACON to CJTF-7 on 15 June 2003. By July, the 800th had its entire brigade in Iraq with the exception of the Headquarters and the support base that was in ARIFJAN, Kuwait. At this time, I told BG HILL, the 800th commander, that he could not support his units from ARIFJAN and needed to move to either CAMP VICTORY or ANACONDA in Iraq. From Iraq I felt the commander and HQ's could better supervise the various BDE units firsthand, they could better coordinate with CJTF-7 by being co-located, and we could build the BDE into our great team. I relayed this to BG KARPINSKI once she took command of the 800th in July, and in late August she moved the BDE HQ's to Camp Victory. I did not rate BG KARPINSKI and did not have written input to her OER. She was rated by BG DIAMOND, 377th Theater Support Commander. The 800th MP Brigade had the responsibility to run all detention facilities in Iraq. Since the Brigade was TACON to CJTF-7, our degree of oversight was command authority over forces made available for tasking, limited to the detailed and local direction and control of movements necessary to accomplish missions assigned. I kept abreast of all the separate Brigades in CJTF-7 by holding a Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) update three times a week with commanders. I included 800th MP's in the briefing, but BG KARPINSKI very seldom participated. LTG Sanchez held a nightly TACSAT update with his Area Commanders, but the separate BDE's were not included. As the deputy commander, I was responsible for overseeing logistical support for all facilities in Iraq, along with many other duties, and therefore dealt with Abu Ghraib extensively in that capacity. I ran the Accession Review Board which reviewed and allocated resources for life support and resource support for every facility in Iraq. Since Abu Ghraib was a key facility where consolidation of detainee operations was located, a lot of resources went there. BG KARPINSKI always came to me when she needed support, along with the other BDE Cmds. In my attempts to help the 800th MP BDE I referred her to work with the C4 and the rest of the staff to get the resources she needed - we worked through a lot of issues with supporting Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities in Iraq. COL PAPPAS assumed command of the 205th in July 2003 from COL PARRISH. I was, and am still, COL PAPPAS' boss. COL PAPPAS commanded the 205th throughout Iraq. His unit was conducting military intelligence missions in support of CJTF-7 throughout Iraq. His unit was conducting Interrogation, and Human Intelligence Collection and Counter-Intelligence (HICI); Signals Intelligence Dissemination (SIGINT); Operations. Interrogations operations were being conducted in several locations when COL PAPPAS took over. He had a good team of battalion commanders. We needed a central facility where we could hold detainees and screen them. Abu Ghraib was the logical place. It was in the central location of the Sunni Triangle and most detainees were coming from that area. The other reason for consolidation was the more efficient use of scarce resources. We constantly redistributed resources and consolidation at Abu Ghraib helped us focus resources on that facility and that forward operating base. Camp Cropper was closed because it was at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and we needed to get all units out of BIAP in order for the Airport to open for commercial business. Camp Bucca would still remain operational but some of its resources were pulled up to support Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was also the logical place for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC). The C-2 (Intelligence) and Military Intelligence (MI) and the Iraqi staff were all working very hard on the process of handling detainees from the moment they were picked up to the time they were released. LTG SANCHEZ was concerned and had great expectations on interrogation operations and we all participated in improving this part of our intelligence operations. He gave explicit instructions A. Treat all detainees humanely; B. Expedite the intelligence gathered. Quickly identify who is of value and who is not. He wrote the MNC-I Commander which detainees could be released for non-security value; C. Integrate the future of the Iraqi legal system by releasing detainees of no intelligence value to the Iraqi legal system. The Rules of Engagement (all ROE, not just interrogation ones) were published from the main CP. I do not remember ever issuing a FRAGO on interrogations, but we may have done one and I simply can't remember it - we published over 200 orders in my time in Iraq. I do remember several FRAGO's to commanders reinforcing the need to treat all detainees and all Iraqi's with respect and IAW the Geneva Convention. There was great effort in developing the right rules of engagement. The process was extremely complex, detailed, thorough and painstakingly complete. It included extensive legal reviews, coordination with CENTCOM and our subordinate units, and

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF, TAKEN AT, DATED"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 — DA FORM 2823, 1 JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE. USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF Walter Wodakowski TAKEN AT Carlisle Barracks DATED 2004/05/17

2. STATEMENT (Continued)

complete briefings to our Commander. We would distribute changes through Fragmentary Orders. Yes, FRAGOS were classified to protect and control information flow, but they were written for commanders who could extract pertinent information and pass it on to their soldiers. The FRAGOS were not written to be distributed directly to every soldier. Yes, I did know about some prisoners who were getting to Abu Ghraib without the proper tagging and screening being accomplished by our forward units. We had to tolerate some of this because, given a choice, we knew it was better to sort out detainees at our central facility than forward in a hostile area where people were routinely being killed. We knew we had some challenges in the detainee system and that is why we requested assistance from various places through CENTCOM and the Army. We requested more interrogators, interpreters and HUMINT support. The CG I believe expressed this shortage to the Army and I know the C2, BG FAST did also. COL PAPPAS never came to me and told me he couldn't do the job due to his personnel shortages, but we continuously worked on using personnel in the best possible way. BG KARPINSKI did complain to me about personnel shortages, and we redistributed personnel within CJTF-7 to address her concerns. The MPs had to relocate some detainees to CAMP BUCCA, to lessen overcrowding and this was a challenge. We all knew and had various discussions about the risks when hiring civilians and/or contractors in any area of our mission. Subordinate staff officers and commanders provided specifics on the criteria required to hire contractors and for interrogators flow came through the C2 staff. I do not know the exact interviewing requirements placed [illegible] interrogators. I am sure our commanders and primary staff could fire a contractor if he/she was not working out and I believe we could write and fire contract supervisory positions for contractors. I did not have direct knowledge of an alleged detainee abuse case concerning an OGA occurring in a detention facility, but I did hear about it from some one in the C-2 and was told an investigation was initiated. Frankly, I was focused on CJTF-7 operations and did not have the interest or the orders to worry about investigations in OGA. On 1 February, a Transfer of Authority was conducted between LTG SANCHEZ and myself.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to the statement?

A: I can say, without equivocation or hesitation, that no one in the CJTF-7 Command Group, neither myself or LTG Sanchez condoned or encouraged in any way the mistreatment of any detainee. And, we quickly and forcefully investigated any and all suspected violations of any detainee rights we were made aware of.

[illegible] End of Statement [illegible]

AFFIDAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OR BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of MAY 2004 at Carlisle Barracks

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority to Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 2, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
2004/06/19

3. TIME

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
MILLER, GEOFFREY D.

6. SSN [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
O-6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL-DETAINEE OPERATIONS

9.
I, Geoffrey D. Miller, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q. How did the JTF GTMO mission to assist CJTF 7 originate?
A. The requirement to establish a JTF Guantanamo Assessment Team for CJTF 7 was directed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SOUTHCOM. I was in Washington D.C. briefing the Deputy Secretary of Defense in May 03. I met with MG RON BURGESS, JCS J-2 and during our discussions he stated that there were some challenges in CJTF-7 with the transition from Major Combat Operations to Support and Sustainment Operations (SASO) in the areas of intelligence, interrogation, and detention. I told him if there was a request for JTF GTMO to conduct an assistance visit that JCS must task SOUTHCOM to conduct the mission. About ten days later, SOUTHCOM called and notified me they had a WARNORD to support CJTF-7 and that a FRAGO was coming out to deploy. [redacted] interrogation operations, and detention operations. The Assistance Team included personnel who were currently assigned to JTF GTMO or those who had recently been assigned to assist on how intelligence fusion operations, interrogation operations, and detention operation could be better integrated. Once we received the FRAGO, we departed to Iraq.

Q. What was the difference between the mission at JTF GTMO and the mission of CJTF-7?
A. The missions were significantly different. Operations conducted by CJTF-7 were conducted under the provisions of Geneva Convention 3 for EPWs and under Geneva Convention 4 for Security Internees. The operations at JTG GTMO conducted detention and interrogation of enemy combatants. JTF GTMO adhered to the provisions of the Geneva Convention except where military necessity dictated as directed by the Nov 01 Presidential Directive.

Q. Who at CJTF-7 did you discuss the JTF GTMO assessment visit strategy?
A. I met with LTG Sanchez soon after the Team arrived for an in brief and we discussed the assessment plan. We discussed the visit strategy and applicability of Geneva Convention requirements that applied in Iraq. I told him the Team would need 96 hours to conduct our initial assessment of intelligence fusion operations on the staff, the interrogation operations at the CJTF-7 level, and the CJTF-7 level detention operations. Following the initial assessment I would provide an in-process review of the findings. I had a similar discussion with MG Fast focused on the intelligence fusion and interrogation operations.

Q. What were the Team's assessments in the area of intelligence and interrogation and to whom were they provided?
A. The assessments of all areas and recommendations were provided in the assessment report on 9 September 03. I briefed both LTG Sanchez and MG Fast on that day and provided the assessment report and associated SOPs.

Q. Can you characterize the operational environment and focus of the intelligence and interrogation you observed during your assessment visit?
A. The Vth Corps has recently transitioned to a CJTF structure. The intelligence operations and interrogation operations at both the Camp Cropper facility and Abu Ghraib were focused at the tactical level, working to transition to operational level requirements for the CJTF. Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib were two separate interrogation facilities with their own independent collection focus. The majority of the interrogations were being conducted at Camp Cropper. Abu Ghraib was just beginning to establish intelligence exploitation and interrogation operations. I discussed our assessment and recommendation to establish a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center with MG Fast and LTG Sanchez. We discussed the process of intelligence fusion and how strategic interrogations were conducted at JTF GTMO.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

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STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY D. MILLER TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/06/19

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q. Did you recommend establishing interrogation policies and authorities during your assessment visit?
A. Yes. One of the initial assessments was that CJTF-7 had not published written guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities to the units. I recommended this be accomplished immediately to assist in providing clarity for the interrogators as the developed their interrogation plans and conducted interrogations. LTG Sanchez agreed and directed the staff accomplish this action immediately.

Q. Did you discuss specific interrogation techniques with anyone at Abu Ghriab or CJTF-7?
A. No. To the best of my knowledge the JTF GTMO Team discussed interrogation authorities and techniques with the CJTF-7 legal staff and intelligence staff to assist in recommending the development of a policy document for the CJTF-7 commander.

Q. Did you provide Abu Ghriab or CJTF 7 any information on JTF GTMO interrogation techniques?
A. Yes, we provide the SECDEF approved interrogation authorities fro JTF GTMO to the CJTF 7 legal staff to assist them in developing and publishing the commands approved interrogation authorities. We stated these authorities applied only to JTF GTMO and the command should develop its own policy.

Q. Did you spend time with Col Pappas and [redacted] discussing intelligence operations?
A. Yes. [redacted] former director of the Joint Intelligence Group at JTF GTMO, and I spent parts of 3 days with COL PAPAS and [redacted] at Abu Ghriab discussing how they could think about establishing improving intelligence fusion and interrogation operations to provide rapid intelligence fusion. The focus of these discussions was assisting them in establishing a mission baseline and systems to support the operation and integration into the CJTF 7 HUMIT operations. The detainee security and intelligence mission was being transferred from Camp Cropper to Abu Ghriab so they were establishing initial foundation requirements. The discussions used the intelligence fusion systems and staff operating procedures used the Joint Intelligence Group at JTF GTMO as a point of discussion.
COL Papas, commander of the 205th MI Brigade, had been given the mission of establishing this operation and [redacted] who was the interrogations control officer of A Company, 519th MI Battalion, were charged with this mission of conducting interrogations and developing the initial intelligence information. During our visit to Abu Ghraib the unit was conducting tactical debriefing of detainees but did not have the required intelligence databases to conduct effective operational interrogations.

Q. Did you discuss the use of military working dogs with COL Papas?
A. Yes. I do not remember the exact conversation but the discussion revolved around the use of military working dogs at JTF GTMO to help the MPs with the custody and control issues with the detainees and that it was very effective. When you have a large number of detainees and few guards, the dogs help provide a control atmosphere that helps reduce risk of detainee demonstrations or acts of violence. At Abu Ghraib the detainees were housed in Camp Ganci which was a hasty area holding area that used three strands of concertina wire to establish the detainee area. I believe we did recommend the strategy to work the operational schedule of the dog teams so the dogs were present when the detainees are awake not when they are sleeping.

Q. Did you recommend the use of military working dogs in interrogation operations?
A. No. We never used the dogs for interrogations while I was in command of JTF GTMO.

Q. Did you provide copies of the Team's assessment report to COL Papas?
A. No. I provided the report to LTG Sanchez and MG Fast. Additionally I did leave a disc copy of the JTF GTMO SOPs with the C2 and CG for their use. COL Papas attended several of the nightly after action reviews I conducted with the Team at Victory Base. The intent was to allow him to hear the comments and better understand the intent for the recommendations and to be prepared to respond to questions from LTG Sanchez or MG Fast.

Q. Did JTF GTMO provide Tiger Team personnel to CJTF-7?
A. Yes. JTF GTMO was tasked through SOUTHCOM by the JCS to provide 5 Tiger Teams to CJTF-7 for 90 day OPCON until additional interrogation personnel could be provided to Iraq. We deployed the 5 Teams in October 03 to the control of CJTF-7. The Tiger Teams lead by [redacted] and a group of interrogators and analysts. They were selected because they had demonstrated outstanding ability at JTF GTMO. I recommended to CJTF-7 that the teams would work as a team to leverage their experience but since they were OPCON to the CJTF so it was their decision on employment of the Teams.

Q. What did you think they were going to accomplish during this deployment?
A. They were tasked to assist the CJTF-7 interrogation effort as strategic interrogators and analysts. They were supposed to conduct interrogations and assist in the CJTF-7 interrogation mission requirements.

Q. Did you maintain contact with the JTF GTMO personnel while they were in Iraq?
A. Yes. I received a few e-mails from them telling me they were doing well and no one had been injured. They did continue to informally maintain contact with JTF GTMO to request additional support items such as SOPs.

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STATEMENT OF GEFFREY D. MILLER TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/06/19

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q. It has been reported that [redacted] was notified of inappropriate interrogation procedures and did not report this further. Would this surprise you?

A. Yes. It would be out of character for [redacted] to not have taken actions if something was wrong. His performance at JTF GTMO was superb.

Q. Were there interrogation authorities at JTF GTMO that authorized the removal of clothing as an interrogation technique?

A. Yes, From 12 December 02 to 15 January 03 JTF GTMO had SECDEF approved the interrogation authority to remove items of clothing as a part of interrogations. To the best of my knowledge JTF GTMO never used this technique during that period. All personnel were notified in January 03 that this technique was no longer authorized.

Q. Was there intense pressure on COL Papas to produce intelligence from interrogations?

A. When I visited Iraq for the first time, the CJTF was transitioning from combat operations to stability and SASO operations, but there was still a significant amount of fighting going on. I did not detect any extraordinary pressure being applied to COL Papas. In my experience, there is always pressure to provide intelligence to help the commander better be prepared to win the fight. It simply saves soldiers lives and is always a priority. In looking at actionable intelligence to help the fight, I assessed that at the intelligence operations to develop actionable intelligence and information for the commander was bulky and not rapid. One of the challenges I observed was there were a large number of intelligence priorities and requirements for the unit to answer. The leadership and soldiers at Abu Ghraib were confused and didn't know what to focus on. I recommended to MG FAST that the C2 refine and prioritize the intelligence requirements. C2X - HUMINT operations - was not effective and should be redirected to better assist in establishing intelligence collection priorities. The unit at Abu Ghraib was not producing Intelligence Information Reports in a timely manner. This is one of the essential documents to assist in developing actionable intelligence for the commander The Team suggested that the Intelligence Cell at Abu Ghriab at least begin producing Memorandums For Record for their interrogation summaries.

Q. What was your assessment of the Intelligence unit at Abu Ghriab's ability to accomplish its mission?

A. The Team noticed there was a lack of equipment and facilities to conduct interrogations. There were very few computers for the troops to use to leverage the information contained in other intelligence databases. They had a canvas tent that was being used as an interrogation booth. Their interrogators did not have analysts that acted as an integrated team. We recommended they use the Tiger Team concept where the interrogator and analysts routinely worked together so they could be more effective. To do the kind of system linkage to make the most of out the interrogation opportunities we recommended they should establish an intelligence fusion cell for analytical support. The unit was functioning a very basic level - lots of effort but not much intelligence output

Q. Where they developing interrogation plans as the basis for interrogations?

A. The Team assessment was that the organization was not producing many interrogation plans as the basis for interrogation. We recommended they should develop interrogation plans and then get it approved prior to all interrogations. The senior NCOs and Warrant officers should be involved and train their soldiers in this task. The analyst needs to help the interrogator by reviewing the interrogation plans for quality control.

Q. Who did you provide your report after departing CJTF 7?

A. I sent the assessment report to SOUTHCOM J2, and it was forwarded to the JCS J2. I do not know how it was further distributed.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add?

A. No

//End of Statement//

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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PAGE 2, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

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STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY D. MILLER TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/06/19

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

GDM

AFFIDAVIT

I, GEOFFREY D. MILLER, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 22 day of JUNE, 2004

at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

21 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of MG GEOFFREY MILLER

On 19 JUNE 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed MG GEOFFREY MILLER, CJTF-7 - Detention Operations. MG Miller provided a statement based on questions MG Fay asked him. [redacted] wrote a statement based on the answers MG Miller provided. The DA FORM 2823 was typed and provided to MG MILLER for his review and signature. MG MILLER stated he would not sign the statement and stated that we would have to send him a set of questions he would provided answers to. I have attached the DA 2823.

[redacted]
MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	[redacted]		
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
MILLER, GEOFFREY			08

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9. Geoffrey Miller WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

My initial visit to Iraq occurred 31 August to 10 September 2003. I was in D.C. briefing the Deputy SecDef when I received a call from RON BURGESS, J-2. In my own words, he stated that there were some challenges with the transition from major combat operations to Support and Sustainment Operations (SASO). The intelligence fusion and intelligence capability was not established. I told him that the only way was to task SouthCom and that I would assist in looking into Detention Operations because we were good at it. Ten days later, SouthCom called and said they had a call from JCS and had a WARNORD to support CJTF-7 and that a FRAGO was coming out to deploy. I put together a combined interagency team with intelligence, law enforcement, DIA [redacted] We took personnel who were currently at GTMO or those who had been there to assist on how detention operation should be done. Once we received the FRAGO, we departed to Iraq. This was apples and oranges as GTMO was under Geneva three and Iraq was under Geneva four. I stated that we needed to make sure from the beginning that was understood. We handed everyone a Geneva Convention handbook to all we met with. I met with LTG Sanchez and told him we would need 96 hours to conduct an assessment to look at the prison and see how it is established and how they are operating. We visited Abu Ghraib and conducted an assessment of the operations. I told LTG Sanchez once we completed the assessment that I was going to be blunt. Abu Ghraib was not working well. The Corps was transitioning to a CJTF and the focus at Abu Ghraib was tactical not strategic as it should be. A/519th was on the ground and they were literally conducting tactical operations. They had split operations at Camp Cropper where the majority of the interrogations were being conducted (6xbooths) and Abu Ghraib where they were beginning to establish operations (1xRFAP and 1xTrojan Spirit). I told him how strategic interrogations worked at GTMO and how you go about gathering information and segmenting it from high and low level value. I told LTG SANCHEZ he needed to establish interrogation limits quickly because the soldiers on the ground didn't know what had to be done, but not because we had seen any abuse. They just needed to know what some of the limits were. I also stated that he needed to get leadership down at Abu Ghraib to oversee the operations and be ready to calm [redacted] hold back or stop people when things started to go wrong. I wrote my report and sent it up to SouthCom J2 [redacted] and JCS J2 RON BURGESS and no one at DOD

I spent time with COL PAPPAS and [redacted] as discussed with them how you go about establishing operations. We were laying out the baseline we used at GTMO. I told them that the working dogs were used in GTMO to help the MPs with the custody and control issue and that it was very effective. When you have a lot of detainees and few guards, the dogs help with reduce the risk of demonstrations. At Abu Ghraib you had Camp Ganci which was an open area with three strands of concertina wire. To use the dogs as a base would reduce rioting or demonstration. Have the dogs when the detainees are awake not when they are sleeping. We have never used the dogs for interrogations at GTMO and I did not discuss this with them because I did not have this concept. When I left, I did not leave any documents at Abu Ghraib. I did leave a disc with GTMO SOPs with the C2 and CG. I did not leave instructions with the subordinate units. COL PAPPAS attended three to four nightly AARs we held while in Iraq. I wanted him to understand where we were going and to be ready to respond to MG FAST or LTG SANCHEZ. I was asked to send assistance to Abu Ghraib to help get the Tiger Team [redacted] by MG FAST. I told her to go through JCS and ask for the teams. I ended up sending five Tiger Teams lead by [redacted]. I do not know who were the team members who accompanied him. They were supposed to have been the best teams. I told MG FAST that the teams would work as a team and not be split. Other soldiers could be added to the team to learn from them. The teams consisted of an interrogator and an analyst. They deployed for 90 days and were OPCON to CJTF-7. They did continue to informally maintain contact with GTMO but not me. They would ask for SOPs and other information. It would be out of character for [redacted] to not have taken actions if something was wrong. He is a solid Warrant Officer. As far as removal of clothing, we had received SecDef authority to use the removal of clothing as a technique for about a six-week period between Dec 02 to Jan 03 but that was never done at GTMO. I did not elect to use that technique. That was rescinded.

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | PAGE 1 OF ____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT _____ DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

In relation to the intense pressure: When I visited Iraq for the first time, the Corps was transitioning from combat operations to SASO operations but there was still a significant amount of fighting going on. In looking at actionable intelligence to help the fight. I didn't get to that level. I saw that at the operations level the ability to get information was bulky. There were a lot of calls being put out for request for information. There were about 90 priorities and the folks on the ground (Abu Ghraib) were confused and didn't know what to focus on. I told MG FAST that they were confusing the soldiers with what they wanted. They needed to reduce the number of priorities to help them focus because they did not know what they were looking for. C2X was not functioning and they needed to relook at how they were prioritizing the requirements. We helped them established SDRs and priorities. I never heard or was aware of pressure coming from higher up. There were no IIR process fro a long period of time. They were writing DIIR. We suggested to at least writing MFRs for their interrogation summaries.

When I first visited Abu Ghraib, I noticed there was a lack of equipment. They had a tent as an interrogation booth. The system they were using for interrogation was not working and we recommended they use the Tiger Team concept. In order for them to put in place the GTMO system they needed computer systems which they didn't have. To do the kind of linkage we had at GTMO and to link with the fusion cell for analytical support was just not there. They were not doing too many interrogation plans. We told them they needed to develop interrogation plans and then get it approved. The senior NCOs and Warrant officers need to get involve and check on their soldiers. The analyst need to get help get an interrogator on track by reviewing the interrogation plans for quality control, they need to provide an assessment based on what information they have gathered of the detainee and provide assistance by telling an interrogator where they need to go next with the interrogation. They were working very hard and trying to do their best and much of their work had to be done by hand. I didn't see the capability to move this very fast without the proper automation. My first priority was to get the organization of teams established and my second priority became establishing the computer system to help with linkage to the fusion cell and C2X. It is still an on going process and continues to get better.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add? A. No

////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of JUNE 2004

at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2004/06/18		

NAME, MIDDLE NAME	5. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	COL

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
OSJA, MNF-I

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was interviewed by MG FAY [redacted] on 17 June 2004. I was the senior Legal Advisor to LTG SANCHEZ from 15 June 2003 to 15 May 2004. The first time I remember discussing the need for a CJTF-7 command interrogation policy was after MG MILLER's visit to CJTF-7 in late August and early September 2003. We had questions about interrogations come up before then from subordinate units, but we didn't begin to formulate a CJTF-7 command policy until after MG MILLER's visit. I had some conversations with MG MILLER and the attorney on his team [redacted] during their visit to CJTF-7, and I attended the MG Miller team in-brief in the C2 office. There was dialogue about interrogation methods and approaches, and about the need for CJTF-7 to approach interrogations from the operational versus tactical level. When I sat down with [redacted] we discussed the difference between GTMO and Iraq, including the fact that the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq. My officers and I felt that we needed to have a command policy on interrogation techniques, and several of my officers discussed GTMO's experience with such a policy with [redacted] length. I believe that MG MILLER's visit was the genesis for the development and drafting of the CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policy. We started working in concert with officers from the C2 and the 205th MI Brigade on drafting the policy.

While A Company, 519th MI BN may have had its own policy, I do not believe that it was the A/519th policy we used as the basis for our policy. To the extent there was a source document, I believe that it was the DOD memorandum pertaining to GTMO that had been published in the spring of 2003. We used the DOD cover memorandum and modified it as our own. My action officers worked with MI officers to review the approaches and scrubbed them to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions. We saw the A/519th document and used it, along with other comparative sources, to develop the CJTF-7 command policy. I remember seeing the A/519th policy and asking where the document had come from and why a company had its own policy. I assume that some of the other interrogation units had their own policies or simply used what was in Field Manual 34-52. This use of various policies was one of the major reasons why the recommendation that CJTF-7 needed one command policy was compelling. My office took input from the Field Manual, various policies, and MI officers and drafted the 14 September 2003 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. It was later updated in the 12 October 2003 policy, which remained in effect for 7 months. There were drafts that were staffed before the final October policy. As the drafts were reviewed, there were comments concerning how effective certain approaches were and whether our policy should list specific approaches at all. I believe that MI doctrine suggests that use of approved approaches should be left to the imagination of the interrogator, while ensuring that the appropriate controls were in place to stay within the bounds of the Geneva Conventions. I am not sure you can get everyone to agree precisely when otherwise approved and lawful approaches go outside the bounds of the Conventions, but that is why the command has policies and oversight, why there is doctrine, and why there are reviews of interrogation plans. I believe it is possible that the guys at the bottom weren't looking at the policy that we had issued from the top.

We provided the 14 September policy to CENTCOM and received comments through our legal technical channels. We also received input from the MI community. We modified the policy and published the 12 October policy. I am the author of the 12 October Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. I am responsible for the policy document. It came out of my office. We wrote and typed the verbiage and I walked it in for CG signature. The military intelligence expertise came from the Military Intelligence community and I believe they are the ones who provided the input that came from their manuals.

The subject of denying detainees clothing puzzles me. Stripping a detainee to coerce or humiliate him is prohibited. While interrogators must control the environment, this must be done while maintaining the floor, the minimum requirements, of the Conventions. The leadership and those reviewing the interrogation plans should catch anything that violates the Field Manual or the Geneva Conventions. Now I go back and look at our policy and I ask myself if anyone might have misinterpreted or misunderstood what we wrote. The use of dogs is an example. Military working dogs can be used for security. If they were present in the cellblock for security purposes or on the grounds for crowd control or bomb-sniffing, they are not subject to our policy. However, if they are to be part of an interrogation approach, then their use would be restricted by the policy and subject to all of the safeguards and approvals. I doubt that any request to bring dogs into an interrogation booth as part of an interrogation approach would be approved because of issues of coercion and safety. Segregation is keeping a detainee separated from the

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Camp Victory DATED 2004/06/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

general population for security or to prevent collusion. Segregation is also used to separate officer and enlisted POWs, males and females, adults and juveniles. Although often used interchangeably and not defined in the policy, it is different than isolation. It is not solitary confinement and cannot be done to be coercive. Segregation in excess of 30 days required CG approval.

If a detainee was placed in a dark, dank room for purposes of setting conditions for interrogation, it should have been laid out in the interrogation plan and all those leaders reviewing the interrogation plans should have said, "wait a minute, this doesn't look right." I agree that both MI and MP should have known what was going on in the facility. COL PAPPAS worked tirelessly trying to get the place running to appropriate standards and I have observed him to be a very conscientious officer. People were on edge and under pressure in the September/October/November time frame. In the Fall of 2003, CJTF-7 was under intense pressure not only as to interrogation operations, but also as to the production of intelligence in general. I cannot recall ever discussing this with LTG SANCHEZ, but I do recall conversations with officers at the Colonel level stating that the boss or the C2 had just received a call from D.C. in reference to intelligence production. I recall everyone being very tired by this time, and a lot of activity was going on. We all seemed to be under a lot of pressure, but that is part of being in combat for a sustained period. I do not recall CENTCOM pressuring us for intelligence.

In the summer and early Fall of 2003, there was an enormous problem in getting supporting documentation when a detainee was captured. CJTF-7 wrote and published orders and policies on how to tag personnel, and how to document the circumstances of capture. In May or June, we produced detailed capture forms and an accompanying training package. Compliance in the field was uneven at best. Between March and November 2003, we would commonly have prisoners with sparse documentation. This was a problem consistently addressed by the command. Eventually, we published orders that said we would not accept detainees without proper documentation, including sworn statements. It is correct that the biggest problem with documents, numbers and pushback was 4ID.

RELEASE BOARD: This Board was called the Review and Appeal Board and began in August 2003. At the beginning, the files coming to the Release Board were thin. They would sometimes include an incomplete capture tag or CPA apprehension form, and sometimes a sworn statement, and sometimes a seemingly random assembly of MI documents. MG FAST was the Board President and expressed great frustration at the lack of documentation available, particularly MI documents. The recorder would put together a Board file for plenary session review by the Board members. Adjunct members from MI, MP and CID would attend so the Board had as complete a picture of the detainee as possible. At first, it was very difficult to assess the detainee files. The Review and Appeal Board looked at security internee files only. There were two Boards and the other one dealt with criminal detainees. BG KARPINSKI chaired the Criminal Detainee Release Board.

The Review and Appeal Board would base its decision on the information on the capture tag or CPA apprehension form, MI documents, sworn statements if available, and on the judgement of its members. Even if a person was no longer of intelligence value, they could still pose a threat to Coalition Forces or security. At the beginning, the Board went through a learning and maturation process on how to manage risk. We had no experience base or historical data/demographics to fall back on. Insofar as I know, this was the first time since WWII, then using customary law and the Hague Regulations, that this type of Board was established. In the Fall of 2003, the insurgency became a real issue, the security situation worsened, and we found ourselves in a more dangerous time. There was an increase in attacks from the Former Regime Elements and they were becoming more organized. Intelligence became more critical, both enemy attacks and our offensive operations increased, and the security internee population mushroomed. The Board was trying to find an appropriate balance between release and security, and we took the side of security. We did not want to take a chance based on what we didn't know. Unfortunately, we didn't know much from an intelligence standpoint, at least early on. At times, there were no screening sheets and the only thing we had was a capture tag stating that a detainee was captured during a raid of a former regime cell. We would return the file for more MI input and would request that the interrogator talk to the detainee to obtain more information. Despite the difficulties, the Board system was undergoing constant improvement and reviewed thousands of cases, releasing the majority of detainees considered by the Boards.

After a couple of months of Boards, we created more mechanisms to push cases through this process. In October, the Detainee Assessment Board started sending the Board cases of persons who were deemed of no further intelligence interest. We created pre-screening panels of MI, Judge Advocate and MP officers. We devoted increased resources to the problem, all taken out of hide. In the SJA section alone, we had ten personnel doing detention operations, which is not our task or mission, and for which we are not resourced. By the beginning of November, the Board was meeting more frequently and General Officer members were replaced by field grade officers so that the Board could meet for longer periods of time and more often. By February, the Board was meeting six days a week, all day, with permanent members. By January 2004, I think all of us involved in the detainee area knew that we had to change the Board's philosphy and predisposition from retaining detainees to releasing detainees. I proposed that we take steps to change the Board's release philosophy and the CG agreed, authorizing these changes with the implementation of the full-time Board in February. At the same time, however, we continued to have tremendous push back from some commanders in the field. There would be a huge outcry if the Board released one perceived bad guy among thousands of releases. The CG issued command policy memoranda and orders, and I did a presentation at the commander's conference, concerning the need to treat all persons, including detainees, with dignity and respect. The presentation, as well as our published Rules for Conduct in Combat on which all Soldiers were to be trained, emphasized that Soldiers were to use judgment and discretion in detaining civilians, and were to detain civilians only when necessary and authorized by the ROE. The CG stressed precision, focused raids.

ICRC: I was not present at Abu Ghraib during the ICRC visit in October 2003 and, insofar as I know, nobody from the CJTF-7 headquarters or my office was present at the ICRC out-brief. Usually, one of my officers or I would attend the out-brief on ICRC

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Camp Victory DATED 2004/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

camp visits. We met with the ICRC periodically at their Baghdad headquarters until it was bombed and then the meetings were sporadic, often occurring at CPA. Attendees would include officers from my office, 800th MP Brigade, PMO and the CPA Office of General Counsel. We tried to have an MI officer attend as well, although this was not always possible. Throughout 2003, all ICRC reports were addressed to the commander or subordinate commanders of the 800th MP Brigade. SJA received a copy of reports. Letters on specific topics addressed to LTG SANCHEZ were given to me and I would prepare the response for him. Many of the ICRC reports, called "working papers," were responded to orally and the ICRC did not desire or expect a written response from the camp commanders. The ICRC report of the October visit to Abu Ghraib was transmitted by cover letter dated 12 November 2003 and was addressed to Brigadier General KARPINSKI. I believe that it was given to one of my officers by the ICRC Protection Delegate [redacted], at the meeting with the ICRC held on 16 November. I was on leave from 12 through 30 November and one of my officers, [redacted] prepared an analysis of the report on 25 November. Two days later, my office sent the analysis and the report out to the CJTF-7 C-2 and the 800th MP Brigade for review. On 4 December, a meeting was held at Abu Ghraib attended by MP, MI and legal personnel in order to discuss the report. I did not attend the meeting. I believe that [redacted] attended the meeting. In mid-December, the draft response was sent by my office to the 800th MP Brigade for [redacted] and coordination. The Brigade has its own SJA and legal section, and is, of course, commanded by a Brigadier General. I recall seeing drafts of the response in December, but I don't know if the Brigade made changes to the final product. General KARPINSKI signed the response, which was dated 24 December 2003. [redacted] I couldn't believe it. I spoke to

When I saw the ICRC report [redacted] Judge Advocates and MI officers who were familiar with the conditions at Abu Ghraib and the uniform reaction was that these reports could not be credible. I recall talking with [redacted] the Deputy Commander of the 205th MI Brigade [redacted] and [redacted] the Command Judge Advocate of the 205th MI Brigade, all of whom I know to be [redacted]. [redacted] that the report had to be exaggerated. I remember a conversation in which the statement was made that the allegations were crazy, because the [redacted] report to LTG SANCHEZ or MG WOJDAKOWSKI. While this would not [redacted] In hindsight, I regret not having take[redacted] have prevented the abuse we subsequently discovered because it had taken place in November, we would have notified CID a month earlier than we did. The ICRC next visited Abu Ghraib during the period 4 through 8 January 2004 and, compared to October, it was a good visit. The ICRC positively commented on improvements. Invoking Article 143 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, we did not allow the ICRC to have private interviews with 8 internees who were undergoing active interrogation, but did allow the ICRC delegate to see the detainees, observe the conditions of their detention, and obtain their names and Internee Serial Numbers. We informed the ICRC that they could have private interviews in future visits, and this was done. The night before the ICRC visit, I went to the Hard Site with [redacted] and we found females and criminal detainees commingled with security internees on the 1A side. The MPs stated that they had moved the detainees there for ease of security and observation. [redacted] and I told them that this violated the Geneva Convention and that the detainees had to be moved that night. This

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A. No.

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of June, 2004 at Baghdad Iraq

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

~~UCMJ ARTICLE 136~~ 10 U.S.C. § 1044a

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

09 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of [redacted]

On 09 June 2004, [redacted] interviewed [redacted] The following is based on what [redacted] answered to a serious of questions he was asked. He is currently reviewing his statement.

[redacted]

OSJA, HQCO, MCCDC,
QUANTICO, VA 22134

I arrived in Kuwait on the 3rd week of July 03 and immediately deployed into Baghdad, Iraq. My duty the first three weeks was operations lawyer for LTG SANCHEZ. I worked for [redacted] After three weeks, the Navy lawyer redeployed to Germany and I became the Chief of Operations Law over the Task Force. Whe[redacted] arrived in January 04, he replaced me and I went back to work with [redacted] on some issues we had worked on before. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement is a misnomer it is not the correct use of policy when dealing with detainees. The Policies were "Interrogation and Counter Resistant Policy." I first began dealing with interrogation operations when MG MILLER visited Iraq. It was understood that they had a great deal of experience from GTMO and had came to help us gain operational level intelligence. [redacted] the GTMO team and I met to discuss policies for use in Iraq. This was a new game and we were discussing the role of lawyers to make policy. We took the Field Manuals, policies and government regulations to find out how they ran operations. The reason we began writing a CJTF-7 Policy was because there were too many units using their own policies. We felt it was a good idea to have a CJTF-7 Policy to regulate interrogation operations. When MG MILLER came, he brought his policies. We gathered all documentation available on Interrogation and Counter Resistant. These are some of the documents I remember we used: FM 34-52, GTMO policies, CJTF-180 policies, Fourth Geneva Convention, International Laws, DOD Directives, FM 27-10, EPW Regulations. I do not remember seeing the power point slide [redacted] created. It looks to me that she was doing her best to put some policy together for her folks and being proactive. We saw the policies GTMO had and we felt that we needed to focus on the Fourth Geneva Convention because unlike GTMO, the fourth Geneva Convention did apply in Iraq. We saw memos from other theaters and focused on; what had been done right; what we could task; and what didn't fit in our theater. Our situation was different and had to be desperate and distinct to what we were trying to do. We went through a drafting process where we would look at other policies and studied them to try to find and interpret the law. We also wanted to give the intelligence community the ability to do their job while following the Geneva Convention. We initially sent a draft to CENTCOM in September (DATE). The draft was thematically similar to the policy done

by GTMO. CENTCOM came back and had some concerns with the draft policy we had sent. I agreed with their criticism; Stress management and Sleep management were some of the concern. CENTCOM felt they did not comply with the Geneva Convention and could be subjective. The first problem was the ability to try to place safeguards on each technique wasn't working. (Certain techniques had time limits and we believed it was up to the unit to request implementation of timing which would be different with each detainee). After we received the Draft back from CENTCOM, we decided we would stick to FM 34-52 and instead of writing down techniques, we focused on safeguards. We wanted to focus on the process. We wanted interrogation plans to be comprehensive and approved at the units level by the leadership. We wanted leadership involved in the interrogation plan process. We did not want to come up with a list of techniques written by lawyers which would than become the only legal techniques which did more harm than good. We wanted to allow the interrogator to use the Manual to use the techniques that best suited his detainee. We added segregation on the policy for the effectiveness of interrogations. We believed that a detainee should not go back to his buddies to collaborate and exchange information. If a group came in, we needed to segregate them from one another. The approval had to be approved by C2, SJA and finally the CG. I do not think that segregation is a Geneva Convention term but it is an important concept that is discussed in FM 34-52. We felt it was important for the interrogator to control the movement of a detainee. Once the detainee was returned to his fellow detainees, the interrogator lost control of the environment. We limited this to 30 days and anything that went beyond that had to get approved by higher. Why 30 days? There is no book on time duration of segregation and we thought that anything less than 30 days was humane but anything passed 60 days was inhumane. A person trying to solve a problem probably needs more than one week but less than two months to fix a problem. So we decided one month was probably safe an anything beyond that required CG approval. We felt this was a reasonable time for an interrogation to last until it required the CG's involvement and approval. Another word we changed was EPW to security detainees. We made the change because we realized that the number of EPWs were very small and there was already a procedure for EPWs (FM 34-52). We were now had more security and civilian detainees. Our problem was that there was no guidance out there on how to deal with security and civilian detainees. We used the Fourth Geneva Convention because it covered civilian detainees. The Interrogation and Counter Resistant Policy was being staffed to the units and staff. MG FAST reviewed it for the intelligence community and (WHO REVIEWED IT FOR THE UNITS AND OTHER STAFF ELEMENTS?). The policy is still not perfect but I believe it is pretty good. A lot of hard work by a lot of people went into writing the policy letters. The final policy approved by CENTCOM was the 12 October 03 Policy. There was a reduction in the techniques listed in the previous policy. We felt that our attorneys were not expert in telling the interrogators how to do Interrogations. The only way we felt we could manage interrogations was to enforce the Interrogation Plans and have the intelligence community conduct oversight of them. We felt that those that would come to us would be exceptions to policy instead of advocating to interrogators what techniques to use and time limitations. It all had to be focused on the particular detainee they were interrogating. We empowered the Intelligence community to focus on the interrogation plan. Each one would be specific based on the detainee and when they wanted to go outside of the acceptable techniques,

they would submit the request. We understood the combination of techniques would be used and the effect these techniques had on a detainee had to be monitored by the leadership reviewing the interrogation plans. One of the problems I saw coming in as an outsider, was the FRAGO system we had in place. The policies had to get down to the lowest level. We had other services and other countries and we had a problem with distributing the FRAGOs to everyone. The CG always discussed the responsibility of every one to treat detainees with dignity and respect. He would send this out on the FRAGOs that went out. He would get very frustrated because he felt some were not following his request. (I AM NOT SURE IF I CAPTURED THIS RIGHT). The reason for classifying the documents was because we did not want to compromise what we were doing. The second draft (DATE) was never meant to be followed by anyone. It was being staffed. I do not recall the staffing method for the drafts. The normal method was Current Operations' Lawyer would place the document in a folder. The staff would then go to the folder and review it and make comments. The other way was to place a cover sheet on it and send it out hard copy. I might have seen two policies that were signed and I do not know why the CG signed it because it was going to CENTCOM for approval. I was not in on any meeting with LTG SANCHEZ. The only thing I remember is that [redacted] told me that the policy only gets implemented if it is approved by CENTCOM. I do not know how the policies went out before they were approved by CENTCOM. I would assume it was leaked out. I was not involved with the ICRC visit or writing the response to their findings [redacted] was). I did see one ICRC report in January and I sent it to III Corps for their response. The ICRC report was based on a lot of anecdote and it was hard to understand what was true and what wasn't. I never heard of LTG Sanchez giving any blanket use of techniques not even for the night of the shooting. I do remember him being very upset that we had soldiers going in after a detainee who had a gun and not having a preplanning to respond with the appropriate amount of firepower. LTG SANCHEZ expected the leadership to get involve at every level. I do not recall any approval authority delegated to COL PAPPAS. It is up to the commanders to ensure humane treatment is followed and to oversee the limits of what techniques are being done.

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

[redacted]

OSJA, HQCO, MCCDC,
QUANTICO, VA 22134

I arrived in Kuwait on the 3rd week of July 03 and immediately deployed into Baghdad, Iraq. My duties the first three weeks were to serve as an operational lawyer on the CJTF-7 Staff. I worked for [redacted] USA, CJTF-7 SJA. After three weeks, the Chief of Operational Law [redacted] USN) redeployed to Germany and I assumed the duties of Chief of Operational Law for CJTF-7. I remained in this billet until [redacted] USA, of III Corps assumed the duties in January 04. I then moved from Camp Victory to the CPA to work with [redacted] at CJTF-7 (fwd) on some issues we had worked on previously for the purpose of continuity, and to ease the transition to III Corps. I first began dealing with detention and interrogation operations in the very beginning of my tour when we drafted FRAGOs giving CJTF-level guidance to all units regarding detainees. It was the opinion of our office that all detainees must be treated humanely in accordance with international law at all times and specifically, the Geneva Conventions. We addressed all detention and interrogation issues with this founding principle. LTG SANCHEZ, USA, Commanding General, CJTF-7 repeatedly impressed upon his staff and subordinate commands both verbally and in writing, his desire for treatment of all Iraqis with dignity and respect. [redacted] worked directly with the CG in developing these written orders and I participated in their drafting. To my knowledge, the only policies approved by the CG with regard to detainees were the ones published by our office, specifically the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy and various "Dignity and Respect" memos, which were published by FRAGO. Though I was not present in any meeting with the CG wherein interrogation techniques were discussed, I never heard of him giving permission for use of any particular technique. Such guidance would have been contrary to CJTF-7 policy as we created it, and his commander's intent, as I understood it.

When MG MILLER, USA visited Iraq from Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) we focused on preparing an interrogation policy. I believe it was generally understood that MG MILLER and his staff had a great deal of experience from GTMO and had come to help us gain better operational level intelligence from detainees through interrogation. [redacted] members of the GTMO team, myself, and others met to discuss the creation of a standard CJTF-7 policy for use in Iraq. MG MILLER's staff suggested that we needed a theater-level policy, and though I did not initially agree with that idea, I came to believe that the policy was necessary to regularize interrogation practices across the Iraq Theater. I initially felt that the published references (*infra*) and intelligence leadership would serve sufficiently to guide the process, and that lawyers could possibly bring the unintended consequence of unnecessary restrictions to the interrogations. After discussing the matter at length, however, we decided that the policy was necessary to regulate unit-level policies and ensure that policies across Iraq, including those in units coming in from Afghanistan and other places comported with our baseline need to satisfy the Geneva Conventions.

In preparing the policy drafts, we gathered all documentation we could locate on interrogation and counter-resistance, including FM 34-52, GTMO and CJTF-180 policies,

The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and associated commentaries, DOD Directives, FM 27-10, and other regulations relating to EPWs and civilian internees. We also considered other international law even when not binding, e.g., the Geneva Protocols. We looked at the manuals, various policies and other regulations with an eye toward gaining consistency in interrogation operations. It is important to note that while we considered the policy in use at GTMO, and used the general format of their policy for the purpose of organization of our own, we knew that we would be guided neither in content nor legal analysis by the GTMO policy. We felt that our situation was fundamentally different, and that as a force engaged in an international armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions would prevent any such guidance. Instead we attempted to evaluate all available techniques and approaches we found in the various policies and manuals, applying limits and safeguards to remain within the bounds of international law and to promote humane treatment.

After gathering information, we began the process of constructing drafts of the policy for discussion and staffing. There are various drafts in existence that contain changes to the policy as a result of our internal consultations, the staffing process and our interaction with supported commands. The many differences in the drafts, including whether to include EPWs or only Security Internees within the policy, are the result of our discussions and input from units and staff members in the staffing process. To my knowledge, these drafts were not issued to units for their use, though some units may have received electronic copies for critique during staffing. We also received some limited guidance from CENTCOM after we submitted the first signed policy to them that we intended to implement.

In initial drafts, we focused on inclusion, exclusion and limiting some individual techniques in an effort to have the policy comport with international law. In later drafts, (after review by CENTCOM SJA's office) it became evident that we should rely more heavily on FM 34-52 and focus on interrogation approaches as described in that manual while implementing necessary safeguards designed to promote humane implementation of the approaches. Given the fact that interrogation approaches described in the manual could combine techniques, and those techniques could have differing effects on different detainees based on implementation, duration, age and health of the detainee, etc, supervision and intelligence leadership involvement in the creation of individual interrogation plans became a more important focus. Comprehensive individual interrogation plans had to be supervised and approved at the unit level by intelligence leadership. In short, our aim was to allow the interrogator to use the approaches available in the manuals, tailoring the techniques that best suited the detainee under interrogation -- under direct supervision of intelligence leadership --while remaining within the bounds of the law. We selected the approaches in FM 34-52 because the manual had been previously legally reviewed, and offered approaches which could be used on EPWs, the category of detainee with the highest protections under the law. Any deviation from the approaches in the policy had to be approved by the CG. By our policy, this approval would have had to be staffed through the CJTF-7 C2 and SJA prior to CG approval. We viewed segregation from fellow detainees not as a technique, but as a necessary part of any interrogation. Understanding that while necessary, segregation could be viewed as inhumane if lengthy, we installed a 30 day safeguard in the policy, with the need for CG's approval to continue segregation of any security internee past 30 days—whether

consecutive or not. We felt this was a reasonable time for an interrogation under segregation to continue with supervision below the level of the CG. After 30 days, we felt that such segregation should require the CG's involvement and approval.

Questions have been raised as to the security classification of the policy. The reason for classifying the interrogation documents as SECRET was that other interrogation policies we viewed were classified SECRET, and I believed that if the information were leaked, it could severely undermine the interrogation efforts in the field. This classification was selected only for reasons of national security, and in no way hid the contents of the policy from CJTF-7 personnel who had the need to know it.

I recall two interrogation and counter-resistance policies being approved and signed by the CG. The first was rescinded about 28 days after its submission to CENTCOM and superseded by the later policy. We sent the first policy to CENTCOM for review with the intent to implement the policy upon approval. I believe it was dated 14 September 2003. Lawyers at CENTCOM expressed reservation that some of the techniques could violate the GC depending on the manner of implementation. After reviewing the CENTCOM input, we changed our focus to the approach-based model described above. Our desire was to satisfy the need for effective interrogations while remaining within the bounds of international law and promoting humane treatment of detainees. After modifying the policy, we rescinded the original and reissued our final policy dated, by my recollection, October 12 of 2003. I do not believe that the original policy was ever officially issued, but since it had been signed, we thought it should be rescinded as confusion could have resulted. As far as the staffing methods used for these documents, I do not recall which staffing method was used for each particular draft. Moreover, most of the drafts did not leave our office, as the changes were the result of internal decision-making. The normal method for staffing drafts outside of the office was that the Current Operations' Lawyer would place the document in an electronic folder for staffing to CJTF-7 staff and supported units through LNOs. The staff would then go to the folder and review it and make changes and comments. Some documents, especially sensitive ones, may have been staffed in "hard-copy"—placing a cover sheet on them and forwarding to the units for staffing.

The Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) is a document that I have learned was prepared by [redacted] USA. This is a document that I do not recall seeing prior to my interview with the FAY commission. I think that I would have recalled the document, because IROE is a misnomer; it is not the correct use of terminology with respect to detainees. The CJTF-7 policy does not address "engagement" of detainees during interrogation, as they are protected persons. After seeing the slide, however, I believe that it is a well-intended effort at producing a "layman's training aid" tha[redacted] [redacted]reated for her troops to teach them what was allowable under the CJTF-7 policy. I did not normally work with [redacted] on interrogation matters. I worked with [redacted], USA, a lawyer from 205th MI in the drafting of the CJTF-7 policy and occasionally answered questions from the field through him on interrogation matters. In all cases, I advised him to advise the intelligence / interrogation leadership to use comprehensive interrogation plans and to formally request any deviations from policy through the chain of command and the C2 and SJA as discussed above. The only requests for deviation that I saw were requests to continue segregation past 30 days.

Though I was not involved in the legal administration of detention operations at Abu Ghraib, I remember reading one or two ICRC reports in the January 2003 timeframe. The ICRC reports included allegations of mistreatment of Iraqis both at the point of detention and in internment. It was my understanding that these were unconfirmed reports based solely on anecdotes obtained directly from interviews between the ICRC and detainees. These reports appeared quite exaggerated and hyperbolic, citing lawful uses of force as violations, including pointing weapons at persons during capture operations, segregating suspected insurgents from their family members during questioning, or using force to prevent detainee escape. I recall forwarding an ICRC report to the III Corps SJA (detention ops) for response. [redacted] (AUS) a Coalition attorney working in my section, drafted or edited a separate draft response to an ICRC report on behalf of BG KARPINSKI's office. I edited that response. I was not present during any ICRC visit to Abu Ghraib. I did, however, work directly with the ICRC, coordinating access and handling all ICRC requests regarding Saddam Hussein. I do remember that authority to command forces at Abu Ghraib was shifted to COL PAPPAS in response to attacks at that facility, but I do not recall any approval authority being delegated to COL PAPPAS regarding interrogation approaches or policy. Such delegation would have been contrary to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance policy and my understanding of the CG's intent with respect to detainee treatment.

This statement is being provided to the FAY commission in response to their questioning, and for the purpose of their investigation. It is intended to replace the draft statement prepared by the commission on my behalf, which contained errors. I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2004/05/09	1052	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
FAST, Babara G.	[redacted]	OB/RA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
C2, CJTF-7, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq

Barbara G. Fast

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reported to CJTF-7, Baghdad, Iraq on 29 Jul 03. I was assigned as the C2 for CJTF-7. I was tasked by SecDef thru CENTCOM to complete an assessment of the intelligence architecture in Iraq and specifically address intelligence resources, processes and priorities. I spent the first part of the month with the newly arrived C3, visiting all the divisions and various activities, with an eye on the intelligence system. In both my interim and final assessments for SecDef, I highlighted my concerns with detainee operations as a number one problem and an area where we have the greatest challenge. At that time, interrogation operations were strung across the country, from Camp Bucca to Camp Cropper to Ashraf. It was about the time I arrived when Abu Ghraib was opened for interrogation business--bringing in detainees associated with a major CJTF-7 operation. Against that backdrop, I greatly welcomed the visit of MG Geoff Miller and the GTMO team. Although GTMO is a very different effort (no combat, no ongoing operation into which it must fit in a timely manner, a singular effort vice a coherent full spectrum HUMINT effort), I believed we could map GTMO best practices into something that would work in Iraq. There was much work to be done--from organization to facilities to reporting and management. The C2 and the MI Bde immediately began to implement the recommendations from MG Miller's GTMO report. In the C2 area specifically, this included standing up a robust C2X (which, lacking even a competent OIC, I had already identified as my most critical fill) and an analytic effort that capitalized on debriefing reports and focuses interrogations. COL Pappas also began to implement GTMO recommendations, to include an internal reorganization to establish Tiger Teams, as well as receiving GTMO teams augment his effort and provide additional expertise and mentorship. Arrangements were made for a Huachuca MTT, which come in and conducted additional interrogation training. In Sep, the CG published an interrogation policy letter which outlined proper and authorized conduct for interrogation (updated in Oct 03). All of these aforementioned initiatives were implemented from mid-Sep to the end of Nov (being in part dependent on resourcing). Meanwhile, the CG's goal was to close Camp Cropper (less the HVD facility) and consolidate all detention operations into Abu Ghraib by 1 Oct 03. When the first detainees from Camp Cropper began to arrive at Abu Ghraib, interrogation operations were conducted in tents. Up until that time, the Cdr, A Co, 519th MI Bn, [redacted] was the senior officer on the site. Soon, MI personnel from the various MI units began to arrive at Abu Ghraib and operate. In terms of responsibility, the MI Brigade was responsible for interrogation and the MP Brigade was responsible for detention operations. COL Tom Pappas, 205th MI Bde Commander, initially operated from his headquarters in Camp Anaconda, but found it necessary to relocate to Baghdad in order to be closer to CJTF-7 and key components of his command, such as interrogation. I am not familiar with the timing of [redacted] assignment to Abu Ghraib. That assignment was made by [redacted] my deputy and the V Corps G2. He did personnel assignments, due to the backbone of the intelligence coming out of V Corps assets and the close working relationship he had with the CJTF-7 C1, who was also the V Corps G1. The first time I recall meeting [redacted] was just after the mortar attack which killed and injured numerous MI soldiers. It was just before this incident that COL Pappas began spending more and more time at Abu Ghraib, often overnighting. After the mortar attack, COL Pappas made a decision to move all operations and billeting into the hardened buildings to prevent injuries from future attacks (CPA had previously said these buildings were off-limits to CJTF-7 use). During my visits, I was normally briefed by [redacted] and [redacted] on operations; however [redacted] was always in the wings and often discussed various operational and life support issues with me (eg. computers, showers). From an austere, bare bones installation, interrogation operations steadily improved. Facilities were rehabilitated to allow for segregation of detainees. Interrogation booths were built. Databases were built and software improved to link detainees to interrogations and reporting. Unfortunately, there were different databases being used by MI and MP's for detainee/interrogation operations. The decision to begin using BATS was slow in being implemented (just now being fielded to satisfaction). During my visits to Abu Ghraib, I observed areas of concern--shortcomings in defensive preparations, lax conduct among MP's, and a general laxity in cleanliness standards. MI personnel were forced to conduct their own escort of detainees, pull guard duty--something COL Pappas raised as an issue. I voiced my concern to the DCG, MG Wodjakowski, about the need for someone to be in charge of the entire facility, as did the JAG. [redacted] LTG Sanchez made the decision to appoint COL Pappas as the Forward Operating Base Commander at Abu Ghraib. The MP Bn was placed under his TACON. This decision was published in a FRAGO. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF *TAKEN AT* *DATED*

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

Despite this being around the time of the detainee abuses (as founded in the Taguba 15-6), the command leadership was not aware of this abhorrent behavior to the best of my knowledge(I simply can't speak for all others, but have no reason to believe that other staff and the MI Bde Cdr knew about it) and it therefore played no role in the timing of the [redacted] COL Pappas uncovered several disciplinary problems at Abu Ghraib, and to the best of my knowledge, he immediately and thoroughly investigated and took action on each one. These included soldiers having pets and local nationals living on and running a cafe. The relationship between the MI Brigade and the MP Brigade was a frustrated one, with COL Pappas unhappy about the level of MP support. COL Pappas' rater was the DCG, MG Wojdakowski, with LTG Sanchez as Senior Rater. BG Karpinski's rater was LTG McKiernan (I thought it was MG Wodjakowski until just this week) as 800th MP Bde was only TACON to CJTF-7 and LTG Sanchez. My responsibility as the C2 was one of staff supervision for interrogation operations. The C3 was designated by LTG Sanchez as the overall staff supervisor for detention operations, with the PMO being responsible for detainee operations. It is my belief that there was a premise that most units would surrender during Phase III, resulting in there being few detainees. I just don't believe that folks envisioned ever needing a robust detainee operation on a scale not seen since WWII, either during or after hostilities. There are doctrinal and training lessons to be learned and which have been developed throughout OIF. With regard to the detainees abuse--I never saw nor was I made aware of the alleged detainee abuse, the use of dogs during interrogations by MI or MP's (if it occurred), nor was I aware of any photos until the investigation was being initiated. I do not recall if it was just before the investigation began (but after the notification to the CG) or if it was after the investigation commenced when I actually became knowledgeable do recall being absolutely sickened by the description, and later, by the pictures (I have never seen the CD). Clearly, had I been aware of this activity, I would have reported it, just as I immediately actioned a reported violation in the December time frame (reported to me one day, went to JAG the next day and we went to CG--forwarded initial report to CENTCOM as they owned the unit). ////////////

STATEMENT OF MG BARBARA G. FAST TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
DATED 20 JULY 2004

BARBARA GRACE FAST
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
C2, MNF-I
[redacted]
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

On 19 July 2004, I was interviewed via Video Tele-Conference by LTG Anthony R. JONES, and MG GEORGE R. FAY. Present during the VTC was [redacted] and [redacted]

When I first arrived on 29 Jul 03, V Corps was transforming into CJTF-7. I think there was an order that established CJTF-7 on 15 June 03; however I never saw the order. There was an initial JMD. Just after I arrived, the CG and I spent a number of days visiting the divisions and getting an orientation. It also gave me a chance to review intelligence and the intelligence architecture in Iraq. Coupled with my orientation here in Baghdad, I began to understand how V Corps needed to morph to a command and task force. The CJTF was beginning work on an updated JMD that was more reflective of CJTF missions and functions. The first revision was submitted in Sep 03, with modifications in Oct and Nov, and a final approval in Dec 03. These later revisions reflected, among other things, a far more accurate picture of our operation. At the same time, manning was decreasing and we never got anywhere near our fill (about 60% is about the best I can remember). The JMD was, in part, done by CENTCOM—for example, we were told what our coalition makeup was going to be and slots were developed for these positions. We had to create a new intel architecture from scratch, including intel analytic fusion. I focused on the staff and analytical level development on the intel structure needed to be CJTF-7. [illegible] the MI Bde [illegible] deal with his brigade structure/task organization [illegible] made several fundamental decisions. For instance, should the heart of our intel be [illegible] U.S.-U.K.-Australian operation? Given the importance of employing and empowering all of our intelligence assets, it became more important to weight the effort to the big U.S. engine which could bring in intel at all classification levels. In past contingencies, the CG depended largely on a coalition staff, with help from a supporting U.S. National Intelligence Cell—this was a first step in what we did here. I decided on a U.S. and U.S.-U.K.-Australia core model, but also built a common intel cell that would provide significant value in areas like unique religion, attacks, infrastructure, and coalition intelligence. Seventeen patriots, earlier in place individuals from our intelligence cells, so we were able to embed them and thus those which could contribute to the intel picture in these areas, they often bring [illegible] because of unique [illegible] and perspectives. What we understood was non-conventional. I created the Intelligence Fusion Cell as a place where we threw everyone together without stovepipes, to focus on the huge and growing intelligence task – CJTF, Corps, DIA, OGA, NSA, CENTCOM, ISOTF, etc. As they came on station – not just a little NIC. While there was a U.S. only area the Brits and Australians were otherwise completely integrated into the effort. I also directed a shared Collection Management, imagery/geospatial intelligence and CEN that organized to support all classification levels. On the interrogation/detention side, before I arrived, the CG had directed consolidation at Abu Ghraib by 1 Oct (this had to be right about the time I arrived, but believe it was just before). As I mentioned, we modified the JMD over time to make it reflect the way we were operating, per CG guidance. This was an enormous

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [illegible] PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGE

undertaking, as we documented billets and positions. The JMD took a long time to be finally approved, which hindered fill and our ability to operate.

In terms of official investigations or official testimony, I have been questioned about the Abu Ghraib and intelligence operations in Iraq by the SCHLESINGER Independent Panel, VICE ADMIRAL CHURCH, and twice by MG FAY. I have also helped in answering a number of questions by the SENATE and others. I am currently the C2, MNF-I and was the C2 for CJTF-7 since 29 July 2003. I was probably selected as the C2 for CJTF-7 because I was the most readily available general officer and had some experience in the area of operations. As the C2, my rater was MG WOJDAKOWSKI, Deputy Commanding General, CJTF-7. My directions came from LTG SANCHEZ. I did have a lot of dialogue with the J2, CJCS (MG RONALD BURGESS) and J2, CENTCOM (BG JOHN CUSTER), but my guidance came from LTG SANCHEZ. BG CUSTER and GEN ABIZAID, usually thru BG CUSTER, would relay any other intel or issues that might relate to what the enemy was doing, assessments, technology, or other substantive intelligence issues. I had the most dialogue with MG BURGESS, who represented any Pentagon or community interests. These were usually general discussions, ensuring our intel picture was synchronized, topics of interest, etc—not directives. In terms of concerns from Washington, I do recall SecDef and [redacted] concerns about our intelligence reports not being available at the national level. In my opinion, this was a bona fide concern. Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting was not getting into national level databases and analysts/decision makers were missing pieces of information. We had a portal, which was marginally user friendly, but far better than anything we had had before. There were overwhelming communications and automation issues that took a long time to be fully resolved. We required report format changes, reports writers to help translate proper reports, an NF connection, and collector codes. This took until Dec to resolve. Just getting reports officers was a struggle. Once this was in place, we were able to disseminate reports up and have them available over the national automated message system. In fact, it took us until Aug 04 to really get a user friendly portal into place—we had been using a Winter with all pieces—feedback developed locally as just couldn't get to it any other way. There were also concerns over detainee tracking as I recall, most of this being on the detainees were interrogation and. There was also interest in what we were getting out of interrogations. We were directed to begin providing a Weekly Management Report to SecDef via CENTCOM JCS/USD-I in late Oct early Nov 03. EXHIBIT 1: Theater Interrogation Highlights. OTAG was already providing a weekly report and we were asked to do the same. The report would provide what kind of detainees we had who were of intelligence interest. We also provided Interrogation Highlights for the week. There was interest from the Pentagon on what we were getting, but they were not giving us day-to-day directions or telling us who or how to interrogate. In January 2004, I met with DR. CAMBONE and MG BURGESS. Our discussion was on intelligence writ large. Interrogation was not the predominate topic. The purpose of a meeting attended by many leaders in the intel community was to have a discussion of intelligence organization. Iraq was a key topic, hence the request for my attendance.

Regarding the initial assessment, before I left for Iraq, I had an orientation trip to DC to get smart and I met with DR. CAMBONE, MG BURGESS. I do not recall if I saw DepSecDef WOLFOWITZ, but I did not see Sec RUMSFELD. I also visited the National Intelligence Agencies. The SecDef, through JCS and CENTCOM, tasked me to do an evaluation of intelligence in Iraq. I do not know what the genesis of this directive was. I assumed at the time it was because major hostilities had ended and we were shifting from Phase III to Phase IV, and

V Corps was transferring from a Corps mission to a combined joint task force mission. A PERSONAL FOR message from CJCS was the tasking mechanism. I submitted my results in written format. Key personnel from the Pentagon took my comments very seriously and I was told that initiatives were generated to provide support. [redacted] f the CIA was also an addressee on the message due to him being an info addressee on the original tasking message.

LTG Alexander and MG BURGESS/LTG Boykin took a trip to Iraq in an effort to look at each area themselves and decide what help they could render. Their trips were separate and it probably in part as an adjunct to my report. LTG Alexander put together a game plan on how DA-02 could help meet some of the shortfalls in the technical arena. LTG Alexander provided significant help, to include the Biometrics Automated Toolset System (BATS) to help us with HUMINT and detainee accountability (with a goal of being able to have one system help both the detention and interrogation missions); Analyst Notebook, which effectively linked the all source Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) mission; the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS); ASAS-Lites to replace the ASAS systems that were not of utility in this environment; the INSCOM IDC Portal which facilitated intelligence fusion and allowed the interrogator to leverage worldwide information. These improvements allowed for accountability, analytic/interrogator collaboration and exchanges, enhanced analysis, quick name checks on bad actors, an intelligence system, etc. The [illegible] thing was to get [illegible] using the same software and up on the same [illegible] environmental [illegible] ahead by quantum leaps once fielded.

Decision to Use Abu Ghraib as the Main Detention & Interrogation Location: The movement to Abu Ghraib was made before I arrived (or at least just as I was [illegible] I do remember hearing snippets about the use of Abu Ghraib—its availability and movement to Baghdad. My initial visit to Abu Ghraib was 20 Aug [illegible] My goal was to visit Abu Ghraib [illegible] month. With interrogation being 15% of my [illegible] I found times when I couldn't meet my objectives. I visited there in August, September, November, January, February, March, May, and [illegible] because my deputy [redacted] was on [illegible] additionally, we were facing a greatly increased [illegible] as we entered into Ramadan. In December I did not make it because of the capture of SADDAM HUSSEIN. In April we were focused on the large scale enemy activity in Falloujah and Najaf (and other hot spots) and saw continued improvements in Abu Ghraib as time went on. In August 2004, the interrogation operations were barebones and it was stifling hot. There were a couple of tents and a small number of detainees who were of intelligence interest. The detention operation was up and running before the interrogators arrived, with a [illegible] population. Interrogation management at that time was fractured, chaotic, and not a [illegible] operation. Folks were doing [illegible] they could, but nothing had prepared them for what they were facing—it required mass [illegible] organization. At that point, Abu Ghraib was not set [illegible] Quality of life was [illegible] for months. MPs and MIs for months, and COL PAMPHAS worked those issues [illegible] MG WODJAKOWSKI. The operations, however, had improved greatly by Dec.

JIDC

Tactical interrogation locations were sited in areas where detainees ended up on the battlefield. LTG SANCHEZ wanted to consolidate the operations for longer term beyond the tactical interrogations with focus on the operational level. It was a challenge and we had to do everything on the fly. There was no operational pause between cessation of hostilities and the

next phases. We didn't have time to plan it like you would do a normal operation: to plan, organize, train, deploy, set-up, and execute. You do the best you can with what you have knowing there isn't going to be much help in the near term. You morph and operate as you can stand up resources, procedures, and capabilities, and you try to make every day a little better and treat your soldiers right. And, you produce intelligence as you go, as the enemy is not waiting for you to organize against him. You make countless decisions every day, with little time to staff and write things, like in a peacetime environment. At some point in the Fall, we believed we needed one person to run the entire facility and recommended such—the detention/interrogation operation is incredibly complex with mountains of issues. In this regard, MI and MP still would have separate missions, but it would build unity of command and someone to look out for and address all the issues. We felt that a Flag Officer was appropriate, but there was no extra Flag on the CJTF-7 Staff who could take this on and we never did get anyone until MG Geoff Miller arrived. The visit of MG Geoff Miller was directed by the Pentagon, but LTG Sanchez said he wanted to select anyone who would help us. We realized and stated that GTMO did not equal Iraq. This was quite clear. We operate under different authorities; we have a much larger operation than the insular GTMO operation; interrogation is only one smaller part of the Human Intelligence effort and part of a much larger all source intelligence effort; we're in a combat environment and taking enemy fire; the numbers and types of detainees are vastly larger and varied. [illegible] looking for lessons learned from something that at least had detainees and conducted interrogations above the tactical level. From MG GEOFFREY MILLER's November visit, his takeaways included the power of analysis fueling interrogations and the need for a strong CDN management capability and COL PAPPAS took the Tiger Team concept and [illegible] of interrogation analysts and linguists to form the team. COL PAPPAS and I both supported the reorganization to a Fusion Center concept. He decided to adopt the JIDC model. MG Miller also brought blueprints from various types of interrogation booths. I believe the engineers and COL Pappas reviewed them. Ultimately, the quick to construct, wooden booths were selected due to expediency. These booths had one-way mirrors for viewing interrogations as an [illegible] the CG requested [illegible] for recommendations. There was no order I'm aware of establishing the JIDC nor directing us how to establish the JIDC. We took the best Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) which were already being practiced, looked to apply applicable doctrine and policies, and imposed it over into CJTF-7 operations. COL PAPPAS reorganized from within his own Brigade, just as I organized the CI operation to meet our needs with CDN management, plan analysis, collection management, etc. He worked with the personnel he had on the ground.

The Interrogation Control Element (ICE) had responsibility for managing and running the day-to-day interrogation operations. The ICE made all assignments of interrogators to detainees, approved interrogation plans, and monitored every interrogation done at AG. COL PAPPAS [illegible] explain the details of the operations of the JIDC since it was his operation. As with all operations, improvements were made as they could be made. But, I believe it took COL PAPPAS personally moving to Abu Ghraib to really provide the changes and the leadership necessary. I personally believe it wasn't until December 2003 that the JIDC was fully capable and I felt pretty comfortable with the operations. Then in Jan/Feb 04, the Transfer of Authority (TOA) between the 205th MI BDE and the 504th MI BDE occurred. That slowed down operations a bit, but by late Feb, they were fully mission capable.

CDN. The CDN was discussed at some length during the Miller visit. Although we had a very small CDN already, it was very manually capable and lacked experience and senior

leadership. The C2X is the staff management and synchronization element for HUMINT and Counterintelligence (CI), providing collection emphasis, priorities, statistical analyses, working staff actions, interface to CENTCOM and Army, and dissemination of reporting. There were two superb captains who were go-getters and really helped make progress. There was no representation from DIA's DHS. I was familiar already with the C2X structure of Bosnia, and had also adopted this organization at EUCOM. The C2X matured with the arrival of personnel, the first being the Colonel who arrived at the very end of September. Like many other organizations, it took until late October/Nov before it was reasonably capable of full spectrum HUMINT and CI operations (principally due to personnel arrivals and getting processes in place). We had already begun a formalized collection emphasis in August and it got much better over time, until that which you see today. The C2X folks were out at Abu Ghraib every week, principally to work out collection priorities and understand the JIDC's ability to satisfy information requirements, as well as surface any issues from either the JIDC or CJTF-7. Visits were also imperative as the rooms were so poor that there could be a gap of days without good contact. The JIDC products we expected to see at the C2 were interrogation reports, statistics to help understand the population at Abu Ghraib and who was of intelligence interest. The provision of selected interrogation summaries was also an oversight mechanism designed to monitor quality control and gain more immediate information on more significant interrogations. Reports were disseminated and available for the all source analysis effort. A combination of the reports, the initial information on incoming detainees also allowed for better collection emphasis, priorities, and potential answers to the CG's PIRs. As the detainees files were sent to the Appeal and Release Board, the C2X and JIDC worked in tandem to provide information on who was or was not an MI hold and what reports we had received on that particular detainee. The reports also helped us identify resources required for the interrogation operations. While the [illegible] was responsible for ordering equipment, the C2 provided help, advice, assistance, [illegible] worked technology solutions to build the infrastructure.

JIATF: The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) force was not part of the JIDC interrogation operations mission. The JIATF was focused initially on cutting off the money supply to terrorists and insurgents. Money is a key enabler and if you deny it, you limit the ability of an organization to operate. The FBI, CIA, Treasury, Homeland Security and NSA are all members of the JIATF. All the agencies have a charter within their organization, so it [illegible] to analyze information collaboratively and develop courses of action or operations on detainees who have primacy. There were detainees who provided intelligence of interest to the JIATF. They would provide questions to the interrogator, go out to the JIDC to do [illegible] or piggyback an interrogation, providing technical expertise. JIATF did some excellent work identifying and supporting the interdiction of hundreds of millions of dollars. Seized money flowed back into Iraq Development Fund to help in the development, reconstruction of Iraq. The JIATF also moved with identifying and registering the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) within Iraq. There are a large number of suspect NGO's affiliated with terrorist-extremist support that operate in Iraq. We worked closely with CPA to get the NGOs registered to operate in the country, in part because it provides legs for shutting down a bad organization. Some NGO's and companies were actually helpful to our effort—they were basically legitimate companies who worked with us to shut down accounts affiliated with terrorism. Others required other types of operations.

IFC: The Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC) worked for me. The Brigade commander focused on actual collection as the commander and asset manager, and I, as the staff C2, had the

staff supervisory role, focusing on providing timely, relevant intelligence to the commander and the force, the intelligence architecture, and capabilities that enable intelligence operations. The IFC was comprised of Corps assets and World-Wide Individual Augmentee System (WIAS) positions on the Joint Manning Document (JMD). We had billets, but they were not ever filled beyond about 60%. We had good representation from the National Security Agency (NSA), who had a robust cryptologic section and INSCOM, who provided support from the Information Dominance Center (IDC). We also acquired personnel from CENTCOM, OGA, DIA, Counterterrorist Cell, and Special Operations. As a concerted effort to merge efforts, eliminate stovepipes, and have reachback to the theater and national level, they all sat together to mass the focus, energy and agency capabilities on the very hard insurgency and terrorism threats. We also were fortunate to have British and Australian participation. I reorganized them topically to provide operational level value and not be redundant with division intelligence analysis. When the Corps was in pre-hostilities and hostilities (thru May), geographic organization was necessary, but this needed to change to reflect the current environment, mission, enemy, and other factor dynamics. Space was at a premium as this architecture was a departure from the original small, traditional National Intelligence Center (NIC) plan. When we stood up the JIATF, around the [illegible] there was not enough space and so JIATF was co-located in a trailer right [illegible]. Similarly, we also had the Red Cell and a C2X node in trailers due to space constraints. Their work has been outstanding and I'm convinced this was the right decision.

COALITION ANALYSIS CELL. The Coalition cell was in the Palace and was made up of [illegible] nations, to include the U.S. They operated at the coalition classification level, which [illegible] intelligence they could access. Rather than give them the same types of tasks the rest [illegible], hand and behind, I gave them tasks at the coalition classification level where [illegible] they could bring great value and relevancy. So, for example, they were [illegible] information, religious dynamics, attack analysis, [illegible] and staff. They helped provide releasable products to [illegible] and helped the United Nations with threat reports. They really have done a fine [illegible].

INTERROGATION TO ANALYSIS. All reports were available to the IFC and the analysts in each area. Once we were finally able to get reporting into the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) (Due due to technical and personnel issues), interrogation reports were also automatically available to the National Level Agencies.

Interrogation reports were highly used and often provided the best information available [illegible]. As you know, more of our soldiers die from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than anything else. We had an expert from DIA who focused on this problem. He would [illegible] where they were coming from and who was making them. He would read the [illegible] closely with the interrogators at the IDC. He would send questions or would go out there to help with the interrogation of those detainees having connections with IEDs. The analyst would work with the IFC to help the interrogator. The targeting guys at the IFC would take the reports and helped build the next set of targets to go after bomb makers and employers. An entire Saddam related organization was uncovered and we successfully [illegible].

Another example: Due to interrogations and document exploitation, we were able to unravel what we believe to be about five percent of a network that Saddam was attempting to reconstitute. The interrogations did really terrific work on this very hard and time sensitive task. In these types of operations, time is of the essence, so it's imperative to turn information into

actions as quickly as possible. During a visit I made in January, I lauded the interrogators for their heroic efforts. Their work, in great part, contributed to the far lower number of attacks and casualties our soldiers experienced in the Dec/Jan timeframe.

TECHNOLOGY. Building an intelligence architecture and intelligence capabilities were key to intelligence success. First, appropriately cleared individuals at all levels and organizations needed to be able to access data. As I mentioned, from my pre-deployment visit to DC and with other senior level visits to the command, it was constantly stressed that we should eliminate any stovepipes and work together as one intelligence effort. While all the agencies had their own databases, the collocation of agency reps in one analytic center allowed agencies to access their databases and information and make it available to appropriate analysts. Additionally, many accesses were provided to analysts so they could access information themselves—the national reps were instrumental in navigating through these databases. The INSCOM Information Dominance Center was a centerpiece to access and to analytic tools. It was very hard in the beginning because everyone was on a different system and software. The linkage was provided down to the CJTF-7 divisions and brigade through the All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L), which the DA G2 and we worked hard to field. For the first time, this put all units on the same baseline and using the same system. One of the biggest winners we worked hard to field was the Analyst Notebook application, which allowed for linked analysis and collaboration between individuals and units. It saves countless hours of analyst time and contributes greatly to better analysis and common situational awareness. We procured enough copies for the CJTF-7, JIDC, the divisions, and brigades. Our goal is to field it below the brigade level. JWICS was available to CJTF-7 when I arrived, but we could only talk to higher echelons. There were challenges getting it to the divisions as modifications to the VTC and Trojan Spirit communications had to be made. We fielded the requirement in Aug, but it we've only had JWICS down to the LNO division level since December 2003. It's worth its weight in gold. In addition, we have a daily G2 VTC to discuss intelligence support in the AO and collection management. We still do not have JWICS capability at the JIDC due to bandwidth constraints but we are working on it. The enemy is too complex and it is hard for us to be going in all directions simultaneously. What is tactical could be operational or strategic or vice versa. The battlefield doesn't delineate tactical or strategic, it merges it all. We are now working on getting better NIGHT access to the divisions.

Command and Staff Roles & Relationships - Iraq-wide: The CG, C4 and I were the first two-star Corps general officers to join CJTF-7, all of us arriving within weeks of each other in late Jul/early Aug 03. I was concerned about creating any impression that I was being sent in to fix something that was broken - after all, V Corps had performed brilliantly during the war. Creating a team was important. So I wore the V Corps patch. Our command relationship was like any other. There was a command chain and a staff chain. My responsibilities are staff responsibilities as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO). LTG SANCHEZ was the Commanding General (CG) and MG WOJDAKOWSKI was the Deputy Commander (DCG). The DCG looked after the separate units (MI, MP, et al) and focused on support activities. The CG focused on the combat operations. Most of my interaction was with LTG SANCHEZ. I was the principal individual in the command for the intelligence picture, including interface at that time with Ambassador Bremmer and the Iraqis.

I spent roughly 50% of my time at Camp Victory and 50% at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). I spent a lot of time with CPA personnel and AMBASSADOR BREMER. We provided an intelligence brief to AMBASSADOR BREMMER every morning, followed by

a CPA morning update. Part of my staff was located in CPA to work intelligence issues and also as part of the Joint Operations Center staff. We worked with CPA on designing and helping build the Iraqi security capacities, especially focusing on the MOD and MOI.

COL PAPPAS didn't work for me but we worked together in what could be considered the normal G2/MI Cdr relationship. MG WOJDAKOWSKI was COL PAPPAS' rater and LTG SANCHEZ was his senior rater. I did not know how often they talked. Until recently, I did not realize that BG KARPINSKI was TACON to CJTF-7; I always thought she worked for MG WOJDAKOWSKI. I recall MG WOJDAKOWSKI working MP command related issues, resourcing, mission, support to detention activities, unit sequencing, etc. I didn't work with BG KARPINSKI much except during the Detainee Appeal and Release Boards. I would see her periodically in the Joint Operations Center, usually at the evening update, but really never had much time to develop any kind of a personal relationship—those were busy times for me. She and MG WOJDAKOWSKI didn't appear to have a close relationship. MG WOJDAKOWSKI didn't get involved much with interrogation operations. COL PAPPAS would know best about MG WOJDAKOWSKI's involvement from a command perspective, but MG WOJDAKOWSKI and I spent very little time on the subject. He did have a good degree of interface when it came to detention operations and he did spend more time on overall detention operations. He was involved with allocation of fiscal and personnel resources (MPs were scarce), and force protection issues (attacks on Abu Ghraib were nearly daily events). He was also involved with engineering aspects related to detention facilities. He was the driver of a couple of detention summits held over an entire day to work through detention operations. Commanders and action officers provided briefings to him and the CG in order to get guidance and the way ahead. The last one that I participated occurred during the August / September timeframe.

LTC (P) MICHAEL THOMAS MILLER was the operations officer for CJTF-7. He had staff responsibility for operations. He oversaw the Provost Marshall. In February, the CG asked who should be in charge of detention operations and Mike T. Miller offered that he was the CG's man. The Provost Marshall was supposed to be responsible for detention operations, but the quality and training was not.

My office administers two contracts relating to interrogation. The first one was a TITAN Contract which was part of an INSCOM worldwide contract. We have a Titan manager at Camp Victory for all of Iraqi operations and Titan representatives in various regions for oversight and administration. The linguists are assigned to a unit and the unit has responsibility for them. The other contract is a CACI contract for interrogators. The first contract was done in July 2003. The contract was through the Contracting Office of the Department of Interior at Fort Huachuca. This Contracting Office apparently was selected last summer under a Department of Defense mandate. All CACI contractors fall under military management when they are assigned to a unit. There is a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) for both contracts. [redacted] was the COR until January 2004 and he was replaced by [redacted]. The COR served as a conduit for the contracting officer, responsible for tracking performance, to make ensure that we were getting what we paid for, getting the right service.

With regard to the line of authority for MP units and MI units. The MPs are responsible for detention operations and everything that goes with that. MI is responsible for interrogation operations. The only crossover I'm aware of was when BG KARPINSKI no longer allowed the MPs to escort detainees to and from the interrogation booths for interrogations. I personally do not know exactly why she refused to continue that task. LTC PAPPAS would know the real reason.

[redacted] was assigned by [redacted] the JIDC OIC. [redacted] did all the assignments for the C2 in his role as the Deputy C2 (and V Corps G2). The majority of the C2 (and CJTF-7 staff) folks were from Corps, and [redacted] habitual relationship with the Corps G1/CTFB-7 C1 Corps leadership made it a natural for him to work assignments. Knowing there was a need for a LTC to go to the JIDC, he selected [redacted] had good credentials--he was coming from INSCOM where he was the Intelligence Oversight Officer, had analytic duties in his civilian job, had a good reputation, and had arrived at the right time. Circa 18 September 2003, [redacted] went to Abu Ghraib and began to work for COL PAPPAS as the JIDC OIC, with COL PAPPAS as his rater. The JIDC was part of the 205th MI Bde. He got his guidance from COL PAPPAS, not [redacted] or me. I am told that he did not receive an OER due to insufficient time in the position. COL Pappas made a decision to head the JIDC operations when he moved to Abu Ghraib in Nov and [redacted] was reassigned from Abu Ghraib to new duties at the end of December. [redacted] is now on the C2 staff, with duties as the OIC of an initiative to train and build Iraqi capacity. His current rater is the Deputy C2 and I am his Senior Rater. I senior rate all field grades on the staff.

[redacted] was the ICE OIC. She was part of the 519th MI Bn element assigned to the 205th MI BDE. COL PAPPAS placed her as the ICE Chief. I wasn't involved in the details managing the JIDC as that was a unit level responsibility. I wasn't aware that she had departed her assignment and was curtailed while she was on emergency leave. She was the principle interrogator who briefed me on interrogation operations when I visited Abu Ghraib (until her departure). The ICE Chief was responsible for approving the interrogation plans and ensuring they were in compliance with approved procedures.

[redacted] was the 320th MP BN Cdr. I only recall meeting him once. He was responsible for detention operations at Abu Ghraib.

When I visited the JIDC I generally tried to sit down with soldiers of the Tiger Teams in a round table forum and give them a sense of the big picture--how we were seeing the insurgency, give them a better feel for why their piece fits into the overall effort, why what they were doing was important. On two occasions I sat with them and asked them how things were going on. I had a conversation with them on one of those occasions on what their left and right limits were (authorities) and asked them if they understood them. They all said yes. I told them that the CG has some concerns on folks being very cautious and that maybe they didn't understand their left and right limits. I told them they did not have to be in the middle but they also assumed could not go over the limits. They indicated they understood and were comfortable. There were a total of about 10-15 interrogators in the group that day. I also believe some of the Bde leadership was standing around (general officers generally are not left alone!). I believe everybody understood their left and right limits when I left that day. I never had a one to one with interrogators and no one ever approached me separately on that issue. I was approached on other things, like lack of laptops, JWICS connectivity and accounts (all of which we fixed) but never on an issue of abuse or authorities. I suspect most individuals wouldn't feel comfortable just walking up to a general officer and reporting abuse—that would more likely come through their chain of command. I've also met with HDC leaders during Sunday Interrogation Review Meetings at Abu Ghraib. In those sessions, I do a similar rundown of providing the overall picture, what's important to the command, priorities, what they're doing that matters greatly, etc.

I wasn't aware that LTG SANCHEZ had appointed COL PAPPAS as the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cdr until the FRAGO came out. My understanding was that PAPPAS was responsible for force protection and the installation as a whole. Especially given that there were a lot of mortar attacks at Abu Ghraib, the CG wanted to ensure there was a unity of effort and a tight security plan for defense of the facility. I do know that COL PAPPAS identified several incidents of misconduct or substandard behavior and addressed these issues. The MPs were TACON to the 205th but I never got the impression that COL PAPPAS was in charge of detention operations or MP operations—it never came through to me that way. The MPs were responsible for detention operations, managing the entire detention facility, security and protection of detainees. They are not responsible for interrogation operations. They are not responsible for actively assisting interrogation. The only place I view their involvement is in relaying general background information on a detainee as they have an opportunity to observe the detainee—e.g. was the detainee in a good/bad disposition, did he interact with other detainees, if so, with whom? This is very passive, not active activity. There is a very clear dividing line between detention and interrogation operations. I am not sure how they might have viewed their role on implementing such things as sleep management. COL PAPPAS would know what dialogue they had with the MPs as this would have been done at the unit level. Effective 12 October, sleep management was not an authorized technique and would have had to have been approved by the CG as an exception (I saw no requests for this exception). I didn't get involved in the overall planning or training of the prison facility.

The MPs have a U.S. only automated system to track detainees world wide, but it was not user friendly and was not sufficient for running this type of large scale, coalition operation. LTG ALEXANDER would be the best person to tell you about the MI/MP collaboration on BATS. It was a system nearly ready for prime time and not a lot of training is required—it seemed like the best solution for us. It permits one single database for detention operations which tracks detainees from time of capture to release. It helps account for detainees and their pocket litter as they move from location to location without losing the data. Additionally, because it's UNCLASSIFIED, should a policy decision permit, the records could then be transferred to the Iraqis as detainees are transferred to our control. The BATS developers have been working to allow us to map over detainee data to MI operations so that intelligence reporting could also be tagged to detainee data. Use of this type of technology and procedures is not yet in any doctrine. We finalized it as an expedient prototype to get our hands around the problem.

The visit of MG GEOFFREY MILLER was initiated by either the Joint Staff or OSD. We were in the process of shifting over from a tactical mission to an operational mission and LTG SANCHEZ willingly accepted the visit. As far as the RYDER visit, I do not recall how it was generated, as it was an MP visit. MG (R) MILLER's original focus was to have been on the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), but it expanded to CITF. ISG decided they were not going to sponsor so my role became to help facilitate the visit by providing office space and help his team travel to where they needed to go. We had several conversations and he provided an In-Brief and Out-Brief to LTG SANCHEZ. I was in those briefings. I do not know what MG Miller's instructions may have been beyond his In-Brief. He looked at both detainee and interrogation operations. We agreed that there were a number of things that didn't apply because GTMO was different than Iraq, ie GTMO does not equal Iraq. Authorities were different, GTMO was a self contained operation operating in a relatively sterile strategic environment. For us, interrogation operations were only a small part of all the things we do in Iraq, interrogations feed ongoing operations and shape new ones, and we operate in a combat environment. Sheer numbers of

detainees and the vast variety of detainees (from thugs to terrorists) also create a different environment and needs. I personally never saw the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP's) from GTMO although I know the JIDC got a copy of them and perhaps the MP's and C2X. I did not personally know what authorities GTMO used, except that their detainees were categorized, I believe, as enemy combatants. We followed the Geneva / Hague Convention rules. In Iraq, our detainees were either EPW's or civilian detainees. We made some changes to our operation as a result of his recommendations. The brigade established the JIDC and organized into Tiger Teams, along with a management structure, analytic section and collection management section. I had already asked for an experienced colonel for C2X, but added the requirements for Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) representation and reports writers. I also ensured the IFC incorporated procedures and the ability for an analytic-to-interrogation link to enable better interrogations and better use of interrogation reporting.

CJTF-Policy Memos: Interrogation & Counter-Resistance: Before MG Miller visited Iraq, we were already having discussions on establishing policy. [redacted] was very clear on the Geneva / Hague authority. [redacted] was quite adamant about Geneva / Hague as being the right basis for operations, and believed it to be more than adequate for our operations. I was not part of the group who developed the 14 September Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. I was gone out of theater for medical treatment during this time. The policy was created via the legal channels and I believe LTG SANCHEZ felt comfortable with the policy. Effective 12 Oct 03, any technique that was not in the policy later had to be requested in and approved only by LTG SANCHEZ. These exceptions were staffed through C2 lines and went to the JAGs for a legal review. There was some question concerning a 20th Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) training aid that was used for interrogators to understand the authorities. On the left of the slide were those authorities you could use in an interrogation plan you could do. On the right side of the slide were those techniques which interrogators may have seen in previous draft, squad documents, or elsewhere, but that you absolutely were not allowed to use without requesting and gaining CG approval. My take was that it was meant to be restrictive in nature, and eliminate any doubt on the part of an interrogator. The training aid was posted in the JIDC so that the interrogators could see it. I only recall seeing requests for segregation of a detainee beyond 30 days. I heard there were other requests drafted by interrogators but I am told that they never made it to the CJTF-7 staff.

The grade of interrogators ranged from seven 1-2 to CW3. Most had had excellent tactical experience by the time I arrived, but were limited in strategic level debriefing skills. Interrogators with those skills are more often found at the INSCOM and DHS level. This was a void and a need I recognized immediately. Most of the experienced debriefers left when CFLCC redeployed in late 03. In Oct 03, we received 24 interrogators from INSCOM to augment our effort at Abu Ghraib. To this date we do not have any DHS debriefers. GTMO also sent a Tiger Team of experienced interrogators to the JIDC in late Sep 03. We also were fortunate to get a Fort Huachuca Mobile Training Team (MTT) to help train interrogators in early Oct 03. Contractors were also a brought in, because we didn't have enough interrogators. One of the good things about the contractors was that many of the contractors were a little older. In the Arab culture, age is important and is a sign of maturity. It is a positive attribute for more instant credibility and respect. Many were retirees from the military.

Interrogation Successes, Conditions and Abuses at Abu Ghraib: I cannot state what or if certain interrogation techniques worked better than others to gather intelligence. The techniques to be used were in the interrogation plans internally generated and kept in the unit.

Executive highlight summaries were sent via the C2X to me every night; later the JIDC was asked to send all interrogation summaries. We had many operational successes that stemmed from interrogations. I have previously compiled some of the unclassified successes and they are attached to this statement.

LTG SANCHEZ is a tough, no nonsense commander who takes his responsibilities very seriously. He recognized and believed that intelligence drove operations. As far as if there was any pressure, there is always pressure on the battlefield and since intelligence helps build the framework for the operations, you are going to get and feel pressure. Lives were at risk—and the country, too. I never felt that there was any pressure that would cause or encourage someone to go beyond authorized authorities. LTG SANCHEZ had an eye for detail, with no detail too small. Once he took a trip to visit the JIDC and he walked through every aspect of how interrogation occurred. He made some adjustments and that might have been perceived as pressure on the unit. I believe his intent was to provide direction and guidance to make the JIDC a better organization that was responsive to his needs.

LTG SANCHEZ was very focused on intelligence. I finally felt that by the late November timeframe, the whole intelligence organization was sufficiently matured to meet the CFLCC requirements and to produce the intelligence necessary to shape and contribute to operations to begin to get our arms around the foreign regime elements and other threats. Up until then, we were incrementally improving our personnel and systems, getting comms that could support our efforts, getting the architecture into place, and getting the tactics, techniques, and procedures sounded. This is not to say that there was not quality intelligence being produced, but it was not at the level it needed to be. I believe that LTG SANCHEZ was very satisfied after we moved into November. This is a HUMINT-centric environment. Virtually the whole thing [illegible] HUMINT. HUMINT has not been our strength in the Army or intelligence [illegible]. We have a lot of [illegible] as well as. Timing is critical in order to interdict the enemy. HUMINT must meet these [illegible] to time sensitive targeting, as well as our long term [illegible].

[illegible] directed the greater [illegible] Task Force (TF) to focus on SADDAM-related actions/interrogations. COL PAPPAS organized a number of Tiger Teams to put all their effort against the task. The idea behind it was to systematize and create the momentum and expertise necessary to successfully exploit and rapidly use the results to bring down more of the SADDAM network. We had nightly briefings to LTG SANCHEZ during that time. LTG Sanchez personally went over the daily efforts (including interrogations), read each interrogation report, and provided guidance. I estimate that we were able to unravel about 80% of the network the SADDAM had reorganized. While the negation was here, all of intelligence worked very hard to accomplish the mission. Intervention, disruption, [illegible] work. It's hard to put a finger on what we were able to prevent, but I believe it has been a significant disruption to the enemy's plan.

Since we [illegible] Oct 03, the only time dogs could be used in interrogation was with an exception to policy signed by LTG SANCHEZ. If authorized, the policy was that the dog had to be muzzled and controlled by a trained dog handler at all times. The use of dogs for MP detention operations as a whole is within the policy and can be very useful in the kind of facility we have at Abu Ghraib. I had a very brief discussion with COL Pappas on 28 Aug 03 concerning the use of dogs at Abu Ghraib. Based on our discussion, I thought that the intent for use of dogs dealt with using them for security personnel, such as the general security of the camp and movement of detainees within the camp or when they were not in as secure an

environment as behind the wire. At the time, there were no interrogation booths and a favor, that, by design, permits a more controlled environment. "More in terms of detainee/prisoner security operations, not interrogation operations." In general, I am not in favor of dogs in interrogation, and certainly feel there is no need or requirement for dogs in the small Abu Ghraib interrogation booths.

Actions upon learning of Abuses at Abu Ghraib: As far as having knowledge of detainee abuse, I was aware of a detainee dying at Abu Ghraib during an interrogation being conducted by OGA on 4 Nov 03. I believe the first notification came from COL PAPPAS to me, and he sought my counsel. I told him to get an on site Army Doctor to examine the detainee immediately. I called the CG and advised him of the situation and that we needed to initiate an investigation. He said no, that it was an OGA issue and that I needed to call OGA and have them initiate an investigation. I called the Deputy and notified him. Apparently, OGA headquarters personnel called CID for assistance, and they began an investigation on 4 Nov. I saw an interim report but I do not know if the investigation has been completed. In the evening of 2 Dec 03, I was notified of a report of detainee abuse (not at Abu Ghraib). I notified JAG that evening and we went to see the CG on the morning of 3 Dec. The unit accused was not part of our organization and CENTCOM was notified. It wasn't until MG TAGUBA or perhaps CID (just don't recall which investigation I have of first) initiated an investigation that I first became aware of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. On 19 May 04, I was notified by [redacted] MI Bde and JDIC Cdr, of a potential case of abuse stemming back several months—I turned it over to the JAG immediately. Two other cases of potential abuse were already being investigated by the time I became knowledgeable of them.

Alleged Statement made at a Battle Update brief (BUB): In reference to a statement [redacted] might have made about "why are we detaining these people, we should be killing them," I do not recall ever making the statement.

Guidance from Higher Levels: I never received any specific day-to-day direction or guidance from higher levels. We did get Standing Directive Requirements (SDR) from the intel [illegible] but this is a normal procedure for requesting additional collection. CJTF-7 was responsible for detention and interrogation operations [redacted] never raised any concerns that he was getting pressured from MG BURGESS or DR CAMBONE. CPA had a lot of interest on detention matters, but I never got any guidance from them. They were briefed on interrogation and detention operations because there is a convergence of interest. CPA was busy set up the Iraqi criminal court system, and advising the various ministries on processes. CPA also often received requests for release of certain detainees by various Iraqi's, often through AMBASSADOR BREMER and his staff.

Review & Release Board: I am [illegible] BG KARPINSKI stated that I was overly [illegible] to release detainees. We [illegible] that. There were three voting members on the Appeals and Release Board — [redacted] BG KARPINSKI, and me (President of the Board). [redacted] crafted up the initial framework for the Board and the CG approved the document promulgating the board. All votes were to release, release conditionally, transfer, or [illegible]. Occasionally, a detainee was deferred to a subsequent board due to additional time needed for closure (CID or MI usually) usually this was for not more than two weeks. The overwhelming number of votes were unanimous. I recall very few disagreements. Of the over 4200 detainees who went before an Appeal and Release Board from Aug 03 to Jan 04, records indicate that [illegible] of them were released on their first appearance. I do not know where her

inaccurate comment came from. I did not veto or refuse to release anyone after the board adjourned. I stopped sitting the boards on 13 Nov 03.

High Value Detainees (HVD): CJTF-7 had no official direct command relationship with the ISG. The ISG was responsible for running the interrogation operations of the High Value Detainees (HVD)—they made it crystal clear that this was their mission alone. CJTF-7 was required to support them in detention and with other non-interrogation parts of their mission. The 800th MP Bde had a responsibility for running the detention operation in the HVD facility. Those who were not on the Blacklist but were of high value would come to CJTF-7. We always got ISG's Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). They didn't always ask the questions we wanted them to ask because of the difference in mission, so we submitted Source Directed Requirements (SDR) to answer any questions we might have.

Other Government Agency (OGA): The direction I received was to work as closely as we can as a team—a one team, one mission, one effort. [redacted] encouraged a close working relationship, as did DOD—from the senior leadership to the CG. From division level and below in CJTF-7, operations brought OGA and the military into a close working relationship. I believe that we probably got most, if not all OGA reporting, less what went through operational channels. There wasn't written direction on a command relationship. They were just another organization in theater, albeit a key one. I was rarely advised of their specific operations or sources in the theater. As it related to interrogation, OGA had to abide by the CJTF-7 interrogation and counter-resistance policy at all times in CJTF-7 facilities. Their Chief specifically advised me that they had to operate under military authority and that there were no other arrangements for them. OGA approached me and asked if it would be possible to place personnel of OGA interest in a small number of cells. There were continuous problems with the MP accountability of detainees. They continually were having to look for detainees they could not find. Sometimes, it would take us days to find them. COL PAPPAS was highly frustrated (as was I), as this really disrupted the interrogation effort. He advised of times when detainees assigned to a cell would not, finally, be found back in the general population. This operation disorganizes the ability to do sound interrogations, not to mention the fact that it was life threatening. It made sense to segregate their high value detainees in particular cells, so they could always be found and not be out in the general population where they could collaborate with other detainees. I asked COL PAPPAS to work with the MP's and see if this could be accomplished as the facility was under MP control. When they came to our facilities, our rules did not apply. There was no specific guidance we received with respect to OGA, IGI or other non-DOD agency. We operated as a team, collaborated and did not create stovepipes. Folks worked hard to develop cross talk between interrogators, as many detainees would have overlapping ties.

One example of the need for cross-talk here was when another DOD organization had a detainee who was on a terrorist website and a detainee from Abu Ghraib was also on the same website. The interrogators discussed this and connected the dots. There was a plan to consolidate all DOD interrogation operations, but the other organizations determined they wanted and needed to keep their own operations. I am not aware of CIA or any non-DoD organization providing guidance to our interrogators but they did sit in on some of our interrogations. I have no recollection or knowing about "Ghost Detainees" held at Abu Ghraib prior to the investigation. The detainee who died on 4 Nov had apparently just been brought in and had not yet been registered. I am aware only of one other detainee on which CJTF-7

received specific instructions from higher headquarters. I am not aware of any Special Access Programs (SAP) at Abu Ghraib or other detainee locations.

CONCLUSION: The Field Manual in existence is good basis for doctrine but we need to update it to reflect the realities of how we operate in 2004. We are experiencing various scenarios where there are detainees and also individuals we may debrief—our doctrine needs to help us through these kinds of contingencies and operations. There is a lot that technology can do for interrogations now. We do not need to throw FM 34-52 away--we need to update it.

We have learned over the last three contingencies how valuable a COX is and the important role it plays. It needs to be in doctrine and on our manning documents. We need to get best practices into implementation. For example, the Tiger Team concept is a great concept for just about any scenario. We need to train on it, practice it, and do it. Dissemination: there is work to get done here. HUMINT reporting formats must be standardized and used—reports must be able to make their way expeditiously into message handling systems so they can really be used by consumers at all levels and in all organizations. The Portal we use is great—we're getting rave reviews. For the first time, all HUMINT reporting, from Division and below to the operational level command, is going into the portal and is available to all users in an easy-to-use way. Ultimately, as we work with data and not databases, this will be even better. We cannot afford to have to reinvent something for the next crisis—we need to fix this now.

MI and MP and other relationships: I personally think that everyone needs to understand the chain of command of the MI/MP relationship. On the staff, we need to establish who is responsible for overall detention operations. Who synchronizes the building of facilities, manning, screening, resourcing, force protection, movement, detainee release, etc.? Someone has to own ownership. These operations cut across the entire staff but short of the CG and the DCG, no one has full control or responsibilities. We also must figure out these responsibilities within the Services and Joint Staff.

Training: Over the years, interrogation took a back seat, especially during force structure shifts in Desert Storm and subsequently downsizing back other intelligence capabilities. There was the mobilization of large scale [illegible]. Army assumed responsibility for HUMINT operations that could come by the services. Figure and below lost much of their capability and competency. We [illegible] a price. We haven't been able to train up like we need as an Army—[illegible]. We must focus collective training beginning from the point of [illegible] capture, [illegible] segregation procedures, pocket litter to stay with detainee). We need to train on [illegible] our MP's. We have made strides in training on this, but it needs work). Leader training—we miss, train our leaders on detention operations. We are now experiencing the largest detention and interrogation operation since the Korean War. The whole detention issue is a very fragile human dimension issue, [illegible] and there is a very fine line where things can go wrong. It is a leadership issue to ensure soldiers are trained and disciplined to treat detainees humanely even after their buddies have been killed by the now detained attacker.

What did cause happen? I believe there was likely a leadership failure. I don't know at exactly what level—team, platoon, company [illegible]. Individuals made wrong decisions; others witnessed them, or looked the other way. It will be up to the investigative team to judge whether MI contributed to the abuse. As I looked at the photos of the MP's humiliating those detainees, it appears to me that no one was forcing them or perhaps even encouraging them to commit these abhorrent acts. They decided to do this on their own and took advantage of detainees who could not protect themselves. The photos show unacceptable behavior. I cannot believe someone was directing them to do those things. With regard to interrogations, it's apparent now that there

were some practices outside of the approved techniques, but I do not know where the failure occurred. I've thought a lot this. I believe the policy was good and clear. Exceptions to authorized techniques could only be approved by LTG SANCHEZ. Training teams, assistance visits, and command and staff visits occurred. More experienced interrogators were brought in. And while there was pressure to perform, I never felt nor do I believe there was pressure or encouragement to exceed the authorities in order to produce timely, relevant intelligence. When in war, no one jumps to Inspector General inspections/visits (although our IG did make trips to Abu Ghraib), but maybe we need to have them a little more regularly to spend some time around detention / interrogation operations, do a quick sensing and give folks the chance to talk to a disinterested person.

What would I change? I would staff the JMID, to include the JIDC. I am disappointed that as the main effort for the nation, intelligence is staffed only at about 51% even today. We did a good action of requirements to ensure we were not excessive in our requests—the JMD was validated, but just not filled. We are operating at a C4 rating, working with what we have in 24 hour a day, seven day a week combat operations. One additional capability I think we needed was Behavioral Psychologists to help not only with detainees but with our forces (MI/MP) as well. The environment was tough. Maybe, they would have been able to pickup on the first bits of trouble.

We had at 2/3 of our intelligence capability. Intelligence is organized as a nested set of capabilities from tactical through operational to strategic. Beginning in Oct. we were able to get INSCOM (operational) help but there is no strategic DHS presence. Given the mission, all three echelons must be invested. We also need to have robust automation and communications in place. This has been a real challenge. There were days when we couldn't speak to the brigade. Since we are going to be collaborative and networked, we need a robust communication system.

Your Army Corps service members are real heroes--fought hard and magnificently, and the best they could do in a peacekeeping/stability mission they had not trained for. No one knew what was going to unfold--we have been hostilities ended we are still in combat while nation-building. Intelligence is about everything, even protecting our force, shaping operations. I don't know how many coalition soldiers are alive today because of the interrogations that have been done, but the efforts of interrogation were key to interdicting and neutralizing many, many enemy activities that had every intention of killing our men and women.

Barbara G. Fast HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 12. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF MG BARBARA G. FAST TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
DATED 20 JULY 2004

[redacted]

MNF-I CJ2 AC
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
Organization or Address

[redacted]

MNF-I CJ2-Analysis Comp
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ

administer oath, this 20 day of July, 2004
at Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

[illegible]
(Authority to Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [illegible] OF PAGE

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Q Did you report it to anyone?
A. No.
Q. Why did you not report it?
A. I did not think it was abusive.
Q. Do you recall when it occurred?
A. That was after I was working in operations, some time in Dec 03, before [redacted] left. I know it was on a Sunday as I watched football after I left. I think it was a Carolina game against possibly Green Bay.
Q. Did anyone else show you photo's of the detainees in the hard site?
A. No.
Q. Has anyone discussed this case with you other than this office?
A. Yes, I was talking to [redacted] and he told me there was an investigation into detainee abuse.
Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?
A. No.///END OF STATEMENT///

Initials [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 21 Jan 04

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21 day of JAN, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Prison Abu Ghraib

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART 136 UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPA V1.00

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823 DEC 1998

[redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
[redacted] HOPEWELL, VA.	20040623 [redacted]	1135 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
239TH MP CO. VIRGINIA BEACH, VA.

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON APPROXIMATELY 1050HRS ON 23 JUNE 04 INVESTIGATOR [redacted] PRESENTED A LINE UP OF PHOTOS. AFTER REVIEWING THE PHOTOS [redacted] DIGITAL PHOTO #2444C318 ~~WAS IDENTIFIED~~ AS THE INDIVIDUAL AS DISCRIBED IN THE STATEMENT DATED 30 JUN 04. AS A PROFESSIONAL JAILER FOR ELEVEN YEARS THE CONDUCT AND TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS WERE NOT TO STANDARDS. I HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO ADD AT THIS TIME.

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

NOT [redacted]

USED

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Haywell, VA DATED [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Not [redacted]

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL ENCOURAGEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

[redacted] sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of June 2004 at [redacted] VA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

For use of this form, see AR 195-2; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 301(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE	3. TIME	4. FILE NO.
Alexandria, VA	18 July 04		

5. NAME, GRADE, AND ORG: [redacted]
6. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: United States Army Reserve
7. SSN: [redacted]
8. GRADE/STATUS: O2

PART I - RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A - Rights

[illegible] told me that [illegible] with the United States Army. ACE is investigating the activities at the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison. [illegible] wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am suspected: Article 92, UCMJ, Dereliction in the performance of duties.

Before [illegible] asked me any questions about the offense(s), [illegible] made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

1. [illegible] not have to answer any questions or say anything.
2. Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial.
3. [illegible] have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me.

[illegible]

[illegible] have the right to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that the lawyer can be civilian lawyer I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be detailed for me without charge before any questioning begins.

[illegible] have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I signed a waiver certificate.

[illegible]

Section B - Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am fully willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without having a lawyer present with me.

WITNESS: (If available)	SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE
[redacted]	
205th Army Materiel Command [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR [redacted]
[illegible]	TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATOR MG George Fay
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE	ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR G2, United States Army SETF

Section C - Non-waiver

[illegible] Signature [illegible]

[redacted]

[illegible] WAIVER CERTIFICATE [illegible] STATEMENT [illegible] SHOULD BE EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED

DA FORM 3881, NOV 89 EDITION OF NOV 84 IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.01

PART II - RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE

(a) WARNING

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Fort Huachuca MID, Fort Huachuca, AZ	2004/06/10	0945	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SFC/AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HQ, 306th MI Bn (DSDC), Fort Huachuca, AZ

9. [redacted]

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 7 - 21 Oct 03, I was at Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq as part of a five person Mobile Training Team (MTT) from Fort Huachuca, AZ. The mission of the team was to provide interrogation training and provide advice and assistance. My focus was interrogation operations. I spent time with the interrogators during interrogations observing and providing immediate feedback. Upon our arrival at AG, we were greeted by [redacted] We were also provided a tour of the facility. The team spent the first couple of days setting up, conducting an assessment of the operations and establishing a training schedule based on the assessment. The training lasted five days and encompassed various aspects of interrogation operations. Throughout our time at AG the interrogators remained open and receptive to the training and subsequent advice and assistance. The training included the TIGER TEAM concept which had been very effective in interrogation operations at GTMO. When we got there, the interrogators had already started to employ this technique as the analysts participated in the interrogations. After the training, I spent the rest of the time with the interrogator teams. I sat in on approximately 12 interrogations, observed 6 and conducted 3 on my own. Throughout our time at AG the MTT would get together at night to discuss findings and recommendations. We also continued to enhance the training schedule as there were several civilian contract interrogators scheduled to arrive at AG. I cannot specifically recall signing an Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) but all techniques employed by the interrogators were within the limitations established in FM 34-52. The 519th MI Bn interrogators were strong and seemed to know what they were doing. They did things by the book and I did not witness any bad morale within the unit. I did have concerns with the CACI contract interrogators There were several who did not have any background in interrogations or any military background. The MP's did not appear to know their job. This was apparent on at least two occasions. During the first incident, I participated in a lengthy interrogation. At the conclusion of the interrogation I went outside the interrogation booth to summon the MP's to return the detainee to the holding area. When I got outside, I realized the MP had left the area and we were the only people in the interrogation site. This was troublesome because if the detainee had attacked us during the interrogation, we would not have an MP in the area to back us up. I had to walk around the compound to find an MP to take custody of the detainee and drive him back to the holding area as it was a considerable distance. This was difficult as it appeared the MP's were conducting a shift change. The second incident involved the MP's not properly managing the locations of detainees in the solitary confinement area. We requested a detainee for an interrogation and the MP's never escorted him to the interrogation location. We went to the MP's to find out the reason for the delay. The MP's could not find the requested detainee. They kept information concerning detainee locations on a white board. We went to the cell depicted on the board and found it contained a different detainee. Upon further examination, we found that most of the white board location information was incorrect. We had to have all the detainees in the entire cell block hold out their arms so we could read their name tags until we found the correct person. During my time at AG, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee I never witnessed nor heard of any MP offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations. I never witnessed nor heard of any guard dogs being used during interrogations.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No.//End of Statement[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT [redacted] PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 1 OF 02 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF *TAKEN AT* *DATED*

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June at the Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Detachment

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

<HEADER>
</HEADER>
<BODY>On 1] February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, al Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

MG Antonio M. Taguba, 576-50-8375, DCG-CFLCC, Interviewer

[redacted] MP, CFLCC - PMO, Interviewer

[redacted] JA, CFLCC - SJA, Interviewer

[redacted] 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer

[redacted] NAS Signal and Canine Unit, U.S. Navy,

Interviewee

[redacted] 27D30, CFLCC - SJA, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows:

My name is [redacted]. I am in the U.S. Navy. My social security number is [redacted] I am assigned to the NAS Signal and Canine Unit. I can be addressed as Petty Officer or MAI.

I received a verbal order from my Chief back at NAS signal saying that there was a mission coming up at that I may receive it. Time passed and I was told that I would be the one to take the mission here. I am a dog handler. I came here with two other individuals from the same region, but different basis. We arrived here on 18 November 2003. We were given no specific instructions

before our arrival here. We reported to the 320th TOC when we arrived, prior to coming to the prison we met with [redacted] and he told us he was the POC.

As far as I knew we were to support the prison with canine support. I had never worked in a prison environment before. We did a one-day training period on scout and search for escape prisoners back at my unit. No one wanted to claim us when we arrived here so the 229th Military Police Company picked us up. It was just us navy dog handlers that got picked up by the 229th MP CO, the army dog handlers arrived a day or two later. We had a total of five dogs here. There were three navy dogs and two army dogs.

We usually worked with the Internal Reactionary Force (IRF). We would go out with the IRF when they received a call from the 320th TOC. I believe CPT Jones to be the commander of the 2991 MP Company. We never received any orientation on what was

expected out of our canine unit, we just used common sense. I am the NCOIC for the navy dog handlers, and [redacted] is the NCOIC for the army dog handlers.

We usually stayed in close contact with [redacted] Upon arrival we began [redacted] on a daily basis, then about a week later we took over the Entry Control Point East (ECP) for vehicle searches as well as working with the earth. I went over a work schedule with [redacted] regarding a rotation for covering the ECP and the IRF. We had one dog at the ECP, and the other two on standby with the IRF.

We never received any instruction on the use offeree in the compound. We raised question on what we could and could not do in this environment, but we never received a straight answers. I briefed my team to use common sense, and use your escalation of use offeree as the situation dictates. Based on the escalation of use of force, a dog cannot be employed on a prisoner if that prisoner is not posing a threat.

I have a Belgium Melon. He is a control explosive dog. My dog had never been in a prison environment. The dogs didn't have to be retrained we used the same commands

On the night of 24 NOV 03 we were with the IRF when we received a call to search the hard site

for explosives. We had heard also that a prisoner had someone had been shot. All 5 dogs were there that night. The army dogs were for security while our dogs searched for explosives. We went to specific Tier, I couldn't tell you the name, but I could show you if I were in the facility. We searched the cells for explosives, none of the dogs responded. We were preparing to leave when we were told we needed to search another cell. I decided to conduct the search. I reentered the Tier and saw two individuals who were dressed in green BDU's. They instructed me to search the cell and as I approached the cell I heard a lot of shouting and screaming. I looked around and noticed that there was no one else up there; that no other cells were occupied.

I peaked my head in the cell and noticed four individuals, three males and one female. One male was in the corner, two males were crouching, and the female was next to the rack. I was having a hard time controlling my dog because of the noise, and the actions that were happening. I finally got my dog under control when on of the MI guys told one of the detainees, "If you don't tell me what I want to know I'm gonna get this dog on you", or words to that effect. I realized that it wasn't a search and they actually wanted my services for interrogation. I exited the cell, but my dog would break the plan of the cell. The two individuals and the female, which I know now to be an interpreter, reentered the cell and went back in a started yelling and screaming at this guy again.

With all the yelling and screaming going on my dog breaks my control and charges the cell. The cell was very dark; the only illumination was a pin light. I see the female wincing, and I notice my dog on her arm. I immediately call my dog off of her, and my dog comes back to the heel. I ask the female to come out so I can check her. She comes out of the cell and I constantly ask her, "Are you alright, did he bite you??" She says she is ok and that she wasn't bit. I looked at her arm no bite mark, no blood, and her DCU uniform wasn't torn. I once again ask her if she is ok, and does she need medical

attention. At that point I see [redacted] and I ask what's going on, and he responded by saying he didn't know. Once I realized what was going on I left, I didn't want any part of what was going on. As I was leaving, [redacted] followed and then I heard someone say, "where's the dog, where's the dog??"

No names were said but I know one of the individuals was about 6'4", short black hair, slender build, brown eyes, wearing civilian clothes. The interpreter was about 5'7", medium black hair, and I believe she wore glasses. I couldn't tell you what the other two looked like.

When I arrived at the cell I let the personnel know I was there for the search. I never had a discussion with the MI about my dog being used in interrogation. It was a male's voice asking where the dog was. The other navy handler's were called and they actually refused the call because of my incident. They were called once more and then again they refused.

When a search is conducted the detainee should be removed, leave everything in the same condition, give the command for the dog to search the room, let the dog search the room, and then exit the room. On 24 NOV 2003 we were called to the compound to conduct the explosive search. I have never been called to Camp Ganci or Camp Vigilence without the IRF. We keep paperwork on the dogs; the form is a 5585/3-detection/utilization form. We turn in a copy each month. I don't have a record for the incident on 24 NOV 2003, because we only keep track of active searches.

We were never instructed on the Geneva Hague Convention, I just try to treat people with respect. There has been occasions where we have let the IRF commander, [redacted] know we have refused to go to the compound. We were never told not to comply with MI and MP's when they request us to assist them. We never received any guidance on what was authorized and not authorized. The interrogators never approached us individually about us assisting them at the compound. I don't know if the Army dog handlers were ever approached.

[redacted]et up a wall between the Army dog handlers and us. [redacted] stated that the Navy was basically dipping into his Kool-Aid. I sit down with [redacted] to try to work as one team, but [redacted] didn't want to work as a team. We work for the IRF commander, and the Army dogs work for the compound.

I have heard rumors that there are videotapes and pictures of detainee abuse, arid I heard there was a videotape of a rape. We have a SOP that was written up by [redacted] and containing input and guidance from myself. The SOP basically states that the navy handlers are not to be used for anything except for what we were trained for.

[redacted]nd myself shared lessons learned. If anything came up on a professional level we word share it with each other. I honestly believe that dogs are under utilized here; I don't think there is a need for dogs here other than the ECP and for any escape attempts.

We once went out with the 82nd on a mission outside of the compound. We provided security for their team, and also searched fields for weapon caches. I recommended that their be only one canine unit team assigned to this compound.

The SOP that [redacted]nd myself worked on was finished in December. I know [redacted] tried making the Army Handlers follow the SOP and I personally gave [redacted] two copies of the SOP, but like I said before [redacted] didn't want to be part of a team.

I received my dog handling training at the 341st Training Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX. My next assignment was with Southwest Regional Canine Unit. San Diego, CA.

The panel stopped, to discuss [redacted] statements. The panel reconvened.

There were two male personnel dressed in civilian cloths inside the cell that I assumed to be MI. There were two personnel dressed in BDU's were outside across from the cell.

The Tier had lights on but the cell was dark That was my first time in the hard site.

I was outside the hard site when I received the call about a dog being needed. I assumed when the call was placed for a dog, that I was needed to conduct a search. I realized once the interrogator threatened the detainee with the dog, that it was not for a search.

When my dog lounged, I came forward about three or four seconds and regained control of my dog and pulled him back. My dog's leash is about six foot; it did not extend all the way. They started back yelling and screaming and that is when I lost control of my dog again. My leash extended almost all of the six feet. I couldn't tell the detainees reaction because it was so dark, at that time I was trying to regain control of my dog.

We would train with the IRF from time-to-time. We would rehearse in an open area near the compound. When we got called out for a search, the compound

supervisor would let us know it was clear to enter. Next the IRF takes a line formation in front of the "pen". Once the line is set we take someone from the IRF and we start to search the tents, as they hold the line. Once we done searching the tents we position ourselves behind the line. When we search the cells, it's just the dog handler and the dog.

5585.2 B is the Navy military working dog manual. I haven't seen or reviewed any Army Manuals regarding military dogs.

Finished with their discussion, the panel briefed [redacted] and then they dismissed him.

</BODY>
<FOOTER>
</FOOTER>

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; The proponent agency is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq	[redacted]	1429 [redacted]	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SSC

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

, deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

[redacted] wish to make the following statement under oath:

I would like to make the following statement to help clarify a statement I made earlier. It was not until after I left the CID office that I remembered this incident. It was the night of the gun incident at the hard site. We had just about finished up, and they called for a dog for a search in one of the cells. I responded up to the second floor, I heard a bunch of yelling coming out of either the first or second cell on the left side. I do not know who the people were, but there were two guys standing on the back along the wall. I said I was there for the search they said it was in the cell to they pointed to the cell next door. I went to that cell there was a bunch of yelling going on in the cell and my dog started going ape shit. There were three people standing up and a fourth person sitting on the floor in the corner The people standing up were yelling at the detainee in the corner I could not make out what was being said because of everyone yelling and my dog barking. I remember one of the males saying to the detainee, if the detainee did not provided the information the guy was asking about, then he would have me let me my dog go on him. This was the first time I heard of this, and the guy did not say anything prior to me about this. So at this point they were yelling and screaming at this guy some more I turned and saw [redacted] behind me and asked him about what was going on. We do not use our dogs for interrogation purposes. The two males and the female were coming out of the cell, and my dog went to enter the cell, I pulled my dog back, gained control and exited the cell. Then I heard someone say, "Get that dog out of here" Just as I got the dog and myself out of there the two guys and the female went back into the cell and started yelling at this guy some more. I am standing at the door with the dog and the dog jumped into the room and he took a snap at the girl that was in the room. She kind of winced when he went at her I asked her if the dog had bit her, and she said no, I asked her to come out and I would look at her arm. She came out and I looked at her arm and it was ok There were no marks on her arm from the dog, and there were no tears in her clothes from the dog At that point she went back inside the room, and I looked at [redacted] and told him I was leaving because this is not what my dog is trained for. Just as I was leaving, [redacted] and I walked away, one of the males said, "Where is the dog", and I just kept walking.

Q Describe the three people in the cell?

A One of them was about 6'2" or 6'3", black hair, medium to slender build, white male. The two males were wearing civilian clothes The second male, I could not really describe him The female I think was wearing glasses, long dark hair, shoulder length or a little past, maybe 5'5" to 5'8". She was not a soldier; I think she was an interpreter. And she was wearing Desert Camo top

Q Have you seen any of these persons since that night?

A I have seen the tall male around the compound

Q Did your dog ever bite the detainee?

A No.

Q Did you willing allow your dog to go into the cell?

A. No

Q Do you have anything to add to this statement?

EXHI

Q No

Q Prior to making this statement did [redacted] advised you that you were still under the rights advisement you had signed approximately an hour prior?

A. Yes.

Q Do you understand anything you say in this statement can be used against you in a military court?

A. Yes.///End of Statement///

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FREELY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 23rd DAY OF Jan 04 AT Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Warren D. Worth
(Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136, UCMJ
(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGES 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA Form 2823 (AUTOMATED)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; The proponent agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Gharib, Baghdad Iraq	[redacted]	1215 [redacted]	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
NAS Sigonella, Italy, assigned to 229th MP Co, Abu Gharib, deployed with duty at Abu Gharib, Iraq

I, [redacted] want to make the following statement under oath:

Q. What is your job at Abu Gharib detention facility?
A. Work with the Internal Reactionary Force (IRF) and the Entry Control Point (ECP) and a dog handler.
Q. What is the name of your dog?
A. [redacted]
Q. Describe your dog?
A. Tan and black, Belgium Malionis.
Q. How long have you been a dog handler at this site?
A. Little over tow months.
Q. Have you ever heard of a game where dog handlers are trying to get detainees urinate on themselves?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever been asked by an MP or MI to use your dog to instill fear on a detainee?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever used your dog to scare a detainee for MI or other interrogators, for interrogation purposes?
A. No
Q. Has your dog ever bitten a detainee?
A. No
Q. Has your dog ever bitten an interrogator or other MI personnel?
A. NO[redacted]
Q. Have you ever witnessed any detainee abuse or maltreatment?
A. No.
Q. Has your dog ever been in a cell with a detainee?
A. Yes, there was a call put out at the hard site where an IP had brought a gun in. They called us in there to do cell searches, and my job was to clear the cell of explosives.
Q. Have you ever seen anyone take any photographs of detainees?
A. No
Q. Have you ever seen any photographs of detainees that were taken for other than official use?
A. No
Q. Do you know of any of the dog handlers being involved in any of the above asked questions?
A. No
Q. DO you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No///End of Statement// [redacted]

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME, A PERSON BY LAW TO ADMINISTER OATHS, THIS 23rd DAY OF Jan 04 AT Abu Ghurib Prison, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136, UCMJ
(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGES 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA Form 2823 (AUTOMATED)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center	2004/06/06 [redacted]	1317 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS SSG/E6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Correction Facility, Iraq

9 [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I reviewed various photographs of the alleged detainee abuses and identified the following: [redacted] is the female depicted in the following photographs [redacted] the male with black shirt, standing in the background [redacted] leaning towards a detainee, was a CACI contractor named [redacted] in photograph [redacted] jpg, the male in a black shirt was also [redacted] in photograph labeled [redacted] the male on the left in a black shirt was also [redacted] in photograph labeled [redacted] the male in the balck top was also [redacted] Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: No. [redacted]

----------END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT JIDC, BCCF, Iraq DATED 2004/06/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 06 day of June, 2004

at JIDC, BCCF, Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136 (b)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1994

AG0000603

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia [redacted]	2004/06/04 [redacted]		
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		MA1/E-6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Navy Air Station, Sigonella, Italy

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] am currently a Master of Arms First Class (MOS "0000") (Navy equivalent of Army Military Policeman) and I hold the additional specialty of Dog Handler (MOS "2005"). I am currently assigned Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy. I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility, Iraq, on about 20 or 21 Nov 03 and served there as a Dog Handler until I departed on 2 Apr 04. I was the team leader of a three person/three dog navy team. Although there was initially some confusion as to whom we would be assigned when we first arrived, we were placed under the 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN) for command and control. In the later part of Jan 04, the 16th MP BN came in and replaced the 320th MP BN. In discussions with [redacted] the acting 320th S-3 and the 320th XO (whose name I'm not sure of), our mission was to be part of the Internal Reaction Force (IRF) which was part of the 229th MP Company, explosive detection and gate security, and support other units like the 82nd Airborne. The Navy dogs were trained in patrol and explosive detection. After about the third or fourth day at AG, I implemented the team work schedule and we became fully operational. On 24 Nov 03, there was a riot at AG and we had just finished our part in getting the situation back under control. We were on standby when we got the call for the IRF to saddle-up and report to the Hard Site to respond to an incident. I responded with about 10 to 12 personnel from the 229th MP Company. All three Navy dog teams responded, along with the two Army dog teams. We arrived at the Hard Site at about 2000 hours. During the brief, I found out there had been a shooting. Although I don't know exactly when the shooting took place, I had the impression it was relatively fresh. [redacted] was the acting IRF NCOIC while [redacted] the IRF OIC, was on leave at the time. When we arrived at the Hard Site, the situation was chaos. I could hear yelling and screaming and doors slamming, and there were people running in and out of the site. Some of the detainees were in their cells hand-cuffed to the cell doors or their bunks, and some were out in the hallway, hand-cuffed to the open cell doors. We entered the area to the left of the Hard Site, which I later learned to be Cell Block 1A, and the area was in disarray with mattresses, clothes, and trash thrown all over the place. There was one individual that appeared to be in charge, but I don't know who it was. He was about five foot, six inches to five foot, seven inches tall, medium build, medium to light complexion, with blond hair in a "high and tight" style. I heard people referring to him as "captain", but I don't know who he was. He was the same person who provided us the briefing of what was happening and said that a weapon had been smuggled into the Hard Site and Intel reported that there might be hand grenades in the cells. The navy dogs, being trained for explosive detection, were used to search the cells. The MPs would unlock the cells for us to enter, but I was concerned that, given the small size of the cells and close proximity of the hand-cuffed detainees, that one of the detainees might get bitten. I instructed the MPs to un-cuff the detainees and move them out of the way. I announced myself as I entered each cell space, and whenever possible I positioned myself between my dog and the detainee. No explosives were ever detected and we exited the Hard Site after completing the explosives search. We were standing outside the Hard Site in a debriefing when someone (I don't know who) called for a dog. I re-entered the Hard Site, but went to the right hand side of the Hard Site, later identified to me as Cell Block 1B, on the top tier. When I got to the top tier, I met two soldiers in woodland BDUs that I assumed were MPs. I asked them where the search was and without saying anything, they pointed to a cell. When I got closer to the cell door, I heard yelling and screaming and my dog became agitated. I looked into the cell and saw four people inside. There were two males in civilian clothes squatting on the cell floor, a female in DCUs standing, who I later learned was an interpreter, and a male who I took to be a detainee squatting in the back right corner. All three were yelling at the detainee. The cell was lit only from the light coming in from the passageway. My dog [redacted] was barking a lot because there was a lot of stimuli with all the yelling and commotion. My dog lunged and I struggled to regain control of him. One of the men then said words to the effect "You see that dog there, if you don't tell me what I want to know, I'm gonna get that dog on you." I then realized that I had not been called for a search. About this time, the two men and the woman began to step out of the cell. I backed-up to allow them to exit, but there was not much room on the tier. After they came out, my dog lunged and pulled me into the cell and I was worried because I realized there was still someone inside the cell. I regained control of my dog and as I exited the cell I heard someone yell "get that dog out of there." When I exited, I found [redacted] a 229th MP Company sergeant with whom I worked, standing there and he asked me what was going on. I told him I didn't know, but that this didn't seem right. The two men and the woman re-entered the cell and as I was still talking to [redacted] suddenly got the sensation that my dog was not there. I looked down

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA [redacted] DATED 2004/06/04 [redacted]

[redacted]9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]o find that my dog had the female's forearm in her mouth. I regained control of my dog and asked the female if the dog had bit her. She said, "No, no, no. The dog did not bite me." I asked her if she was sure and repeatedly asked if the dog had bitten her. She repeatedly stated that the dog had not bitten her. She pushed up her sleeve and I could see that there was no blood, no marks or bite marks on her skin, and no torn clothing. I made sure she did not need any medical attention. The female then returned into the cell and I looked at [redacted] and said, "We're f[***]ing out of here." I departed the area and got to the bottom of the stairs when I heard someone call "where's the dog", but I didn't return and went to the debrief site. I did not return the Hard Site that night. A few days later, I received a phone call from the 320th MP TOC saying that the Hard Site had requested a dog. I asked for what, and the response was "interrogation" or "interrogations". I explained that our dogs didn't do that and that I could not fill that request. I received similar calls about once every two weeks or slightly more frequently, that the Hard Site was requesting dogs. I received about eight calls in total over those next three or four weeks. I met with my two team members and instructed them that if they received calls for support at the Hard Site, they were not to respond, unless it was for explosive detection. They also had to go as a two person team with one dog, and they had to notify me about the request. I personally never went back to the Hard Site for explosive detection, but my two team members did once or twice for explosive detection searches, notifying me right after. I did return to the Hard Site for Internal Reactions Force responses with my dog, and for training without my dog. No one from MI ever requested dogs from me directly, and all requests came through the 320th TOC. In the later part of Dec 03, I met with COL PAPPAS who wanted to know what my dogs' capabilities were. I explained their capabilities and he never asked if they could be used in interrogations. I provided COL PAPPAS with a copy of the SOP for the Navy dogs, a copy of which I have also provided to investigating officers this day. I was shown two photographs during my interview today. I picked out an "ID Card" photograph of an individual that I believe is one of the men in the cell that made the statement about getting the dog on the detainee, but I am not 100% sure. I identified the same individual in a digital photograph identified to me as "photograph 11, file CG LAPS MARKS". I am also pretty sure that the female in that same photograph ("photograph 11, file CG LAPS MARKS") is the same female that was in the cell during that incident and whose arm was in my dog's mouth. I understand that MG FAY has directed that I not discuss details of this inquiry with anyone other than those investigators I know to be directly involved in this inquiry, or with my legal counsel. I have nothing further to add to this statemen[redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT[redacted]//

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

[redacted]
ALSO NC Washington Navy Yard DC

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004

at [redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

[redacted] HQ INSCOM

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 5:02 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Information on MI Personnel

Pictures .pdf (1,004 KB) [redacted]atement.pdf (313 K

To be placed in his file and added to the list.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, June 05, 2004 9:30 AM
To: B-15 Group Distribution List
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Information on MI Personnel

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, June 05, 2004 8:20 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Information on MI Personnel

Gentlemen,

I have interviewed [redacted] on 4 Jun [illegible] and have attached the sworn statement. It may be hard to read, but if you read the latest New Yorker article, [redacted] have them an interview the same day and told them exactly what he told me.

I had [redacted] look at each photograph that you requested, and have identified as many personnel as possible. This is attached as a PDF file.

As far as the list of questions you sent me, I asked [redacted] each one in my sworn statement.

I kept number 3 seperate: [redacted] stated the following interrogators worked in his section: [redacted]

The intreprotors were as follows: [redacted]

He could not remember a lot of their names and did not know any ISN's.

[redacted] were subjects of a CID Report of Investigation that I worked on at BIAP. There conducted a unauthorized interogation on a female detainee and made her strip to expose her breasts. The original case file should be located at the 519th MP Det, Fort Bragg, NC. The other MI soldier involved in this incident was [redacted] and an intreprotor.

If there is anything else please let me know. Thanks

[redacted]

Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Prisoner Interrogation Team
Abu Ghruyeb Prison
APO AE 09762
[redacted]

RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

For use of this form, see AR 190-30; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 3012(g)
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your Social Security Number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your Social Security Number is voluntary

1. LOCATION
38th Military Police Detachment (CID), Camp Victory

2. DATE
4 June 2004

3. TIME
0951 [redacted]

4. FILE NO

5. NAME (Last, First, MI)
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS
SPC/Res

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHD, 504th MP BN

PART I - RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE/WAIVER CERTIFICATE

Section A. Rights

The investigator whose name appears below told me that he/she is with the United States Army Criminal Investigation Division and wanted to question me about the following offense(s) of which I am suspected/accused: Dereliction of Duty, Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation [redacted]

Before he/she asked me any questions about the offense(s), however, he/she made it clear to me that I have the following rights:

1. I do not have to answer any question or say anything.
2. Anything I say or do can be used as evidence against me in a criminal trial.
3. *(For personnel subject to the UCMJ)* I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer I arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for me at no expense to me, or both.

or

(For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) I have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with me during questioning. I understand that this lawyer can be one that I arrange for at my own expense, or if I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me before any questioning begins.

If I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation with or without a lawyer present, I have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if I sign the waiver below.

9. COMMENTS (Continue on reverse side)
Have you been advised of your rights in the past 30 days? No [redacted]

Section B. Waiver

I understand my rights as stated above. I am now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer first and without having a lawyer present with me. [redacted]

WITNESSES (If available)

10a. NAME (Type or Print)
[redacted]

10b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE
[redacted]

11a. NAME (Type or Print)

11b. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS AND PHONE

12. [redacted]

13. SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR
[redacted]

14. TYPED NAME OF INVESTIGATOR
[redacted]

15. ORGANIZATION OF INVESTIGATOR
Prisoner Interrogation Team (PIT)(CID)
75th Military Police (DET) (CID)(-), BCCF

Section C. Non-waiver

I do not want to give up my rights.

☐ I want a lawyer.

☐ I do not want to be questioned or say anything.

SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWEE

ATTACH THIS WAIVER CERTIFICATE TO ANY SWORN STATEMENT (DA FORM 2823) SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY THE SUSPECT/ACCUSED

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45, the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
38th Military Police Detachment (CID)	4 Jun 2004	1203	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HHD, 504 MIDDF

[redacted], [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

On or about the 24th of October 2003, was invited by [redacted] to witness the punishment of three (3) detainees suspected of raping / sexually assaulting another male detainee in Camp Vigilant B (Gen. Population). Accepting his invitation, he and I walked to the isolation bay. Inside were [redacted] and a civilian interpreter, [redacted]. There was another SPC, [redacted] identified, but wearing green BDUs. Here holding a speaker box, shouting into a darkroom, dubbed as "the hole." The SPC in green DDUs shouted profanities and insults to (3) three naked detainees. [redacted] spoke with [redacted] and the detainees were brought out and instructed to crawl on their stomachs and crawl, dragging their genitals, on the floor. They were told to roll left-right. [redacted] would sprinkle/pour water on the detainees, called the the grabbed a chair, climbed to the second tier and pelted the detainees below. Below the detainees in a hand-cuffed together in [illegible] to mimic homosexual relations. [redacted] + the MPs [redacted] the SPC laughed. Asked for a [illegible], promising to stop the punishment if the detainees confessed. They. Using their feet, [redacted] the MPs forced the detainees' legs to further mimic sexual relations. The instructions / requests were aided in full by the interpreter [redacted]. At some point one of the detainees began to bleed from his face — possibly the nose. [redacted] asked if the punishment should be stopped. [redacted] answered to continue. [redacted] interrupting about 15 minutes of the incident, I tell [redacted] that I am ready to leave.

EXHIBIT | INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ___ TAKEN AT ___ DATED ___ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM

DA FORM 2823 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED

FILE NUMBER: [redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 38th MP DET (CID) DATED 4 June 2004 CONTINUED

[redacted] asks me [redacted] you are not going to tell anyone. I [illegible] exit. The next day I tell [redacted] about the incident. She then tells the MP [illegible] [redacted] about the incident, and tells me the issue is never pursued high enough the MP chain of command as they were never informed

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q Prior to this statement were you advised of your right to legal counsel?

A Yes, I was

Q Other than the incident detailed above, have you present at any other incidents where detainees were forced into a "human pyramid"

A Never

Q Was this the only incident you witnessed?

A Yes

Q Why did you not report this to your commander?

A Utilized your judgement, tried to take part of issue at a lower level

Q What was the purpose for you being present during this incident?

A I was invited for entertainment, to enjoy the show of force against detainees

Q Did you ever take any photographs of the detainees?

A Never

Q Who was present during the earlier incident

A [redacted]

Q Who was throwing the football at the detainees?

A [redacted] was the only person I recall throwing the ball

Q Did you ~~not~~ participate in the above incident in any way?

A As a witness, instructor, or the carrying out of any instruction was never carried out by myself.

Q Was any other organization [redacted] present during the abuse?

A No, only the MP unit had soldiers present during event

Q Did you or any other MT person (civilian or military) tell the MP's to

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

"soften-up" a detainee?

A Never

Q Is it common to have MP's assist in interrogations?

A: Only at the special request of MI, with proper authorization, on MP's will be asked for assistance if change of environment/or sleep deprivation)

Q: At the above incident, did anyone hit, punch or otherwise assault the detainees on the floor?

A: Aside from the use of the fire hose by [redacted] no.

Q: Did you know who the detainees were their ISN etc?

A No, I don't recall names or Identification numbers

Q: Who was taking the pictures?

A: I don't know.

Q: Who routinely took pictures in this the cell blocks?

A: No, there were other people against pictures of detainees

Q: Who appeared to be the leader / Instigator of this incident?

A: [redacted] said the orders followed by those present, a technology

b1 [redacted]

Q: Did this appear to be part of an interrogation (MI) or security Matter (MP)?

A: No, this was described to me as a punishment for [redacted]

Q: To whom did you report/inform about this incident which happened as a result?

A: I informed [redacted]

Q: Were there any other incidents such as the one you described?

A: I Never witnessed any other incidents as the one related in this statement

Q: Did you observe Know of any other detainees wearing only underwear, women's underwear or only a blanket?

A Never

Q: Were dogs used for interrogation or so under what circumstances?

A: Yes, they were with the proper authorization, special interrogation detainees were transferred to the "Dog Handler" team. The dogs were used to scare the detainee into cooperating & providing intelligence

Q: Approval to use dogs was by whom and at what level?
A: Col [illegible] was aware of the use of dogs, but I don't know if he was the final authority.
Q: Were the dogs muzzled?
A: I don't know
Q: Were the dogs present or actively used to "fear up" det detainees?
A: I was told the dogs were used to bark and growl at detainees to induce a collection of intelligence information.
Q: Did you use sleep deprivation or know others using it as an interrogation method and who approved it at what level?
A: ~~[illegible]~~ Being an analyst I never used it, and don't specifically recall others in the method was used. However [redacted] I remember hearing that it was done. I do recall the approval used at the Corp Interrog Ctr facility @ Baghdad International Airport, also under the jurisdiction of 325 MI + 519 MI.
Q: Did you work with OGA or have knowledge of OGA "Ghost detainees"?
A: [redacted] on several of the interrogations that at one time a people believed in the interrogation booth by OGA
Q: Did you witness or hear about circumstances of OGA abuse/humiliation of detainees?
A: Never
Q: Describe the leadership, control & oversight of you and your section?
A: I do not recall any section [illegible] regarding about him the leadership and who was found the [illegible] loosely defined & confusion. I know that at the top one [redacted] and [redacted]
Q: Did they know about what was being done to the detainees?
A: I can't say what the rest of the incidents. But the [illegible] I was present at, now the MI leadership was unaware. [redacted]
Q: Were they 1) "In the loop" 2) "looking the other way" 3) "oblivious"?
A: Judging from the incidents I was present at, the leadership seems oblivious
Q: Did you observe detainees kept naked for periods of time in the cells?
A: Yes, initially, when the JDIC was first standing detainees were

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 38th MP Bde (CID) DATED 4 June 2004 III

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

Kept naked to "humble them" This was a practice instituted by MPs. Later, the 800th MI Command forbade the use of this practice

Q: Was it standard practice to strip some upon arrival and keep them naked and to offer clothing as an inducement to cooperate?

A: Yes, initially, as related above the practice was utilized to "humble" detainees. Later, about a month after the 205th came into existence, the practice was forbidden. Any interrogator or MI representative known to use the practice would have received the proper punishment

Q: Were some stripped as part of their "processing" to 1A or was this done only at the processing / screening center?

A: They were stripped and kept naked at isolation after in-processing.

Q: Were some stripped for short periods by either MI or MPs if so who supported such action?

A: As described above only during in processing.

Q: Did you ever discuss or witness a discussion with any supervisors or receive verbal/written approval to strip a detainee?

A: No

Q: Who within MI, knew of the practice to strip detainees, [redacted]?

A: The individual interrogators and analysts present. As far as I know, it was known

Q: Outside of scheduled interrogations how tight were procedures for access to Tier 1A?

A: Anyone could walk in at any time as long as they were allowed it. Although not readily visible, it was easily circumvented

Q: Were logs maintained or could one circumvent procedures?

A: There was a log equipped, but access was granted by MPs. One could always just walk in.

Q: Was it common practice and by whom, to visit the cell block off duty or off shift?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 DA FORM 2823 DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT 36th MP Det (CID) DATED 4 June 2004

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

A: N/A, Entering in IA was by authorization for interpreter only. Although, as stated before this could be easily circumvented

Q: Describe the interaction both professional & personal (social life duty) between the MT and MP personnel?

A: Professionally: There was a lack of communication between the "lost" and "misplaced."

Personally: Appropriately excepted after an incident where [redacted] found out about a liquor / prostitution operation by the MPs. However, there was friendly / informal interaction on case by case scenario.

Q: Did you ever hear about an interpreter who sexually assaulted a detainee?

A: Never

Q: Did you ever witness / hear about [redacted] having sex with a female detainee?

A: Never

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A: Nothing /// END OF STATEMENT /// [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT (Continued)

[redacted]

NOT USED

AFFIDAVT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004
at: 38th MP DET (CID), Camp Victory, [redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Article 136 UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Iraq	2004/06/06	1400	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
			SSG/RA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Correction Facility, Iraq

9. , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed various photographs of the alleged detainee abuses and identified the following: In the photograph labele the male with brown hair, desert camoflauge trousers, brown t-shirt standing in the on the right wa irst Name Unkown; SPC/E4; who I believe was an interrogator. In photograph e male with black shirt, standing in the background and leaning towards a detaine by the nickname I believe his name was in photograph labele the male in a black shirt was also in photograph labeled the left in a black shirt was also in photograph labeled the male in the balck top was also in photograph labled believe the picture of the room, with the bed frame with no mattress and the blood stained floor with drag marks, is the room after the shooting of the detainee in October or November of 2003. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: No.

END OF STATEMENT

NOT USED

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF , DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT JIDC, BCCF, Iraq DATED 2004/06/06

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THE USE OF COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June 2004

at JIDC, BCCF, Iraq

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	12 June 2004	1352	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT/USA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labeled [redacted] Titan linguist. I do not recall his name. The individual on the right is [redacted] Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing to the right of the dog handler in a tan cap. [redacted] is standing to the left of the detainee. Photograph [redacted] on the left of the photograph. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: No [redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

[redacted]

NOT USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. VBAPPC V1.10

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] LLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12th day of June, 19 04 at Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPC V1.10

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	12 June 2004	13:44	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT/USA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labele[redacted] depicts [redacted] on the right of the photograph. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted]. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing to the right of the dog handler in a tan cap. [redacted] is standing to the left of the detainee. Photograph [redacted] depicts [redacted] on the left of the photograph. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A. NO. (RES) END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED

EXHIBIT | INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.10

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12th day of June, 19 04

at Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPPC V1.10

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSLOG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/04/27 [redacted] 1620	[redacted] FILE NUMBER
4. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]	7. GRADE/STATUS CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 12 October 2003 to work as a screener initially. I was then selected to be a reports officer. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I had On the Job Training on report writing. [redacted] in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE). She briefed the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed two different IROEs. I don't recall receiving any Geneva Convention training. [redacted] explained the Geneva Convention in a broad sense. I was told what I can and can not do. [redacted] was in charge and had general responsibilities in the logistical support of the area and treatment of prisoners. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse, any photos taken or the use of dogs. I was never aware of any MI personnel telling MPs to "soften up" a detainee or give them "the treatment." I did hear about the abuse after the investigation began.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 4-27-04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing

follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Correction Facility

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

[redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ	2004/05/06		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was notified of my rights, waived my rights and made the following statement. I arrived to Abu Ghraib in early November 2003 as an interrogator. When I first arrived I set up my living area, a few days later, I received a briefing on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROE. The were also posted on the wall. I don't recall training on the Geneva Convention but I received training during the interrogation school at Fort Huachuca. I felt I understood the Geneva Convention. My immediate military supervisor was [redacted] My civilian supervisor was [redacted] I was in a Tiger Team and worked with a few analyst, I can't recall their names. Maybe their names were [redacted]. I do not remember all the translators I worked with. I worked with [redacted] I used most of the translators. Some males some females. When I arrived, COL PAPPAS was in charge of the MI unit. [redacted] was there but I really don't remember what he did. [redacted] was also there. I did interact with the MPs when we needed to move a detainees. I never spoke to them about interrogation procedures it was basically small talk. If we wanted to deviate from the Interrogation Rules of Engagement we had to request it and get the request signed by higher. Interrogations were conducted in the booths, Hard Site, in one of the rooms down stair used for storage and the shower room. These were all in Tier 1A. We also used a room above the MPs office in Tier 1B. Before the mortars I was interrogating in Tier 1A. After the incident with the handgun, I was given the mission by [redacted] to interrogate the Iraqi Police. This was conducted in Tier 1B. this is all I did for about a week. I would brief COL PAPPAS, [redacted] on my results. I did see the use of dogs during interrogations. [redacted] (tall male with a beard, civilian) used them during an interrogations after the incident with the Iraqi Police and the handgun. I know one needed the approval by LTG SANCHEZ before using dogs. I do not know if [redacted] approval. I did use the dogs once or twice but I submitted a request through [redacted] who gave it to [redacted] then it went to COL PAPPAS and approved by LTG SANCHEZ. The dogs never bit anyone I was interrogating. I do recall a time when detainees were wearing female underwear. [redacted] was interrogating someone who was wearing the panties. There were a lot of people present [redacted] MPs, JIDC and ICE personnel. I do not remember their names. I never witnessed or had knowledge of any detainee abuse other than the time I was accused by [redacted] Linguist of pushing a linguist off a truck. The case was unfounded they were false allegation [redacted] quit when the investigation began. I had no knowledge of any photos being taken or photos with detainees being abuse. I have no knowledge of any video of detainees. I never knew any MI to ask MPs to "soften-up" detainees or give detainees "the treatment." I was then shown some photos in which I identified [redacted] MP and [redacted] linguist on several photos. The photos were of naked detainees bunched up together. I also identified [redacted] in a photo with naked detainees all bunched together. [redacted] hung around the Hard Site all the time. I then saw three photos of [redacted] The first photo had a detainee on a chair. I was in front of the detainee and [redacted] was on the side. I do not recall this photo being taken. I didn't realize someone had taken this particular photo. I never asked the detainee to sit in the position he was in. I can't recall when the photo might have been taken. I did remember the other two photos being taken. It was sometime after the Iraqi Police incident. I do not know where [redacted] is now. I believe she quit after she went to work with 180th IDF. We were just friends and nothing beyond that.
Q.Do you have anything else to add to the statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/05

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY			

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]		[redacted]

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Baghdad Correction Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO 09335

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was transferred to the Abu Ghraib facility on 27 December 2003. I was processed through the camp and twas interrogated 18 days ater my arrival. When I was first interrogated, I was asked questions and the interrogator got mad. His face looked philipine. He then started cussing adn told me that he was going to make sure I stayed here my whole life. He put me in the hard site and for 55 days no one came to see me. Fifty-five days later, a female came in. She spoke very sweet. She came back two months later and spoke to me. I was then transferred to the CAMP. I have been there for over two months. No one touched me or phyically hit me. There was an Egyptian female who was translating and cussing and saying that the interrogator was going to astrip me and make me wear female clothes. The interrogator would say something and she would translate. I felt that she was embarrased to tell me. I was never threaten. That was the only bad thing. Others were very good. The bad treatment occured before I arrived at Abu Ghraib When I was captured, I was taken to RUTHWANIA PALACE where I was mistreated for 4four days. My hands were handcuffed to my back. For four days, I was not allowed to sleep. I was forced to kneel down on gravel and I had a bag over my head so I couldn't tell who was doing this. My three brothers and father were with me. My father had a heart problem and for two days he did not have his medication He was taken released and taken to the hospital.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

One (1) page was not released.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternative means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY	2004 Feb 13	0915	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted] | 6. SSN | 7. GRADE/STATUS [redacted]

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Baghdad Correction Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO 09335

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was transferred to the Abu Ghraib facility on or around 17 December 2003. When I arrived, I was handcuffed and had a sandbag over my head. I was interrogated three days after I arrived. I was questioned on how I had arrived at Abu Ghraib. I answered how I arrived by telling them my story. My story was not that complicated, I was accused of working with SADDAM HUSSEIN. I told them I wasn't working with SADDAM HUSSEIN but they kept insisting I was. The interrogators told me I had to talk. I told them I was a General and it was a shame if one had to lie. My military honor does not allow me to lie. I don't recall how many times I was interrogated. I was interrogated by an individual with a beard. I do not know his name. He is white, long and tall about 45-50 years old. Another guy was Arabic who told me he was from [redacted] The treatment at Abu Ghraib was not bad and I was never hit in Abu Ghraib. The bad treatment began from the time I was captured until I arrived at Abu Ghraib. The group that captured me did not want to know the truth. They called themselves intelligence personnel and tell us they are from the American Coalition Forces to scare us. They were wearing civilian clothes but no flak vest or helmets. They came in their cars (BMW, NISSAN Truck, and other cars) and with guns. They pulled all the women out and they entered the house. They looted the house. They steal gold, money, and cars. My son and I were taken away quickly. My son was sitting in the garden and was not at fault. When I was captured, I was interrogated by an American and an Iraqi. I do not know what they looked like because I had a bag over my head. The American hit me but the Iraqi hit me more. Most of the time they took me at night. One time at Abu Ghraib, I was made to walk without shoes over rocks from my cell to another place and I had my hands tied behind me. Another time I had my hands tied behind my back and the person would run with me and hit my head against the wall. He did this three times. Another time in the bathroom, he hit me on my head and while another guy (I do not know who) held my hands. My head was dizzy from the hits for three days. I thought I was going to die. (I was seeing things moving. I thought I saw my family and I was talking to them. I saw my wife she was bleeding. The trash bag appeared to be moving like they were people. This went on for three days.) I was made to take a cold shower with my suit while my hands were tied. I was tied to a window. This lasted for around fifteen days. It wasn't until [redacted] came. [redacted] was an interrogator with green eyes and a goatee. He did not hit me. He saw my bump on the head and asked me what had happened. I did not want to tell him. I thought this is America a great city, and I said I have to tell my interrogator. He was hurt when I told him. After I told him, no one touched me. [redacted] was very kind and gave me cigarettes. I asked why they hit me. The first 15 days I arrived were very difficult. I was punched and hit. The person who hit me was the one who spoke Iraqi. He put me down in the mud and walked on me and hit me. [redacted] had a doctor check me out. I do not recall being humiliated in any other way. The American treated me very well. I helped with the tactical establishment. The first group at the beginning were the ones who would not accept what I was telling them.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. No.

//End of Statement//

See Translated Copy for [redacted]

signature on each page (3 pgs. sworn statement) and change to statement. Change is indicated above in brackets. Specifically, "Arabic" guy was not from "Texas" but Iraq and belonged to Iraqi intelligence [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

A total of three (3) pages were not released.

06 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview of [redacted]

On 06 May 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] was read his rights (abuse of detainee, violation of interrogation rules of engagement, failure to report that abuse and violation) which he waived. (DA Form 3881 provided). The interview was completed and a sworn statement was written by [redacted] based on the information [redacted] provided. [redacted] returned back on the 7th of May and based on counsel form his lawyer, refused to sign the statement. I have included the DA FORM 2823 and a memorandum for record on what [redacted] said.

[redacted] was notified of his rights and waived his rights plus made the following statement. [redacted] arrived to Abu Ghraib in early November 2003 as an interrogator. When of his rights and waived his rights plus made the following statemen[redacted] first arrived HE set HIS living area, a few days later, of his rights and waived his rights plus made the following statement. [redacted] received a briefing on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROE. They were also posted on the wall. [redacted] did not recall training on the Geneva Convention but [redacted] received training during the interrogation school at Fort Huachuca. [redacted] felt HE understood the Geneva Convention. HIS immediate military supervisor was [redacted] HIS civilian supervisor wa[redacted] was in a Tiger Team and worked with a few analyst. [redacted] can't recall their names. Maybe their names were [redacted] did not remember all the translators HE worked with. HE worked with [redacted] HE used most of the translators. Some males some females. When [redacted] arrived, COL PAPPAS was in charge of the MI unit. [redacted] as there but I really don't remember what he did. [redacted] was also there. [redacted] did interact with the MPs when we needed to move a detainees [redacted] never spoke to them about interrogation procedures it was basically small talk. If we wanted to deviate from the Interrogation Rules of Engagement we had to request it and get the request signed by higher. Interrogations were conducted in the booths, Hard Site, in one of the rooms down stair used for storage and the shower room. These were all in Tier 1A. Interrogators also used a room above the MPs office in Tier 1B. Before the mortars [redacted] was interrogating in Tier 1A. After the incident with the handgun [redacted] was given the mission by [redacted] to interrogate the Iraqi Police. This was conducted in Tier 1B. this is all [redacted] did for about a week. [redacted] would brief COL PAPPAS [redacted] on my results. [redacted] did see the use of dogs during interrogations. [redacted] (tall male with a beard, civilian) used them during an interrogations after the

incident with the Iraqi Police and the handgun. [redacted] ated he knew one needed the approval by LTG SANCHEZ before using dogs. [redacted] id not know if [redacted] ad approval. [redacted] said he did use the dogs once or twice but [redacted] ubmitted a request through [redacted] ho gave it to [redacted] then it went to COL PAPPAS and approved by LTG SANCHEZ. The dogs never hurt anyone. [redacted] was interrogating. [redacted] d recall a time when detainees were wearing female underwear. [redacted] s interrogating someone who was wearing the panties. There were a lot of people present; [redacted] MPs, JIDC and ICE personnel. [redacted] id not remember their names. [redacted] never witnessed or had knowledge of any detainee abuse other than the time I was accused by [redacted] Linguist of pushing a linguist off a truck. The case was unfounded they were false allegation. [redacted] uit when the investigation began. [redacted] had no knowledge of any photos being taken or photos with detainees being abuse. [redacted] have no knowledge of any video of detainees. [redacted] never knew any MI to ask MPs to "soften-up" detainees or give detainees "the treatment." [redacted] was then shown some photos in which HE identified [redacted] MP and [redacted] Linguist on several photos. The photos were of naked detainees bunched up together. [redacted] also identified [redacted] in a photo with naked detainees all bunched together. [redacted] hung around the Hard Site all the time. [redacted] hen saw three photos of HIMSELF and [redacted] The first photo had a detainee on a chair. HE was in front of the detainee and [redacted] was on the side. [redacted] id not recall this photo being taken. [redacted] didn't realize someone had taken this particular photo. [redacted] said he never asked the detainee to sit in the position he was in. [redacted] couldn't recall when the photo might have been taken. [redacted] did not know where [redacted] is now. [redacted] said that believe she quit after she went to work with 180th IDF. [redacted] they were just friends and nothing beyond that.

[redacted] RETURNED TO NOTIFY US THAT HIS ATTORNEY ADVISED HIM NOT TO SIGN DOCUMENTATION.

[redacted]
MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

on ideas for target folder development, then work with [redacted] developing specified interrogation plans, and then structure report formats for C2 approval.

After the 20 Sep 03 mortar attack, I realized that the soldiers at Abu Ghraib did not have an appropriate standard of living. There was no dedicated PX facilities, no weight room/gym/cardio facilities, minimal internet connectivity, almost no telephone lines, no dedicated mail service, no dedicated dining facility other than the field kitchen, no hot showers, no washing facilities for clothes, etc. I spoke with COL PAPPAS about several problems with Abu Ghraib. I cited how civilian employees were being deployed without the appropriate force protection equipment, soldiers without weapons and/or ammunition, lack of basic office equipment and supplies, etc.

Following the memorial service, I believe on 26 September for two soldiers killed in mortar attack, COL PAPPAS offered me the JIDC Commander position. I initially accepted the role pending discussion with my rater who was on leave. However after a week or so, I discovered that there was no Command and Control (C2) associated with the position over soldiers, civilians, or policy. As I did not have any C2, I declined the JIDC Commander role. COL PAPPAS stated that he would have one of his Battalion Commanders assigned with their unit to run the JIDC. I agreed to stay and continue assisting COL PAPPAS. After declining the position, COL PAPPAS referred to himself as the JIDC Commander/Director. I decided I would best serve as some sort of executive officer performing a mayoral support role for life sustainment issues. I started serving in a Mayoral capacity at that point, around 20-25 October, about the time COL PAPPAS moved out to Abu Ghraib fulltime.

I advised [redacted] that I declined the JIDC Commander position [redacted] stated that COL PAPPAS would not have input on my OER and I continued supporting soldiers.

THE FIRST INCIDENT OF UNAUTHORIZED INTERROGATIONS:

Around 6 or 7 October 2003, I learned that three interrogators and a translator went into Tier 1B to interrogate two female detainees and possibly had been drinking alcohol. [redacted] and I reviewed the MPs written statements. I learned that the interrogators and one civilian linguist had the MPs release a female juvenile detainee (17) under the guise of an interrogation and moved her to an isolated cell area and purportedly asked her to remove her top and kissed her. They then asked to interrogate another female detainee that was an MP hold for criminal activity. They moved this detainee as well to an isolated area and spoke with her and one held her hand. Both detainees separately identified all four individuals.

COL PAPPAS asked me investigate the matter more fully. When questioned, all three soldiers invoked their rights and requested an attorney. The civilian linguist indicated that they had gone for an interrogation and he just did translation as he was directed by the soldiers and denied any use of alcohol. I forwarded the statements to [redacted]05th MI Bde legal officer, and later spoke with CID. I do not know what happened with the matter after that.

The next day, [redacted] went over the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) with all military and civilian personnel.

OTHER INTERROGATOR MISCONDUCT

The only other incident of detainee misconduct I was aware of is that [redacted] informed me that [redacted], an interrogator, and [redacted] an analyst, had a detainee diarrhea during an interrogation one evening and walked back to his area [redacted] stated that [redacted] had already reassigned both soldiers to other duties.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Baghdad, Iraq DATED 2004/05/29

DETAINEE CLOTHING

When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, some detainees had torn jumpsuits and some were civilian clothes. In mid-September through late October, it was very warm and detainees would sometimes have their tops off. Even when detainees were wearing their jumpsuits or clothes, they would wear their underwear or wrap a towel around themselves. When bathing, I saw them put up sheets over the doorway for privacy. The only male detainees I saw without any clothing where new arrivals who were undressed when being searched and a few who had mental problems and took their clothes off.

I never saw any male detainees wearing women underwear on their body or head. I never saw any female detainees ever without clothing.

DOG and TRUCK INCIDENT

I have no knowledge or ever saw any detainee being thrown off the back of a truck or any vehicle. [illegible] I never saw a checkpoint or [illegible] ever being used or approved for interrogation. Dogs were used on staff and instructed to sniff for explosives or weapons or explosives were on site. Dogs were also used at the ECP to check vehicles for explosives. I never saw the dogs muzzled. [illegible] protection gear.

[illegible] SITE

[illegible] Abu Ghraib Hard-Site was through three locked or guarded gates from the [illegible] to a final locked gate from another entranceway [illegible] MPs always escorted me in and around the [illegible]

[illegible] SHOOTING INCIDENT at the Hard Site

[illegible] MPs were reportedly attacked by detainees. [illegible] and a few others wounded to which [illegible]

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL saw me walking and told me that [illegible] The MPs were trying to conduct a cell search. [illegible] talked with the informant detainee.

[illegible] the MPs conduct the cell search. [illegible] they were going to search the area [illegible] The suspected detainee [illegible] The suspected detainee [illegible] at the same time an MP returned fire. [illegible] suspected wounded in his legs.

[illegible] the wounded detainee said he knew the knives in the cell. Another informant detainee [illegible] in the possession of [illegible] smuggled in weapons and [illegible] Detainees [illegible] as well as [illegible] and the detainee belongings.

[illegible] the incident, CPL PARKS opened the family cuffed door.

After the shooting, I remember going into the lower-level of Tier 1A, looking for either [redacted] of the MP Company for assistance with the Iraqi police chain-of-command. The working dogs were not muzzled and were searching the cells in concert with the QRF. I believe there were two or three dogs present with their handlers. I saw no detainee abused or dogs being mishandled. I do not know if COL PAPPAS received permission to use dogs during this time.

TF-121, OGA, and GHOST DETAINEES

OGA and TF-121 routinely brought in detainees for a short period of time. The A/519th soldiers initiated the term "ghost". They stated they used this term as the detainees were not in-processed in the normal way via the MP database and were not yet categorized. It was difficult to track these particular detainees and I and other officers recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding be written up between OGA, the 205th MI BDE and the 800th MP BDE to establish procedures for a ghost detainee. [redacted] suggested an idea of processing them under an assumed name and fingerprinting them but COL PAPPAS decided against it.

[redacted] worked with OGA to train people on properly filling out the Detainee Coalition Intake Form and sworn statements describing capture as two were required for the in-processing of each detainee.

Ghost Detainees were referenced in the database with their capture tag numbers. COL PAPPAS began a formalized written MOU procedure I believe in late November between the 205th MI Bde, 800th MP BDE, and OGA. COL PAPPAS introduced me to. I believe [redacted] the senior representative for OGA and [redacted] introduced me to various staff from TF-121. [redacted] stated he had heard of me from [redacted] and that [redacted] stated I would assist with possible linguist and logistics support. [redacted] usually accompanied his staff when they dropped off a detainee about two to three times a week.

Some of the OGA people I recall include [redacted] I do not know whether [redacted] interrogated detainees. I don't recall briefing MG FAST or COL BOLTZ on ghost detainees per se but used the term OGA detainee.

The only TF-121 personnel I remember by name were [redacted]

OGA ordered [redacted] to move a detainee by himself from Site [redacted] to the Hard-Site. I intercepted [redacted] while transporting the detainee, asked him what was happening, and then served as his battle buddy. After transporting the detainee, I spoke with [redacted] and suggested that OGA should move their own detainees or at a minimum request Army assistance through Operations.

DETAINEE DEATH

At approximately 0715-0720 on a day in late Oct 2003, someone approached me and asked if I knew COL PAPPAS' location. I asked what was going on because it was nearly time for the scheduled Brigade Command Update. I learned that a detainee died in the Hard-Site.

I walked over to the Hard Site and talked with [redacted] an Iraqi prison medical doctor on site, who told me that the detainee was dead. The detainee was in the Tier 1B shower stall, face down, handcuffed with his hands to his back, wearing an orange jumpsuit.

[redacted] from OGA, [redacted] various MPs, [redacted] Hard-Site OIC, and U.S. medical staff were on site. [redacted] uncuffed the detainee and he was turned over. I did not see any blood on the body, [redacted] the walls, floor, clothes, et cetera, except a small spot where the detainee's

head was touching the floor. I asked the MPs if they had notified the 320th MP Battalion and they had [redacted] said he would notify his supervisor [redacted] notified COL PAPPAS and [redacted] COL PAPPAS stated he wanted to know when [redacted] arrived and to keep him abreast of everything.

When [redacted] arrived he stated that he had to call Washington and requested that we maintain the body until the next day. I contacted COL PAPPAS who agreed to hold the body [redacted] brought in a body bag and units were contacted for ice to pack up the body. [redacted] had the body secured in the shower area.

CID was informed and the body was removed on a litter the following day making it appear as if the detainee was merely ill. This was because the Iraqi police were stationed in the immediate area and Intelligence reported that some officers might have been working for anti-Coalition forces. [redacted] accompanied the body and OGA staff form the Hard-Site to another area to ensure that the body was loaded into a government vehicle.

I heard that OGA brought the detainee to Abu Ghraib at approximately 0530 hours. JIDC operations were not notified of the detainee's arrival. This was not in accordance with the verbal agreements with COL PAPPAS. Reportedly, a Seal Team captured the individual during one of their missions. The detainee was presumed to have been involved in the attack against the ICRC and apparently had several weapons with him. He was resisting arrest and allegedly a Seal Team member butt-stroked him on the side of the head.

In January 2004 I spoke with a case officer [redacted] who indicated [redacted] wanted to speak to me. [redacted] told me that the detainee's death was being investigated by OGA and asked me to speak to the OGA attorneys. After speaking with the attorneys, I never heard anything again about this incident until I saw photos of the deceased on the news.

OTHER MISCONDUCT

Around 10 – 12 December 2004, four Titan linguists were seen departing Abu Ghraib without authorization. When they returned to Abu Ghraib, COL PAPPAS ordered the 165th MI BN Commander and me to wait for them and report when they returned. We learned that they had departed without authorization to go shopping and visit relatives in Baghdad. The linguists were removed from the base and allowed to transfer to further outlying areas or lose their positions.

ICRC

The International Red Cross visited Abu Ghraib. COL PAPPAS told me that he and BG KARPINSKI received the final report. I did not see the report. COL PAPPAS asked me if I had ever seen or heard rumor of any abuse. I replied no. I am not aware of COL PAPPAS doing anything about the allegations. This occurred mid to late October [redacted] and I called a formation and addressed these issues to the soldiers and civilians of the JIDC. Nobody indicated that they were aware of any such activity and again IROE was stressed as well as the need to treat detainees with respect.

PHOTO IDENTIFICATION:

I identified [redacted], a Titan Linguist, possibly [redacted] an analyst [redacted] an analyst; and another soldier I believe to be either an analyst or an interrogator. The photos were taken in the Hard-Site area and depicted detainees naked and all bunched up together. I also identified [redacted] and a female Titan Linguist in three other photos. On one photo, Mr. [redacted] appeared to be interrogating a detainee who was sitting on two stacked plastic chairs facing back in a likely stressed position. [redacted] was standing by the side. I also identified a photo of [redacted] an MP. Other photos were of Ms [redacted] and [redacted] together. I saw other photos of dogs in the Hard-Site area.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Baghdad, Iraq DATED 2004/05/2[redacted]

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of May 2004

at Baghdad, Iraq

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AA 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS 05

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I volunteered to deploy to CJTF-7 with duties as the Deputy CJ2. When I arrived, some of the organization had changed and MG FAST was the C2 and [redacted] was in charge of the Intelligence Fusion Cell. On 13 Sep I met with [redacted] who told me that he did needed some assistance at the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib. I did not know what the JIDC was. I was told that 205th MI BDE was in charge of the JIDC and COL PAPPAS was the commander. I was told I would be filling a Liaison Role. My responsibilities were to get the reporting done, establish target folders and get the flow of intelligence to the C2 started. I was told the JIDC was a purely Army Run with civilian and military personnel operation. I was not told of the role of Other Government Agencies (OGA). [redacted] stated that the 205th MI BDE had responsibility of all the MI units at Abu Ghraib. He stated that other smaller holding areas were going to be shut down and everyone was going to be transported to one facility and it would be Abu Ghraib. My understanding was that I was the Liaison for BG Fast to the 205th. I received [redacted] Support Form and I wrote mine based on his and my Liaison duties. I turned in my QER Support Form to C2 Admin, [redacted] I never received my Support Form back so I do not know [redacted] it. My duty description on my Support Form was Liaison officer or Senior Liaison Officer. The day after I m[redacted] introduced me to COL PAPPAS (15 September 2003). I told COL PAPPAS that I was not HUMINT BASE and had no experience with HUMINT operations. On 16 September, COL PAPPAS took me to Abu Ghraib. He introduced me to [redacted] He told him I was there to support with reporting and developing target folders and to check to see if there was a place for me. [redacted] was the operations officer and the senior MI officer on the ground. I stayed at Abu Ghraib and COL PAPPAS departed that same night. He left due to the threat on the roads. He had other places in Balad and Camp Victory. He was all over the place because of his units. After COL PAPPAS left and [redacted] helped me get situated. He showed me the living space [redacted] made a statement to the effect so you are the officer from CJTF-7 we heard about. I heard you were coming to assist us. I told him I was there to help get operations up and running, the reporting started and develop target folders so that the flow of intelligence can get to C2. [redacted] took me around and showed me the area. I found out there were other MI units there. B/325th MI, A/519th MI, and a company from 323rd MI. I visited the dining facility, Camp Vigilant, Camp Ganci, the isolation area in the Hard Site. The MP TOC and was introduced to [redacted] as in charge of the Interrogation Control Element. The first night I was there, 16 September, [redacted] arranged for me to sit in on an interrogation. The interrogation was held in Tier 1A (hard site). This was the MI Area where High Value Detainees where held. MI did not run it. The MPs did. MI did not have free access to get in. Before the interrogation, I met the team in the JIDC. The senior interrogator told me to just observe. He said he was going to use the fear up and was going to be very aggressive. We were given access by the MPs. The interrogation lasted an hour and a half. I didn't see any detainee abuse. The interrogator was calm and didn't really raise his voice. The interrogator didn't seem to have a plan to follow. (I used this to help develop the interrogation plan). Based on the interrogation I observed, I told [redacted] that we needed to develop target folders and come up with a diagram of who should be doing what. I also recommended to COL PAPPAS on some ideas I had on target folders. Prior to my first interrogation, I did not get the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. Within days of my arrival, I read and sign the IROEs. I don't quite remember when but I know it was before the mortar attack (20 September 04). I believe the IROEs were on a message format sent by LTG Sanchez. COL PAPPAS came back to Abu Ghraib and he and I along wit[redacted]d an expanded discussion of my role. I told him that there was no SOP to run the operations and that I could help him out by starting to write one and making it happen. He chastised me. He said that the SOP was the brigade's responsibility and that they were already working on one. He told me, "Here is what I want you to do." He wanted me to work on ideas on developing target folders to help focus the interrogators. Once Target Folders are complete, work on an interrogation plan and then structure on a reporting format approved by C2. He was only on site for about two hours. After he left, [redacted] continued to introduce me to CACI personnel, the 321st MPs, the Engineers, the Chaplain. At that time, I believed COL PAPPAS was in charge of the MI operations and the MPs were in charge of their operations [redacted] I was introduced to [redacted] 320th MP BN CDR. [redacted] gave me a run down on what the MP Company's missions were. He stated that the MI folks were focus on Camp Vigilant. He told me the number MPs and Detainees on the ground and about the

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2004/05/

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

frequent mortar attacks and IEDs. He never mentioned any issues with MI or detainees. The relationship between the MPs and MI was a good one and professional one. [redacted] not have an XO and I met his S3 [redacted] I was asked by [redacted] to attend the morning briefings held by the MPs and so I became the MI Representative in those meeting. All units at Abu Ghraib attended the meeting. I interacted with everyone in that meeting. The topics discussed were basically logistical issues; DFAC, showers, weight room. By the first week I was improving the process and getting into operations. Basically doing what you were supposed to do. During his third visit, after I arrived, he told me I had no command and control nor did [redacted] He said [redacted] as the operations officer and I was from another unit. By 10-12 Oct, I had outlined my roles and responsibilities. I never received any FRAGOs or OPORDS from CJTF-7 personnel. Within 2-3 days of my arrival, I began to read them. [redacted] had them all on his computer. The only problem was that there was only one computer available for use. The essence of what I read or reviewed were the IROE, Force Protection issues, Convoy FRAGOS, focus of Intelligence Estimate. I had also noticed it was not a smooth operation and I wanted to pull the despaired groups together, but COL PAPPAS basically told me to stay in my lane. Between the 1st and 2nd week, I spoke to COL PAPPAS about how no one was really in charge. He told me he was in charge but he wanted me to be the JIDC Commander. I told him I would think about it. This happened four or five days after the mortar attack. I spoke to [redacted] about what COL PAPPAS had offered me. I asked COL [redacted] COL PAPPAS would have input on my OER and he said no. After about a week, I got back with COL PAPPAS and asked him if I would have Command and Control of soldiers. He said no and I replied with "I don't think that would work," and declined it. On 5or 6 October, [redacted] came in the JIDC looking for [redacted] He said that three interrogators along with a translator (of Egyptian nationality) were under the influence of alcohol, had gone in to get a detainee to interrogate. They went in on their own and the MPs allowed them to go in. No interrogations were supposed to occur at night because of the mortar attacks that were occurring in the evenings and our interrogations were sometimes held outside in tents. The interrogators took a female detainee and asked her to remove her top and kissed her. The same day I was made aware of this incident. I phoned COL PAPPAS and relayed to him what had occurred. He asked me to read them their rights and handle the Article 32. I checked with the magistrate cell, [redacted] for assistance. I got a copy of the rights statement and read each one of them their rights and the article 32. Their 1SG and Company Commander were also present. All three invoked their rights and requested an attorney. The statements were taken to [redacted] the JAG officer. I told him what I knew. I believe CID also received a copy of the statements. To my recollection, the investigation was unfounded. Apparently. The interrogation coincided with the interrogation plan and there were no criminal charges. The Linguist was transferred to another location. The day following this incident, [redacted] went over the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. I had an adhoc formation and told them that I was [redacted] and I wanted to make sure everyone knew the IROEs. I told [redacted] to make sure there was additional training. No one objected to me calling the formation because I was pretty involved. COL PAPPAS told me he was glad I had put that out. COL PAPPAS wanted operations to run 24/7 but I did not agree and he told me to stay in my lane. [redacted] did not want to do 24/7 operations and I told her that if she had someone conduct one interrogation early in the morning it would meet the BDE CDR's requirements. There was a problem with not enough equipment to conduct the mission. Units were showing up with personnel but no equipment, office equipment or even personal equipment. On one instance, I sent back CACI contractors because they did not have TA-50. I searched for crew served weapons, computers, and medical supplies. I brought this up to COL PAPPAS. His staff then told me not to go to the Cdr on these issues to bring them up to them. I started working with them but nothing was being done. After three weeks I stopped working with the staff because there was limited improvement. MG Fast came by Abu Ghraib in Mid October. She asked me to tell her how things were really going. I told her we needed computers, combat lifesaver bags etc., She said I needed to help with Mayoral type of duties. Within two day of speaking to MG FAST, we received radios, computers and other critical equipment. Plus we had JWICS. By mid October, COL PAPPAS gave me all Mayoral duties in support of interrogations with a duty description based on GTMO. I agreed and then spoke to [redacted] about what had happened. I wanted to go to MG FAST. He advised me to have all my ducks in order if I did. He also told me he agreed with my new duties and told me to go take care of soldiers. I never notified BG FAST of the changes to my duties. I didn't think it was appropriate for me to tell her that. This all occurred at the same time COL PAPPAS moved to Abu Ghraib. My duties were basically soldier care, maintenance, billeting, awards, and assistance with administrative support of the JIDC. I will provide a copy of my duty description. The MPs were still in charge of Abu Ghraib and ran their meetings. I met with the MPs twice a day and never saw or became aware of any abuse or heard of any rumors of mistreatment, never saw or was aware of any pictures or videos of detainee abuse and I never saw any dogs being used during interrogations. I never was aware of MI telling the MPs to "soften up" or give "the treatment" to detainees. During my daily meetings no one mentioned any such things. I didn't see anything that appeared the MPs were lacking oversight. There was a good feeling among the MPs. They were focused and were very professional. I simply believed they needed more MPs to assist with their mission. I never went to the MPs LSA. Within days of the Memorial, LTG Sanchez went to visit Abu Ghraib. [redacted] asked me to help him put some slides together and COL PAPPAS asked me to brief. Mortars were constantly hitting us but I don't know why there wasn't more aggressive patrolling or preplanned fires. COL PAPPAS brought in the 165th MI BN and the 82nd sent additional assets to assist with the Force Protection mission. COL PAPPAS spoke to BG KIRPINSKI but I don't know what the result of the meeting was. The International Red Cross visited Abu Ghraib and their report stated there were allegations of detainee abuse such as detainees wearing female underwear on their heads, electrocutions, and physical abuse. COL PAPPAS asked me if I had seen any of this and I said no. I am not aware of COL PAPPAS doing anything about it. This occurred mid to late October. A month later, JAG began to respond to the ICRC allegations. This was all news to me because prior to the ICRC, I had no idea this was going on. On 24 November, I was on my

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT _____ DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

way to the LSA and [redacted] called me and stated that it appeared we might have a weapon in the Hard Site. He asked if I mind going in to assist them. (I didn't really know who [redacted] was) I went with [redacted] assist. I asked who the detainee was and the MPs were sorting this thing out. They were suiting up for a cell search and I was trying to find out who the suspected detainees were. I knew there had been a threat of one of them trying to kill some one. I found out one of the suspects was at the far end of the hallway. I told them where to stand and leading them. I told them to be careful because they might be hiding the weapon. Next thing I know, someone stepped up and around came flying out. There were shots fired (MPs had rubber bullets). Someone finally used a mirror to show where the detainee was in the cell and he was shot in the leg. The detainee was later medivac out and return at a later time. I questioned that decision. I saw myself as the leader since I was the ranking officer. In hindsight, I believe maybe my actions were not the best decisions. I notified COL PAPPAS and relayed to him what had occurred. I am not sure when he was notified. COL PAPPAS requested that the facility be locked down. The QRF came in and dogs were used to sweep the facility. In reference to Ghost detainees, OGA would bring in detainees for a short period of time. [redacted] brought them in. These particular ghost detainees were not yet categorized and OGA was working on that. It was very difficult keeping track of these OGA because they were not processed until OGA decided to turn them over to us. COL PAPPAS was not happy with that procedure. I [redacted] recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding be written up between OGA and MI on the procedures to drop off a ghost detainee. COL PAPPAS met with OGA and TF-121 and the memorandum on procedures for dropping ghost detainees was signed. COL PAPPAS introduced me to [redacted] and a couple of more guys from TF121. [redacted] stated he had heard of me from [redacted] stated I would assist with possible linguist and logistics. [redacted] always accompanied his folks when they dropped off a detainee about twice a week. I never knew of him interrogating. I don't recall briefing MG FAST or [redacted] on ghost detainees. Some of the incidents of detainee abuse I was aware of are as follows: It was brought to my attention by [redacted] interrogator, and [redacted] analyst, were walking back a naked detainee from the interrogation booth to the isolation cell. I notified COL PAPPAS of the incident. He notified COL PAPPAS of the event. He told me to get [redacted] and explain to them the seriousness of this. I took [redacted] and their NCOIC and explained the seriousness of the incident. I told them it was wrong and did not follow the IROEs. [redacted] stated she didn't think it was wrong. [redacted] told he had questioned [redacted] while she was stripping down the detainee, but that [redacted] said it was okay. I didn't follow up so I do not know if there was any disciplinary action taken. I did not have any more conversations with COL PAPPAS reference this event. [redacted] asked me if I had recommended UCMJ, I told her it wasn't in my lane. In reference to the death of a detainee around late October, this is what I remember. I was asked if I knew where COL PAPPAS was and I told them he was in a meeting. I was then told that someone had died in the Hard Site. I asked dif it was military and they said no that it was a detainee. I walked over to the cell and saw [redacted] medical doctor on site. He told me that the detainee was dead. The detainee was facing down, handcuffed with his hands to his back and the shower stall. The handcuffs were taken off and he was turned over. I looked around for blood to see if there had been any beating and didn't find any. I asked the MPs if they had notified the battalion and the OGA onsite [redacted] said he would notify his supervisor [redacted] notified COL PAPPAS and he said he was on his way and to keep him abreast of everything. [redacted] Hard Site OIC came in and thereafter [redacted] arrived. [redacted] said he had to go to Washington and could we please take care of the body. I told him we didn't have the facilities to take care of a dead body. Meanwhile [redacted] brought in a body bag and we began looking for ice [redacted] closed off the shower area to keep people from going in there. A litter was brought in and the body was taken out making it appear as if we were taking someone sick out. CID was informed and the body was taken to get an autopsy [redacted] accompanied the body. OGA had apparently brought the detainee at around 0530. Seal Team 7 had captured the individual during one of their missions. The detainee was presumed to have been involved in the attack against the ICRC. The detainee apparently had several weapons with him. He was resisting arrest and apparently the Seal Team but stroked him on the side of the head. I never saw the results of the investigation CID conducted. I was asked after the report on the news came out to speak to a case officer, [redacted] who was investigating the incident. I believe [redacted] was an attorney. In reference to clothing for detainees, I know there was a problem with getting jumpsuits. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, some detainees had torn jumpsuits. In Sempember, it was very warm and detainees would take their top off, but they always had clothes on. I never saw any detainees without any clothing except for when they arrived and were being searched and a few who had mental problems would tear their clothes off. I never saw any detainees with women underwear on or on their heads. The only time I was aware of detainees with women underwear was when the ICRC mentioned that detainees were wearing women's underwear. I have no knowledge or ever saw any detainee being thrown off the back of a truck. I have no knowledge of dogs ever being used or approved for interrogations. Dogs were used to sweep the cells after the shooting to ensure no weapons were on site. I do not know if COL PAPPAS had received approval to use the dogs the night of the shooting. I was shown some photos in which I identified on several photos [redacted] Linguist, Possibly [redacted] interrogator, Analyst, and [redacted] MP and on one photo Possibly [redacted] The photos were taken in the isolation site and depicted detainees naked and all bunched up together. I also identified [redacted] and a female TITAN Linguist on three other photos. On one photo, [redacted] appeared to be interrogating a detainee who was sitting on a chair facing back in a stressed position. [redacted] was standing by the side. The other photos were of [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] together.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2004/05/

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*
NOTHING FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of MAY, 2004 at

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSCOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: CAMP VICTORY
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/05/07[redacted]
3. TIME: 1550[redacted]
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: SGT
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 372nd Military Police Company
9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib in mid October around the 12th. I was assigned as the Dayshift NCOIC of Tier 1. I had split responsibilities between Tower 2 and Tier 1. [redacted] had the night shift sometimes. The soldiers who work my area at one time or another were [redacted] A lot of soldiers were intergrated from [redacted] Camp Vigilant. [redacted] I arrived later on. Part of the platoons had the escort mission. When I first arrived no one told me the MI Procedures in relation to detainees. What I was told was my job was to manage the sleep plan, make sure the detainees were showered, got fed and didn't cause any problems, keep them from talking to one another. I was told by MI the dirrefenc between segregation and isolation. I never witnessed or had any knowledge of any detainee abuse except for the time when an interpreter kicked a detainee into the shower. I told [redacted] about it and told him that I would take care of it. I told the linguist that if he ever did this again, he would have to deal with me. I never saw or knew of any photos of videos of any detainees, or witnessed the use of dogs for interrogations. I [redacted] it was used but that is all I knew. None of my soldiers told me of any problems with MI or detainees. I woud interact with MI only when they came and picked up or drop off a detainee. They would use the stairs and the shower room in Tier 1A and 1B for interrogations when there was no room at the other sites. When MI would request to give this guy the treatment, that meant give them some Physical training, and keep them awake, monitor their sleep management. As far as clothing for detainees, at times all we had were women's underwear. We would request it from CPA and the supply system, but we never got in enough. Some of the detainees refused to wear women's uderwear and we told them that was all we had. Some refused to put them on and chose to be naked. One particular detainee refused everything, food, clothing, shower and became combative. He said he was going to kill me with t missle. We had to give him an I V because he was becoming a health issue. We began shaving detainees beads because of a couple of lice problems we had. The detainees who were found with lice, had their clothing and other items burned. One detainee mentioned that a black guy had beaten him up. This particular detainee used to lie a lot. This event was unfounded [redacted] never interrogated in front of us. I never saw him interrogate anyone. As far as MI encouraging MPs to abuse a detainee, I never witnessed or knew of it. "Ghost detainees were detainees who were brought to our facility by Other Government Agencies (OGA). They were not part of our count or given an ISN. I still included them in my numbers but they didn't exist. They were kept in isolation cell to prevent them from being identified by someone else. There were some who appeared to have been beaten when they wer dropped off by OGA. I always had them checked by medical personnel when I came on shift. When we first arrived, we worked 12hr days for about 40 days. The enviroment was very stressful and Abu Ghraib was a harsh environment. Some of the detainees in isolation were kept there longer than 30 days and we would request from MI their status but we were not given one. Detainees were supposed to be kept in isolation for only 30 day. They were not supposed to be in Tier 1 for more than 30 days.

Q Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY DATED 2004/05/07

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (HS)

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

29 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Telephonic Interview of [redacted]

On 29 June 2004, I conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] to clarify a statement [redacted] had made. [redacted] he reported to [redacted] the incident of detainee abuse [redacted] had reported to her. I asked [redacted] if in fact [redacted] had reported to him the incident. He stated that he remembers [redacted] coming to him and telling him about something that had happened at night but she didn't give any specifics or mentioned any names. He told her he would take care of it. [redacted] stated that he didn't tell the Night NCOIC but that he believes he spoke to [redacted] about it and nothing abusive came about the conversation.

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

23 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview o[redacted]

On 23 May 2004, MG George R. Fay and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] During the interview, [redacted] began to incriminate himself and MG Fay stopped the interview and read him his rights for failure to report, failure to protect a detainee and dereliction of duty. [redacted] requested a lawyer. He refused to answer any further questions on advice of his counsel.

The following is a statement on what [redacted] provided prior to his rights being read:

After reading about and seeing pictures of some of the incidents of possible detainee abuse on the internet [redacted] wanted to mention some recollections of matters he observed while assigned at Abu Ghraib.

The first pertains to a picture on the internet of a detainee with a hood over his head handcuffed to a railing on the top floor. (He was not able to identify the detainee in the picture). [redacted] bserved a similar incident on one occasion when [redacted] was in the area to pick up a detainee for interrogation [redacted] bserved a detainee hooded and handcuffed to a railing. [redacted] sked the MP what it entailed and was informed that since the MPs were short handed they often had to "park" a detainee somewhere if they could not immediately return him to his cell. [redacted] did not remember the identity of the detainee or the MP [redacted] did not report this to anyone as the explanation by the MP was plausible and this was a common practice due to the shortage of MPs.

The second matter pertains to a picture on the internet of a MP [redacted] standing next to a detainee in a hallway. The detainee (reportedly) had a brown substance spread over his body. [redacted] once observed a detainee we commonly referred to as "shitty" because he would often defecate in his cell and throw the feces around, at time throwing it at the MPs. (This particular detainee appeared to act very strangely at times and might have had a mental condition). On this particular occasion at nigh [redacted] saw him sleeping on a mattress on the floor in the hallway, handcuffed and covered with a blanket. [redacted] asked the MP what was going on and was informed that the detainee had defecated in the cell, covered himself with feces and thrown feces around the cell and at the MPs The MPs had to take him to the showers to clean him up and clean his cell – that was shy he was sleeping on a mattress on the floor. Again [redacted] did not report this, as similar matters were a common occurrence with this particular detainee. A similar situation could have been the precipitation behind the photo on the internet.

The night of the shooting, [redacted] was sent in to help with guarding of the Iraqi Police (IP). My duties were to keep them from talking to one another. [redacted] were there as well. Whe[redacted]

[redacted]rrived to the Hard Site, [redacted] was the senior person on site. The interrogators had been going on for 3-4 hours already. The dogs were being used at the time as well. There was one cell the dog went into. The dog barked but was not close enough to hurt the detainee. [redacted]id not remember who the interrogator was but [redacted] does remember that the interpreter was [redacted] The dogs were authorized before but by this time, any approval had to go through LTG Sanchez. During this particular incident, there was a sense of urgency to conduct simultaneous interrogations of the police that had been identified as being involved and word circulated around that LTG Sanchez had given blanket approval for somewhat harsher interrogation methods for the police interrogations. [redacted]d not see any written blanket approval and do not remember any one individual specifically telling me that we had a blanket approval – it was just accepted by all of us). During this time, there was an IP who was taken into isolation and into the shower room to keep him away from the other IPs. He was left there for about half an hour. [redacted]as directed to go back in with the IP. When [redacted]got to the cell, the detainee was falling asleep and one of the MPs, [redacted]hrew a bucket of water to wake him up. [redacted]sked if this was necessary, he said [redacted]stated that the IP was falling asleep and had to keep him awake. The IP was given a blanket to keep him warm. The third matter also pertained to [redacted] It occurred after the shooting incident, possibly two to three days after, where in a detainee had a gun in his cell and had it had to be taken by force. There was an informant (one of the detainees) who had tipped MPs to Iraqi police smuggling weapons and other contraband into the detainees so after the shooting incident, the Iraqi police were rounded up and put into cells. As this was done, the informant pointed out which of the police were involved and which were not. In this particular instance, [redacted] was working with a civilian interrogator [redacted] observed [redacted] interrogating one Iraqi policeman and [redacted] alternated between coming into the cell and standing next to the detainee and standing outside the cell. [redacted] apparently using the MP as an intimidation tactic with the detainee and would tell him to answer questions or he would bring [redacted] back into the cell. At one point [redacted] put his hands over the nose and mouth of the policeman, cutting off his air flow and not allowing him to breathe, this lasted for a few seconds. At another point [redacted] used his collapsible nightstick to push and possibly twist the policeman's arm causing some pain. When [redacted] walked out of the cell at one point he commented to me that he knew how to do this without leaving any marks. When [redacted] made that statement I wondered why he would say such a thing. [redacted] did not report the matter to anyone for two reasons. First, [redacted] was an interrogator who knew the IROEs and [redacted] was a SSG – therefore, both should have known what was allowed and what was not. Second, it was commonly understood that LTG Sanchez had given blanket approval for somewhat harsher interrogation methods (not specified) for use against the Iraqi police as a result of the shooting incident. [redacted] never heard some one tell him this specifically. The interpreter with [redacted] was [redacted] supervisor was [redacted]

The last matter concerns treatment of a detainee who was accused of shooting an Army Colonel in the head (just walked up to him on the street and shot him). The detainee was in an isolation cell and one or two MPs and a male dog handler with a leashed but unmuzzled dog outside the cell. The detainee was handcuffed to the cell door on the

inside and the dog was allowed to jump up at the door and bark and snarl. The dog was on the leash at all times and was not allowed to get close enough to bite the detainee. [redacted] did not report this because it did not seem to be abuse. [redacted] did not remember the identity of any of the personnel involved.

[redacted] mentioned these incidents at this time only as a result of reading and seeing pictures on the internet bringing the matters to mind.

STATEMENT WRITTEN BY: [redacted]

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/05/23		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, DARMSTADT, GERMANY

9.

I, , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

After reading about and seeing pictures of some of the incidents of possible detainee abuse on the internet I want to mention some recollections of matters I observed while assigned at Abu Ghraib. The first pertains to a picture on the internet of a detainee with a hood over his head handcuffed to a railing on the top floor. (I am not able to identify the detainee in the picture). I observed a similar incident on one occasion when I was in the area to pick up a detainee for interrogation. I observed a detainee hooded and handcuffed to a railing. I asked the MP what it entailed and was informed that since the MPs were short handed they often had to "park" a detainee somewhere if they could not immediately return him to his cell. I do not remember the identity of the detainee or the MP. I did not report this to anyone as the explanation by the MP was plausible and this was a common practice due to the shortage of MPs. The second matter pertains to a picture on the internet of a MP [redacted] standing next to a detainee in a hallway. The detainee (reportedly) had a brown substance spread over his body. I once observed a detainee we commonly referred to as "shitty" because he would often defecate in his cell and throw the feces around, at time throwing it at the MPs. (This particular detainee appeared to act very strangely at times and might have had a mental condition). On this particular occasion at night I saw him sleeping on a mattress on the floor in the hallway, handcuffed and covered with a blanket. I asked the MP what was going on and was informed that the detainee had defecated in the cell, covered himself with feces and thrown feces around the cell and at the MPs. The MPs had to take him to the showers to clean him up and clean his cell - that was why he was sleeping on a mattress on the floor. Again I did not report this, as similar matters were a common occurrence with this particular detainee. A similar situation could have been the precipitation behind the photo on the internet. The night of the shooting, I was sent in to help with guarding of the Iraqi Police (IP). My duties were to keep them from talking to one another [redacted] and [redacted] were there as well. When I arrived to the Hard Site [redacted] was the senior person on site. The interrogators had been going on for 3-4 hours already. The dogs were being used at the time as well. There was one cell the dog went into. The dogs barked but was not close enough to hurt the detainee. I do not remember who the interrogator was but I do remember that the interpreter was [redacted]. The dogs were authorized before but by this time, any approval had to go through LTG Sanchez. During this particular incident, there was a sense of urgency to conduct simultaneous interrogations of the police that had been identified as being involved and word circulated around that LTG Sanchez had given blanket approval for somewhat harsher interrogation methods for the police interrogations. (I did not see any written blanket approval and do not remember any one individual specifically telling me that we had a blanket approval - it was just accepted by all of us). During this time, there was an IP who was taken into isolation and into the shower room to keep him away from the other IPs. Her was left there for about half an hour. We were directed to go back in with the IP. When we got to the cell, he was falling asleep and one of the MPs [redacted] threw a bucket of water to wake him up. I asked if this was necessary, he said [redacted] stated that the IP was falling asleep and had to keep him awake. The IP was given a blanket to keep him warm. This same matter also pertained to [redacted] it occurred after the shooting incident, possibly two to three days after, where in a detainee had a gun in his cell and had it had to be taken by force. We had an informant (one of the detainees) who had tipped us to Iraqi police smuggling weapons and other contraband into the detainees so after the shooting incident, the Iraqi police were rounded up and put into cells. As this was done, the informant pointed out which of the police were involved and which were not. In this particular instance [redacted] was working with a civilian interrogator [redacted] I observed [redacted] interrogating one Iraqi policeman and [redacted] alternated between coming into the cell and standing next to the detainee and standing outside the cell. [redacted] apparently using the MP as an intimidation tactic with the detainee and would tell him to answer questions or he would bring [redacted] back into the cell. 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10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/23

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Second, it was commonly understood that LTG Sanchez had given blanket approval for somewhat harsher interrogation methods (not specified) for use against the Iraqi police as a result of the shooting incident. The interpreter wi[redacted] was [redacted] supervisor was [redacted] The last matter concerns treatment of a detainee who was accused of shooting an Army Colonel in the head (just walked up to him on the street and shot him). The detainee was in an isolation cell and one or two MPs and a male dog handler with a leashed but unmuzzled dog outside the cell. The detainee was handcuffed to the cell door on the inside and the dog was allowed to jump up at the door and bark and snarl. The dog was on the leash at all times and was not allowed to get close enough to bite the detainee. I did not report this because it did not seem to be abuse. I do not remember the identify of any of the personnel involved. I mention these incidents at this time only as a result of reading and seeing pictures on the internet bringing the matters to mind.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A.

AFFIDAVIT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of MAY 2004 at SPRINGFIELD, VA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is OPCOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	[redacted]E NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27[redacted]	2200	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 23 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a tour of the facilities, screening area, the living Support Areas and all the work areas. I conducted a right seat ride with the individual I was replacing. I received the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and signed the IROE. I really didn't have any questions. It was pretty clear what we could and could not do. I have never witness any abuse of detainees or photos of detainees by MI personnel. I did see one instance where a military dog was used in the Hard Site. An Iraqi police had managed to provide a detainee in the hard site with a pistol. An interrogation was on going and the detainee was not cooperative and the dogs were used. The dog was in the cell with the detainee. The dog was close to the interpreter [redacted] This happened in December. I found out a detainee had been bitten that same night. This technique had to be approved by higher command and I was told this had been approved (the use of a dog). When we wanted to deviate from the approved IROEs we had to send a detail plan and get it approved by LTG SANCHEZ. COL Pappas was in charge and had control of operations and [redacted] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element. My belief was that BG Fast was in charge of the camp.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib DATED 27 April 2004

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOTHING

Follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April 2004
at Abu Ghraib Correction facility
[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
UCMJ Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted] PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

AG0000652

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: [redacted]

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/06

3. TIME: 1515

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS: E-8/NG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 72nd Military Police Company, 992 Troop Command, Army National Guard

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 23 May 03 to 15 Oct 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG) as the 1SG of the 72nd MP Company. My company's mission was to prepare the facility to accept detainees within three days after arrival with a follow-on mission of training Iraqi corrections officers for the eventual transition of AG into Iraqi control. When we arrived at the hard site, we found it to be unusable as it had been ransacked. We built up a portion of the original site and started to receive detainees within four days. Until the end of Jul 03, all detainees at AG were criminal. The main facility was in BIAP. The BIAP facility was overcrowded and AG was originally going to house to overflow. At the end of Aug 03, the 320th MP, arrived at AG. At around the same time, intelligence personnel arrived at AG. There were no interrogations conducted prior to the 205th MI Bde personnel arrived. On occasion, Judge Advocate General (JAG) personnel would come to the facility to interview detainees concerning trial issues. The MI folks arrived and began establishing a location to conduct screening and interrogation operations in preparation of a mission to interrogate suspected SADAAM FETAYEEN members. The criminal detainees were moved to another part of the facility to make way for the security detainees which were going to be interrogated by MI. The MI folks borrowed tents from us to set up the interrogation facility. At one point Camp Vigilant housed about 700 security hold detainees. My company worked more with the MI personnel than the 320th MP's. The MI personnel lived with us and used our mess facilities. In Aug 03, a 320th MP Bn reported to [redacted] that [redacted] and several detainees moved into the sun. I met with [redacted] MCBRIDE and [redacted] after the incident. [redacted] insinuated he had coordinated with me for medical support. This was wrong, as the only thing he asked was the location of the medical tent. Doctor [redacted] examined the detainees, and said a few were dehydrated but there was no permanent damage. For a very short period after the incident, my relationship with [redacted] was strained. There was also a situation where two MI personnel and an interpreter conducted an unauthorized interrogation. The situation was immediately reported to [redacted] and COL PAPPAS who took immediate steps to rectify the situation. At the end of Jul, the criminal prisoners were transferred to Camp Gancey in preparation of a suspected influx of security detainees associated with operation VICTORY BOUNTY. I did witness detainees on adjusted sleep schedules. The schedule for the detainee was posted on the outside of the cell. MI personnel would do most of the waking. The MP's would help out by turning on the lights or banging on the door. At one point, MI personnel would beat on trash cans to wake up the detainee. Once we found out about this, the activity stopped. During the initial set up of the interrogation site, we lent the MI personnel tents and escorted the detainees to and from the interrogation site. The interrogation site consisted of a couple of tents that were open on the sides which allowed personnel to see the conduct of the interrogations. In Sep 03, GEN MILLER visited AG. He spent most of his time with the MI folks, but he had an MP Captain on the team who just explained some of the functions the MP's conducted at GTMO. After the GEN MILLER visit, [redacted] commented that the MP's would end up working for MI. Other than the incidents discussed above, I never witnessed any detainee abuse or maltreatment while at AG. I never witnessed or heard of any MI person asking the MP's to abuse the detainees to help with interrogations. I never witnessed or heard any MP offer to abuse a detainee to help with interrogations. During my time at AG, there were a constant flow of personnel coming through IA. At the beginning of Oct 03, we started our transition with the 372nd MP Bn. The transition consisted of a walkthrough and a right-seat-ride which lasted approximately one week. One of the immediate changes the 372nd made was to restructure the guard force, cutting back on security personnel at Camp Vigilant which resulted in several detainee escapes within days of their transition of authority. After dealing with the 372nd MP's I had concerns in their ability to successfully conduct the mission at AG. The unit had come directly from a mission in the south and seemed distraught about taking over another mission. I feel their morale was extremely low. Detainees were stripped searched during their inprocessing, but I never witnessed or heard of a detainee being stripped as a form of humiliation. I have seen the pictures and cannot understand how it could happen. The actions depicted by the photos clearly fall outside the doctrinally authorized restraining techniques. MP training calls for the restraint (with handcuffs) and the segregation of unruly detainees. It seemed to me that MI was under constant pressure to report. On one occasion, [redacted] made the comment "they were sending someone else to teach us how to do our job," concerning the constant flow of visitors. [redacted] also complained that he had sent up numerous requests through his chain of command requesting rules of engagement of interrogating detainees, which he never received.////////////

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Henderson, NV DATED 2004/06/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A: No.

End of Statement

[redacted]

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT [redacted] ACCEPTS THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004

at Henderson, Nevada

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, IZ	09JUN04	1400	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		E5
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS			
JIDC BCCF/ A Co. 202nd MI BN			

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted]rior to 01APR04, Detainee assessment and Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB) operation were as follows: Once a detainee was determined by the ICE to be of no further intelligence value, a MFR was created by the ICE, signed by [redacted] and the file was transferred to CM&D. If there were no outstanding requirements on that detainee the file was transferred to the DAB. Once a file was received by the DAB a Tiger Team would interview the detainee for the purpose to assessing and making a recommendation as to what the disposition of the detainee should be. DAB assessments covered Summary, Background, Personal Information, Circumstances of Capture, Detainee Explanation, Assessment, Recommendation, Packet Contents and additional Comments. Once an assessment was made, the detainee's file was organized and all reporting not contained in hard copy was included (via electronic dossier). One entire copy was made of each file and was sent by the DAB OIC, [redacted]hrough channels I do not have knowledge of, to the appellate review board. The original was maintained within the DAB. Additional reporting that was added to the existing files included Interrogation Notes, Interrogation Plans, Knowledgability Briefs, Analysis Support Packages, Photos, RFIs, DIIRs, and IIRs. Essentially, all reporting that was contained in the electronic dossier and not contained in the hard copy file was added. At no time was reporting removed from the detainee's files. After 01APR04, the mission and operation of the DAB changed to where interviews and assessments were no longer required. The focus then became expediting the back-log of files. All active files were organized, reviewed, and a recommendation was made based entirely on the information contained within the packet. The organization of files is the same as stated previously, all reporting that was not present in the hard copy file, but was present in the electronic dossier was printed and added to the hard copy file. Files were grouped together, instead of a DAB assessment, a MFR was created containing muliple files, and was signed by the [redacted] Once this was complete, all the active files were transferred to the Magistrate Cell and a completed DA Form 200 was maintained by the DAB. After the back-log of active files was transferred to the Magistrate Cell, the number of personnel in the DAB was reduced. Between 20MAY04 and 01JUNE04 all the completed files (original files) that were being maintained were transferred the Magistrate Cell and said transactions were recorded on DA Form 200 which are maintained by the DAB. Currently, detainee's files are processed through the JIDC in one of two ways. The first way is, once the detainee is determined to be "Not Actively Interrogated" an electronic MFR is created and contained within the BATS Database. The file is then transferred from the ICE to CM&D, and if CM&D does not identify any outstanding requirements and file is transferred to the DAB. Once in the DAB the file is organized (same as stated previously), reviewed, and an assessment is made based on the information contained in the file. The electronic MFR is completed, printed, signed by the JIDC Director, and added to the file. The detainee is then removed from MI Hold, CM&D is notified, the file is then transferred to the Magistrate Cell, and a completed DA Form 200 is maintained to record the transaction. The second method of processing files is as follows: Once the detainee is considered to be "Not Actively Interrogated", the file is transferred to Operations where it is organized and a MFR is created containing multiple files. This MFR is checked by CM&D for outstanding requirements, and returned back to Operations where it is signed by the JIDC director. The completed MFR is sent to the DAB and the detainee's contained within the MFR are removed from MI Hold, and CM&D is notified. The files are them transferred to the Magistrate Cell by Operations. When files are processed in this manner, it is the responsibility of JIDC Operation to organize the file and maintain the DA Form 200. The second method was adopted primarily to expedite the removal of detainees that were not of intelligence value or not being actively interrogated from MI Hold. Q: WHO DID [redacted] WORK FOR. A: CACI. Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT A: NO [redacted] END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.

STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. SLA

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of June, 2004 at TIDC DCCF Iraq

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

INFMT Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [SLA]

DA FORM 2 1 10

DAMI-ZD

29 May 2004

MEMROANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

On 29 MAY 2004 at 0815, MG GEORGE R. FAY, USA, read [redacted] her rights (details are on the DA 3881) [redacted] xercised her rights to obtain a lawyer. No questioning was initiated and [redacted] was given a copy of DA Form 3881 [redacted] et with Army lawyer [redacted] 54th LSO TDS
Devens, Massachusetts 01432.

[redacted]
MAJ, MI
Investigating officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/24[redacted]	(MIT)	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC/E4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Company, 2d Military Intelligence Battalion, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Darmstadt, Germany

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collector/Interrogator (MOS 97E) assigned to B Co, 66th Military Intelligence (MI) Group, Darmstadt, Germany, currently attached to the 202nd MI Battalion (BN) at Abu Gurayb (AG), Iraq. I deployed to Kuwait along with 11 other 66th MI Group personnel on 15 Oct 03. I arrived at AG on 19 Oct 03. I was on a Rest and Relaxation leave from 5 to 25 Apr 03. Upon arrival at AG, we received a briefing concerning the breakdown of AG operations, the Tiger Team configuration being used at AG, and Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I read the IROE slide and nothing, other than the presence of military working dogs, surprised me. We were then split up into various sections and paired up with interrogators who were already experienced with AG operations. I conducted my first interrogation on 21 Oct 03. I can not recall my first section leader because it was for only about a week. My second section leader was [redacted] while I was assigned to A Section. I then moved to the Special Projects Team and my supervisor was [redacted]. I predominately worked with interpreters [redacted] While with A Section, I was paired up with a staff sergeant from the Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, named [redacted] known as [redacted]. I personally observed three incidents which I believe were incidents of detainee abuse. I provided this information in a sworn statement to Army CID on 21 Jan 03 (CID File Number 0003-04-CID149-83130), and more details can be found in that sworn statement. The first incident was what I believed at the time to be an accident when a Military Policeman (MP) named [redacted] was escorting a detainee down a flight of stairs in the AG hard site. The detainee was hand-cuffed, leg-shackled, and had a sandbag over his head. As [redacted] was bringing him down the stairs, the inmate appeared to trip and fall on the stairs. This incident was reported to [redacted] by [redacted]. The second incident also involved [redacted] and a cooperating detainee named [redacted] was a Lebanese national raised in Syria. [redacted] who resided in either Ganci or Vigilant, requested isolation, apparently concerned for his safety because he was cooperating with Coalition Forces. When I arrived at the hard site with [redacted] asked "is this your guy?" and roughly put a sand bag over [redacted] head and began to pull him roughly into the hard site. I was caught of guard by the harsh treatment, but then intervened and asked what [redacted] was doing. [redacted] then responded with something to the effect "is the one of the good guys". When I said he was [redacted] then took the [redacted] sandbag off [redacted] head and calmed down. [redacted] then said that he was going to strip [redacted] down, but did not have a jump suit to issue him. I notified [redacted] and [redacted] my Officer-in-Charge (OIC), and [redacted] intervened to have [redacted] clothes returned to him. [redacted] remained my detainee and he never mentioned any further abuse after this incident. The third incident occurred in late Dec 03 or early Jan 04 and involved a reluctant Baath Party General Officer named [redacted] also know as [redacted]. I had a sleep management plan which was approved by COL PAPPAS (205th MI BDE Commander). I was in Cell Block 1B of the hard site, which was the area of the hard site dedicated to female and juvenile detainees. I had [redacted] held in the shower area of 1B when I witnessed an MP guard and an MP Working Dog Handler with his dog entered 1B. I do not know either of their names, however, investigators showed me digital photographs this day of an MP Working Dog Handler. The MP Handler involved in the incident was the same as the MP Handler in digital photographs numbered as 0196/CG LAPS, 0094/CG LAPS, and 0213 CG LAPS. The dog was a large, black, breed which appeared to be a mix of Labrador Retriever and Belgian Sheppard. It was the only black working dog at AG. The dog was on a leash, but was not muzzled. The MP guard and MP Dog Handler opened a cell in which two juveniles, one known as ("Casper") were housed. The Dog Handler allowed the dog to enter the cell and go nuts on the kids, barking and scaring them. The kids were screaming, the smaller one hiding behind [redacted]. The Handler allowed the dog to get within about one foot of the kids. Afterward, I heard the Dog Handler say that he had a competition with another Handler to see if they could scare detainees to the point that they would defecate. He mentioned that they had already made some urinate, so they appeared to be raising the competition. This happened about 0100 and I returned to my quarters for the night. I forgot about reporting it the next day and did not remember it until the CID investigators came to talk to my in Jan 03. Incidentally [redacted] died in the mortar attack on Abu Garayb on Apr 03. I never witnessed, nor ever heard of anyone taking unauthorized photographs or videotape of detainees. I never heard anyone talking about "softening up" detainees in preparation for interrogations. I was told by [redacted] from the GTMO Team that I was permitted as the interrogator to strip [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT [redacted] TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Alexandria, VA DATED 2004/05/25 [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

a detainee completely naked in the interrogation booth, although I never used this technique personally. The only incident I ever heard of involving such a technique involved [redacted] and I do not have any first hand knowledge of that incident. [redacted] also told me that I could use working dogs and said that he had used them previously, although he was unclear if he had used them at GTMO or AG. I never used dogs and do not know of any instance in which dogs were used as an interrogation technique. I never questioned the veracity of [redacted] statements. I spent a considerable amount of time in the hard site area talking to detainees and giving them cigarettes, building rapport. While there, I would occasionally see inmates without jump suit standing in their cells. I inquired about this and was informed by the MPs that they did not have enough jump suits for all the detainees. I did see some detainees in women's underwear, but this appeared to be by their choice, not as a punishment or harassment. There simply was not enough men's underwear to go around. Since Cell Block 1B of the hard site housed the female detainees, the hard site received shipments of women's underwear and apparently had extra reserves that were offered to the males as better than nothing at all. I had few dealings with OGA and do not know the term "ghost detainee". I know that there are OGA detainees that were off limits for Army interrogators and that some OGA detainees have waited for months for OGA interrogators to see them, violating the 30 isolation limit rule. On only one occasion I recommended a detainee for an extension past the 30 days. The inmate was an Iranian named [redacted] and I suggested that he be extended in isolation due to his mental instability. [redacted] had gotten into a fight in Ganci for no apparent reason and continued to show a tendency toward violence while in isolation. It was reported to me by [redacted] had been bitten by police dogs while his cell was being searched. I went to check on [redacted] and saw that he had bites on his thighs. When I asked [redacted] what had happened he said that the dog bit him, started to cry, and asked to be sent back to Iran. He was present in digital photograph 0178/CG LAPS, shown to me this day by investigators.

//END OF STATEMENT//

Nothing

Follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. [redacted] LLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of May 2004

at Alexandria, VA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PSH

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CRYSTAL CITY, VIRGINIA	2004/05/10[redacted]	1229[redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/CO, 470th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, CAMP BULLIS, TX 78234

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in Mid October 2003. When I first arrived, I was asked if I wanted to work in the Fusion Analysis Cell (FAC). There were only a few soldiers with Top Secret Clearances and I was one of them. I agreed to work in the FAC. There were a total of five individuals working in the FAC. My focus was on the Foreign Fighters and Extremist Cell. We would bring together all intelligence on these groups from the interrogation reports. From the reports, we would develop link analysis and analytic assessments. I didn't really do interrogations, but did sit in on a few. I was asked to help the interrogators and better guide them with specific questions to assist in gathering intelligence. When I first arrived, I didn't receive training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs) or the Geneva Convention. There was one time when [redacted] held a formation and told everyone to read the IROEs and sign them (this was prior to the CID investigation). We were then given updated IROEs and a class on them when the 202d MI BN assumed responsibility of the JIDC. This was sometime in February 2004. At the time I arrived, I believe LTC JORDAN was in charge. Once my [redacted] left, I was placed in charge of the FAC. I worked in the FAC the entire time I was at Abu Ghraib with the exception of six weeks when I left to work in a Tactical HUMINT Team at the entry control point. I never witnessed or heard of any detainee abuse. The only thing close to it was: when we first arrived, The GTMO SGT took us on a tour of the facility. While in the Hard Site, we saw the MPs had two detainees in the middle of the cell. They were naked with a bag over their head, standing on MRE boxes and their hand spread out each holding a bottle in each hand. I asked if this was right. I was told by the GTMO (NCO)that this was the MP's way of disciplining detainees and that it was normal. Apparently the detainees had tried to stab some other detainee. I believe that [redacted] 500th MI in Japan) was also with me. I have never seen or heard of pictures and videos of detainees prior to the CID investigation. After the investigation, [redacted] a girl he believed to be an MP with pictures of detainees. He came to me to tell me about it. I told him to take it to CID and report it. I saw dogs being used a few times. The detainees were in the back of a Humvee with the dog handlers and the dogs. The detainees were sitting on one side while the dog handler was sitting on the opposite side. The dogs were next to the dog handler. I know the drivers and passengers were MI, interrogators and/or analysts. I recognize one civilian. He had blond hair, a goatee, was chunky, about 27-28 years old, and about 5'7 or 5'8. From my understanding, they would always have prior approval to use the dogs. Dogs were also used for crowd control along the concertina wire. There were two analyst who were transferred into my section because they were no longer allowed to interrogate. These two, [redacted] were great analysts and outstanding soldiers. These two individuals came to me (separately) with concerns of something they had done [redacted] told me that [redacted] hadn't involved that he went to the JIDC and asked [redacted] go with him because he wanted to show him something. They went to the hard site where the MPs had several detainees naked on the floor and a nerf ball was being thrown at the detainees. Apparently [redacted] got into it and threw a nerf ball at the detainees. After they left, [redacted] asked [redacted] he was okay because he looked concern. They told me they were afraid and they wanted my advice. I told each that they needed to get some legal advice. I told [redacted] They told me they knew about it and that I should not have been told about this. I went ahead and reported it to CID just in case they had not heard. They said they knew bout it. The only other incident that I heard of which might have been considered humiliation was when a detainee wanted to smoke. The MPs let him smoke but they made him smoke the entire pack within 30 minutes while he did PT. In reference to OGA detainees, I only dealt with this situation once. I wanted to speak to one of their detainees who was a foreign fighter and belonged to OGA. I asked and was told he would not come to me but that I would be able to see the report OGA wrote up on SIPR. I never got it or saw it. One of the problems we had was sharing information or obtaining information with other units conducting interrogations. The reports would be posted on the portal or a similar site, but the interrogator notes were not posted. One time I saw a report that would have been very helpful to me a month previous. I began to make back channels to share information with other interrogators. This worked out great but my leadership got mad for doing that. I kept doing it because there was information they had which helped us develop link analysis diagrams and write analytic assessments. I was shown some photos. .Photo #23 shows [redacted] and [redacted] looking at naked detainees. Photo #11 in file named CG Lapmark shows a female interpreter (name unknown) and a CACI interrogator. There was another photo which showed [redacted] an interpreter working with one of the Military Police. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ *TAKEN AT* _____ *DATED* _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? [redacted]

A. No. [redacted]

//////////////////////////////////End of Statement//

Nothing

follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of MAY, 2004

at CRYSTAL CITY, VIRGINIA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
[redacted] 12 June 2004	[redacted] 1347	

LOCATION
Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
[redacted]

GRADE/STATUS
SPC/USA

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police: Photograph labeled [redacted] on the left. I do not recall his last name. The individual on [redacted] dog depicts a Titan linguist whose first name is [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing the right is [redacted] Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] on the left of the photograph. Photograph labeled [redacted] jpg depicts [redacted] standing to the right of the dog Photograph labeled [redacted] is standing to the right o[redacted] The handler in a tan cap. [redacted] is standing to the left of the detainee. [redacted] Iraqi Policeman, who name is unknown to me. Q. individual standing behind the bars on the left side of the photograph is an Iraqi Policeman, who name is unknown to me. Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: NO [redacted] END OF STATEMENT

[redacted]

NOT USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.10

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted]

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12th day of June, 19 04

at Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPPC V1.10

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/06/0[redacted]	1533	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN		7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I arrived at Guantanamo (GTMO) Bay on July 03. After three month on site, I deployed to Iraq. I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 6 October 2003. I deployed as a member of a GTMO team consisting of CW3 [redacted] who focused on CITF-7/C2, SSG [redacted] Analyst) focused on setting up the fusion cell and set analyst to better support interrogation operations [redacted] (97E) was placed on the Extremist Foreign Fighters, [redacted] (96B) help [redacted] plus he conducted interrogations as part of Former Regime Elements Tiger Team and myself, an interrogator. Our mission at Abu Ghraib was to help set up the Tiger Team Concept and help them get back on track. I wasn't there to teach interrogation techniques. I would say that [redacted] was very knowledgeable on interrogation operations and presses responsibilities down to the soldiers. He would give me a task and expected me to complete it. He took care of soldiers and wanted the needs of the Army done. [redacted] was a hard working Marine who does everything by the book. [redacted] was quiet but did a good job [redacted] was outspoken. He spoke his mind and wasn't afraid to speak out. He wasn't as experience as he thought. [redacted] is on of the most intelligent individuals I know. He wanted to jump into things more than he should have. He knew his job well. When we first arrived, we settled in and I was given a tour of the Hard Site, Camp Vigilant and Ganci. Within two day, we received training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. The first day I arrived, I was told to conduct an interrogation. [redacted] gave me the file of the detainee. She told me that some detainees were in sleep deprivation and some on dietary management. I interrogated a detainee who apparently was a Foreign Fighter from Syria. (I can't recall seeing on the file if the detainee was on sleep deprivation or dietary management. I was then placed as the Section Leader on the Former Regime Tiger Team. My Tiger Team consisted of [redacted] I was the section leader for about a month. My responsibilities were to prioritize detainees for interrogations, separate sources with interrogators, proofread all reports the interrogators on my team wrote and most of the administrative tasks for the team. I was the first authorization for approval of interrogation techniques to be used during an interrogation. My team would request a detainee to interrogate and tell me the approaches they were going to use. I would make the decision to approve and then forward them to [redacted] and they would sign off the interrogation plan and techniques to be used. Those requiring approval from higher were forwarded through [redacted] and she would send it up. The requests were submitted two to three days prior to the approval because they would take a while to get back. My team submitted a request for a stress position (stress positions were authorized when I first got there) to be used against a detainee who apparently was the head of a cell of a mortar team who was firing mortars at our troops. The team members were [redacted] The technique to be used was to have the detainee sit against the wall. The duration would be for 15 minutes. I oversaw the interrogation and after a few minutes, I told them to stop. In late October, [redacted] also requested to interrogate a detainee naked. The request was forward to [redacted] and it was approved. I oversaw the interrogation and after a couple of minutes, I told them to stop because I believed this was not a productive technique. I had heard about nakedness at GTMO, but I never used it. Most of the detainees we had had no intelligence value and were brought to us by the 4ID. I would oversee some of the interrogations and the majority of the interrogation techniques were the direct approach, fear up and pride and ego down. I would spot check the team and I saw a few interrogators scream and yell but no physical abuse was conducted. I worked mainly with CW2 [redacted] and [redacted] The manpower was low and that is why believe I was placed as a section leader. I still had a responsibility to oversee other teams implementing the Tiger Team Concept. I was not able to truly mentor the other teams because I was pretty busy with my Section Team Leader duties and responsibilities. Once more personnel arrived from the 66th MI, 470th MI and 500th MI, I turned over my team to [redacted] and I was taken out as section leader. I gave a tour of the site to [redacted] (500th), SSG [redacted] (66th), [redacted] (500th) [redacted] (sic) (66th), [redacted] (66th), [redacted] (66th) and [redacted] (500th). While on the tour, I never saw any detainee abuse. One of my responsibilities as a GTMO Team Member was to present classes on Cultural environment. What was strange was that I was there to help implement the Tiger Team concept and I was placed as a section leader on a Tiger Team [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	
1-4 (E-MAILS)	[redacted]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

None of the other Team members had to give classes or placed in a leadership position. In my eyes, we were misused. Analysts were not allowed to conduct interrogations in GTMO unlike, at Abu Ghraib, where [redacted] an analyst was allowed to conducting interrogations. The GTMO Team would get together every once in a while and discuss how the implementation of the Tiger Team Concept was going on and on how the interrogation plans and files were coming along. [redacted] were focused on establishing a database and making sure everyone could find it and gather information from it. They were able to properly train other analysts by sitting with them. They didn't have to write reports but they reviewed some. In reference to GHOST DETAINEES: One day when I came on shift, I was told by someone that a detainee had died the night before. What I was told happened was that OGA chained a detainee up in the shower area and the detainee ended up dying. I went t[redacted] [redacted] and told him that I had a problem with what OGA did to this Detainee and that what happened could come back and get us in trouble. [redacted] said that OGA had their own rules. I then went to [redacted] and he told me the same thing. My concern was that they were being placed in the cell without being documented. I told [redacted] that the OGA issue needed to be changed and he agreed that they needed to change it. After I moved from the Tiger Team, I was going to be placed as the coordinator with OGA, but that didn't happened. I didn't see OGA treat their detainees any different than the MI detainees. One day when I was walking through the Hard Site, I remember seeing naked detainees in the Iraqi Police site (MPs area). I do not know why they were naked. I saw them naked every once in a while (about weekly). I never questioned the MPs. Anyone who walked through the area should have seen the same thing I saw. In reference to ladies underwear: I remember one MP put a detainee in underwear. The MP was an African American male and an E-5. I believe he said that the detainee was placed in pink silky women's underwear because the detainee was being punished for something he did wrong. I did not get any other information on why the detainee was in silk panties. The individual was in a cell on the second floor and anyone who walked by could see this. I didn't report it because I knew that [redacted] would walk around daily and would see this. I saw some detainees shackled to the bed bars, but never to my team's detainees. The MPs ran the cages and they knew I was one of the GTMO guys and they didn't mess with my detainees or me. I would tell them that if they do not touch my detainees unless I told them specifically to do something. We would suggest to the MPs what we wanted them to do to the Detainees, i.e., give them more food, but we had control of our detainees. I was not at the Hard Site the night of the shooting on 24 November. I was volunteered to go. I had heard that there was a detainee who had a weapon in the cell and that the MPs were yelling at him "Drop it. Drop it!" The detainee would not drop the weapon. The detainee shot at our MPs and our MPs fired back. I did not see this. No one really had a duty when I arrived. I am not sure if it wa[redacted] who came up with a plan. There was a Detainee who was sitting in a vehicle (he had good knowledge of who was a Former Fedayeen). We would take the Iraqi Police and he would identify them as a Former Fedayeen or not. His results were very accurate with names we already had. Once identified as Former Fedayeens, they were set aside to later be questioned. That individual selected to question the selected individuals was [redacted] and he had his interpreter, [redacted] did one interrogation that evening in the storage area off to the side of the MI Hold. I then became part of the group who kept the Iraqi Police quiet (Shut Up Group). I did see dogs that evening. They were checking the cells. At one time, the dog almost bit me, but the dog did bite the handler. I do not know if the detainees were in the cells when the dogs went in there that evening. [redacted] did do one interrogation, I found out he was questioning the [redacted] reporter, when I found this out, I told him to stop because this was my detainee. He stopped. There was nothing violating the IROE in that particular Interrogation. The MP's conducted a search of the cells to find out information on any more weapons possibly smuggled in the Hard Site. The next day, I was on a team with [redacted] and [redacted] who checked all the IPs from the next shift. I did this until I left. The only thing close to detainee abuse that I saw was when a detainee was being forced fed with an I.V. I was told this was to help him eat. The MPs would hold him down while the IV was on him. I did hear that before I got there two interrogators from Fort Bragg had interrogated a female detainee without approval and they were taken out of interrogation operations. There was also the incident with [redacted] The night of the incident, she told me that [redacted] had taken her out of interrogations because she had walked a naked detainee back from interrogations. She asked me if I knew what actions they would take against her and I told her She was in trouble. After the incident, [redacted] had a formation and told everyone to make sure they were following the IROEs and we had to sign them again. Those that worked in the night shift knew about the incident, but it is possible that those who were on the day shift did not know what happened. I saw an MP (E-6 with Mustache, later identified as [redacted] from a photo. I also identified the female the photo was taken of in one of the photos pr[redacted]ator [redacted] take a picture of a female detainee who was leaving the Hard Site. I tol[redacted] that he was not authorized to have a camera or take pictures. I also told him that if I find out he is taking photos of MI Detainees, he was going to deal with me. I asked of the DISK and I destroyed the disk. I never reported the incident to higher. I do not know why he had the camera in the hard site and I do not know what they do with their detainees, but I told him not to mess with the MI Hold. Soon after that, I departed IRAQ. I was e-mailed by [redacted] on several occasions where he told me of the investigation going on and provided some questions being asked. I have provided those e-mails to the Invesugative Team as part of this statement. I was also ordered not to discuss anything about this investigation with anyone. Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A. No[redacted]

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

Not used

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES [redacted]

HKMH 14-2
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4TH day of JUNE, 2004

at: METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD VA

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted] PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 10 June 2004 at 1010 hrs, I called [redacted] at (360) 513-2853 to clarify a statement he made on his sworn statement dated 4 June 2004. He wrote:

"In late October [redacted] and [redacted] also requested to interrogate a detainee naked. The request was forward to [redacted] and it was approved."

I asked [redacted] if he was sure he requested approval from [redacted] He told me:

"YES, As accurate as he can remember."

I then asked him if he was definitely sure it was [redacted] He said that he only dealt with [redacted] and that if it wasn't [redacted] it could have been [redacted]

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 6 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Tier 1 Logs and Requests for Exception

1. (FOUO) On 6 June 2004, [redacted] SPC/USA, JIDC approached the undersigned and volunteered that he kept multiple records of several old operations files. Within these files are multiple logs concerning detainee movement within Tier 1. He also provided several requests for exception to IROE. [redacted] arrived at JIDC in January 2004. He does not know the location of any other records not already previously located.

2. (FOUO) I assumed control of all documents that pertained to the timeframe 15 July 2003 to 31 January 2004.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/2[redacted]	1510[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 15 October 2003 work as a screener with in and out processed detainees. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a one week of inprocessing. The inprocessing included orientation to the area, briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROEs. I felt I was very knowledgeable of what I could or could not do. I received Geneva Convention training at CRC but not at Abu Ghraib. It was a bit confusing as to who was in charge. I was told the 519th was in charge but the 205th was in charge of the entire site. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse, any photos taken or the use of dogs.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ *TAKEN AT* _____ *DATED* _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/11	3. TIME 1628	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
302nd Military Intelligence Group, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in late November 2003. I am a 98J and when I arrived at Abu Ghraib I was assigned to a Tiger Team for about a month. I was then assigned as the analyst who research, put questions together for the interrogators, and scheduled the interrogators with detainees. When we first arrived we received training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagements (IROEs) and signed the the IROEs. These IROEs were posted on the wall next to the Interrogation Control Elements. We knew what we could do and what we couldn't do but we did not know what the MPs could or couldn't not do in their area. There was one time when [redacted] held a formation and told everyone not to do it or you will be caught. We did not know what the incident was or who they did what. I knew you couldn't abuse detainee That was just common sense. I knew pictures were not allowed. This was posted on the wall. I never saw any photos or videos of detainees. The only thing I saw was the use of sandbags over the detainees head. I never heard or had any knowledge of MI telling MPs to "soften-up" or abuse a detainee to get them ready for the interrogation. I had heard prior to my arrival that the MPs would wet the detainees and get them cold. Then they would take the detainees to the booth (I never personally witnessed or heard first hand). Dog were used to walk down the hallway, but never go in the interrogation booth. I do remember seeing a naked detainee against the wall in TIER 1B. The MPs were getting him wet [redacted] was with me at the time. This occurred sometime in December. I didn't tell anyone because I didn't know what MPs could do or not do. I had the perception (do not know where I got the perception from) that the MPs did this when a new detainee arrived As 302nd MI we weren't attached to the unit there. My team would go to [redacted] as our immediate supervisor

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//

[redacted]

Initials

follows

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of MAY 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/24	1845 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CI Detachment Zama, 500th MI Group, APO AP 96338

I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on 21 October and was assigned as as the Chief of the Terrorist, Foreign Fighters and Extremist element of the JIDC. At various times I had the following personnel assigned to my team, but not all at the same time: [redacted] went through a 2 to 3 day newcomers' orientation and tour of the facility immediately after my arrival, as did all newly arriving personnel. [redacted] and [redacted] did the IROE portion of the orientation. The IROEs were in line with current doctrine and training and also reflected what I had experienced in previous assignments. Incoming personnel had to acknowledge in writing they had been informed of and understood the IROEs. I did not have any concerns over the IROE and was pleased to see that certain procedures, especially sleep deprivation, had to be approved by LTG Sanchez. Sleep management technique and process was being developed as I was leaving GTMO and I had wondered how it was worked out and put into practice It was good to see that a higher approval authority (LTG Sanchez) was required. The IROEs were posted in numerous places and were quite conspicuous. I do not recall if the in processing involved reading the 12 October Memorandum signed by LTG Sanchez We were aware of the techniques and procedures that required approvals, especially those that required approval by the CG. Interrogators and first line supervisors knew to ask if they were uncertain on any of the approval levels. My duties called for me to participate directly in interrogations as well as observe the interrogations conducted by personnel in my section. I did not observe or hear about any violations of the IROEs. On one occasion I did hear some dogs barking and asked about it and was told they were being used for an interrogation. I had been told by [redacted] about the general procedures for dogs: they had to be requested and approved with an IROE exception to policy memo prior to use, could not be in the booth, only present in the area and the dogs could not touch the detainees. [redacted] used the dogs, said he had requested approval. I did not see the approval, but knew that the SOP was that [redacted] would not have given the go ahead if she had not received the proper authority. At one time I had requested approval to use sleep management and to use the MP dogs but did not employ either as the approval was not received in a timely manner It was not until 6 weeks after I requested it that the approval came through I did not see the written approval but was informed that it had been approved. The process for obtaining approvals was that the interrogation team had to request it in writing in accordance with the interrogation plan and submit it to the section leader who sent it to [redacted] who would in turn forward it thru the Deputy Commander to C2/JTF-7. As far as I know there was no tracking system at the section level - I put the request in the distribution box and checked later to see if it was gone. If it was no longer there, I assumed that ops had forwarded it, since it was not returned to me. We were transitioning from a paper/hard copy system to an automated system had been put in place for recording and tracking the detainees. The maneuver element was supposed to send the detainee with a capture tag and preliminary screening info when the detainee was forwarded to us. Detainees of intelligence interest were put on "MI Hold" as soon as they were identified as such. Our screeners would take the paperwork that came with the detainee and prepare a screening review which was forwarded to the magistrate, who in turn passed the packet to [redacted] and the operations folks. There the info (identifying info, capture data, location, etc) was entered into the computer system by the AG Number, the ISN Number and cross referenced to name. The hard copy dossier was then passed to the Section leaders who parceled them out to the teams Most of the time we cross checked the hard copy with the data base to make sure the info had been entered The interrogators entered follow up data from the interrogation process as they progressed. I am not sure if the data base can be assessed from outside Iraq A civilian woman named [redacted] who traveled to the various units training them on the system would be the best person to contact about that accessing the Biometric Automated Tool (BAT) data base. Higher priority MI hold detainees would be interrogated as soon as possible. Other MI hold detainees could conceivably be held for up to two months before being interrogated. During Oct and Nov the pace was very hectic at AG - in fact it was "crazy" 14 to 18 hours days were the norm. We had constant mortar attacks and other types of harassing fire and the maneuver elements were literally flooding us with new detainees As we finished interrogations and felt we had exhausted intelligence value we forwarded the packets to the Detainee Assessment Branch for processing and consideration for release. The DAB memo would be filled out and put into [redacted] box for review and processing. I could check the data base from my section and see if the memo had been accepted by the DAB [redacted]

10 EXHIBIT

11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I observed or heard about some out of the ordinary procedures as explained below. One detainee in an unrecalled block (where the Iraqi Police were held when the round up was conducted) was handcuffed to the cell bar - he could move a short distance and could sit down but was handcuffed in such a manner that his movement was somewhat restricted. He was restrained in this manner because he had tried to attack one of the MPs who had been searching his cell for drugs. On another occasion I observed another detainee in Block 1B being put through a physical training session by the MPs by having to carry water jugs back and forth, up and down the hallway. Another occasion involved a high value detainee we knew was coming in for interrogation. He told us that he had cold water thrown on him and when we further questioned him on the details we found that he had been given a shower and all we had was cold water. This detainee [redacted] has recently been quoted in the London Times about the cold water incident and said he had been beaten and hit in his mouth. We actually favored him and treated him quite well, with extra rations and cigarettes, etc to have him feel like he was being favored and to keep him talking. The mouth incident was actually a tooth infection and we had made sure he had dental care. This particular detainee had been in Kurdish control for some time before he was transferred to us. One of the results of the Red Cross visit was a stipulation that all detainees had to be dressed in orange jumpsuits. [redacted] made a comment that it did not stipulate how much of a jump suit so he reportedly cut off the sleeves and legs and made it into two pieces for the detainee to wear. At the time [redacted] was working a "special project" and reported directly to COL Pappas and did it to one particular detainee who was a suspected high level al Qaeda operative. On another occasion we experienced a slight problem when we returned a detainee to his cell from the wood site. This detainee was always hostile and arrogant. On this particular occasion he jumped up against the interrogator and right after jumped up and down in place (as would a small child throwing a tantrum). [redacted] said that because of this, the detainee would "have a new look" - the next morning his head was shaved.

I never saw any abuse or humiliation of prisoners by either Army personnel or OGA personnel. I do not know of any unauthorized use of guard dogs for interrogation. I never saw any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. However, when [redacted] in processed, I was told he took a picture of the compound and that he was told to delete it, he was not allowed to take pictures. He immediately deleted the picture. Later [redacted] was taking a picture of a departing female in the ops shop and I told him to delete the photo, which he did. I am confident that all my Soldiers or civilian/contract interrogators would have come to me to report any humiliation or abuse. I am sure that most of the other Soldiers and civilians/contractors would also come to me, as they had a sense of trust in me. I knew [redacted] from a previous assignment, but on this tour he was not assigned to me and we did not work together. I feel he is arrogant and cocky and he did not talk to me. I saw him in the booth on occasion, but did not really observe his work. I heard about his attitude from others but never heard any problems about his work. I did not work with [redacted] and did not hear anything adverse about his work. [redacted] was very confident, almost arrogant. He felt he should have been in charge and not have to work for a military interrogator and not have to listen to a SGT or SSG. I never heard any complaints about his work. [redacted] was very reliable and I would have believed him if he came to me about observing any abuse - he never did so. I expected that all my Soldiers would have done so. I saw them on a daily basis and held weekly section meetings. On one occasion [redacted] was walking a detainee from his cell and I was escorting them. [redacted] had hooded and cuffed him and turned him around to walk down the stairs. The detainee lost his balance and fell. I had already returned to the ICE but two soldiers saw this and immediately reported it to me. I immediately informed [redacted] that it was an accident and not deliberate. She immediately addressed [redacted] and the MP shift NCOIC about the matter. [redacted] was always bragging and stretching the truth. Toward the end of November he was working as an analyst and may have received an Article 15 for drinking. I do not know if he ever worked with [redacted]. He pal'd around with [redacted]. Interrogators might not know what the MPs were doing or what they were supposed to do or not do. I always felt that the MPs had more leeway than we did, but the MPs should also know right from wrong. The interrogators should know what they are allowed to do and what they cannot do. Q: Is there anything else you would like to add? A: No [redacted]

//End of Statement//

NOTHING

FOLLOWS [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

NOTHING

FOLLOWS

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May 2004

at Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/1[redacted]	3. TIME 13[redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS LTC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
G2, HQ USAEUR, Heidelberg, Geramny APO AE 09102

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Iraq the third week in April. I was assigned initially as the G2 Planner, then as the V Corps Deputy G2. Once MG FAST became the C2, I went to C2 Operations and eventually became the C2 Chief of Staff. I traveled to Abu Ghraib approximately five times from early October to Late January before I departed country on 6 Feb. My visits were related to checking on the support for CACI contracted personnel at the site. I had no relationship with the TITAN Contract, though the CJTF-7 Language Manager (not the CFLCC contract officer) fell under me. I do not recall who was the particular individual that had overall responsibility or was the senior TITAN Contractor at Abu Ghraib, if there even was one. My focus from a linguist perspective was on getting requirements from the units filled by CFLCC. V Corps was already a user of a CACI contract in place but it was for force protection, counter terrorism and analytical slots. The vehicle used for the interrogation and screening services in CJTF-7 was under an existing Army contract that CJTF-7 did not have purview of. The contracting office was Fort Huachuca. The first time we began considering expanding the Statement Of Work on the existing contract was in the summer of 2004. The year prior when the TPFDD and the Request for Forces for the war plan were being drawn, we identified a shortage of HUMINT and Counterintelligence assets to conduct Corps and Division level operations. We identified the shortage and FORSCOM had already begun the mobilization of numerous reserve units. We knew the reserves' mobilization would most likely be for one year and ultimately we had to look at who would replace these units. As the ground phase of the war ended and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) began, the pace of raids and number of captured personnel was increasing through the summer. The Tactical HUMINT Team and interrogation operations were quickly becoming the "core" of the SASO intelligence effort. The Corps and divisions did not have enough assets to screen and interrogate all detainees being captured in a timely manner to provide actionable intelligence. The demand for interrogation results was intense at times as the leadership struggled with defining the emerging threat. The screening of detainees at the tactical level was not being done due to a shortage in assets. The divisions needed their Tactical HUMINT Teams out with the maneuver assets, gathering intelligence for their next operation/raid. Detainees would arrive at the theater interrogation facility without proper screening, no background data, etc, making interrogation difficult. Around July 03 we began looking at options for future MI resources/rotations. We held a mid level conference and knew there were minimal HUMINT assets available long term because they had already been mobilized (and pending demobilization in about 6-8 months), or committed to other operations such as OEF. We began looking at the option of possibly filling the HUMINT and CI shortages at static locations such as division/theater interrogation facilities with civilian contract services to augment the military personnel. The Theater Interrogation Facility was in Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Camp Cropper at the time. Once time at Cropper, [redacted] myself and some other senior interrogators sat down to discuss the possibility of integrating civilian contractors (former interrogators and screeners) into the operation. Everyone agreed it made sense and we began developing the statement of work (SOW). I also discussed the concept with 205th MI Brigade personnel, specifically [redacted] the S3 and others on the C2 staff such as COL BOLTZ. I worked the SOW and would discuss it with [redacted] and [redacted] as we went through versions. The SOWs were actually for more than screening and interrogations. In June, V Corps was not fully staffed to become the CJTF-7 and did not have the resources required. Within the C2, Coalition partners began giving us staff but we didn't get any significant fill from other services for months, with the exception of the USMC. For instance, we did not have an officer really qualified to be a G2X/C2X until late September. It was a hectic time. Many in CJTF-7 looked to contracting solutions to provide services. As examples, we needed to stand up an open source analysis cell, which started with reserve component personnel and ultimately transitioned to contractors; the same with our SSO shop and locally employed persons (LEP) screening effort. For instance, we developed the concept to hire LEP screeners for vetting local nationals being employed by the US military (as done in the Balkans) so that some military CI assets could be freed for operational missions. At previously stated, the number of enemy personnel being detained by units was too large for the assets on the ground (and growing), and the detainees were often not being screened or processed fast enough. Often when the detainees came in to Camp Cropper, many were being dropped off without any paperwork. This was often due to the lack of resources at the divisional and below levels. We looked at using contact services as databasers/analysts, screeners and interrogators to help alleviate this shortfall. The package we put together for [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF 3 [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT (Continued)

division was for approximately 5 x screeners, 3 x interrogators, and 2 x analysts/databasers. For the theater level, we needed more interrogators, so the package was approximately 6 x screeners, 8 x interrogators, and 4 x analysts. The SOWs were staffed in July. The final approval for the SOW and funding was the DCG, [redacted] The money for the contract was MIPRed in August and we began to receive the first hires in September, onward. CACI would review all resumes and would forward to them, [redacted] or me, for those that met the required skills as specified in the contract. There were many resumes that were not even considered due to lack of skills required, and rejected by CACI without sending to us. We did specify in the SOW employees had to have the right skills such as prior interrogators, valid clearance etc, and that employees fell under local unit SOPs, regulations, etc for interrogation operations. Both [redacted] and I reviewed 99% of the resumes as a QC; I could never say 100% because life downrange was hectic and busy. There were occasions when [redacted] was the only one who reviewed the resume; such was the personal and professional relationship I had with [redacted] who I know as a HUMINT professional. We would approve the individual to come to theater based on the resume qualifications and clearance validation. I do not know if CACI actually conducted interviews with those meeting the requirements. The contract did not specify that interview had to be done. Those hired would travel to a CRC where they would receive their equipment and training. (I do not know what the specific training they actually received was but would assume the Geneva Convention was covered as a general topic). I did meet with the 205th S-3 [redacted] and I had a daily relationship on a range of issues) and discussed the integration of the contractors into the overall units, from both a support and operational standpoint. I believe it was clear that the contractors belonged to the unit, and worked for the unit. Either [redacted] or I did the same with the Divisions. Once in theater, the first green suiter they saw was usually when they arrived to the supported unit, because usually the contract country manager on site was the one who met them first at BIAP and arranged movement to the unit. We told the units that the contractors were just another asset that belonged to them; similar in concept to the individual augmentee military interrogators that came from other commands. I know there was a 205th MI Brigade training program at Abu Ghraib, but I do not know its content. The contract did not specify how a contractor could be fired or what steps needed to be taken. If someone left, I tried to find out why, but I cannot say that was always the case or always possible. I also can't say that I actually sat down with 205th leadership and laid out how the firing process went if any contractor did not perform to standard. But I believe they knew to go to me if there ever was a problem that could not be resolved on site - we (the Bde and the G2/C2 staff) were a close team. I only know of one individual fired due to her questionable suitability, and that was a staff position, and I directed the firing based on statements provided by the staff section and supervisor. She made inappropriate sexual comments, lacked the appropriate clearance and refused to respect military rank. She did not follow the CACI rules of conduct, and CACI took swift action to remove her. There was an analyst who was reported by the unit chain (302d MI BN) to have used alcohol one night (before the CACI rules of conduct were established); that individual was appropriately reprimanded by CACI, with my full knowledge and approval or their action. I have no other knowledge of any problems with performance of CACI employees. There were some who showed up and saw the austere conditions and quit. That was not at all unprecedented, because we were used to TITAN linguists quitting all the time because of the conditions since the beginning of the war. CACI did move some personnel between sites due to minor issues such as internal personality disputes, or to balance out teams between theater and divisions However, I was never made aware of any problems with contractors at Abu Ghraib regarding their conduct or performance from CACI or the unit chain of command. Feedback that I got from [redacted] and COL Pappas was always good regarding their performance I can say that when I visited Abu Ghraib, my intuition was that you didn't get a good feeling I didn't see many mid level leadership or above on the MP's side. Conditions were very austere, with seemingly lax security/standards I did have complaints from the contract screeners that they sometimes had to do prisoner escort, when the detainees initially arrived at the holding area and were being processed (which they are not required to do) and wanted to be armed for self defense. I reported the issue to COL PAPPAS and [redacted] and they resolved it. I also informed the C2, BG(P) Fast. At the time I left Iraq, the issue of arming contractors for self-protection was still under consideration, pending theater policy. The MI personnel I interfaced with were very professional, working under extraordinary conditions. I believe COL PAPPAS and staff were doing their utmost to improve the situation. [redacted] was one of the hardest working individuals there, a real professional. Regarding [redacted] I did not have a good intuitive feeling about what he was doing sometimes, though nothing tangible. For instance, he took me around the facility and I left thinking, "Is he really an MP or is he MI (I later found out he was CA, former MI)?" He seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time concerned with detention operations, vice interrogation There were some professional issues between him and COL PAPPAS. COL PAPPAS never came out and told me, but through his S-3 and Deputy, I knew there was some tension between the two, but do not believe it was related to inappropriate behavior [redacted] represented himself as running interrogation operations and we all understood that was his role while at Abu Ghraib At some point (around DEC 04) COL PAPPAS made it known that he was not comfortable with [redacted] and I helped facilitate the move from Abu Ghraib to job within the C2.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14th day of MAY 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

Sworn Statement of [redacted]

Privacy Act Statement
Authority: 10 USC 301; 5 USC 2951; EO 9397, dated 22 Nov 43
Principal Purpose: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
Routine Uses: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
Disclosure: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

Location: Heidelberg, Germany
Date: 16 July 2004
Name: [redacted]
SSN: [redacted]
Rank: LTC
Organization: V Corps, APO AE 09014

Q: What is your current duty assignment?

I am currently the Deputy G-2 for ~~HQ~~ V Corps, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Germany

Q: What unit were you assigned to in Iraq?

I originally deployed to Iraq as the G-2 planner for V Corps which became CJTF-7 in JUN 03. For a short while, I was in the C-2, Ops. In OCT 03, I became the C-2 Chief of Staff under MG Fast. I departed Iraq in FEB 04.

Q: Have you been interviewed previously about this matter?

Yes, I was interviewed by someone out of the IG shop about three and a half weeks ago. I can't recall the name. I was also interviewed by [redacted] WRT Abu Ghraib.

Q: Do you recall attending the BUBs over there?

Yes, I would generally attend the BUB during mornings and evenings. Regarding the comment that you were referring to, I can't recall any specific comment being made by LTG Sanchez. I do recall one instance where we all kind of collectively stopped and scratched our heads after a comment by the general, but I honestly can't recall the context of that comment. I do not even want to speculate as to what the substance of that comment was.

Q: Do you recall a conversation you had with [redacted]

No, I don't recall any discussion with [redacted] about a comment, though we talked numerous times each day about lots of issue. It could have happened, but I simply cannot remember.

Q: What was your understanding of the ROE for combat operations? For example, if US Forces are engaged by a hostile force. The hostile force is armed and has fired upon US forces, the hostile force is now maneuvering away from our forces, but has not laid down its arms and not indicated surrender in any way, what would the ROE allow US forces to do at that point?

It sounds like at that point, the enemy is still an armed force capable of further resistance. We could still engage it.

Q: What kind of oversight did you provide for any contracts in Iraq?

I had no direct oversight of the Titan contract. CJTF-7 was a user of the contract. I had oversight of the CJTF-7 language manager. My role was to identify requirements for linguists Category 1 through 3. I did not perform oversight over the Titan linguists. I was more supervising the requirements manager than anything else.

As for the CACI contract, while there was never a COR officially appointed in writing by the Cont Officer, I was the closest thing to being the COR for that contract.

Q: How many CACI contractors did you have there?

For phase I beginning in JUL 03, we started getting fills in AUG-OCT for detainee screeners, interrogators, personnel for the SSO shop, local national employee screeners and open source intel analysts. This was about 45-50 employees (actual fill) of a requirement of approx 70. By late DEC 03 to early 2004, we had filled all these slots. Phase II expanded in part due to [redacted] study or the JIDC. We had about 90 additional contractors including interrogation report writers, more intel analysts for the JIDC and C2 staff, more CI/HUMINT specialists, planners and foreign disclosure officers. Many of these positions were still unfilled as I departed in FEB 04.

Q: What was the need for all these contractors?

For one thing, my personal opinion is that we were not resourced to make the transition from being a Corps headquarters to a CJTF HQ. We had a Joint Manning Document that was not being filled systematically by the other services (except the Marines) or by our coalition partners. CJTF-7 headquarters was struggling to be effective in a combined/joint and SASO environment, especially early on. The CPA mission was larger than expected, there were numerous undocumented requirements that developed, and the spectrum of issues that CJTF-7 HQ dealt with from day to day was extremely broad. We were staffing/directing matters from in the "weeds" tactical, day-to-day operations such as precise targeting of groups, through strategic CENTCOM/Service/NCA level issues. We found ourselves faced with a range of issues that were very different from those faced by a traditional Corps HQ. Frankly, we were "covering down" on all sorts of positions with all sorts of MOS. Further, we were filling positions with individuals who were much lower in rank than the positions called for. We had 55 or so joint slots and only the Marines filled theirs. It wasn't until DEC 03 that

we started to see USN and USAF fills of any significance, and those only came after a long fight and were almost always lower in grade than the requirement.

Three dynamics necessitated our use of contractors in intelligence:

1. CJTF-7 wanted to reduce green suiters' performance of some tasks where possible. At first, during ground operations, HUMINT ops were not a high priority compared to the other intel disciplines. The rate at which our units maneuvered made the HUMINT gathered often OBE by the time it was reported. However, after we transitioned to SASO and became relatively static, HUMINT became far more important and critical to the operation. HUMINT became the "coin of the realm" as we determined the nature of the evolving threat and developing insurgency, and provided intel support to raids and precision targeting. At the same time we were setting up numerous permanent bases/camps which required intel support to force protection, screening local nationals to work at those camps, screening the MEK population, screening Iraqis for certain positions of trust (BIAP, linguists, key government officials, etc) – the demand for CI/HUMINT was very high. There was never enough and the demand was only growing. Because of the demand versus availability, Tactical HUMINT Teams (CI and interrogators) were one of the most "emotional" assets to task organize within the CJTF, usually resulting in GO level involvement.

2. The detainee population began skyrocketing in summer 03. We did not have enough assets to process detainees and extract timely, actionable intelligence at any echelon. It was nearly impossible to speedily transport, process and keep up with the number of detainees captured during the dozens of raids being performed every day throughout the AO. We had whole groups of detainees that would arrive at holding areas with no specific information about the circumstances of capture other than the fact that they might have been involved in, for example, a raid against a possible bomb-making cell. Who was in the room with the material, vice who was just rounded up in the general area was often unknown to the interrogator (an example). This made the subsequent interrogation mission very difficult, and was directly linked to a lack of screening and HUMINT assets.

3. Much of our CI & HUMINT assets were from the reserve component, as well as a significant number of our analysts. The RC assets were on a 365 day clock, and very unlikely to be extended to a second year. I recall several mid-level sourcing meetings, and looking at 6-10 months down the road it was pretty clear that shortages would be very likely in these areas once our RC assets redeploy. We knew that by late 03/early 04 we would lose about 2/3 of our CI/HUMINT assets to demobilization, and sourcing of replacements was very unclear at the time. Other commands were looking at contracting options (ie CENTCOM J2X was looking as a company (either ACS or SOS I can't recall)) and we knew GITMO was using contractors.

Q: Did you assess the quality of the contractor personnel?

Generally, the contractors were very professional and the skills/experience they brought to the table were very good. I personally was able to assess contractors at Camp Victory on a near daily basis. At Abu Ghraib, I relied on the JIDC/Brigade staff on the ground, COL Pappas, [redacted] and [redacted] They always had positive comments about the CACI contractors.

Q: Did you interface daily with contractors?

At Camp Victory, I had daily interaction with many contractors, specifically analysts, SSO and local national screeners. Again, at Abu Ghraib, I relied on the staff at that site to fill me in on the duty performance of their contractors. I made between 5 to 6 trips there between the fall of 2003 and winter of 2004.

Q: Did you have a formal system to monitor contractors and validate their performance?

No, there was no formal system to monitor their performance, though there was an informal process as indicated earlier. In retrospect, that's one of our biggest mistakes, but we were pretty much consumed trying to get personnel in, support established, operational, etc, all during combat ops. Everything I saw first-hand and heard from others indicated that contractor performance was going very well. We did not get around to establishing a formal system to monitor their performance. We should have made that happen. I was aware of only two problems throughout the contractor force, one dealing with an SSO employee at Victory who lacked the proper clearance and had duty performance issues, and the second dealing with an OSINT analyst downtown who drank alcohol in the Green Zone. The former resulted in CACI firing the employee; the latter (though contractors were not under GO #1 per our SJA) resulted in a reprimand from the company to the employee for poor judgment, and the institution of a CACI code of conduct that all Iraq employees had to review/sign which precluded the use of alchol, among other common sense items. The only complaint I recall was about possibly arming the screeners at Abu Ghraib. There were security issues out there which I observed first hand that made many contractors desire an individual weapon for personal protection in the event of a riot or breakout attempt. This was still being staffed when I departed, but was a valid concern, which I relayed to MG Fast earlier. COL Pappas took action to mitigate the concerns, pending staffing, by ensuring that contract personnel were never required to escort detainees, as was happening periodically due to a lack of MPs at the screening point.

Q: Were contractors briefed on the requirements of the Geneva Conventions and the CJTF-7 Interrogation Memo?

I do not have first-hand information on this matter. However, I was told by [redacted] and [redacted] (a CACI contractor in the C2X) that all interrogators read the memo before going into the "booth." I was also told about the interrogator orientation program/brief (believe developed by [redacted] which included training on the Geneva Conventions as well as 205th MI Bde SOPs, etc at Abu Ghraib; I believe contract personnel went through this orientation program.

Q: What was [redacted] role?

He arrived in September '03 as an individual augmentee, soon after I got back from leave to see my new baby. [redacted] selected him to be the JIDC director / OIC of interrogation ops, to support COL Pappas. Later, there was some tension between COL Pappas and [redacted] I was asked by [redacted] and [redacted] if there was a place to move [redacted] due to this conflict. When the "Party of Five" tasking came down in Dec 03 (a new requirement for a LTC), we move[redacted] over there.

Q: What was the command relationship like at Abu Ghraib with the multiple command structures there?

What I know was the MI chain of command over there was solidly under the 205th MI BDE and COL Pappas. There was not much confusion as to the chain of command within the MI chain. I cannot speak to the other command relationship but there did appear to be confusion with the MP relationship.

Q: Do you recall working with [redacted]

I interacted with [redacted] on a couple of occasions, but more so with [redacted]

Q: Do you know [redacted]

I don't recall the name.

Q: Who is [redacted]

[redacted] is a CACI contractor through a V Corps contract. He was embedded in V Corps as we deployed. His work is excellent. When we wanted to hire contractors at in CJTF-7, we originally looked to expand the V Corps CACI contract. However, we received guidance not to do so since we knew CJTF-7 will be around a long time after we left. We did not want the contract to be associated with a unit such as us that would redeploy from the AO. One of the Vice Presidents of CACI [redacted] was there at the time and suggested that instead of using the V Corps contract that an alternate route, was using the Ft. Huachuca contract. Nobody knew then that it was a DOI blanket purchase agreement at the time, vice Army. We assumed a Ft. Huachuca contract would be an Army contract. Huachuca wound up blessing off on the proposed statements of work and CJTF-7 provided funding.

Q: At Abu Ghraib, was there an individual responsible for monitoring contractor performance?

There was no single person tagged with monitoring the contractors, though interrogation oversight went through interrogation ops channels. I went to to the BDE S-3 for operational support or employment issues or feedback. I went to the Commander for

issues related to command satisfaction with contractor performance. We had a senior CACI employee [redacted] on the ground as a "contract team leader," so to speak, as the direct POC for the MI Brigade.

Q: In your opinion, is the use of contractors in future operations a viable option?

Yes, although the command and control needs to be tight. The current active and reserve component structure isn't sufficient, at least for CI/HUMINT given current and foreseeable OPTEMPO. OIF I seriously depleted us with regard to RC assets, as discussed earlier.

It's unfortunate that one guy might give the whole experience a bad name; contractors bring unique skills, experience and backgrounds to complex operations. As an aside regarding [redacted] I'm 99% sure and I confirmed this with [redacted] that [redacted] was initially hired as a screener. This means he didn't need to have been a 97E interrogator or equivalent. If a decision was made to put him in the booth for interrogations, this was made internally at Abu Ghraib. I don't know of anything from a regulatory perspective that prevents a screener that demonstrates superior skills from being used as an interrogator, but that is not the norm. I do know that he did have strategic debriefing training, but do not believe he was a formally trained interrogator.

Q: Are the strategic level interrogators at INSCOM and DHS military or civilian?

Military I think, at least predominantly.

Q: Do we have a DA Civilian population of interrogators?

We have a GS132 intel series; but they are generally not used/trained in that role to my knowledge. There may be some special program interrogators.

As an aside, HUMINT assets in the AC have been greatly depleted from the force structure. At Corps level, there is supposed to be a Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB) with an interrogation company. But most of the active Corps TEBs lost their interrogators. Only the 18th Airborne Corps retained theirs – the 519th MI. There is a lot of demand for tactical HUMINT operationally, but during force re-structuring, those Corps and below assets have often been used as bill payers.

Q: Does V Corps have an MP Brigade?

Yes, the 18th MP Brigade, but they were assigned and consumed by their mission of securing Baghdad. The 800th MP BDE was given the Abu Ghraib mission partly because they advertised their services in the detention ops unit, as far back as our initial planning process and performed this role during the ground war for CFLCC. Also, they were not a V Corps asset, they were retained by ARCENT.

I, [redacted] have read this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 7. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

[redacted]

(Signature of LTC [redacted]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16th day of July 2004 at



APO AE 09069 (HEIDELBERG, GE
(location)

[redacted]

(Typed name of Person Administering Oath)

10USC 1044(a) GCU CORPS OSJA
(Authority to Administer Oaths)

SUPV. ATTY

CJTF7-TF FAY

24 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Identification of CPT [redacted] 372nd MP Company, as the Individual Who Reportedly Assaulted an Iraqi Detainee at Abu Ghraib Hard Site on 24 November 2003

1. On 23 June 2004 [redacted] Article 15-6 Investigating Officer (MG Fay Inquiry), interviewed [redacted] SGT/E-5, USAR, 229th Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA, concerning the incident he reported to US Army Criminal Investigative Command on 20 January 2004, in which he observed a US Army soldier choking, dragging, and kicking an Iraqi detainee in the Hard Site of Abu Ghraib Detention Facility on or about 24 November 2003. At the time of the incident [redacted] identified the individual involved in the incident only as a soldier because the individual was not dressed in full military uniform and therefore [redacted] could not identify him by name or rank. Subsequent to the incident, [redacted] saw the individual again, this time in his full uniform with Captain's rank, but he did not see the Captain's name tag. [redacted] presented [redacted] nine photographs of US Army Captains who were assigned at Abu Ghraib at the time of the incident. The photographs were eight by ten inch color print outs of digital photographs obtained from the Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC) database. The photographs were presented to [redacted] randomly and without comment, other than instruction t[redacted] that he look carefully at the photographs to determine if any of them was the individual he observed choking and kicking the detainee at Abu Ghraib. All photographs were presented simultaneously and [redacted] was allowed to peruse and study them at his leisure [redacted] immediately and without hesitation identified [redacted] USAR, 372nd MP Company, as the individual who he had observed choking, dragging, and kicking a detainee at the Abu Ghraib Hard Site on or about 24 November 2003. After [redacted] identified CPT [redacted] from the nine photographs [redacted] asked [redacted] if he was sure of his choice, and [redacted] stated he was "absolutely sure." In his civilian profession [redacted] is a correctional professional employed by the State of Virginia. [redacted] executed DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, dated 23 June 2003, which stated the following:

"At approximately 1050 hrs on 23 June 2004 investigato[redacted] presented a line up of photo's (sic). After reviewing the photo's (sic) I identified [redacted] digital photo #244410378 as the individual as discribed (sic) in the statement dated 20 Jan 04. As a professional jailer for eleven years, the conduct and treatment of the prisoners were not to standards. I have nothing else to add at this time."

2. On 24 June 2004 [redacted] Article 15-6 Investigating Officer (MG Fay Inquiry), interviewed [redacted] SPC/E-4, USAR, 229th Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA, concerning the incident he reported to US Army Criminal Investigation Command on 20 January 2004, in which he observed a US Army soldier striking and kicking an Iraqi detainee in the Hard Site of Abu Ghraib Detention Facility on or about 24 November 2003. At the time of the incident [redacted] identified the individual involved in the

incident only as a soldier because the individual was not dressed in full military uniform and therefore [redacted] could not identify him by name or rank. Subsequent to the inciden[redacted] [redacted] saw the individual again, this time in his full uniform with Captain's rank, but he did not see the Captain's name tag. [redacted] resented [redacted] nine photographs of US Army Captains who were assigned at Abu Ghraib at the time of the incident. The photographs were eight by ten inch color print outs of digital photographs obtained from the Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC) database. The photographs were presented t[redacted] [redacted] randomly and without comment, other than instruction to [redacted] that he look carefully at the photographs to determine if any of them was the individual he observed striking and kicking the detainee at Abu Ghraib. All photographs were presented simultaneously and SPC [redacted] was allowed to peruse and study them at his leisure. [redacted] immediately and without hesitation identific[redacted] USAR, 372nd MP Company, as the individual who he had observed striking and kicking a detainee at the Abu Ghraib Hard Site on or about 24 November 2003. After [redacted] identified [redacted] from the nine photographs [redacted] [redacted] asked [redacted] if he was sure of his choice, an[redacted] stated that he was "100 percent sure." In his civilian profession, SPC is a detective for the Newport News, VA, Police Department. [redacted] executed DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, dated 24 June 2003, which stated the following:

"On June 24, 2004, I identified [redacted] from a photospread (sic) provided to me as being the unknown Captain described in my January 20, 2004 statement to CID [redacted] This is the Captain that I witness beating a prisoner inside the hard site in late November 2003. I have nothing further to add to this statement."

3. [redacted] was the Officer-in-Charge of the Hard Site facility at Abu Ghraib at the time of the incident on 24 November 2003.

4. [redacted] attorney-at-law, Law Offices o[redacted] [redacted] legal representative for [redacted] telephoned [redacted] [redacted] investigating officer (MG Fay Inquiry) on 9 June 2004, and notified [redacted] [redacted] wanted to cooperate with investigating officers, but that he would submit to an interview and make a statement only if granted immunity. MG Fay declined to accept [redacted] conditional offer to cooperate and no further effort has been made to interviev [redacted]

5. POC is the undersigned at (703) 428-4822

[redacted]

AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

Enclosures:
DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, dated [redacted] ecuted by [redacted]
DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, dated 24 Jun 04, executed by

[redacted]
DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement,
dated 20 Jan 04, executed by
[redacted]

DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement,
dated 20 Jan 04, executed by
[redacted]

MFR, dated 9 Jun 04, Subject: Procedure 15
Interview of CPT [redacted] USAR

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
[redacted] HOPEWELL, VA.	20040623 [redacted]	1125 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th MP Co. VIRGINIA BEACH, VA.

9.
[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

AT APPROXIMATELY 1050 HRS ON 23 JUNE 04 INVESTIGATOR [redacted] PRESENTED A LINE UP OF PHOTO'S. AFTER REVIEWING THE PHOTO'S I IDENTIFIED CAPTAIN [redacted] DIGITAL PHOTO [redacted] ~~WAS IDENTIFIED~~ AS THE INDIVIDUAL AS DESCRIBED IN THE STATEMENT DATED 20 JAN 04. HIS A PROFESSIONAL JAILER FOR ELEVEN YEARS THE CONDUCT AND TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS WERE NOT TO STANDARDS. I HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO ADD AT THIS TIME [redacted]

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

NOT [redacted] USED

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Haycell, Va. DATED [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Not [redacted]

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of June, 2004 at Haycell Va.

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Newport News, Virginia	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/06/24	3. TIME 0815	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS E-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229TH Military Police Co., Virginia Beach, Virginia

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On June 24, 2004, I identified Capt. [redacted] from a photospread provided to me as being the unknown Captain described in my January 20, 2004 statement to CID Agent [redacted] This is the Captain that I witnessed beating a prisoner inside the hard site in late November 2003. I have nothing further to add to this statement [redacted]

Nothing Follows [redacted]

Nothing [redacted]

Follows

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
[redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Newport News, VA DATED 200406 2[redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted]

Used

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24TH day of June, 2004 at Newport News, Virginia

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC. 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq	28 Jan 04	1919 [redacted]	0005-04-CID141-83131

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-5 / VANG

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th MP Co. , deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq

[redacted] want to make the following statement under oath:

Approximately 23 August 2003, I was assigned to the Internal Reaction Force. On various occasions the team is required to respond to various types of situations at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilance, and the Prison. Our mission is to quell inmate disturbances and to stand guard while the compound MP's search the inmates. In September Camp Vigilance was attacked by enemy mortar fire. Some soldiers were seriously injured. At approximately 2100hrs, IRF was called out to assist the QRF (Quick Reaction Force). Upon arrival at the south wall where the base exit is located, the team was staged approximately three hundred meters east of the exit where there were two GP medium tents set up. The QRF turned over two Iraqi citizens, one male and one female. I was told that the two suspects may know something about the mortar attack. [redacted] and a Sergeant Major was also present. I was assigned to look over the male suspect to await the Military intelligence personnel (MI). Before MI arrived I took my flashlight and shined it in the male suspects face. I wanted to see who I was guarding. The suspect appeared to be scared. At approximately 2115hrs, Military intelligence arrived to take over the suspects. An unknown person from MI went straight to the male suspect and started to yell profanity at the male. The MI person hit the male in the back of the head with a closed fist causing the suspect to fall forward. The suspect was handcuffed, on his knees and a towel wrapped around his head. The MI soldier kept yelling eyes down, get up while knocking the suspect back down and repeated verbal abuse towards the suspect. Another MI soldier came to assist the first MI soldier. The second MI soldier put an arm lock around the suspects neck pulling the suspect from the ground. While pulling the suspect from the ground by the neck, the MI soldier was twisting left and right yelling at the suspect while the first MI soldier struck the suspect in the mid section of the stomach. I [redacted] (IRF Commander) approached the soldiers and asked if this treatment was necessary. The MI soldier told the LT that he is a trained professional and to let him handle the situation. The LT reminded the soldiers that these suspects maybe innocent. The MI soldiers continued their verbal abuse and excessive force. [redacted] stated to the MI soldiers that this behavior is not necessary. The MI soldiers ignored the LT and continued to verbally abuse the suspect and drag the suspect off by the neck. The LT approached [redacted] and asked the Major if he was going to let this continue. The Major said nothing. The LT stated that he was not going to allow this abuse to continue. The LT went to the MI vehicle and wanted to know who was the NCOIC. I was then ordered back to the vehicle that I arrived in. There was a lot of loud talking between the [redacted] (IRF NCOIC) and the MI personnel. MI drove off with the suspects. This same night I wrote a statement on the events and turned them into [redacted] and [redacted]. In November at an unknown time and date, the IRF responded to the prison site because of a shooting. We were informed that an inmate shot a soldier. Our mission was to assist the guards in searching the prison for more weapons and the possibility of hand grenades. I assisted the dog handler Kimbro. During the [illegible] I saw a soldier dragging an inmate by a chucking [illegible] Captain [illegible] I then went to the top tear to assist searching rooms. On the top tear, I had a view of [illegible] the inmate against the wall. The inmate fell to the ground. The Captain began [illegible] the mid section yelling at the inmate. At this time I assisted [redacted] because [redacted] was asked to assist MI personnel to interrogate a prisoner [redacted] was instructed by MI to let the dog scare the inmate for some information. The MI person told [redacted] these different times to let the dog in on the

23 Aug ???
Sep 2003 - ??? [redacted]

Page 2 of 5

For Official Use Only

Enclosure 3

with the searches.

Q. Regarding the incident at the ECP, do you know if the situation was ever handled by unit personnel?

A. I was never present when the MI chain of command discussed the issue with [redacted] and [redacted] I was aware it happened, but not the outcome. I was told that I may be talked to about it, but to this date no one has approached me.

Q. Do you know who the MI personnel were?

A. No not at all. We tried to get a name, but were unsuccessful. Everyone one that was at the incident provided sworn statements, and are maintained with [redacted]

Q. Do you recall the date of the second incident?

A. It was the day all the riots occurred. There was a lot of rock throwing at the towers.

Q. Why were you called to the hard site?

A. Because of a shooting. We were briefed an inmate had shot a guard with a pistol. We were called to assist in the searching of the rooms for suspected grenades. We were working both sides of the wings upper and lower tiers.

Q. Where were you when you observed the CPT striking the detainee?

A. As I proceeded to the top tier, I observed this CPT with a chock hold on a detainee. He was dragging the detainee to the shower room on the lower level. I proceed to the upper tier, and observed the detainee come out from under the tier and the CPT approached him and kicked several times in the mid section. The detainee was screaming while this was going on. The CPT stated "you like hurting my soldiers". The kicks were full force into the detainee.

Q. Were their any other soldiers assisting with this assault?

A. No, not that I saw.

Q. Describe the detainee?

A. Approx 5'7, small frame, short dark hair, and a jump suit. The detainee being drug had a sandbag covering his head and I can not be for sure he is the same detainee being assaulted by the CPT. When he was in the shower room he was naked.

Q. What is the time frame between being drug to being kicked?

A. Approximately 10 minutes.

Q. Did you see anyone else assaulting this detainee?

A. No I heard people but did not see anything.

Q. Approximately how many people (soldiers) were in this area at the time of the incident?

A. I would say about 10.

Q. Describe the CPT?

A. About 5'8 5'9, white, thin but fit, athletic type, mid 30's, dirty blonde flat top style haircut clean cut. I was later told he was a CPT

Q. Have you this CPT since the incident?

A. Yes, at the chow hall

Q. Do you know his name?

A. No.
Q. Did you report this to anyone?
A. Yes, [redacted] We always have an AAR to discuss the mission.
Q. Do you know what actions he took after being notified?
A. No.
Q. Describe the incident with the K-9?
A. The MI person (tall, dark hair, possible Asian appearance) kept calling the K-9 handler and the K-9 into the cell. The MI stated to the K-9 handler to allow the dog into the cell as a method of obtaining information. The dog would go into the cell for about a minute, and then MI would call them out. I saw the dog during this strike the detainee. The detainee was bound and could not move, and the K-9 handler would allow the K-9 to approach within inches his face, and one time the dog bit the detainee's arm. When I saw the detainee later it appeared the detainee was bitten multiple times. The K-9 handler stated he did not think the dog could be used in this fashion and we departed the area. During the time I was in the cell the detainee never resisted. The MI was calling the dog into the cell as a scare tactic to gather information.
Q. Do you know if this was report to anyone?
A. Other than the AAR, I do not know.
Q. Has anyone approached you regarding this incident?
A. No, other than [redacted]
Q. Where did the dog bite the detainee?
A. Upper right arm.
Q. Do you know who the detainee was?
A. No
Q. Do you remember the cell this occurred in?
A. Wing 1A and it was either the second or third cell on the upper tier.
Q. Was there anyone else there that witnessed this incident?
A. A male interrogator, female interpreter and [redacted] (K-9 Handler).
Q. Describe the female interpreter?
A. Dark hair, shoulder length, and she was approximately 5'4, thin and possibly Iraqi.
Q. How many K-9 handlers were present on the Wing?
A. Just [redacted] There were two others on the other Wing.
Q. At any time did you observe the detainee resist the CPT?
A. I did not see any resistance, but I did not see the entire altercation.
Q. At any time did you see the detainee in the cell resist or provoke the K-9?
A. No, I did see the entire incident
Q. What was the MI interrogators reaction to the K-9 biting the detainee?
A. He did not seem concerned for the detainee, he entered the cell and continued his interrogation and again he would call the K-9 in. This went on approximately three times.
Q. Was medical aid rendered to the detainee?
A. At the time there was no medical attention. I know when the interpreter was bitten they attempted to get medical aid for her on the spot.

Initials [redacted]

For official use only

Q. Did you witness any further assaults this evening?
A. No.
Q. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?
A. No.///END OF STATEMENT///

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ABU GHRAIB PRISON, ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ	2004/01/20	1048	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
			SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229TH Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA (deployed to Abu Ghraib, Iraq)

9. I, _____ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the day in which the Abu Ghraib Prison saw the prisoners for the first time, I, as a member of the Internal Reaction Force for the prison, was on stand-by for any future incidents. On that night we were called and instructed to go to the hard site and assist the unit running it. No other information was known until we arrived and were briefed by a senior enlisted soldier. We were told that a prisoner had gained access to a handgun and had fired at an American guard. We were instructed that the unit responsible for the hard site wanted our unit to conduct a search of every cell. We entered through the north entrance of the hard site and went to the first bay on the left. We went immediately upstairs and began to search the cells. I was on the top deck with other members of my team when I heard a man screaming from the first deck. I was on the south side of the bay and I looked back to the northwest corner of the bay through the open center, and observed two soldiers and a prisoner. The prisoner was lying prone on his stomach, dressed in an orange jumpsuit, tie-cuffed behind his back with a sandbag over his head. The prisoner was not resisting in any way. One soldier was standing next to the left side of the prisoner's head with the barrell of his rifle pressed against the prisoner's head. I observed the other soldier kneeling next to the right side of the prisoner at approximately waist level. I observed this soldier begin to strike the prisoner in the small of the back with a closed fist. The soldier struck the prisoner approximately ten times. The soldier then stood up and kicked the prisoner in the right hip and right side approximately three times. I observed that this soldier was a white male with blond hair cut very close on the sides with a flat-top style on top. This soldier was wearing a solid olive-green vest with two pouches on the left and right sides at the rear, at the bottom of the vest. I [illegible] able to identify this soldier until I observed him several days later in the dining facility and saw that he was a Captain. I [illegible] able to recall the Captain's name. The other members of my team that were present during this incident were [redacted] and [redacted] have since returned to the [illegible]. All others are still assigned to the Internal Reaction Force, 229th MP Company.

Q: Do you know the date of the incident?
A: No sir. I do not. I believe it was in Nov 03.
Q: When were you assigned to the IRF?
A: Aug 03.
Q: Did you observe the detainee resisting at any time before, during or after the incident in question?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know who the soldier was with the weapon?
A: No, sir. He never looked up. I could not see his face.
Q: Can you describe the soldier with the weapon?
A: Other than white male, no sir.
Q: Was there any other soldiers observing this incident?
A: From my location I could not tell if anyone was observing what I saw.
Q: Did anyone from your team observe the incident?
A: I am not sure, sir.
Q: How long did the incident last?
A: No more than five minutes.
Q: What were you doing when this was going on?
A: Searching the south side of the second deck. I heard the screaming while conducting the searches. I looked down at the incident. I continued with the searches glancing down at the incident and at some point they had stripped the prisoner and moved him from my view.
Q: Did anyone say anything to this CPT?
A: Not that I saw.
Q: Did you report this to anyone other than this office?

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 | DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE | USAPA V1.00

For official use only

Exhibit 2

A. Not officially. I discussed it with certain members of the IRF as a whole.
Q. Was the CPT striking the detainee with an open or closed fist?
A. Closed fist.
Q. Did you see what led up to this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. Could you hear what was being said to the detainee?
A. No, sir.
Q Could you describe the detainee?
A. Male, dark hair and an orange jumpsuit.
Q. Where exactly was the detainee struck?
A. The detainee was struck in the small of the back by the CPT. He was using his right hand.
Q. After you finished your search did you see the detainee again?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see the CPT in the isolation area again?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you witnessed any other incidents of concern?
A. In September of 2003, when we first arrived at the prison complex, I observed that the prisoners at the compounds were receiving punishment in the way of being forced to kneel on gravel until their knees were bleeding. I stopped this punishment whenever I observed it and brought it to the attention of [redacted] the IRF commander. This type of punishment stopped. Also in September of 2003, I observed an MI soldier choke and strike a prisoner in the presence of [redacted]. This incident was reported to my chain of command. Sworn statements were written and presented to [redacted]. I heard nothing more from this incident.
Q Do you know what action was taken on the second incident?
A. I was not present when it was discussed. I heard that MI personnel came over and apologized for their actions.
Q. Have you heard of any other incidents of maltreatment towards the detainees?
A. The same night the CPT struck the detainee, I heard one of the navy dogs had bitten a prisoner that was flex-i-cuffed and was not resisting.
Q. Do you know who witnessed this incident?
A. [redacted] was the dog handler whose dogs bit the detainee.
Q. Do you know the details of this incident?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have anything else to add to your statement?
A. No, sir.///END OF STATEMENT///

Initials [redacted]

For Official Use Only

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Abu Ghraib Prison DATED 20 JAN 04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Jan 2004 at Abu Ghraib Prison Baghdad, Iraq

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ADJ, 15U, USARF

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

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09 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Procedure 15 Interview o[redacted]USAR

On 09 June 2004, [redacted] attorney contacted me reference an interview we had requested of [redacted] stated that [redacted] wanted to cooperate but that he would only do it if he was granted immunity. I relayed to [redacted] that MG Fay did not have the authority to grant immunity and that he would have to get in touch with the Staff Judge Advocate in Baghdad. He also wanted to know what we would ask him i[redacted] decided to speak to us. I told him that our focus was on military intelligence and that he did not have to answer all the questions we ask. Mr. Sheldon stated that he would have to discuss this with [redacted] I told him we could see him at anytime but that we needed to get it done soon. The latest would be on 14 June because we were trying to complete the report. [redacted] stated that he had to attend a hearing on Friday and that he would get back with me after he speaks to [redacted] I did not or have not heard from [redacted]

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Investigating Officer

[redacted]

June 4, 2004

ATTN: Major General George R. Fay
United States Army
Army Pentagon
VIA [redacted]

Via Facsimile Transmission to [redacted]

Subject: Scheduled Interview of [redacted] CAPT, USAR

Dear Sir,

This letter is to confirm the substance of our conversation today. You advised me that [redacted] has been removed from the witness list for tomorrow, June 5, 2004, and that he need not appear as previously directed

Again, we respectfully request that a member of your staff contact us on Monday to discuss this matter. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

Very respectfully,

[redacted]

By [redacted]

Copy to:

[redacted]



FAX NUMBER: [redacted]

DATE: June 4, 2004

OF PAGES: This cover plus 1 page(s)

FROM: [redacted]

COMMENT: PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] USAR

The information contained in this telefacsimile message is transmitted by an attorney. It is privileged and confidential, intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copy of this communication is strictly prohibited. If this communication has been received in error, please notify us immediately by telephone, collect if necessary, and return the original message to us at the above address via the US Postal Service (we will reimburse postage). Thank you.

Please contact [redacted] if you do not receive all pages.

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 3 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Detainee Inprocessing Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 3 June 2004, the undersigned and [redacted] met with [redacted] SFC, USA; NCOIC, Detainee Inprocessing Facility, Bahgdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), Iraq to determine the number of detainees inprocessed into and released from the BCCF.

2. (FOUO) [redacted] provided the daily number of detainees inprocessed into, released from, and transferre out of BCCF between 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004. The results are attached as an enclosure.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

ENCL (3)

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 4 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Change Sheet Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 4 June 2004, the undersigned met with following individuals concerning Change Sheet records; [redacted] SFC, USA; NCOIC, Detainee Inprocessing Facility; Bahgdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), and [redacted] 1LT, USA; assigned to the S1, 391st Military Police Battalion. Both individuals indicated that the Change Sheets records were perishable, that is, the documents are not stored after use. The Change Sheets are filled out whenever a detainee is moved from one location in the facility to another, the moves are then annotated on the Change Sheets. There are so many generated that they are destroyed when completely full. There are no Change Sheets available during the time frame of 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq	12 June 2004	1330 hrs	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]		SPC/USA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I reviewed several photographs of the alleged detainee abuse at Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq and was able to identify the following individuals assigned to the 372nd Military Police. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts a Titan linguist whose first name is [redacted]. I do not recall his last name. The individual on the right is [redacted]. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted]. Photograph labeled [redacted] depicts [redacted] standing to the right of the dog handler in a tan cap. [redacted] is standing to the left of the detainee. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: No. /

END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.10

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] . HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths this 12th day of June, 19 04 at Building B30, Camp Victory, Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

USAPPC V1.10

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
151 Horizon Ridge Parkway, Henderson, NV	2004/06/06	1534	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	O-2/USAR

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
72nd Military Police Company, 992nd Troop Command, Army National Guard

[redacted] 9. I [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 23 May 03 to 4 Nov 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG). I was a Platoon Leader responsible for daytime guard operations. The 320th MP's and 519th MI arrived circa the end of August. MP techniques for control of detainees relied on internal (detainee) control. We would identify the apparent leader or someone with a good command of English within each cell group and make them responsible for maintaining order and translating. This procedure worked very effectively but in cases where a detainee still failed to cooperate we would employ isolation to encourage cooperation. I do not know specifically what the MI authorities were for interrogations. Early after their arrival, MI conducted interrogations in tents in Camp Vigilant. The interrogations were readily visible. I observed MI use some stress positions to include detainees holding their arms out for extended periods, keeping them in the sun or having them kneel on the ground. Later on, MI moved their detainees into the hard site (Tier 1A). As part of my daily routine I walked through Tier 1A at least two times a day to check on operations. I never observed or heard of any detainee being abused. Detainees were never forced to remove their clothing. I never observed photos being taken. I did hear about an incident that occurred at Camp Bucca involving the 320th MPs. Supposedly four of their soldiers had been brought up on charges for detainee abuse. I had no further knowledge of this incident but the 320th did have a reputation for harsh treatment of detainees. During our transition of responsibility for Abu Ghraib (as part of my in-brief for incoming 320th personnel) I explained that we didn't tolerate abuse of the detainees. Regardless of their reputation I was fairly confident they would do a professional job after our departure.
Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A: No.
//NOTHING FOLLOWS//[redacted]

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004

at Henderson, Nevada

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

CJTF7- TF FAY 27 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of SPC [redacted]

1. On 27 May 200[redacted] and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] SPC/E-4, US Army Reserve, MOS 97E (Human Intelligence Collector/Interrogator), 98th Division (Institutional Training), with duty as an instructor at the Reserve Center in Colchester, VT; previously assigned to B Company, 325th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility, Iraq. [redacted] was interviewed regarding HIS knowledge of possible MI personnel involvement in Detainee abuses or unauthorized interrogation practices at AG as part of an AR 15-6 Inquiry. Approximately fifteen minutes into the interview, [redacted] made statements that led MG Fay to believe that [redacted] may have been personally involved in detainee abuse, and violation of provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the existing Intelligence Rules of Engagement (IROE) at AG. MG Fay stopped the interview and read [redacted] HIS rights under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and informed [redacted] that HE was suspected of the violations annotated above. After hearing HIS rights and the charges of which HE was suspected, [redacted] invoked HIS rights under UCMJ, stated that HE did not want to be questioned or say anything further, and requested a military lawyer to represent HIM. Prior to invoking HIS rights, [redacted] stated, in essence, the following information:

a. [redacted] was mobilized for duty as a 97E for duty in Iraq and was cross-leveled and assigned to the 325th MI BN, initially stationed at Camp Cropper and then AG Detentions Facilities. On 15 Sep 03 [redacted] arrived at AG and was assigned to an interrogation "Tiger Team". [redacted] (female interrogator) was HIS team leader, [redacted] was HIS team's analyst, and a female identified only as [redacted] was the Titan contract interpreter/translator (I/T) for HIS team. Sometime during HIS first week at AG (15 to 20 Sep 03), [redacted] read the [redacted] and signed that HE understood its contents, but HE did not receive an oral briefing on the IROE. Shortly after the mortar attack on 20 Sep 03, [redacted] moved from the Interrogation Tiger Team to the Screening Cell. During HIS short time on the Tiger Team, [redacted] BRUTTOMESSO conducted approximately six interrogations, all but one being in the AG interrogation tents. HE participated in one interrogation of a detainee in Cell Block 1A in the AG "hard site". Other than this interrogation, HE was only in the hard site on two or three occasions while HE was assigned to the Screening Cell and escorted detainees to the hard site

b. On a specifically unrecalled date while HE was assigned to the Interrogation Tiger Team (15 Sep to shortly after 20 Sep 03), [redacted] participated in a nighttime interrogation of a detainee in Cell Block 1A. HE could not recall the detainee's name, but HE described the detainee as a suspected "foreign terrorist", approximately 17 years old. [redacted] the team leader, was the lead interrogator for the interrogation and [redacted] was the I/T. The detainee was naked when the Tiger Team arrived at his cell. All the Military Police (MP) in the area at the time were males. As the team was entering the area of the interrogation [redacted] informed SPC [redacted] that the detainee they were about to interrogate was naked. HE was unsure if [redacted] was simply passing along that fact because the MPs had informed as such, or because she had directed the MPs to strip the detainee. [redacted] recalled seeing "some" other detainees naked, but that the majority of the detainees were clothed. HE did not know who was approving the pracuce of striping detainees. [redacted] stated that, at the time of the interrogation, HE "didn't remember the part about humiliation (of detainees) in the Geneva Convention", and it was not until HE saw the news over the week preceding this interview that HE realized that what HE did "could be considered wrong" The interrogation began in the detainee's cell, but due to the small area, the interrogation was moved out of the cell into an open area at the end of the Cell Block 1A tier. The detainee had fashioned an empty "Meals-Ready-to-Eat" (MRE) bag to cover his genital area. Someone on the interrogation team then instructed the inmate to raise HIS hand to his sides, and when he did so the bag fell to the floor exposing him. [redacted] could not recall if HE or [redacted] gave the detainee the order to raise his hands

2. At this point, MG Fay halted the interview and read [redacted] HIS rights, which HE immediately invoked [redacted] was provided the name and placed in contact with [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] Trial Defense Service attorneys. [redacted] gave [redacted] a photocopy of HIS signed DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate, so HE could provide it to HIS attorney.

3. POCs ar[redacted] or the undersigned a[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigating Officer

CJTF7- TF FAY 28 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Declination of Further Statements by [redacted]

1. Reference, Memorandum, CJTF7- TF FAY, dated 27 May 2004, SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

2. On 28 May 2004, at 1040 hours, [redacted] CPT, USAR, Team 18, Trial Defense Service (TDS), 154th Legal Support Organization (LSO), Boston, MA, telephone numbe[redacted] defense attorney representing [redacted] SPC/E-4, US Army Reserve, MOS 97E (Human Intelligence Collector/Interrogator), 98th Division (Institutional Training), with duty as an instructor at the Reserve Center in Colchester, VT; previously assigned to B Company, 325th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility, Iraq; officially informed MG George Fay, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer, that [redacted] had invoked HIS right under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and declined to make any further statements to Investigating Officers.

3. POCs are [redacted] at [redacted] r the undersigned a[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center	2004.06.05 [redacted]	1505 hours [redacted]	

5. LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SSG/E6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Correction Facility, Iraq

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] reviewed various photographs of the alleged detainee abuses and identified the following: In the photograph labeled [redacted], the male with brown hair, desert camouflage trousers, brown t-shirt standing in the foreground on the right was [redacted] First Name Unknown, SPC/E-4, who served as either an interrogator or analyst. In photograph 3b8h8bada0ae4d6ffdbe291e523fdb9.jpg, the male with black shirt, standing in the background and leaning towards a detainee, was a CACI contractor that went by the nickname [redacted] I believe his name was either [redacted] In photograph labeled [redacted] the male in a black shirt was also [redacted] In photograph labeled [redacted] the male on the left in a black shirt was also [redacted] In photograph labeled [redacted] the male in the black top was also [redacted] Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement? A: No. [redacted] ----END OF STATEMENT----

NOT USED

10. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____, DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH SUCCEEDING PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 (DA FORM 2823, APR 72, IS OBSOLETE) APD PE v1.00

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT JIDC, BCCF, Iraq DATED 2004/06/05

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

[redacted]

NOT USED

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE [redacted] AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 05 day of June 2004

at JIDC, BCCF, Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136 (b)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

AG0000713

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27[redacted]	1320[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib on 5 October 2003 as an analyst. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, [redacted] the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center Commander gave all new arrivals a down and dirty on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement, some Force Protection issues, the mission of the JIDC. We all signed the the IROE. We were also briefed on how to handle and escort detainees. There was no doubt in my mind on what constituted abuse of detainees. I do remember receiving some training on the Geneva Convention sometime during the first week. I personally read it as a refresher for me. I really do not know who was in charge overall of Abu Ghraib. In November 2003, COL PAPPAS, 205th MI BDE took charge of Abu Ghraib. The MPs were running their own thing before then. They were receiving guidance form BG KARPINSKI. Once COL PAPPAS arrived, things did change. For one thing, MI was now running security type tasks. I don't feel MI should be running the Camp when the majority of the tasks were Force Protection. MI personnel are not trained to conduct Force Protection. COL PAPPAS did a lot for what he knew. Prior to his arrival, things were a cluster. The MP units didn't even coordinate with one another. When problems occurred, I took them to the JIDC Commander. [redacted] would then take it to [redacted] took care of all troops. I never witnessed any detainee being abused. I did see other type of mistreatment. That mistreatment was when [redacted] has stripped a detainee of all his clothing. [redacted] the analyst on her team should have stopped it. I reported the incident to CID. Another person who might know about the incident is [redacted] 470TH MI. There was an interrogation that I felt was on the border line of approved techniques. I found out by the Interrogation Control Element Chief that the technique had been approved by LTG SANCHEZ. I didn't hear any rumors on detainee abuse until the investigation with CID began. I heard there were some photos reference detainee abuse but I never saw them. I once saw a detainee with a cut across his forehead. I asked the MPs what happened and they stated the detainee was resisting going in the cell and the detainee hit his head as he was being forced in the cell.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ *TAKEN AT* _____ *DATED* _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 | DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE | USAPA V1.00

Nothing

Follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 OF 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of APRIL, 2004

at ABU GHRAIB

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 [redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

1. On 2 June 2004 [redacted] and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] SGT/E-5, US Army, 42nd Military Police Detachment, 16th MP Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, NC, as part of an AR 15-6 Inquiry into possible Military Intelligence involvement in detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility, Iraq. The purpose of the interview was to obtain [redacted] assistance in identifying unidentified individuals in photographs taken at AG and to further identify possible instances of MI involvement in detainee abuse.

2. [redacted] was unable or unwilling to identify any individuals in the photographs shown to HIM. Further, [redacted] stated that HE would not answer any questions. [redacted] was then dismissed without HIM making any statement.

3. POCs are [redacted] at [redacted] or the undersigned at [redacted]

[redacted]

AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/0[redacted]	1750[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police Company

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib in mid October 2003. Initiislly, I was assigned to Tier 2 where the Iraqi to Iraqi criminals were kept. I had about 140 detainees per tier for an average of 280 inmates in Tier 2. I worked the night shift with the Iraqi Correction Officers (ICO). The NCOIC[redacted] or [redacted] (accodring to the schedule) of the Hard Site would walk around and check on us. To my knowledge, I did not witness any detainee abuse by MP or MI. I had no prior knowledge of any photos or videos of detainees noting abusive behavior. The staff of the Military Intelligence Office or their contractors did not instruct me to abuse inmates. There was san incident were an MI official told me to take one blanket away from a detainee and this was resolved by inmates receiving a standard issue of clothing and linen that no staff member have the authority to remove to ensure cooperation. I advised MI staff that any requests concerning their detainess was placed in writing. On Thanksgiving Eve, I was called over and was told that a detainee had mentioned someone had a gun inside the area. I had [redacted] (Level II Interpreter) to assist with questioning #151365 (detainee with information). After asking several questions to the detainee, we identified the individual with the gun. I sent information up my chain of command. The individual with the gun later told CID that he was going to use the gun to kill [redacted]. K-9 was present the night of Thanksgiving Eve 2003 wereas a detainee had a handgun. In this situation, the dogs were not used to interrogate but search for the detection of a bomb and/or other contraband. After the shooting incident, all Tier 1-A detainess were handcuffed to the cell doors and an inspection team removed the detainess one by one, using the K-9 to check inside each cell. After nothing was found, the handcuffs were taken away. Sometime during the early December 2003, I was assigned to Tier 1.As far as clothing, there was a shortage of supplies. I brought in some care packets and so did some other soldiers. I informed the chain of command and battalion that our priority was the health of the detainees. Afterwards, a supply system was established. There were some detainees who were naked but they had mental problems whereas they would take their own clothes off. CW2 [redacted] informed me to make sure detainees were not naked and that males were not in panties. When I was in charge of the tier detainess were in appropriate clothing. I would go look for clothing at Camp Vigilant because they had more supplies than we did. The only thing I could say about interrogations is that MI would come get the detainee and take them to the stairs. If we hear something, I would go down and investigate to ensure the safety of the staff. I encountered no incidents while MI interrogated detainess in the MI wing. There was a problem with detainees being held in the isolation for more than 30 days. LTG SANCHEZ policy was that no detainee would be held for more than 30 days without an extension. I would identify those beyond 30 days and provide their names to MI for a status. The MI Operations Chief worked on this list until the detainess over 30 days were resolved or an extension was granted; however, sometimes this took longer than 30 days.Once the new MI unit arrived, things got better. They were more responsive to the 30 day limit of detainees in isolation. OGA (Other Government Agency) detainees were brought in prior to the 504th MI Brigage. These individuals did not go through processing and were housed in Tier 1 awaiting disposition. There was one incident that I recall of an OGA being brought in at night. I was not assigned to Tier 1 and have limited information on this detainee. This detainee died at the facility. CID conducted an investigation on this incident and I am not aware of the outcome. When the 504th MI Brigage took over MI responsibilities for Tier 1, everyone was processed to include OGA.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] | PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 OF. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004

at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

AG0000718

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2005/05/1[redacted]	174[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

6. SSN: [redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
302nd Military Intelligence Battalion, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib around the 26th of October 2003. I am a 96H and my duty at Abu Ghraib was intelligence analyst. When we first arrived at Abu Ghraib, we were given a tour of the site, CAMP Vigilant, CAMP Ganci, and the Isolation Area. We were also tolde about the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) which were posted on the wall. We signed the IROEs as well. The analyst were given a class on the database. There was no doubt in my mind that I could not abuse a detainee or physically touch a detainee. The closes thing to detainee abuse I observed was making the detainees do PT. I knew we could not take photos of the detainees or take cameras in the Hard Site. I worked during the day and that's when I would go to the Hard Site (Tier 1 A and B). My immediate supervisor was [redacted]. The interpreter I usually worked with was [redacted] and [redacted]. I never witnessed or was aware of anyone abusing detainees. I never saw dogs being used or knew of anyone who used dogs during interrogations. We requested the use of dogs for one of our interrogations and even though it was approved, we did not use the dog because our focus had changed. I did hear that the dog had bitten the Iranian detainee when the Iranian moved toward the dog. (This is only hearsay) Detainees in Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci wore their civilian clothes. Those in Isolation wore jumpsuits. There was one individual (I heard this and id not witness it) who wore women's underwear. This individual was the Iranian detainee. This detainee was very rude toward women. I sat in one of his interrogations where he threatened to rape me. I had to sit there for hours and pretent it didn't bother me. He played the Crazy Guy. I never heard or had knowledge of any MI personnel tell MPs to "soften-up" or give "the treatment" to detainees to prepare them for interrogations. I never saw any or knew of any photos or videos of detainees. The relationship between the Camp Ganci MPs and MI was not good. The MPs were cocky and they did not want to search our detainees when we took them to Camp Ganci.

Q. Is there anything else you want to add to this statement?

A. No[redacted]

//End of Statement//[redacted]

Follows

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11TH day of MAY, 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2005/05/1[redacted]	3. TIME [redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
302nd Military Intelligence Battalion, Heidelberg, Germany APO AE 09102

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I never told [redacted] that the MPs had told the MI soldiers that we could do anything we wanted with the detainees. I do know that some of the MI soldiers were allowed to select what exercise to have the detainees do next.
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. No
//End of Statement//

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11TH day of MAY, 2004 at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, VA	2004/05/[redacted]	1345 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E5

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Detachment, 500th MI Group, Camp Zama, JA 96338 Deployed to Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) circa 18-20 October 03 and remained there until I went on emergency leave on 10 Feb 04. The end of my emergency leave was so close to my rotation date I was told to report back to my permanent duty station in Japan rather than return to Iraq. I was placed on a new detail back to Iraq on 10 May 04 and that is my current duty station. While at AG from October 03 to Feb 04 I had a series of duty assignments of approximate four weeks duration each. These duty assignments were to screening, document exploitation, detainee transfer, tiger team and detainee assessment board. Ihave no first hand knowledge nor have I heard about any instances of detainee abuse or humiliation, any instance of detainees having to wear women's underwear or clothing, or use of dogs. While assigned to AG I did not see or become aware of any unauthorized photos, film clips or videos of detainees. While assigned to docex I routinely handled authorized photographs of detainees and other types of photographs that were seized by maneuver elements during combat operations. If I had observed or become aware of any unauthorized activities I would have reported them to my first line supervisor, CID or the JAG. Q. Is there anything else you would like to add? A. No [redacted]
//End of Statement//

Nothing follows [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of May 2004, at Metro Park Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

MAKING STATEMENT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia [redacted]	2004/06/01	[redacted] 1626 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		LTC/O-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
115th Military Police Battalion, Salisbury, Maryland

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] currently the Commander of the 115th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN), Salisbury, MD, and was the Commander during the 115th deployment to Iraq. We mobilized for Operation Iraqi Freedom on 10 Feb 03 and arrived at our Mobilization Station at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD 16 Feb 03, and deployed via Kuwait arriving at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on or about 23 Apr 03. The 115th MP BN mission was to establish a "Special Prison/Confinement Facility" (SP/CF) capable of holding 100 High Value Detainees (HVDs) in isolation at Camp Cropper on BIAP. We later assumed a second mission of running a Corps Holding Area as the 3rd MP BN was preparing to depart BIAP. With the exception of a two week period when I was detailed to Abu Ghraib (AG), I remained at Camp Cropper until I departed for Kuwait in late Nov en route to the US. Camp Cropper was a split operations facility. The SP/CF occupied the end of Cropper near the west perimeter of BIAP, with only a garbage dump between the SP/CF and the perimeter wall surrounding BIAP. The SP/CF had four buildings, three of which were divided into 42 cells each. It was surrounded by triple strand concertina wire and had manned guard towers. The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) also brought in a number of trailers where they ended up doing interrogations. The Corps Holding Area (CHA) occupied the other end of Cropper, about 300 to 350 meters from the SP/CF, and was divided into numerous smaller compounds with a "GP Large" tent in each. The CHA was encircled with triple strand concertina wire, with double strand wire dividing each of the smaller compounds. There was a large warehouse in which medical, SJA, and other in-processing and support functions were located. The 325th MI BN eventually set up six segregation booths in one corner of the warehouse. We were tasked to build the CHA to house 200 detainees, but we built it to hold 250. At its most crowded, there were approximately 1,100 detainees in the CHA. From May through October 2003, over 10,800 detainees were processed through Camp Cropper. The CHA was closed in early Oct 03, when operations were consolidated at AG. The interrogation elements of the 519th MI BN were located at Cropper and I understood their mission to be interrogation operations to obtain tactical intelligence in the CHA, and not in the SP/CF. [redacted] along with an E-7 NCOIC whose name I can not recall, constituted the MI leadership at Cropper. Eventually, B Company, 325th MI BN [redacted] Commander) took over operations from the 519th, when the 519th moved to AG. While at Camp Cropper, I never saw any interrogations taking place. I never saw, nor heard of, any detainee abuse by MI personnel at Camp Cropper, nor observed or heard of any unauthorized interrogation techniques. I am aware of two incidents regarding detainee abuse. One incident involved a soldier [redacted] under my command. He was accused of urinating on a detainee who was awaiting in-processing. The incident was investigated by [redacted] of the 800th MP Brigade, and he recommended that [redacted] be court martialed. The 377th Theater Support Command (TSC) JAG told the 800th MP BDE JAG [redacted] to give the soldier a Field Grade Article 15, instead of pursuing court martial, which I did. The second incident regarded a detainee returned to the SP/CF by Task Force 20. The detainee was bruised over a large portion of his body. I reported the incident to the 10th MP Bn (CID). I did not hear the outcome of their investigation. I never saw, nor heard of, any detainees being stripped or held naked. I never saw or heard of any unauthorized photographs or videos of detainees. In fact, I issued Special Order #1 which prohibited taking photographs of detainees and of security measures within Camp Cropper. I had never used the term "ghost detainee", but I vaguely recall that OGA had expressed an interest in placing some of their detainees in Cropper without being in-processed, but I argued against that practice, because the detainees would not have been officially in-processed and accounted for. I can not recall any specific instances where such detainees were admitted into the Army system at Camp Cropper, but it is possible. The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) did bring in a number of trailers into the SP/CF where they ended up doing interrogations, but I was not privy to those interrogations. A couple of times, I also went into the six segregation booths the 325th had set up, and I never saw any problems. Initially, the CHA at Cropper was the only place in Baghdad where detainees could be held. The 3rd Infantry Division Commander, MG BLOUNT wanted to get the looting in Baghdad (3rd ID AOR) under control and there was a large effort to round up looters. The population at Cropper began to mushroom as we were receiving upwards of 100 criminal detainees per day. MG BLOUNT had ordered that looters be held for 21 days and then released, but the number of incoming detainees far exceeded the number of outgoing. As the population steadily increased, the need for more space was identified. The search began for new prison space, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was also involved. A small office of the Prison Bureau evaluated several former regime prisons, but apparently none were [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 30 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/06/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

deemed adequate. AG was identified as the largest facility available that hadn't been completely looted or destroyed for establishment of a large detention facility. AG was the only site identified that was surrounded by a wall which would provide protection for the detainees against direct fire. I was generally involved in discussions about looking for new, larger detention facilities, but I was not involved in the decision-making. I recall that BG KARPINSKI (800th MP BDE Commander), [redacted] (800th MP BDE Deputy Commander [redacted] (18th MP BDE Commander) [redacted] (400th MP BN Commander) and CPA Bureau of Prisons personnel were all involved in discussions related to the consolidation of detention operations at AG. I do not recall any MI involvement in these discussions, and I don't know who made the final decision on the matter. The 72nd MP Company, 400th MP BN, was the first MP unit to arrive at AG. I cannot remember the timeframe. In addition to the AG detention facility, the 400th also had the responsibility for a few smaller jails downtown that had come on line. I remained at Cropper at this time, but I did not hear of any instances of detainee abuse at AG. I do not remember when the 320th MP BN arrived at AG. On 17 Oct 03, BG KARPINSKI called me into her office and told me that the Commander of the 320th MP BN [redacted] was "overwhelmed", and that she was putting him in a deputy commander of the 800th role. I was under the impression that she was searching for a new battalion commander for the 320th. She said I would "fill in" at AG for no more than two weeks. I never received any written orders appointing me to AG, and she was not very specific when we talked, so I'm not quite sure what my official role was. I arrived at AG on 18 Oct and departed on 31 Oct 03, when [redacted] returned to AG. [redacted] commander. While I was at AG, my XO ran the 115th. He was never appointed as comm under either. [redacted] never ceased being the 320th commander, just as I never ceased being the 115th's commander. The troops loved [redacted] in fact they called him "Dad" behind his back. Their morale was fairly low. None of my own staff, nor any of my soldiers were with me at Abu Ghraib, although I asked my Executive Officer and S-2 to go there for a day to help me assess the security posture, which they did. I do not remember the date they were there. When I arrived at AG, my first priority was Force Protection. The 320th MP BN was tasked for both detainee operations and perimeter security. I had discussions with [redacted], and then COL PAPPAS, about having MI soldiers augment the MPs on perimeter security. Internal security was my biggest concern, because there were numerous local national contractors (food deliveries, sewage removal, construction workers, etc.) present in large numbers and were generally not monitored closely enough due to a lack of manpower. I recommended to the 320th to improve this situation by tightening up the access roster, working with the S-2 to implement a better accountability/badge system, and worked with the MI screeners to get a better handle on contractors coming into the facility. While at AG, the International Committee Red Cross (ICRC) provided a verbal back brief, which I attended. I never saw any ICRC written product. The ICRC briefed that generally things at AG seemed to be fine, commenting that the detainees were receiving adequate food and water. An ICRC doctor then briefed that he was concerned that there were a few detainees in the hard site that appeared to have psychological problems, having provided "abnormal responses", and that they should be evaluated. He also said that some of the detainees had alleged that they had been hand-cuffed to their cell doors while they were naked. Some detainees had claimed that they had been made to wear underwear on their heads, and one claimed he was forced to wear female underwear. There was an additional complaint of "sleep deprivation", but the circumstances were not clarified or expanded upon. The ICRC [redacted] Prior to the meeting I briefed [redacted] regarding the detainee allegations the ICRC had brought out. Out in the hallway after the Integration Committee meeting I told [redacted] of the 205th MI BDE [redacted] with BG KARPINSKI and [redacted] (800th MP BDE S-3) [redacted] There were others present when I told them, although I can not recall if there was any other MI presence besides [redacted] While at AG, I never saw, nor heard of, any detainee abuses other than what was briefed by the ICRC. I never saw, nor heard of, any unauthorized interrogation techniques, [redacted] I never heard of any incidents involving the use of military working dogs to support interrogation operations. I never saw, nor heard of, any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. No one ever asked me, or anyone else of which I am aware, to "soften up" a detainee, or "give the treatment" or any words to that effect. The only time I ever heard a statement similar to that was when MG MILLER (CG, Guantanomo Bay detention facilities) was conducting his assistance visit at Camp Cropper and mentioned that the MPs should help "set the conditions for successful interrogations" by having the HVDs moved only in five-point restraints. The HVDs had not been moved in restraints up to that point, and after discussion with the CG, ISG (MG DAYTON), we never did use the restraints, as the treatment the detainees received at the SP/CF was appropriate to their age (average age > 61) and former status. I understand that I am not to discuss any details of this AR 15-6 inquiry with anyone other than my legal counsel and investigating officers that I know are associated with the inquiry. I have nothing further to add to this statement. [redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

NOT USED [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

19. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted]

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

[redacted]

National Guard Bureau

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1st day of June, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BLDG AT-5636 Gorham St. Fort Bragg, NC 28310	2004/06/04	1700 hours	-
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
			SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

9.
I, , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) with the advanced party at the end of July 2003. I am an interrogator with A Company, 519th MI Bn, 525th MI BDE. My job for the first week or so was to set up tents and computer systems for operations and help establish living quarters. After the camp was set up, my duties shifted to developing and maintaining a database which tracked all detainee interrogations performed by my unit. CW2 was very familiar with the database. During my time at AG, I conducted only 5 or 6 interrogations. Initially, the prison was set up into two areas separated by a cinder-block wall. Military Police (MP) managed the detainees on both sides, while our unit interrogated the detainees only in one side of the prison (where fewer detainees were held). Operations and quarters for the Trojan Spirit operators were in tents up until the mortar attack of 20 Sep 2003, after which operations moved into hardened structures and the Trojan spirit operators moved into our living quarters. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) was set up at the end of Sept or early Oct with the arrival of reserve or national guard elements and the 205th MI BDE. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) were very clear and well known by all interrogators. Prior to the IROE's approval by Combined Joint Task Force 7, my unit instructed us to be extremely conservative in interrogation roles and techniques. I signed acknowledgement statements stating I had read and understood the IROE on at least one occasion. and CW2 had a large role in developing the IROE because of their experience in interrogation operations in Afghanistan. The IROE for Iraq was very similar to the one used in Afghanistan. The Iraq IROE was more detailed and specific than that used in Afghanistan. The IROE required that specific approval had to be obtained for certain more aggressive interrogation techniques. I do not remember specifically which techniques required the approval process. All interrogation plans were submitted to the interrogation team leaders, and if necessary, to CW2 or . The interrogation plans and interrogation approaches requests were not maintained in the database. After the command elements of the 519th MI Bn left, was in charge of the facility reported directly to COL PAPPAS who arrived at AG in late Oct or early Nov 2003. After this change in command, and a visit by LTG SANCHEZ, there was much more pressure to produce more reports. There was also a tendency by officers to micromanage our interrogations and an increase in superfluous paperwork. During Oct 2003, I did not notice any differences in the actions of the MPs towards detainees. If anything, the MPs made things easier for the detainees, providing them with catered meals and opportunities to play sports in the facility. I never witnessed nor heard of detainee abuse or mistreatment by MPs. I never witnessed or heard of the use or requested use of guard dogs by MPs or interrogators. Guard dogs were used, unmuzzled, but leashed along with loud music, as an intimidation means during detainee inprocessing in Afghanistan. The dogs were not used during subsequent interrogations. I never witnessed or heard of Military Intelligence (MI) personnel requesting MPs to abuse detainees. I never witnessed or heard of MPs offering to abuse detainees on behalf of MI. I never witnessed or heard of unauthorized photography taking place at AG. We were specifically told that only during screening operations were photographs to be taken of the detainees. We could not and did not take photographs of detainees or their living tents or in the cell blocks where detainees were held. The difference in our operation in Afghanistan and our operation in Iraq was primarily the number of detainees. In Afghanistan, the low number of detainees allowed us to interrogate each detainee at least two to three times and in some cases, up to 70. Also, in Afghanistan, the low number of detainees allowed the MPs to effectively control and prohibit communication between detainees. In Iraq, the large number of detainees combined with the few number of MPs affected their management. The MPs were unable to effectively enforce detainee segregation and silence. At AG, detainees were strip searched and medically screened upon entrance to the facility. Outside this, I never witnessed nor heard of detainees being forced to distrobe. I never witnessed nor heard of detainees wearing female undergarments. I was told that the contract interpreter, was a great interpreter. I was acquainted with him and had several discussions with him but never about specific interrogations or detainee operations. I left AG on 16 December 2003.////////////

[redacted]

NOT

[redacted] [redacted]

USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ ~~OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME~~ THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 1 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 391st Military Police Battalion Records Check

1. (FOUO) At 1528 hours, 1 June 2004, the undersigned and [redacted] met with [redacted] MAJ, USA; S3, 391st Military Police (MP) Battalion, Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq to obtain MP logs concerning the transfer of detainees between MP and Military Intelligence control. [redacted] advised that 391st MP BN do not have any logs prior to 11 February 2004. He added that the previous MP unit most likely destroyed or took their logs with them when they departed.

2. (FOUO) We also reviewed the 391st MP BN computer files to located electronic records concerning the movement of detainees and allegded detainee abuse. This review produced no records.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/06/08	13:30 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		SFC/E7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
365 MI COMPANY, BRISTOL, PA 19007

[redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] I am a member of the 365th MI Company, but when I was activated, I was cross leveled to B Co,325 MI Bn. From May to Sep 03 I was assigned at a Platoon Sergeant in the 325TH at BIAP, mostly working LSA issues (finance, billeting, supply, evaluations, etc) for the interrogation personnel as we really had no support structure. (Interrogators under me included [redacted] I also worked with [redacted] I moved to Camp Victory and was assigned to the 205th Headquarters, in the S5 shop as an LNO, working for [redacted] (S-3) and [redacted] (S3 Ops SGM), supporting various Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). Starting in Sep most of the interrogators under me moved to AG, the remainder occasionally visited AG but were not assigned there. The ones that moved were [redacted] sure. Two personnel who may have some knowledge of activities at AG from the Nov 03 to March 04 time frame would be the acting Company Commander, [redacted] and the acting ISG, [redacted] due to their occasional visits to AG. During the period from mid-December 03 until late Feb 04, I was assigned as a liaison officer between the Bde S-3 shop and Abu Ghraib (AG). During that time I continually went back and forth between Camp Victory and AG, sometimes spending a couple of days or more at AG at any one time. Previously, I had occasional visits to the actual detention facility there, escorting COL Pappas, but did not work there. During mid-December, I was assigned duty to escort a Red Cross Inspection Team consisting of 4 or 5 males and one female. One of the male Red Cross visitors was a doctor. One or two of the males had previously inspected AG earlier that year and [redacted] During the Sep to Dec time frame when I made periodic visits I would see some of my former interrogators who had moved to AG - none of them ever mentioned abuse or humiliation of detainees, unauthorized photos or videos, use of dogs or any questionable interrogation practices such as stripping detainees, use of sleep deprivation or stress positions. We had received training on the Geneva Convention and used to discuss it a lot while at Ft Dix and Kuwait prior to deployment. I do not remember any specific training or orientation in Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs), but during my time at BIAP there was a process of requesting authority through the chain of command for some interrogation practices. I believed the way the system worked at AG was to send the request thru interrogation ops NCOIC/Team Leader to COL Pappas, via 205th JAG office [redacted] At times [redacted] might have to get a legal review or opinion from his boss or other sources [redacted] To my knowledge, [redacted] or [redacted] in ICE and Ops worked very closely with CW2 [redacted] and MAJ [redacted] I dealt with [redacted] in requesting and obtaining information pertaining to schedules for AG and other THTs and Tiger Teams. I understood that [redacted] was the Director of the JIDC, but I had little if any contact with him. I had very little to do with the actual running of AG, even after COL Pappas was assigned as the Commander of the FOB. It was my understanding that COL Pappas did not "control" the MPs or their work in running the detention and confinement aspects of AG. MPs did MP work and MI did MI work; even in training scenarios in the States, MI and MP operations were kept separate and trained only in their own MOS's. From the outset the 325 did not seem to be welcomed by or accepted by the 519th; this might have been due to the active component vice reserve component culture or it could have stemmed from previous times when the two organization were assigned in the same area. In my time at BIAP and at AG I did not see, hear about or become aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see, hear of or become aware of any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. I did not see, hear of or become aware of any use of dogs for interrogation purposes. I did not see, hear about or become aware of any detainees being stripped and kept in the nude or of detainees having to wear women's underwear. Q: Is there anything you wish to add to this statement? A: N[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

NOT [redacted]

USED

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted]. HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 8 day of June 2004

at Metro Park Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1.00

[redacted]
97E SFC/E7
[redacted]
365 MI Company

I am a member of the 365th MI Company, but when I was activated, I was cross leveled to B Co,325 MI Bn. From May to Sep 03 I was assigned at a Platoon Sergeant in the 325TH at BIAP, mostly working LSA issues (finance, billeting, supply, evaluations, etc) for the interrogation personnel, as we really had no support structure. (Interrogators under me included [redacted] I also worked with CW2 [redacted] In Sep I moved to Camp Victory and was assigned to the 205th Headquarters, in the S3 shop as an LNO, working for [redacted] (S-3) and SGM [redacted] (S3 Ops SGM), supporting various Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). Starting in Sep most of the interrogators under me moved to AG, the remainder occasionally visited AG but were not assigned there. The ones that moved were [redacted] moved, but I am not sure. Two personnel who may have some knowledge of activities at AG from the Nov 03 to March 04 time frame would be the acting Company Commander, [redacted] and the acting 1SG, 1SG [redacted] due to their occasional visits to AG. During the period from mid-December 03 until late Feb 04, I was assigned as a liaison officer between the Bde S-3 shop and Abu Ghraib (AG). During that time I continually went back and forth between Camp Victory and AG, sometimes spending a couple of days or more at AG at any one time. Previously, I had occasional visits to the actual detention facility there, escorting COL Pappas, but did not work there. During mid-December, I was assigned duty to escort a Red Cross Inspection Team consisting of 4 or 5 males and one female. One of the male Red Cross visitors was a doctor. One or two of the males had previously inspected AG earlier that year and [redacted] During the Sep to Dec time frame when I made periodic visits I would see some of my former interrogators who had moved to AG – none of them ever mentioned abuse or humiliation of detainees, unauthorized photos or videos, use of dogs or any questionable interrogation practices such as stripping detainees, use of sleep deprivation or stress positions. We had received training on the Geneva Convention and used to discuss it a lot while at Ft Dix and Kuwait prior to deployment. I do not remember any specific training or orientation in Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs), but during my time at BIAP there was a process of requesting authority through the chain of command for some interrogation practices. I believed the way the system worked at AG was to send the request thru interrogation ops NCOIC/Team Leader to COL Pappas, via 205th JAG office [redacted]

[redacted] At times [redacted] might have to get a legal review or opinion from his boss or other sources at JIF7. To my knowledge, [redacted] or [redacted] in ICE and Ops worked very closely with [redacted] and [redacted]. I dealt with [redacted] in requesting and obtaining information pertaining to schedules for AG and other THTs and Tiger Teams. I understood that [redacted] was the Director of the JIDC, but I had little if any contact with him. I had very little to do with the actual running of AG, even after COL Pappas was assigned as the Commander of the FOB. It was my understanding that COL Pappas did not "control" the MPs or their work in running the detention and confinement aspects of AG. MPs did MP work and MI did MI work; even in training scenarios in the States, MI and MP operations were kept separate and trained only in their own MOS's. From the outset the 325 did not seem to be welcomed by or accepted by the 519th; this might have been due to the active component vice reserve component culture or it could have stemmed from previous times when the two organization were assigned in the same area. In my time at BIAP and at AG I did not see, hear about or become aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see, hear of or become aware of any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. I did not see, hear of or become aware of any use of dogs for interrogation purposes. I did not see, hear about or become aware of any detainees being stripped and kept in the nude or of detainees having to wear women's underwear.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Caroapolis, PA	2004/05/25 [redacted]	1710 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SPC

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/165TH Military Intelligence, Fort Snelling, Minnesota

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was mobilized for Iraqi Freedom on 19th March 2003. I was crossleveled from the 88th RC to the 94th within days of being mobilized. I mobilized at Fort Dix and ended up with B/325 MI BN (Interrogation Company). I was at Fort Dix for about 5 weeks. The 325th deployed to Camp Virginia, Kuwait and a week later we deployed to Camp Cropper at Baghdad International Airport, Iraq. At BIAP, I initially supported screening and performed a handful of interrogations. I didn't feel comfortable with my interrogation experience and requested to be moved to operations. Once I moved to operations, I took ownership of the database for tracking of detainees. Up to that point, the MPs had maintained a detainee tracking database, but there had been nothing established or maintained for keeping track of the MI hold status of detainees at Camp Cropper. I also assisted with the daily reporting, was a liaison to the MPs, Magistrate's office, and any outside agency (i.e. 1AD,OGA) would request information and I would coordinate with them for the sharing of any information we had on a specific detainee or group of detainees. I was at Cropper for about five months. I moved to Abu Ghraib sometime before 20 September as the Advance Party for 325th MI. When I first arrived, I didn't receive training, as no training plan yet existed. We were starting up new operations, merging with the 519th, based on directives from higher . As Operations were established and as the structure of MI operations at Abu Ghraib began to take shape, we were required to read the established IROEs and were required to sign that we understood them. I signed them. The IROEs were reiterated time and time again. I was not present at every ICE formation because I was part of the FAC and reported to through the FAC chain of command, which is on the same echelon as the ICE, both reporting up to JIDC Operations. However, I was present at several JIDC formations held in the ICE during my tenure there. Generally, these formations required everyone, military and civilians, full-time or TDY-support to be present. Most of these formations were led by either the ICE NCOIC or by [redacted]. I initially arrived with [redacted] followed shortly thereafter . [redacted] arrived a few days later; he was not part of the 325th command. The 519th was already there and had been running operations for a specific mission : FEDEYEEN SADDAM members. They had a system already in place when we arrived, but that system changed when the two units merged operationally. Our focus began to change rapidly and frequently We were soon overwhelmed with detainees. I only went to the Hard Site a couple of times I do not recall who I went with. I didn't even know the assignment numbers to differentiate the 1A or 1B blocks. I was aware that a numbering system was in place, as for a very short period of time, I kept accountability of the isolation counts by detainee number. I never saw or was aware of any naked detainees. I knew that the detainees wore jumpsuits. I am pretty proactive and won't hesitate to tell anyone, regardless of rank, if something is wrong. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, I began working with a gentleman who was a database professional to learn how the system operated. I also worked with [redacted] in an administrative role managing the PERSTAT and other personnel reports. The last two to three months, I worked in the Fusion Analytical Cell (FAC). I participated in one interrogating while at Abu Ghraib. I assisted [redacted] with the interrogation of a female detainee. The female had moved from Cropper to Abu Ghraib, was pregnant, and had given birth while in detention. [redacted] was working with JAG to turn the baby over to her family or to an orphanage. I did conduct preliminary interrogations with the female detainee, but after we established the depth of her knowledgeably of MI interests, I handed her off to a Tiger Team and was then no longer involved with her case. The second instance in which I had direct contact with a detainee, I was present during a Knowledgeably Brief (KB), as some level on high had mandated that all detainees have a KB on file . Interrogators were spread far too thin and overwhelmed with the workload. As policy required that each interrogation/interview required at least 2 people present, .I supported in one of the KBs when the team analyst was occupied on another task. The interrogation was conducted in the open tent in the Ganci camp--just outside of the detainee holding area The detainee turned out to be the husband of the woman who was being sought after as a Black List #1 facilitator. As the facilitator was still being sought after and as BL#1 had not yet been apprehended, I communicated with the interrogation team leader the importance of prioritizing an interrogation for the detainee [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

For the most part, I had limited contact with the Tiger Teams and had wanted to communicate with them more frequently in my role as a fusion analyst. I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainees, the use of dogs during interrogations, or the humiliation of detainees. The only time I knew dog s were present was during the shakedown of the Iraqi Police . I never actually saw dogs used other than for car searches--I had only heard that they were called in for the IP shakedown. A gun was found in an isolation cell and there had been a shoot out during this same incident. The only direct contact I had with OGA was in doing business with the agency analysts. I sat as an observer and note-taker on one interrogation with OGA at Camp Cropper. Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A. No. [redacted]

//End of Statement//

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25th day of MAY, 2004 at Caroapolis PA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted] PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. (FOUO) On 9 and 10 June 2004 [redacted] was telephonically interviewed at her office [redacted] and residence in Wiesbaden, GM. She is assigned to A Company, 302nd MI BN in Wiesbaden. From approximately the first week of June 2003 to 21 September 2003 [redacted] was deployed to Abu Ghraib. She served as the liaison officer between the CJTF7 C2X and the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) in Abu Ghraib. Her primary responsibility was to ensure C2X requirements were met and to maintain visibility (track) high value target interrogations. She reported to [redacted] C2X who in turn reported to MG FAST, C2. Day-to-day she was supervised by [redacted] and CW2 [redacted] at the ICE where she was fully integrated into operations. During her time at Abu Ghraib [redacted] never observed or heard of detainee abuse. Other than on one occasion, described in the following paragraph, [redacted] never observed detainees stripped or partially clothed. She heard that detainees were stripped as a standard operating procedure during in-processing. Operations in the ICE included two daily operational ("pass down") meetings, one at 0800 and the other "at the end of the day". These meetings were to assign and plan the interrogations for the upcoming shifts. They were generally led by either [redacted] (night shift) or CW2 [redacted] (0800) and/or [redacted] or the ICE NCOIC (unidentified E-5) if they were unavailable. Assignments for interrogations/interrogation teams would be made and the teams would get together to write out their interrogation plan (objectives, questions, techniques) have them reviewed, and approved Generally the analyst assigned to a team only saw reports and developed questions and did not participate in interrogations. The TIGER TEAM concept of Interrogator/Analyst integration had not yet been employed at Abu Ghraib. Almost all interrogations during this period were conducted in open tents as the Hard Site was still under construction. [redacted] never saw or heard of nudity as an interrogation (ego down) technique. She never saw stress positions employed. [redacted] felt the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) were well known and [redacted] spelled out what was authorized very specifically. No "special" techniques were discussed, used, or employed. She never heard of or saw a request to higher for approval of an interrogation technique. On 21 Septembe[redacted] was reassigned to the C2X in the "Green Zone." She worked on the Detainee Release Board. She was responsible to conduct the background file review before a detainee was referred to the board. She would review the entire file (interrogation reports and arrest report but oftentimes not much more than the arrest report was in the file) to determine 1.) Why a detainee was incarcerated. 2.) What information he/she provided. 3.) Why he/she should be released. 4.) If not enough information was available recommend additional debriefing or interrogation.

2. While assigned to the ICE as the C2X liason at Abu Ghrai[redacted] once participated in an interrogation in the Hard Site. When she and the interrogator arrived at

the detainee's cell he was unclothed. She was asked to stand back by the MP while the detainee dressed and did so.

On 10 June the undersigned recontacted [redacted] to obtain further information on this incident. An investigative review of MP Logs at Abu Ghraib indicated on 16 September 2003 "MI directed a detainee be stripped nude in his cell" The interrogation report for this detainee indicated [redacted] was the analyst and [redacted] was the interrogator for an interrogation conducted 17 September. [redacted] recounted the following additional details. She did not remember the interrogators name. He was a "young, big, guy; a Specialist." This Specialist had just returned from R & R leave at Ft. Bragg. She could not recall the exact date but thought it was in late September. During the morning meeting she observed the interrogator working on his plan and she volunteered to work as his analyst. While not her normal duty, she saw this as an opportunity. During this time analysts were usually not sitting in on the interrogations and the hard site was not being used but on this day she was offered the opportunity to "sit in." The interrogator had already developed his plan and he briefed her quickly. The technique to be used was "love of family" as the detainee was elderly and the sole wage earner for his family. They requested (to the MPs) the detainee be brought out for interrogation. After waiting about 30 minutes near the open tents in Camp Vigalant (assuming the detainee was housed there) they asked what the delay was. The MPs (names unrecalled) re-checked and determined the detainee was housed in Tier 1A and they would have to go there. Upon arrival at the cell an MP (name unrecalled and described as 6 feet tall, medium build, strawberry-blond hair, mustache, from Nevada) asked [redacted] to move to the side as the detainee was naked. Both [redacted] and her interrogator were surprised that the detainee was naked. The interpreter (name unrecalled and described as older, short, possibly Pakistani whom she could likely identify in a photo) asked the detainee to put on his clothes which were in the cell. [redacted] asked the MP why the detainee was naked. He explained the detainee was extremely agitated and had been taking off his clothes as a protest. The detainee dressed and they took him to an empty cell at the other end of the hard site to conduct the interrogation. The detainee was very angry at first but calmed down as the interrogation proceeded. He was a plumber arrested on his way to work and apparently had been arrested without cause. (Note: A check of the interrogation report noted that this was the only interrogation of this detainee) [redacted] never thought to report the detainee was unclothed. It appeared to be the detainee's choice, he never complained of being forced to disrobe (even though excellent rapport was established by the end of the interrogation) and his clothes were in the cell. The interrogator completed the interrogation report and back-briefed the ICE Operations. [redacted] did not know if the interrogator documented or reported the nudity. It was not discussed at subsequent ICE operations meetings.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is [redacted]

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
BCCF, ABU GHURAYB, IRAQ	[redacted]	1730	
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER**		**GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		CW3

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Company, 202d Military Intelligence Battalion, APO AE 09342

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted]ived at the Baghdad Central Correction Facility (BCCF) at Abu Ghurayb, Iraq on or about 18 [redacted]ary, 2004. I am currently the Day Shift OIC for the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) at the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) and have been since my arrival. This sworn statement covers procedures dealing with hard copy packets of Detainee files during that time frame. The hard copy packets (referred to as dossiers) are passed from the In-Processing Section to the Magistrate's office. Those dossiers of MI interest are then signed for by the ICE leadership and brought to the ICE. The dossiers contain all the hard copy paperwork that involves the Detainee...capture card, sworn statements, magistrate file, prior reporting, medical in-processing sheet, all intelligence reporting, interrogator notes, and miscellaneos documents. However, the content varies from dossier to dossier and is reliant on what paperwork is generated for each Detainee. The dossiers stay in the ICE for the duration of the intelligence exploitation of those detainees. The difference between the procedures prior to my arrival and now is fairly simple...accountability of the files. Prior to my arrival and during the first approximately two months of my time here, the dossiers were separated and filed by Section and the Section Sergeant was responsible for maintaining control of the paperwork. Since then, all of the dossiers are filed together and accounted for by the ICE leadership. Rarely does a dossier physically leave the ICE. When it does, it is only for a short time. When intelligence exploitation of the Detainee is completed, the Detainee Assessment Branch (DAB) process begins. The interrogator and the Section Sergeant decide the Detainee has no more intelligence value. They ensure the dossier is complete and attach a DAB Memorandum for Record in the BATs database. The dossier is then brought to me. I review the dossier and the MFR and pass the dossier to the Collection, Management, and Dissemination (CMD) shop for further review. Previous to May, 2004, I was taking out all the handwritten notes and the Interrogation Plans of the dossier before submitting the dossiers to CMD. Starting in May, 2004, I began leaving the Interrogation Plans in the dossier. After passing to CMD, the dossier will never come back in to the ICE unless a requirement is found that has not been addressed. If the dossier does return, the requirement is addressed and the DAB process begins again. Processing exceptions to the counter-resistance policy differs between what happens now and what I was told was happening when I arrived. The process up the chain of command is the same with the interrogator providing an MFR to the Section Sergeant who reviews and passes it to the ICE OIC, then to the JAG officer for the MI Brigade who was [redacted] prior to the end of January and who was [redacted] up until approximately one week ago. Brigade JAG reviews it, submits for approval to the MI Bde Commander who then sends it up the chain for final review and approval by LTG Sanchez. When I arrived at the JIDC, I was told that usually when an exception was approved by the CG, a confirmation would come down by either vocal confirmation or an e-mail and then followed sometimes by an actual copy of the signed and approved MFR. When I came on board, there was never an instance of my instructing the interrogators to execute the exception without a signed copy of the MFR. I didn't have to. We either had a copy or we continued exploitation without executing that approach strategy. I do not know what instances happened where exceptions were executed without a signed copy. This statement just verifies what I heard when I got here. Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement? A: No [redacted]

END OF STATEMENT

NOT [redacted] USED.

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.10

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////

Nothing

follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 20. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of MAY, 2004

at CRYSTAL CITY, VIRGINIA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] A/302nd MI BN

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned telephonically contacted [redacted] at the 302nd MI BN, Wiesbaden, GM, to clarify details taken in a 13 May 2004 sworn statement and 31 May telephonic interview with [redacted] concerning his knowledge of abuse at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] was identified by [redacted] as one of his associates with whom he passed rumours of abuse.

[redacted] is an analyst assigned to A Company, 302nd MI BN, Weisbaden, GM. He was deployed to Abu Ghraib from Mid October 2003 to early February 2004. For his first month there he was assigned to an interrogation team. His Team Chief was SSG [redacted] never observed or heard what he considered detainee abuse while at Abu Ghraib until after the USACID investigation "broke." After his first month [redacted] was reassigned to an ad-hoc guard force to escort detainees and ensure security and safety during interrogations. [redacted] and [redacted] were on the guard force and [redacted] was Sergeant of the Guard. [redacted] did not recall [redacted] speaking about or purporting knowledge of detainee abuse. [redacted] did hear general rumours of abuse (source unrecalled) and discussions of "MPs smoking" detainees. He once heard a detainee was raped by fellow detainees. [redacted] would hold formations each Tuesday where he would discourage the spread of rumours. If [redacted] had claimed knowledge of abuse [redacted] would not likely have believed him.

2. [redacted] believed dogs could be used in interrogations when authorized by the Commanding General. He observed one interrogation where dogs were employed to "fear up" a detainee. It was an interrogation of a high value detainee captured with [redacted] The interrogation lasted nine hours. [redacted] was the analyst and "DJ" was an observer while a "blond guy" (NFI) conducted the interrogation. A female was the interpreter (NFI). The detainee was handcuffed to an I-bolt on the floor with a sandbag over his head for the majority of the interrogation. At one point dogs were brought outside the interrogation room door, the detainees hood was lifted, and the dogs were encouraged to bark. This interrogation was one of three (also captured with Hussein) occurring at the same time. Things were chaotic and "just about everyone was in the ICE" following the capture of these HVTs. [redacted] believed [redacted] and [redacted] were there but is not certain. Based on the perceived value of these detainees, everyone received approval (one day approval) to use "fear up" with the dogs. [redacted] could not recall anything else concerning this event or the approval process.

3. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27 [redacted]	2000 [redacted]	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 0933

9. [redacted]

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I receive a tour of the facilities and the Tiger Team Concept, Reporting but it was so fast, it took me a while to fully understand everything. We did receive the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and a hand out on the IROEs which I signed. Then was nothing new compared to what I had been taught at school. I do not remember receiving any information on the Geneva Convention. When I arrived, I didn't know that COL PAPPAS was in charge of the entire site. I know that now. I believe tha [redacted] was the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center commander, [redacted] was an analyst for the Force Protection team,he worked with [redacted] but he quickly left and began to work with the Former Regime Extremists team. I never witnessed any detainee abuse. I was really shocked when CID began their investigation. I have never heard or seen MP Guards use dogs. I did find out there were some photos but that was after the fact.
Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No [redacted]
//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF	[redacted] TAKEN AT DATED	

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted]. HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004

at Abu Ghraib Correction Facility

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary. [redacted]

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMM[redacted]	TIME [redacted]	FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, IZ	2004/06/09 [redacted]	1350	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	1LT/RA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center, Baghdad Central Corrections Facility, Iraq

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On or about 20 January, I inprocessed the JIDC and began work in the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) shop. I spent the first week doing a transition with the outgoing CM&D analysts. Part of the transition training was CM&D's role in the DAB process, explained in detail below. In the DAB process, CM&D is responsible for ensuring that all requirements levied against a detainee are answered to the fullest extent possible. When a file arrived from the Interrogation Collection Element (ICE), the DAB memo contained was reviewed. After ensuring that the memo was complete, an ISN check was done through the database (first on an Access-based database, then on BATS when we switched). The purpose of this check was to check to see if the detainee had any requirements levied against them in the database, and to see if they had answered the requirements. There we a couple different routes the packets took from this point based on the database check and the packet review. The first route was if the detainee had no requirements levied or if all the requirements had been answered, then the CM&D analyst reviewing the packet signed at the bottom of the memo indicating that there were no outstanding requirements. The CM&D analyst then logged the ISN, date recieved, date evaluated, date transferred to DAB, and a remark that included who was the reviewer and the status of no outstanding requirements. Then the packet was walked down to DAB and placed into their recieving box. The second route was if there were outstanding requirements that had not been answered, then the CM&D analyst decided if the ICE's justification provided enough validation for not answering the requirement. If it did, the packet was signed, logged, and delivered to DAB. If it was unclear, the CM&D analyst went to the ICE and discussed the detainee's packet and the outstanding requirement. Again, if the CM&D analyst thought there was a valid reason that the requirement had not been answered, then the packet was passed to the DAB. If not, it was returned to the ICE for further exploitation. The final route was if the ICE's justification completely failed to validate not answering a requirement. The packet was returned to the ICE with a sticky note on the cover indicating which requirements were still outstanding that were not addressed in the justification. The packet was not accepted until further exploitation was done on those requirements or the ICE provided stronger written justification addressing the unfulfilled requirements. Exceptions to this standard operating procedure occured when detainees were to be released, despite their potential intelligence or outstanding requirements, by order of the Chain of Command. In these instances, the detainees' packets were rushed through the DAB process in order to facilitate their release. Generally, these instances were noted in the log under the remarks section indicating by whose direction they were to be released. At no time was CM&D to remove any paperwork from a detainees packet. At no time was CM&D to add any paperwork to a detainees packet. The only physical contact with the detainees packet came when reviewing it for the DAB process. The only alteration that CM&D was to do was sign below the ICE chief on the DAB memo indicating there were no outstanding requirements. The current process has CM&D add their statement electronically in the memo in the detainee's BATS file before delivering the hard copy of the packet to DAB. Q: Do you have anthing to add to this statement. A: N[redacted] ——————End of Statement

NOT [redacted] USED

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]	PAGE 1 OF [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT _____ DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT USED

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of June, 2004
at JIDC, BCCF, Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136, UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	[redacted]	[redacted] PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CJTF7-TF-FAY 9 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephonic Interview [redacted]

1. (FOUO) On 3 June 2004, the undersigned conducted a telephonic interview wit[redacted] [redacted] was assigned to Abu Ghraib as the Signal Officer for the 320th MP BN. He acknowledged tha[redacted] worked in the 320th and confirmed [redacted] statement that he maintained a copy of e-mail correspondence within the 320th. [redacted] kept this on a CD-ROM, secured in a safe, at his Reserve Unit Headquarters in Fort Dix, NJ. [redacted] did not recall anything in the e-mail traffic concerning abuses of detainees or specific allegations/incidents. He opined there were some e-mails pertaining to the challenges/difficulties during the transition period between the Military Police units at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] is scheduled for "drill" at his unit on 6 and 7 June 2004. He offered to review the e-mails and telephone if he discovers any coorespondence related to detainee abuse or allegations of abuse. Otherwise he will copy the CD and FEDEX or Priority Mail the CD NLT 8 June 2004.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait	2004/05/02	[redacted] 1815 hrs.	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	04 / ACTIVE [redacted]

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
320th Military Police Battalion

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in July 04. We were the only ones there and I believe the 519th MI had a company that arrived around the same time we did. The 320th MP Bn was in charge of base operations and we were under the 800th MP BDE. We had contact with MI Leadership on a daily bases because they attended our Battalion Staff meeting. All units at Abu Ghraib had a representauve there. During the meetings we would discuss issues relating to detainees such as medical, billeting, water, food, and escorting. We (MPs) also discussed that MPs were not to take part in interrogations. Personnel who were in charge of MI soldiers were, [redacted] I didn't really have a detail conversation with MI in reference to detainee handling violations or Rules of Engagement. I provided [redacted] copy of the MP Rules of Engagement. At the time we arrived, only Camp Vigilant was operational. The Hard Site was not open yet and neither was Camp Ganci. Except for one time, I never saw or was aware of any detainee physical abuse. The incident I am referring to occurred on 22 September. We had just had a mortar attack. The guard at the tower saw personnel moving outside the area. I sent in the QRF after the individuals. Two individuals were captured and brought in. It was procedure to have the MI Screen the personnel brought in. I drove to the Entry Control Point and MI drove right behind me. The individuals caught were in a HMWV. MI personnel moved the detainees to the back of the vehicle. [redacted] came up to me and told me something. I didn't hear him because I was on the radio with higher. When I finished I heard a lot of yelling going on. I went to where the yelling was occurring and asked the NCOIC what the problem was. I told the NCOIC to escort the detainees to the holding area and meet me back in the battalion TOC. By the time I arrived at the TOC, the NCOIC was already there with [redacted] asked me if anything like this had happened before. I said no. I found out that the soldier sent out was from the unit that had just received mortars and had two soldiers killed from the mortars. I told him that you don't send soldiers out who were that emotional. I told him he needed to take some disciplinary action such as reprimand, counsel, or send him to be seen for combat stress. I do not remember the soldier's name. CID took the case but deferred it to the chain of command. I do not know what disciplinary actions were taken. Three weeks after the incident, the 519th redeployed. I notified my battalion commander about the incident. I do not know of any other incident. I never aw or had any knowledge of MI using dogs during the interrogations. The use of dogs had to be approved by [redacted] Prior to the investigation beginning, I never saw or had knowledge of any photos or videos of MI personnel with detainees. The taking of photos was not authorized and we would take cameras away from individuals we caught taking photos. This policy was put out six days a week and personnel caught would be punished and cameras confiscated. I never had any discussion with [redacted] or COL PAPPAS on detainee abuse occurring in the prison. One issue we were concern about was the frequent mortar attacks. We did not have enough personnel to provide the adequate protection for the camp. We had a challenge trying to get all units at Abu Ghraib to cooperate and assist with force protection of the site. It wasn't until we lost the two soldiers during the mortar attack that we started to receive additional help. We received a platoon from 1/504th and COL PAPPAS brought in the 165th MI BN with their LRSD to help with force protection. But this was simply the protection inside and the towers. No one was providing support outside our area. [redacted] came to visit Abu Ghraib one day. He went up to the guard tower and said take the fight out to the field. We didn't have the manning to do that. We had too many other responsibilities with the detainees.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? [redacted]

A. No.

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2 day of MAY 2004 at CAMP ARIFJAN

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136 10 U.S.C. 1044 Military Notary

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
151 Horizon Ridge Parkway, Henderson, NV	2004/06/06	1320	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	E-6/NG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
72nd Military Police Company, 992 Troop Command, Army National Guard

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From late May 03 to early Nov Oct 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), as an MP Guard for the 72nd MP Company. I worked on the night shift. I observed two incidents of concern. On one occasion, I was outside 1A when a fellow MP, I believe [redacted] yelled to me and told me to come observe a naked detainee for the purpose of humiliation. I refused to view the naked detainee. The detainee was outside his cell naked with his hands restrained behind his back by two individuals. It did not appear to be part of an interrogation. I believe it was an MP procedure because the detainee had been uncooperative. The MP Sergeant was speaking with an Other Government Agency (OGA) member who I could not see. I believe the OGA was giving the MP advice on how to humiliate the detainee by having me observe him naked. The other incident involved an unscheduled nightime interrogation in 1B. I was on shift when the unauthorized interrogation of two Iraqi females by three MI soldiers and an interrogator occurred and reported the incident to higher Headquarters. I was later interviewed by [redacted] and Criminal Investigation Command (CID) personnel. Most problems in the facility involved detainee on detainee physical or sexual assaults. Clothing removal and making them wear burlap bags over their heads were acceptable MP methods to control or modify behavior when isolation or pressure through the detainee leadership didn't work. No other humiliation or physical abuse was authorized. I observed more detainees without clothing in 1A than any other place in the camp. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I never saw or heard of any photography of the detainees. I was never asked nor heard of any other MP being asked by MI to abuse or humiliate detainees. MP's do not utilize humiliation as a form of control.

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement [redacted]

A: No.////////////

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING FOLLOWS [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6th day of June, 2004

at HENDERSON, NV

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES

08 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 08 May [redacted] stopped by for an interview appointment with MG Fay. [redacted] refused to make a statement due to the information that has already been released on him to the press.

[redacted]

MAJ, MI
Assistant Investigative Officer

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Springfield, Virginia	2004/05/23 [redacted]	1553 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	LTC/O-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
323rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am the Commander of the 323rd Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), Fort Meade, Maryland, having assumed Command on 17 Nov 01. The 323rd MI mobilized on 21 Jan 03. After spending almost eight weeks of preparation and training at the Northeast Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (NEARISC) at Fort Dix, New Jersey, we deployed and arrived in Kuwait on 28 Mar 03, and initially stayed at Camp Udairi, KU. I crossed into Iraq on or about 15 May 03 and the battalion followed by companies over the next 30 days except for A Company which remained in KU. We departed Iraq out of Baghdad by air on 12 Mar 04, and returned to Kuwait, where we remained until we redeployed to US on 31 Mar 04. While at the NEARISC at Fort Dix, the 323rd MI was being crossed leveled with approximately 70 personnel who arrived sporadically and in small numbers over several weeks. The 70 additional personnel integrated well and the battalion congealed into a cohesive unit. The 323rd was authorized 294 personnel, but we arrived in Theater with only 198 personnel, considerably under strength. While at Fort Dix, we awaited enough personnel to get to P-2 status, but we never made it, and we finally received a waiver for deployment. While at the NEARISC, 323rd MI interrogators received approximately three to three and a half weeks of training provided by the ARISC personnel, which I personally observed. Interrogation training was first and foremost practice in the interrogation booths utilizing various approaches. Although I did not personally witness it, I believe the interrogators received classes in Geneva Convention requirements and Interrogation Rules of Engagement. Records documenting the training may be on file at the NEARISC. The 325th MI BN was also at the Fort Dix NEARISC processing and training for deployment at the same time. The 323rd and 325th trained simultaneously, but separately, and the NEARISC priority at the time was to support the training and deployment preparation of the two battalions. Although the 325th had arrived at Fort Dix later than the 323rd, both units deployed to Kuwait on the same day. We arrived in Kuwait on 28 Mar 03 and initially staged at Camp Udairi, Kuwait. The 323rd was a Theater level collection and exploitation battalion that was war-traced to the 513th MI Brigade (BDE) [redacted] Commander) which supported Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait and Iraq. We spent approximately two months at Camp Udairi where we continued with some training and war preparation. At the time of our arrival in Kuwait, I had the 323rd organized with one headquarters company and three line units. A Co was the SIGINT and MASINT company with approximately 20 personnel. A Co was almost immediately cut to the 201st MI upon our arrival in Kuwait. B Co was the Counterintelligence company and had approximately 48 personnel. After the war began, B Co was cut to the 221st MI Battalion to screen the [redacted] MEK) at Camp Ashraf north of Baghdad (approximately 22 Jun - 30 Aug 03). C Co was the Interrogation company, with analytical ability and a COMTECH platoon. Initially there was a 513th MI Bde plan for the 323rd to support an "Intelligence Support Base", possibly at Camp Udairi, but it never came to fruition. After the war began, our mission was to relieve the 202 MI BN in place. The 202nd had ongoing interrogation operations at Camp Bucca and we assumed those operations. [redacted] attached to the 202nd from the 141st MI BN, Utah National Guard, was the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of interrogation operations at Bucca. We also assumed the mission of interrogation operations of black listed detainees in Baghdad. Because the 141st was attached to the 202nd at the time, we basically retained those personnel when we assumed the 202nd mission. We also had essentially a "caretaker" mission at BIAP until the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) took over operations, and C Co was detached to support the ISG. Camp Cropper was primarily under the 325th MI BN and we had no real role there. On 22 Jun 03, the 323rd was attached to the 205th MI BDE (COL PAPPAS Commander). After interrogation operations at Camp Bucca began to shut down on approximately 20 Aug 03, [redacted] was moved from Bucca to Abu Ghurayb (AG) and was assigned the role of Operations Officer for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JDIC). He only had about 12 soldiers that he took with him. I was residing at BIAP at this time and I had wanted to bring [redacted] to BIAP to make him my S-3, but [redacted] (205th MI Brigade S-3 on behalf of COL PAPPAS) directed that [redacted] assume the JDIC Operations Officer role. I was not involved in decisions concerning the establishment or manning of the JDIC at AG. I do not recall exactly when I first visited AG, but I suspect it was toward the end of Aug 03, and I can not recall the specific reason, although it probably was to meet with [redacted] and his soldiers. [redacted] was supposed to stand up the JDIC, but he indicated to me that [redacted] was really the one in charge of AG interrogation operations. [redacted] did not want to disrupt [redacted] system and organization by immediately interjecting himself into the operations. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

[redacted]

[redacted]TEMENT *(Continued)*

apparently felt confident and comfortable enough that [redacted] had a handle on interrogation operations, and he concentrated his efforts on logistical and administrative matters. I viewed [redacted] as the person on the ground who ran the interrogation operations. Through discussions with 205th MI BDE staff members (I can not recall specific individuals or exact discussions), I had the impression that COL PAPPAS was under quite a lot of pressure at the time to produce quality, actionable intelligence from the interrogations at AG. I believe LTG SANCHEZ was not happy with the intelligence coming out of AG, felt AG was the best place where he could get actionable intelligence, and really wanted COL PAPPAS to focus his efforts and attention on AG. By about 15 Jul 03, I perceived that, as a result of the focus of LTG SANCHEZ on AG, COL PAPPAS emphasis was increasingly concentrated on AG as well. Between late Aug 03 and 15 Feb 04, I visited AG five or six times. Generally the reason was to visit my soldiers, but a tasking to stand up a Headquarter Service Company (HSC-Provisional) increased my involvement at AG. I received a SIPRNET message from [redacted] (S-3, 205th MI Brigade) saying that I would need to stand up the HSC since it appeared I had more available personnel than anyone else. It was at this that it was rumored that they were looking for a JDIC Chief and that my name was on the short list for selection. At this time, [redacted] was at least temporarily in charge of the AG JDIC and he was finally selected as the Chief, JIDC). My last visit to AG, about 15 Jan 04, was when I resided at AG for seven days while I conducted an Article 15-6 investigation into an incident involving a South Carolina Air National Guard Rear Area Operations Center unrelated to the JDIC or AG interrogation operations. I selected [redacted] to be the HSC Commander. He, like [redacted] and the 12 soldiers he had taken with him from Camp Bucca to AG, were from the 141st MI BN, Utah National Guard, and it made sense to me, since 141st personnel were already effectively functioning in a staff and support function, that [redacted] should assume the HSC Command. I can not recall the exact time this took place, but it was after [redacted] had come on the scene at AG. My focus related to AG was logistic and administrative support. [redacted] was responsible for interrogation operations (per [redacted] DCO, 205th MI Brigade). During my visits to AG, I saw what appeared to by very competent, experienced professionals. Given the capabilities and experience of the MI leadership at AG, I believed they had a solid handle on operations. I did not look into interrogation operations because it was not my role. COL PAPPAS had been going back and forth between his Brigade HQ in Balad and AG. After he moved to AG permanently in the Oct-Nov 03 timeframe, I did not have any doubt that COL PAPPAS was in charge of AG. He was active, involved, and energetic about the mission. I never had any occasion to interview any CACI contract interrogators and I never observed any of them in action. [redacted] had mentioned to me that he felt confident enough with, and did not express a lot of concern about, the CACI interrogators. What little concern he had was because he was not certain about the currency or how recent their experience was. I never had any conversations concerning specific interrogation techniques. While at Baghdad, [redacted] but I can not provide any specifics. Based on conversations I had with some of my warrant officers [redacted] I am confident that they understood very clearly that they were limited only to interrogation approaches and techniques specified in FM 34-52. I am not aware of any incidents beyond accepted Army techniques as specified in FM 34-52, and no one ever talked about using approaches beyond established norms. I personally never witnessed any incidents of abuse or unauthorized treatment of detainees or unauthorized interrogation techniques. There was an incident that my [redacted] told me about that took place in Jul 03 [redacted] saw a prisoner at Camp Bucca struck to the ground by an MP [redacted] reported the incident to the MP Chain of Command and the MP was reportedly punished for [redacted]

NOT USED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

[redacted] the incident. This is the only such incident of which I am aware. I cannot recall seeing anyone taking photographs or video, and no one ever reported such activities to me (each of the prison facilities had signs clearly posted saying that photos of the prison were forbidden). Nor did I ever see or hear of any incidents involving military working dogs. [redacted] did mention to me once that a 205th soldier (not in my Command) had come forward about the MPs at AG drinking and partying and one 205th soldier (also not in my Command) was involved with them. COL PAPPAS reportedly punished the soldier under UCMJ. [redacted] told me that he and [redacted] were trying to keep MI soldiers away from the MPs because some of the MPs were perceived as "party animals" and potential problems after the drinking episode. [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23rd day of May, 2004

at: Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	[redacted]	PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metropark, Springfield, VA	2004/06/02	1250 hrs.	
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	**6. SSN**		**7. GRADE/STATUS**
[redacted]	[redacted]		SGT/AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A Co, 519th MI Bn, Fort Bragg, NC 28310

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From the end of Jul 03 to 21 Dec 03 I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq as an interrogator with A Company, 519th MI Bn. All the interrogations I participated in or witnessed were conducted within the limitations of FM 34-52 and the established Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). The IROE written by [redacted] established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. Shortly after my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the IROE and also signed a memorandum stating I understood and would follow the IROE. In my opinion, the IROE were clear and adequately established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. Throughout my time at AG, the interrogators were creative in their techniques, but I never witnessed anything that was outside the IROE during an interrogation. Interrogation plans were required for any interrogation. The mission of my team was to identify required intelligence information concerning alleged members o[redacted] [redacted] based on a list provided by higher headquarters. The list was old and in many cases inaccurate. We derived most of our information through direct questioning since there was not a lot of resistance from the detainees. This mission eventually was phased out and was replaced by other "special" missions, including Operation McClellan 1, 2 and 3. I was assigned to two different teams. I was on the Foreign Fighter Team for approximately two weeks until I went on leave and the Foreign Fighter/Extremist team upon my return. I did see naked detainees in the facility. I was brought naked detainees on occasion to interrogate. At no time did I request any detainees be stripped before being brought to interrogations. I do not know who ordered the detainees to be naked. I witnessed detainees wearing women's underwear. I did not request this to be done and was told the reason for the women's attire was the MP's were experiencing a supply shortage and the women's underwear were all that was available for the detainees. I was aware of the [redacted] incident involving her walking a naked detainee around the facility. This incident occurred while I was on leave. I do not recall who told me of the incident, but it did become a topic of discussion in the office, specifically whether or not it was the right thing to do. In my opinion, this was clearly outside the bounds of the IROE. After the 20 Sep 03, mortar attack on the facility, I conducted my first interrogation in the hard site. I interrogated the person suspected of firing the mortar. I did not spend a lot of time with the detainee as he was transferred to the 325th MI Bn interrogators who assumed the mission. In Sep 03, I was supposed to sit in on an interrogation with an OGA member. I was not allowed to participate in the interrogation and a sheet was placed over the opting of the interrogation booth which prohibited anyone from seeing inside. During the interrogation, things got a little loud and there was a sound like something had hit the table. I confronted the OGA member and he told me it was his hand hitting the table. During the discussion I noticed he still carried his sidearm, which was against the rule for the facility. I told him about the sidearm requirement and he checked the weapon with the MP's. I reported the incident to [redacted] On or around 13 Dec 03, just after the capture of SADAAM HUSSEIN, my team was tasked to go to LSA Cropper under the auspices of interrogating SADAAM HUSSEIN. During this time, I helped conduct a Vulnerability Assessment of the Cropper facility. The interrogation never occurred and the team eventually returned to AG. Around this time, my team interrogated a high level detainee with suspected ties to Al Quada. After we got him to his cell in 1A, we went through the documents found on him during his apprehension. COL PAPPAS and MG FAST showed intense interest in the interrogation and I felt COL PAPPAS would approve any interrogation procedure I requested to facilitate the interrogation process. In my opinion, COL PAPPAS was more interested in getting intelligence information quickly than allowing the interrogator to choose the best approach. There was a lot of pressure to report intelligence information concerning this detainee. There was not a lot of intelligence reporting from the interrogation as it was more of an assessment. In Dec 03, I used an adjusted sleep schedule as an interrogation technique. I requested the procedure and it was approved by COL PAPPAS. I believe an adjusted sleep schedule is at the O6 level for approval. When an adjusted sleep schedule is approved, the schedule is provided to the MP's to follow. In Dec 03, [redacted] told me he was approached by an MP who told him that a guard dog had visited one of my team's assigned detainees. I immediately went to the detainee's cell. The detainee claimed the guard dog came into his cell and mangled his bedding. Upon further inspection of the cell, I noticed the bedding had been ripped apart. I did not request the use of the guard dog and do not know who authorized the guard dog to go into the cell. It took several hours to calm down the detainee and this incident was detrimental to my interrogation approach. In Dec 03, after [redacted] and I escorted detainee back to his cell after an interrogation, we turned to leave and heard what could have been a person being struck.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We talked to the MP's and reminded them they needed to stay professional and to not let emotions dictate their actions. The situation did not feel right and I reported the incident to [redacted] in Dec 03, after the shooting incident involving a detainee with a pistol. I arrived at the scene approximately two to four hours after the incident occurred. I saw approximately 10 Iraqi Police detainees in the breezeway outside of 1A, and heard that approximately 40 Iraqi police officers had been stripped searched. [redacted] was in charge, walked around the room and may have participated in the interrogations of some of the detainees. When [redacted] arrived at the location, I told her that the hallway needed to be cleared and a course of action needed to be established. During my time at AG, I did not personally witness any detainee abuse. I am shocked at the pictures and have no knowledge of who approved the use of the guard dog depicted in picture "213". (The picture is of a guard dog, without a muzzle being held in front of [redacted] who is bound and on his knees) [redacted] was one of my assigned detainees. I interrogated him for four or five days before transferring him to [redacted] upon my departure from AG. I departed AG on 21 Dec 03.

Q: Is there anything you would like to add to this statement?

A: No [redacted]

//End of Statement[redacted]//

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted]. HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2nd day of June 2004 at Metropark, Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
MJE

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DOCSOPS

LOCATION	DATE	TIME	FILE NUMBER
JIDC, Abu Ghurayb, Iraq	09 Jun 04	1500	

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: [redacted]

GRADE/STATUS: MSG

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Abu Ghurayb, Iraq on or about 10 October 2003 and stayed here for about two weeks. I was a member of a five-person Mobile Training Team (MTT) sent from the US Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS). [redacted] (351B) lead the MTT made u of [redacted] and myself. The MTT was prepared to train interrogators and analysts using material from the Program of Instructions (POI) of the 97E10 course, 97E30 course, the Department of Defense Strategic Debriefer Course (DSDC), and the Intelligence Support to Countering Terrorism (ISCT) course. My contribution to MTT was the 97E30 POI that I had prepared at the Military Intelligence NCO Academy at Fort Huachuca, AZ. All of the 97E30 POI was based primarily but not exclusively on FM 34-7-1 Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Operations (Dated September 2002), FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation (Dated September 1992), and DIAM 58-12 The DoD HUMINT Management System (Dated June 1997). We also had access to a memorandum that talked about approach strategies outside of the ones mentioned in FM 34-52 (Like the use of military working dogs, sleep deprivation, etc) This memo was classified SECRET/Noforn and the MTT referred to it as the "SECDEF Memo." I observed 10-15 interrogation sessions while at abu ghurayb and gave feedback to the individual interogator. I conducted several hours of the training in a classroom environment pertaining to topics like cultural/religious awareness, approach strategies, questioning techniques, behavior symptom analysis, terrorist organizations, interpreter use, etc. The audience that the MTT trained was made up of military and civilian interrogators and analysts who were working in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). The audience varied from day to day and from morning to afternoon as personnel in the JIDC were fully engaged in interrogation operations. The only thing out of ordinary was the lack of booth space for interrogations to a degree where interrogators had to use the foot of a stairwell, the shower facility, or even the jail cells in the hardsite to conduct interrogations. I did not witness any detainee abuse or humiliation while I was present at Abu Ghurayb. I did not see any dogs present during any of the interrogations while I was at Abu Ghurayb. I saw two male detainees (who had just arrived to the prison facility) naked while they came out of the shower and the MPs issued them their orange overalls which they put on. The MPs then took them to their cells and interrogators started to screen them to assess their cooperation and knowledgeability. I did, however, hear there was Criminal Investigations Division (CID) investigations going on but no one told me any of the details nor did I inquire about it. At one point, while the MTT was still at Abu Ghurayb, [redacted] the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Officer In Charge (OIC) gathered all JIDC personnel in the ICE and asked everyone to read and sign a memorandum which was very similar to the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-resistance Policy Memorandum For Record (MFR), effective 12 October 2003 Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement. A: NO. [redacted] —END OF STATEMENT—

NOT [redacted] USED

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED. USAPPC V1.00

STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of June, 04 at JIDC BCCF Iraq

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

IAGMT · Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

DA FORM 2823, 1 JUL 98

[redacted]

THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA

Timeline at a glance:
-04 MAR 03—arrived in Camp Virginia, Kuwait
-Late MAR/early APR 03—jumped to LSA Bushmaster for several weeks
-APR thru SEP 03—located at LSA Anaconda (Balad, Iraq)
-SEP thru NOV 03—located at Camp Victory, Baghdad
-Thanksgiving (26 NOV 03?)—moved to FOB Abu Ghraib, Iraq
-14 DEC 03 thru 5 or 6 JAN 04—went on R&R leave
-On/about 14 JAN 03—CID approached me re: abuse allegations/photos; notification/investigation began immediately
-Mid-FEB 04—returned to Kuwait for redeployment
-24 FEB 04—redeployed to 1AD in Germany

I worked in the 1st Armored Division (1AD) Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), Wiesbaden, Germany, but was attached to the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade MTOE and deployed to Kuwait/Iraq in MAR 03.

Once I arrived in Kuwait, I immediately made contact with the V Corps OSJA, led by [redacted] At the beginning, my focus was on supporting the MI commanders with a wide variety of deployment legal issues, to include Targeting, ROE, LOW, Code of Conduct, Legal Assistance issues, Military Justice, etc. One of the main tasks that I performed at this time was ROE/LOW/Code of Conduct/Geneva Convention training for 205th MI personnel. I conducted more than 40 formal classes on ROE/LOW/etc. I also conducted "make-up" training classes for those officers/soldiers that missed the initial training. Company commanders and senior NCOs sometimes requested that I conduct refresher training, which I did on a frequent (but informal) basis. There were no interrogation operational issues in Kuwait.

In late MAR or early APR 03, I moved forward into Iraq with the 205th MI BDE. We moved forward soon after 3rd Infantry Division. Our first stop was at LSA BUSHMASTER. We were there for about two weeks and then we moved on to Balad, Iraq (LSA ANACONDA). The brigade had units in approximately 20 different locations. The Tactical HUMNINT Teams (THT) were almost everywhere throughout Iraq. I was on the road a great deal for the first several months, and visited many locations where the 205th MI had soldiers.

I would travel to the different locations for several reasons. First, I would go check to see whether the soldiers had any legal issues, concerns or questions and to make sure they knew where they could get in touch with me. Next, I would check on the communications to make sure commanders and soldiers had the means to communicate with me. Most places didn't have good comms in the beginning. It took Abu Ghraib longer than most places to get comms up and running. Finally, I would speak with

commanders to see if they had any military justice issues (ART 15s, etc.), administrative law issues (15-6 investigations, Reports of Survey, etc.), claims (later centralized at V Corps JAG), and provided legal assistance (Wills, Power of Attorneys, etc.).

"Home base" for me was LSA ANACONDA (Balad, Iraq) until September 03. I moved to Camp Victory (Baghdad, Iraq) in early September.

The first time I became involved with the Interrogation Rules of Engagement was when MG MILLER came to visit. He brought a contingent of personnel with him. [redacted] told me that it would be valuable for me (both now and in future operations) to sit in and participate in the discussions/staffing regarding the development of the interrogation operation policies. [redacted] asked whether I would be involved with the MP mission at Abu Ghraib. I told her "no" and that the 800th MP BDE had 4 of their own JAG attorneys. [redacted] told me to make myself available to the interrogators and [redacted] in case they had legal questions or issues concerning interrogation policies or approaches. [redacted] also recommended that I "sit in" on interrogations as much as possible, which I did on subsequent visits (as well as when I moved to Abu Ghraib in late NOV 03). I never witnessed any interrogators conduct interrogations in a manner that violated applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

Personnel involved in the staffing of the IROEs from the legal perspective were: [redacted] was the V Corps/CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate. [redacted] was the POC on what was eventually to become a theater-wide interrogation approach and safeguards policy. The initial policy drafting process took more than one week to complete (early SEP 03). The initial interrogation policy utilized the Guantanamo Bay interrogation policy as a template, but was changed substantially to reflect the fact that Geneva Convention protections applied to detainees in Iraq. The original policy included approaches from FM 34-52 as well as input from the intelligence and MP communities.

[redacted] would call me to check on the status of the IROEs from higher. She said that she needed IROES so that she could tell her soldiers "the rules" because there were numerous approaches that had been used in the past by various interrogators in different operations (not sure which operations she was referring to). I told [redacted] that I would check on the status of the policy with CJTF-7 JAG and that she should tell her soldiers to adhere to the accepted approaches in FM 34-52 until a signed, approved policy was in place.

The second week of SEP 03, I called [redacted] and said "I've got good news and bad news." The "good news" was that LTG Sanchez had signed the original interrogation policy, the "bad news" was that the policy would still have to be sent to CENTCOM, who could accept (or reject) it in whole or in part. I sent her the policy. [redacted] was eager to put something "on paper" (other than FM 34-52) that she could provide to her soldiers. She drafted the "IROE slide" and sent it to me. [redacted] told me that the slide she drafted had accepted FM 34-52 approaches on the left-hand side of the slide. She stated that the right-hand side of the slide contained some approaches that were not

in FM 34-52, and that these approaches were not to be utilized without the required approval from the CJTF-7 CG, if they would be allowed at all (since CENTCOM might eventually reject all or part of the policy). I took a copy of the slide to CJTF-7 OSJA for their thoughts/comments. The consensus was that the slide was "O.K." as long as the slide remained restrictive (not permissive) in scope and provided minimum protections (CG approval for all the approaches on the right-hand side of the slide). Interrogators that followed the IROE slide instructions wouldn't get in trouble because the CG would have to "sign off" on all restricted approaches (some of the approaches were later disallowed altogether). Also, I recommended that [redacted] include a sentence on the slide that the Geneva Conventions apply and that detainees should be treated humanely; she did include this language.

CENTCOM did not approve the first several IROE policies CJTF-7 had submitted. The final CENTCOM approved IROE was signed on 12 Oct 04. One of the reasons that it took a long time to get the IROEs established was because we were operating in uncharted waters. CJTF-7 OSJA attempted to look at all applicable legal authorities and precedents that were out there (Geneva Conventions/Protocols, Hague, international law, Army doctrine, established military protocols, case law, etc.). GTMO detainees were classified as unlawful combatants and weren't protected by the Geneva Conventions, whereas CJTF-7 understood that the Geneva Convention applied to IRAQ. I do not know whether SOUTHCOM was consulted on the IROEs. I do know that the IROEs were coordinated with CENTCOM, but I wasn't involved in those details. I helped type several of the modified versions of the policy.

One of the areas that CJTF-7 OSJA debated over and had legally intense discussions about was stress positions. In the original policy, stress positions could be used only with CG approval. I don't recall ever seeing a request for an exception to policy regarding stress positions.

I kept COL PAPPAS updated on each proposed change to the interrogation policy that came out. COL PAPPAS commented to me that the 12 October policy was very close to FM 34-52 except for the "Safeguards." I agreed with him. One of the changes implemented was changing the word "isolation" to "segregation." Segregation is the word used in the Geneva Conventions and CENTCOM/CJTF-7 OSJA wanted the interrogation policy's language, as well as intent, to be in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

The final interrogation policy stated that the segregation of any detainee beyond 30 days had to be approved by LTG SANCHEZ. If segregation was utilized, it was supposed to be written in the interrogation plan. I was not involved in the first few requests for an exception to policy to extend segregation beyond 30 days. [redacted] onducted the final legal sufficiency review on segregation extensions. [redacted] called me and told me that several of the requests for exception to policy did not have sufficient factual information to justify continued segregation of a detainee. Therefore, he asked me to review future requests to insure that they were factually sufficient to allow [redacted] o make a decision regarding continued segregation. [redacted] also said it

wouldn't hurt to get another "set of eyes" on the requests, so I became part of the process of getting the requests reviewed.

The segregation extension requests would be written by the interrogator and reviewed by their section leader who would than pass it to [redacted] would review the request and, if they felt it was sufficient, pass the request to me. I reviewed the request to ensure there were sufficient details and facts justifying the segregation extension request. If I found the extension request to be legally and factually sufficient, I would then pass it on to COL PAPPAS to review and either sign off or reject the request. The request would then go to [redacted] at Camp Victory, who would hand deliver them to MG FAST for review and approval/disapproval. If approved by MG FAST, they went up to CPA where [redacted]. [redacted] would conduct the final legal review. It would then go to LTG SANCHEZ for approval/disapproval.

LTG SANCHEZ didn't rubber stamp requests, I believe he was looking at them very closely because he would sometimes reject requests, saying that if MI didn't (or couldn't) get the info from some of the detainees in a certain amount of time, they should let the detainee go (LTG SANCHEZ didn't communicate this to me personally, I heard it either through JAG or MI channels when an extension request was denied).

The exception to policy process was a somewhat of a logistical nightmare, since signed originals were required to go from Abu Ghraib to Camp Victory, then to CPA to obtain the required signatures. However, this needed to be done to ensure that everyone was in line with the interrogation policy. Average "turn around time" took 10 days to two weeks, although 5-7 days wasn't unusual. In order for someone to request an extension, they would normally begin the process approximately 10 days two weeks in advance because that is how long it took to physically move the document from place to place to get it reviewed, signed and approved (since we were in hostile territory). There were, however, several extension requests that we managed to get through the process in 1-2 days where detainees were near the "30 day window." I saw approximately two requests where an extension beyond the original 30 day extension was being submitted. Fully executed extension approvals were returned to the JIDC. I advised [redacted] to maintain the signed copy of the request just in case there were any issues with a detainee in the future.

In reference to the use of dogs: I recall thinking that it was unusual during the initial drafting of the interrogation policy that the use of dogs was placed in the IROE because I don't believe there were dogs at any of the Iraqi detention facilities at the time, but I believe it was inserted as a safeguard measure. The September 14 interrogation policy stated that the use of dogs during interrogations had to be approved by LTG SANCHEZ, even though the dogs had to be muzzled. I never told COL PAPPAS that the authority to approve the use of dogs had been delegated to his level.

I wasn't the approval authority for any approaches used. Although I was given the authority to be the "No guy" with regard to application of approaches, I couldn't be the

"Yes guy" to approve whether certain approaches could be used; approval authority for approaches falling outside the scope of the interrogation policy rested with the CG.

Some of the soldiers would ask me about some of the techniques they wanted to use and whether the proposed technique fell under an approved interrogation policy approach. I told them that we would always need to look at each circumstance on a case-by-case basis, since the facts surrounding a particular detainee could often determine whether an approach could be used (old/young man, female, health issues, etc.). I provided my analysis to CJTF-7 OSJA based on legal research of the Geneva Conventions, FM 34-52, ARs, interrogation policy, Federal Laws, etc., before giving the information to commanders for their assessment.

Several examples of issues that were addressed are: can we deprive detainees of food (no, not under any circumstances); can they use the good cop/bad cop technique (yes, provided there weren't any unusual factors that might preclude using this approach); can they change their meal times (yes or no, depending on the circumstances and as long as they weren't depriving detainees of food). Per CJTF-7, stress positions could not be used. Safety positions could be used if, for example, a detainee is physically confronting or fighting you, but must be discontinued once you get assistance or if the detainee calms down. Sleep management: anything less than 4 hours of sleep per night for the first 72 hours would have to be approved by higher.

I began visiting Abu Ghraib (weekly) in September. Upon introducing myself to the MP chain of command and NCOs/soldiers at Abu Ghraib, I told them that even though I wasn't their JAG, I would help them out if they had legal issues or if there was an emergency and they were unable to contact their attorneys. I did not discuss the IROEs with the MPs.

The only MP that took me up on my offer of assistance was [redacted] When I first went to Abu Ghraib to tour the Hard Site in mid/late September, I saw a naked detainee. I approached [redacted] and asked him, "Hey, what the heck is going on here?," or words to that effect. [redacted] told me the detainee had approached him and wanted to wash his uniform, but that there wasn't a replacement uniform to give the detainee. [redacted] then took me to the back side of the cell (outside) where the detainee had hung his jumpsuit to dry. I told him to get the detainee a blanket, which he did. [redacted] told me there was always a shortage of uniforms. I told him to go to his S-4 and that if the S-4 was not responsive, to tell me and that I would get involved. I left my contact info for [redacted]. He didn't call, but when I saw him again and asked him if he had any results and he said "no." I called CJTF-7 OSJA [redacted] and he told me he would put a word out to CPA. I also told [redacted] about seeing the naked detainee and that we needed to make sure detainees had clothes. [redacted] told me it was hot [outside], but I think he was joking. I told [redacted] that if the ICRC came by and saw this they would have a problem because of our responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions. [redacted] said he understood and agreed; I believe he addressed the situation and corrected it. The next time I saw [redacted] he told me they had received 400 uniforms.

The MPs had four attorneys and the JAG at Abu Ghraib was [redacted] who worked in the Magistrate Cell. When I arrived permanently at Thanksgiving, I saw a lack of standards with the MPs. There was no military courtesy or uniform standards. There were soldiers out of uniform and one particular individual had a T-shirt that said "F— Bush." I identified myself as an officer and made an on-the-spot correction by telling the individual he could not be wearing that and to change.

I moved to Abu Ghraib at COL PAPPAS' request. In mid-November, COL PAPPAS asked me to go to the Dining Facility with him. He sat me down and told me that LTG SANCHEZ had decided to make him the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cdr for the prison. LTG SANCHEZ was concerned that there were too many perimeter security issues (mortars, rockets, RPGs, small arms, etc.) and that he wanted COL PAPPAS to fix it. COL PAPPAS decided to bring in the 165th MI BN to help with force protection. COL PAPPAS said that the MPs were going to run MP operations and MI was going to run the MI operations. COL PAPPAS took [redacted] to Abu Ghraib to help with the force protection and to instill standards. COL PAPPAS told me he wanted me to be on-site at Abu Ghraib so that I could be readily available for any questions that might arise. I remember the first time COL PAPPAS and [redacted] walked the outside perimeter--there were breaches in the perimeter walls. COL PAPPAS also brought in a Dining Facility, an Internet Café, and removed several local vendors that were conducting food/retail businesses at the prison.

Several MI soldiers were upset and approached me regarding their perception that the MP personnel were "getting away" with UCMJ and GO1 violations, while MI personnel were being disciplined/punished for the same misconduct. I notified [redacted] (MP) about this perception and reiterated that I could assist with military justice issues, if needed. [redacted] thanked me and reminded me that they (MPs) were TACON to the 205th MI, not OPCON. I took his comment to mean that he had the situation under control and that I shouldn't tell the MPs how to conduct their business, so I left it at that.

I tried to walk through all the detainee camps daily, but always went at least four times a week minimum. I never walked through after my shift (usually midnight at the latest). I also walked through 1A and 1B regularly because I often acted as a "tour guide" whenever high ranking military officers, foreign military officers, the General Council, and civilians came to visit. In January, we had visitors almost every day; visits generally lasted half a day.

There was a change to Detainee [redacted] and I asked [redacted] whether or not he had seen it. He said "no," so I provided him with a copy. I told him to get his lawyer to come down and provide a class on the changes. I believe they did have a class. I believe this happened right before I left on R&R on 14 December 03.

Interrogators were familiar with the interrogation policy. The 519th received extra attention because they were conducting the more critical tasks. Upon arriving to Abu Ghraib, I gave a Train the Trainer Class on the IROE and Geneva Convention to 519th.

Section leaders and [redacted] provided them refresher training. I saw the section leaders discuss IROE strategy and approaches with soldiers during daily meetings. The interrogators were aware that I was observing interrogations at various times (behind the 2-way mirror). I always emphasized to classes that they must respect and protect the detainees and treat them humanely. I told soldiers that if they ever had any doubt, they should discuss whether an approach was permissible with me or their chain of command, etc. I also encouraged them to put themselves in the detainees place and ask whether they would want to be treated similarly if the tables were turned. I told them if they ever had any questions, they should see the IG, CID, chaplain, chain of command, me or any other JAG.

[redacted] was in charge of the JIDC but he was not in COL PAPPAS' rating chain of command. I believe [redacted] rated him, according to what [redacted] told me. [redacted] was in the prison (physically) all the time; the MPs liked him. He was present when a detainee obtained a weapon and shot an MP. The shooting incident occurred before I moved out to Abu Ghraib at Thanksgiving.

In reference to the ICRC: When the ICRC came for an October visit, [redacted] called me at Camp Victory and said, "This is B.S. they just showed up unannounced and they want to go anywhere/everywhere." I told him, "Sir, They can go everywhere." He then said, "We have to see about this, they need to announce they are coming; they have to make sure we know they are coming." He also said he knew there was a prohibition against allowing the ICRC access to some of the detainees. I told him that he was referring to Article 143 of the Geneva Convention and that it was possible to temporarily deny access if imperative military necessity requires. I discussed this issue with CJTF-7 OSJA [redacted], who agreed, although they stated that it couldn't be a "blanket" prohibition and that the Article 143 exception was very narrow in scope and must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

The command invoked Article 143 regarding eight detainees during the December ICRC visit. The caveats to this decision (in order to meet the imperative military necessity standard) were: 1: It is only temporary. 2: Cannot apply as a general statement to an entire group. It cannot be a blanket request. 3. It has to be supported by factually sufficient reasons. 3: You must still give them access to their living area, since merely observing their living conditions won't compromise any intelligence objectives. I was on R&R leave during the December ICRC visit. The ICRC seemed pleased during their review of the December visit (in January 04) regarding the positive changes made since their October visit. In reference to the ICRC response to their first visit: I was not involved in replying. This is the memo that BG KARPINSKI signed.

I am aware of one allegation of sexual abuse. [redacted] called me and informed me that three interrogators and an interpreter had conducted an unauthorized interrogation on two female detainees and asked one of them to take her shirt off. When I discussed this with COL PAPPAS, he was very upset. He took this matter very seriously and told me we were going to "nail" these guys (soldiers) if the allegations proved true. CID conducted an investigation, but it was inconclusive and we were unable to prove sexual

assault. Also, the involved soldiers denied any misconduct, and other detainees in the same holding area told CID that the females making the allegations were "nuts." The only thing we could prove was that the soldiers conducted an unauthorized interrogation without clearing it through proper channels. They were given ARTICLE 15s for the unauthorized interrogations. I do not know of any other incidents. I do not know about the incident relating to [redacted] COL PAPPAS was always extremely careful to make sure he followed the UCMJ regulations.

I knew that detainees were placed in segregation. They were in cells alone to prevent them from speaking with other detainees. There might have been confusion with the word segregation and isolation. Segregation was authorized if you wanted to separate an individual from a group of detainees to prevent them from speaking to one another. Isolation was implemented as a means of discipline.

I never witnessed dogs being used during interrogations. I did see the dogs out in the yard near the Entry Control Point and walking around outside the concertina wire. No request for the use of dogs ever came through me. I never saw any requests with "want to be allowed use any approach necessary." In reference to women's underwear, I never witnessed or was aware of any detainee in women's underwear. Any interrogation plan with a combination of an approved technique and a technique requiring approval from higher had to be submitted in its entirety for approval.

About a week after I returned from R&R in January 04, [redacted] (CID) came to me with the pictures of detainee abuse that had been turned in. He wanted my assistance as a prosecutor to determine how to proceed. I immediately called CJTF-7 OSJA to notify them about the photographs. After assisting CID with the investigation for the first month, we felt that MPs and MI soldiers accused of abusing detainees were doing it (at least in part) for fun because of the witness statements, as well as the time, place and manner that the misconduct occurred.

The capturing units were bringing in detainees who were suspected of BA'ATH party or FEDAYEEN Membership. This was filling up Abu Ghraib. The magistrate cell identified good candidates for release in relation to theater policy and the Geneva Conventions. I would assist the magistrate cell with any questions relating to MI Holds who had been identified as candidates for release. If there was nothing on the capture tag, I would go to [redacted] and ask about the status of the detainee. She would then provide details on that particular detainee. The Magistrate Cell would have the copies of the Medical file, MI Notes, CID report, and MP report. The 519th kept the interrogation plans.

Please let me know if you have additional questions regarding this matter.

[redacted]

Judge Advocate General's Corps

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27 [redacted]	1800 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
C2, CJTF-7, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was aware of a thumb drive which was turn in to me sometime in March. I was told one of the photos was of [redacted] I opened the file to find out if the photos were of [redacted] or any MI personnel. When I opened the photos, I saw photos of dead bodies. There were also some personal photos of females posing as normal soldiers. One of the females looked like [redacted] but it was not [redacted] There were other photos of military personnel posing with detainees. I believed the photos to be of troops from the 82nd conducting their operations from the beginning and the end of detainee operations. There were no sexually implicit photos. There was one photo of a detainee on his knees with his back to me and military personnel were posing behind the detainee in front of a building that appeared to be what they had just raided. I didn't feel the photos were severe enough to take it to CID. I asked the JAG officer, [redacted] what I should do with the photos. He said since it did not involve MI personnel, we should return the thumb drive to the owner. I gave the thumb drive to the MSG who worked with [redacted] and asked him to find out who it belonged to and return it to its rightful owner. They spoke to [redacted] and asked if the drive was hers and she said no. She identified one of the individuals as being an 82nd soldier. She knew that because she has worked with the 82nd before. I don't remember naked bodies, however, there was one dead body that his upper body exposed because it looked like the body had been blown up. I know our folks can not take pictures of detainees and I do not know the policy for other units. I do know that if he was a POW they could not take photos to degrade an individual.
Q. Do you have anything else to add to the statement?
A. No.
//end of statement//[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

Nothing

follows [redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

[redacted]
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib) 1 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center Records Check

1. (FOUO) On 1 June 2004, the undersigned and [redacted] met with [redacted] LTC, USA; Deputy Director, Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC), Baghdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), Iraq; and [redacted] CW4, USA; Senior Interrogator, JIDC to obtain all logs concerning JIDC operations between 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004. Foust advised that no such logs or records currently existed within the JIDC. He recommended we contact the 391st Military Police Battalion, BCCF to obtain logs and records concerning detainee operations.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER
ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ APO AE 09342

AFVQ-JIDC-OPNS

17 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Directed Document Search

Pursuant to the telephone request on 16 June 2004 made by [redacted] for MG Fay, Deputy G2, USA, I caused a thorough inspection to be made of all office, storage, and work areas in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) for documents pertaining to interrogation and debriefing operations from August 2003 to January 2004. The inspection was conducted from 16-17 June 2004 and did not reveal any additional documents beyond those documents previously made available to representatives of MG Fay's office.

[redacted]
LTC, MI
JIDC Deputy Director

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ARMY G2 PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC	2004/05/18[redacted]	12:30[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	633-22-9845	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/CO 470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, CAMP BULLIS, TX 78254

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib as an Individual Augmentee from the 470th MI Group on or about 16 October 2003. I was assigned to the Detainee Assessment Board (DAB). My DAB Supervisor was [redacted] When I first arrived, we didn't receive any training for working in the DAB. We received the IROEs and I believe I signed them. The IROEs I would say were only vaguely understood due to the speed at which operations had to be conducted. Since the focus of the initial groups was on maintaining a steady stream of intelligence reports answering PIR's, methodology took second stage to volume of output. The IROE's were clarified three months later when we received updated IROEs which we signed again. We were shown the Geneva Conventions and told to adhere to them. They were on the wall along with the IROEs and other memorandums from various commanders within theater for the perusal of anyone who wished to review them. There was some controversy in relation to what the school taught and the environment we were in The school is an environment where you have some overwatch and where the ambience wherein interrogations are being conducted in a safe place with no additional stresses involved, but at Abu Ghraib, we were so busy there was no oversight on most of the interrogations being conducted as everyone was busy trying to hold up their part of the process. Most individuals arrived one day and were conducting operations the following day. Additionally, because of the additional stresses and due to the detainee's cultural and religious upbringing, many of the things taught at the school house were nearly useless or even irrelevant, which is why experienced or flexible interrogators were so absolutely necessary. Many of the interrogators should not have been conducting interrogations on their own. Most were young, inexperienced, and reservists who did not have the sufficient training nor the experience needed to achieve the necessary mindset of an interrogator in a combat zone. They did not know what to do so they reverted to screaming and throwing things, in other words, harsh approaches. After they didn't get what they wanted, they could send the detainee to isolation for thirty days or more as long as they wrote the right memo. The focus was on intelligence, and the fast tempo dictated that oftentimes the individual interrogator or direct line supervisor had to be trusted to make the right judgment, but unfortunately not everyone was equipped to make the right decisions. The memos were being approved by COL PAPPAS or whatever individual had the authority at the time. No one was checking to ensure the recommendations were sound with any sort of regularity. At the beginning even a memo was not required as far as I knew but as I was not there during the first few weeks of the reorganization of Abu Ghuraib into an interrogation facility, I cannot speak with any certainty. We were standing up the JIDC, being mortared daily, and the gate guards were being attacked. The DAB was not part of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and there was no SOP in place on how to run one. We began developing one based on the GTMO concept, but the environment was different than GTMO. We were in a combat environment and the numbers of detainees requiring processing was higher so we had to make a lot of changes to the SOP. We were responsible for debriefing all detainees interrogated by the ICE. When a detainee arrived, he was screened and was either identified as being of intelligence value or not. Those with intelligence value were placed in CAMP VIGILANT. Eventually, CAMP VIGILANT became overcrowded some detainees having intelligence value were sent to one of the GANCI camps. A lot would go into isolation to prevent them from corruption of intelligence. I would say that the DAB identified about 85% to 90% of detainees were of either no intelligence value or were of value but innocent and therefore should be not have remained in captivity. We debriefed all the detainees considered to having some intelligence value to ensure intelligence was not getting lost and determined if detainees required to be held longer or recommend release of detainee. At the beginning, the initial group at Abu Ghraib became overwhelmed with the number of detainee being delivered by lower echelon units The prison went from 200 one day to thousands during the following days. We did not have enough personnel to conduct the screenings and interrogations and determine the value of each detainee on a timely manner. When a detainee was able to answer a Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR), he would get interrogated numerous times and therefore, others would go without being interrogated for months The DAB would identify those who had not been interrogated and question the JIDC why it hadn't been done. An interrogation would then be conducted but this didn't always occur because of the shortage of interrogators and due to their focus on detainees of intelligence value. This of course changed for the better after the JIDC was more established and more direct oversight began to be conducted by higher echelon commanders. We would then get the detainee once the interrogator finished with the detainee. We would conduct a thorough debriefing of the detainee. The

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT Army G2, Pentagon DATED 2005/05/18

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

In November, we also began to ask all detainees we debriefed if they had ever been mistreated while in the custody of the U.S. Several individuals stated they had. One general stated that while at Abu Ghraib, some drunk MPs had gathered the him and five other generals from the General Population and taken them in to the Hard Site. They were tied up, blind folded and placed in a circle and were punched by the MPs. After the MPs were finished beating them, they were placed back into the general population. I wrote this on my DAB report and reported it to my [redacted] 66th MI. She told [redacted] and it was reported to a warrant officer (do not know his name. He is part of the unit who is there now). He received a copy of the report and thanked us for reporting it. Another detainee stated he was stripped naked, made to stand on a box with his arms spread out and bag over his head while he was hit on his legs by the MPs. There were also two other instances where detainees reported being abused before they arrived to Abu Ghraib. One reported being electrocuted by an Egyptian interpreter who was working for a civilian agency. This had occurred four to five months prior to us speaking to him. Another detainee stated the capturing MPs threw him to the ground and pour dirt all over him. He said he was diabetic and was trying to tell the MPs and he went into diabetic shock. More prevalent than any abuse while in U.S. Custody were the reports that the detainee's had been abused by the Iraqi police and the BADR Corp. I never witnessed any detainee abuse except when I saw a naked detainee walking in the Hard Site. But that is all I saw. I was pretty far away and could not tell who it was and do not know the circumstances. I do know that when criminals were placed in isolation they were often stripped. I was in the hard site at that time picking up a detainee to debrief. IN reference to humiliation, I know that some interrogators would insult the detainee's religion and family. They did not physically abuse them, but humiliated them with words. The use of words was kind of questionable. We didn't know how far they could go with words. In reference to dogs, One of my friends, I do not remember who, said someone used the dog for an interrogation. That is all I know about dogs. We did not know what the MPs could do with the dogs or maybe the MPs did not know what we could do with the dogs, some things appeared to be in gray areas and often the individual interrogator or MP may have thought they had to make the decision themselves. In reference to OGA detainees, all I know was that some were not processed and we could not talk to them. They (OGA) came and went as they pleased for the most part though some coordination was required. The operations section of the JIDC would know more as they were the POC for these agencies. I never saw or knew of any photos or videos of detainees until after the CID investigation began. [redacted] a fellow DAB member, stated that [redacted] CACI employee pushed a detainee against the wall once. This was reported in the written report and reported up the chain. [redacted] spoke to [redacted] and told him that was not acceptable. We told [redacted] spoke to [redacted] then became my partner. I was not pleased with his work. He made comments which were unnecessary. I did not allow the interpreter to translate the comments. He would insult their religion and would state that this was the time for them to show their loyalty to the U.S. I reported to my supervisor that I did not want to work with [redacted] He left a few days later to go work as an escort. I wrote about the incidents on a memorandum that I believe was submitted by my supervisors to [redacted] I believe [redacted] the CACI supervisor on the ground in Abu Ghraib, was very leery about doing anything to his guys. Another incident I was made aware of (I believe it may have been [redacted] who told me but cannot say with any degree of certainty) was of a female linguist or interrogator (If linguist I believe it to be the female on the photo shown in photo #11 on file named [redacted] who was asked to humiliate male detainees by making comments as to their manhood by talking about the size of their genitals. My personal opinion is that of all the female linguists, she was the only one that would have agreed to something of that nature. I believe I heard this right before the CID investigation, but cannot say for sure. She was a bit more open than the other female linguists. I personally know of one female linguist and a male linguist that quit because they did not agree with the way interrogators spoke to detainees. My assumption on the CACI personnel is that a lot of them were being hired on the basis of their experience in law enforcement and other such areas but that no true determination of their abilities as interrogators/screeners, etc. was done by the civilian company that hired them. Most of them were not properly trained on questioning and interrogation methodology but due to the fact that a lot of them were as much as twice as old as the interrogators leading Tiger Teams, they were not willing to listen. The focus on numbers (i.e. output) was so great that non-qualified individuals, both military and civilian, were allowed to have positions that gave them what seemed at times full powers over another persons life, namely detainees. Because these individuals (U.S. Personnel) were not screened or trained properly and not properly supervised, detainee's suffered incarceration and varied other discomforts, from mild to major, which were completely unnecessary in my estimation. Various reports were made of interrogators, linguists, and civilians treading the gray line between harsh interrogation and violation of the Geneva Conventions/IROE, but as far as was apparent no particular importance was placed upon them until the advent of the CID investigation. Some of the civilians thought that they were exempted from the rules of conduct which governed the soldiers and some of the interrogators seemed to feel the same. This, I believe, led to some of the misconduct that occurred, since the civilians didn't fear negative action and the soldiers could honestly say they were not personally involved in the actual misconduct. These statements are conjecture based upon my personal observations and conversations with other individuals and do not reflect any but my own opinions. I also think that U.S. personnel, especially civilian contractors, allowed their personal biases to color their reports, leading to detainee's being placed in isolation and being incarcerated for a longer period of time though no proof of wrongdoing was apparent. Often enough, the conclusion at the end of a report which the determined a detainee's future disposition (release/further incarceration), was more a matter of personal opinion than actual analysis of information given. People were afraid to take personal responsibility of recommending release of detainee's, even when obviously innocent, and often this would lead to condemning statements such as "the detainee told the same story seven times but is lying because he should know such and such information and was therefore uncooperative. Recommend detainee be held in U.S. custody for the duration of the conflict." [redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

Statements such as these were insufficient of themselves to commit detainee's to longer incarceration but couple that with supervisors fear of releasing anybody, and what came out was detainee's being held for months on nothing but an interrogators personal opinion for which no substantiate information was given. The biggest issues that lead to the inefficiency in the collection process, I believe arose from the actions of lower echelon interrogation facilities and the capturing units themselves. The capturing units themselves were often not accompanied by appropriately trained individuals, namely members of THT or interrogators, able to make quick determinations of the value of a detainee and the appropriateness of detaining an innocent individual even if he did have information of intelligence value. Since the detainees were not properly screened on the spot and the capturing units were often not even qualified to conduct those types of operations, anyone who was in the area or looked out of place was detained regardless of culpability. When these individuals were taken to a brigade or division level facility, they were screened by civilians or military personnel who were not sufficiently or properly trained, or even sufficiently staffed, to render intelligent judgments as to the detainee's suitability to the information exploitation process. This resulted in the glutting of Abu Ghraib, a facility, which should have been housing only individuals necessary to the interrogation process, and not innocent individuals who should have never been taken from their homes, much less gone through two or three different interrogations facilities. Reports from lower echelon facilities were often not available and even when available, spotty at best. This led to a lot of duplication of effort at Abu Ghraib, which in turn meant an unnecessary delay in the detainee exploitation process. This was also true however of interrogators in Abu Ghraib, as stated above, who were also often not qualified or experienced enough for the job they were doing. The failure to ID those that could help us out in the communities instead of holding them in detention is a major cause, as far as I'm concerned, for the political instability/anti-U.S. sentiment existent in Iraq at the moment. I personal interviewed several individuals who were influential in their communities, military, religions, etc. but who had done nothing wrong or had previously voluntarily cooperated with U.S. agencies but were detained anyways. Some had letters from U.S. officials detailing the extent of [redacted]

[redacted]

Initials of Person making Statement

[redacted]

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8. STATEMENT (Continued)

their participation and a request to not arrest these particular individuals. These papers were ignored and the detainee's held for months without any particular care paid to these documents. These detainees's, who had the potential to be great friends to the U.S./Coalition efforts in Iraq, would have very little reason to stay their hand, and every reason to become implacable enemies of the U.S. once released. The detainee assessment branch functioned as a checks and balances for the JIDC interrogators who were constantly being pressured to produce and thus had no real opportunity to check their work or pay attention to the detainee's themselves. Individuals within the ICE attempted to do away with the DAB, stating that the interrogators themselves were qualified to make final decisions as to a detainee's final disposition, but as evinced in the statements I made above and in the actual reports present in Abu Ghraib, oversight from a section not directly involved in the Interrogation Collection Element was necessary to avoid not only missing information of possible intelligence value, but also to prevent the needless incarceration of innocent people who may have never even talked to an interrogator before their fate was decided upon. A comprehensive report was necessary to ensure that the proper disposition of detainee's was being enacted and that interrogators did not recommend further incarceration of detainee's who had done no wrong but had been unlucky enough to be present at the scene of a raid. Beyond that, I believe a system of checks and balances was sadly lacking at the lower echelon interrogation facilities, and someone should have been given the task of spot-checking every facility occasionally to ensure the proper implementation of the IROES as well as adherence to the Geneva Conventions. We received a training class by a linguist who taught us what type of words to use to humiliate the detainees. His name was [redacted] was also requested by those interrogators who used more aggressive techniques. Although this does not necessarily entail any wrongdoing on his part or on the part of those interrogators who used him, the fact that the class occurred at all was indicative I believe of the notion that it was OK to humiliate detainees, to curse their mothers and daughters, to deride their religious practices, all unnecessary to a truly professional interrogator. I was shown some photos and was able to identify some of the military intelligence personnel. Photo #6 and #7 in file named Mark 5 show [redacted] observing some detainees on the floor. Photo #23 show an analyst in PT uniform and [redacted] is leaning against the wall to the left. Photo #11 in file named [redacted] shows a female interpreter (name unknown) and a CACI interrogator who I believe was a member of a special interrogation team. Though this is probably of little relevancy, I would also like to comment that I was personally present at the general population camps in Abu Ghuraib at one of the riots that occurred in November and which resulted in the deaths of some detainee's(number unknown) and the injury of several. The riots were a constant threat to the MP's during that time period due to the Muslim religious holiday of Ramadan. Many of the detainee's, especially the innocent ones with families, and who had been there a long time, felt like it was extremely unfair to them and were easy prey to the leaders amongst them who called for riots and such forms of violent expression.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? [redacted]

A. No [redacted]

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//

Nothing Follows 506

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of MAY, 2004

at ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
OSJA, DAMSTADT, GERMANY

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) [redacted] 2004/05/1[redacted]

3. TIME [redacted] 1535

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
[redacted]

6. SSN
[redacted]

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A/302nd MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE 09102

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Kuwait on 12 February 2003 and was assigned to the targeting cell in the Intelligence Fusion Center at Camp Victory. This was a Coalition operation and we were conducting Support and Stability Operations. Sometime in January, I was sent to Abu Ghraib to interrogate a [redacted] I had developed a linked diagram on this GENERAL who had over 100 members. I was working the targeting folder for the general and knew more about him than most people. I was sent by [redacted] in order to verify or validate [redacted] link diagram I had created. I was to possibly develop more targets from this interview. When I arrived at Abu-Ghraib, I asked to speak to the GENERAL. They tried to find the GENERAL because they did not know where he was. Some interrogators told me, do not know who they were (a SFC about 5'9, balding light brown hair, in his mid 40's, and possibly wore glasses.) that I could not interrogate the GENERAL because he had just endured a 14-hour interrogation and had been broken. They did not want me to jeopardize their interrogations. I was told that the GENERAL was very concerned about his son due to his age, 17yrs old. The interrogators (not sure what type of soldier did this -MP, Intel, or exactly what MOS) took his son and got him wet. They then put mud on his face and drove him around in the back of the Humvee. The boy was very cold. They placed the son in an area where his father could observe him. The GENERAL thought he was going to get to see his son but they just allowed him to see his son shivering and this broke the GENERAL (this incident supposedly took place the day before I interrogated the General's son). The son also verified this account in my interrogation of him. [redacted] was with me as my analyst and took notes while I interrogated the son. The son said he wanted to go to another tent where his brothers were because he was afraid of the other men in his tent.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to your statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13TH day of MAY, 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335	2004/04/27 [redacted]	1745 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
66th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, Deployed to Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9 [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 October 2003 to conduct interrogation operations. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib, I received a legal classes on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), the boundaries on interrogations, a tour of the facilities. on the Third day we toured the Screening area, the LSA and had classes on paperwork and Report Writing. We did receive minimal training on the Geneva Convention. It was mostly what we learned at school but a step down on what techniques we could use. We were not allowed to use Pride and Ego down. When I first arrived, COL PAPPAS was in charge of the whole place. I never witnessed any detainee abuse, never saw any photos or the use of dogs. I never knew of any MI personnel telling the MPs to "soften up" the detainee or give them "The Treatment". Any deviation from the approved techniques had to be submitted and signed by LTG Sanchez.

Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?

A. No [redacted]

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

Nothing

follows [redacted]

[redacted] AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004

at [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
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DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/05/19[redacted]	1429[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	CW2

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A/CO 519TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATALLION, FORT BRAGG, NC 28310

[redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on or about 25 July 2003, after staging thru Kuwait (12 March 2003) and serving for a period of time in Iraq at Bushmaster and Dogwood (6 - 30 April 2003). On May 1st I moved to BIAP to establish the V Corps Interrogation Facility. We conducted a Transfer of Authority with B/325 MI in June 2003 as we were expected to soon redeploy to the Fort Bragg. However, we had were informed by [redacted] and [redacted] around 20 July that we would be moving to Abu Ghraib to establish a special interrogation facility there. While on a recon of AG with COL Pappas [redacted] and others, I and several other interrogators gave recommendations on setting up the facility and processes for screening and interrogating the detainees. We were first told that the objective would be to establish a specialized facility to identifying and interrogating Saddam Fedayeen personnel detained as a result of Operation Victory Bounty. (A unidentified maneuver unit was conducting operations based on a list of some 1800 - 2000 names of Saddam Fedayeen. When CJTF-7 found out about the list, Operation Victory Bounty was formed). The actual raid rounded up some 180 folks from the list out of which only 62 proved to be of any value. The impression I had was that this operation was based on old and unverified single-source information. Many of the detainees who were on the list really did not have any affiliation with the Fedayeen Saddam (i.e., mayors and other officials who were notified they were now members of the Fedayeen Saddam then later - 2 months later - notified they were no longer members). At some point the decision was made to expand our mission to a larger scope due to short falls at Camp Cropper. I suspect that BDE [redacted] may have known about the consolidation of facilities at AG and might have wanted for A/519 to get its foot in the door at AG and begin to lay a solid foundation for the consolidated facility. Although operational plans for new operations called for detainees to be sent to Camp Cropper, they redirected to AG instead. AG began to receive detainees of value from all raids in the area and gradually mission creep set in and we were no longer specializing in attempting to identify Fedeyeen Saddam personnel. In the beginning of the establishment of the facility at AG, C2X and 205th constantly pressured us for more and quicker reporting from detainee interrogations, at times contacting interrogation personnel directly. Only after the intervention of the 519th BN Commander did they begin to back off and start using the established reporting chain without skipping echelons On or about 12 September we found out that the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) was to be formed at AG, mostly as a result of the visit by MG Miller and his team, although the decision might have been made prior to the MG Miller visit. MG Miller and his team recommended to COL Pappas on forming "Tiger Teams" with a dedicated analyst, but in hindsight that might have been more suited to a strategic environment than to our tactical situation. One of the main problems we faced was a lack of thoroughness by capturing units, MITs and Division cages - there seemed to be no tactical screening, the processing was not done right, and capture tags were either not done or done incorrectly. By 12 September the decision had been made to consolidate some facilities and move detainees into AG. Around 14 or 15 Sep detainees from Camp Cropper began moving to AG. A couple days later, interrogators from the 325th moved to AG. (We were joined by interrogators from 66th, 500th, and 470th in October). While the 205th was beginning to stand up the JIDC around mid September, COL Pappas informed me that [redacted] would be the JIDC Operations OIC and that [redacted] would be the Deputy JIDC CDR. In several meetings with COL Pappas [redacted] the 519th personnel raised several issues that needed to be dealt with (detainee population, composition of JIDC, reporting, detention criteria, JIDC's criteria for accepting detainees from other units, release process, use of Mobile Interrogation Teams, OGA, etc.) Detainee population: In the beginning (end of July to mid September) the 72d MP Company commented that the detainees held at AG were well mannered. Normally, 519th personnel ended interrogations by reinforcing the camp rules Yet after the consolidation of facilities the detainees who had moved from Camp Cropper and other facilities who were not so well mannered or orderly began to influence our original detainees. Also, since detainees were slow to be released, we were quickly becoming severely overcrowded. The engineers originally built the facility to hold 300 detainees and we had a population of around 900. Detainees that had been screened and were deemed of value were placed on "MI Hold" status. The definition of MI Hold was originally our designation to let the MP's know we were interested in the detainee and to not move them to another camp. Somehow the MI Hold status became a designation which needed senior officer approval for removal, much like the designation of Security Detainee needed senior officer approval for release. [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

At one point, we were told that all Victory Bounty detainees would need LTG Sanchez's approval for release. By mid-August we had some 300 plus detainees from various raids an[redacted], and I tried to convince those above us that we were maxed out, but there was no change. Prior to the arrival of additional interrogators from 325th MI, the 519th conducted interrogation operations during the day. After 325th interrogators arrived (on/about 15 September) up to about 20 Sep we worked in two shifts: A/519th on days and 325th on nights. The detainees moved from Cropper were a part of a huge backlog of detainees that were earlier designated as MI Holds by 325th MI had had not yet been interrogated. This schedule lasted until the mortar attack on 20 September 2003 which killed two of our personnel. Composition of JIDC: Likely influenced by MG Miller's visit, a decision was made to form Tiger Teams (consisting of an interrogator, an analyst, a reports officer and an interpreter) plus support personnel. Using our past interrogation experience, A/519th leadership tried to explain to COL Pappas and [redacted] on how best to structure the organization and how the interrogation operations had worked for us. [redacted] was not on site most of the time; he received input by phone and email and then made decisions). When I asked for a list of all inbound personnel (by rank and MOS) so I can begin organizing the "Tiger Teams" I was told by [redacted] that [redacted] would decide on the composition of the teams, not me. Around 23 to 25 September we had a meeting with [redacted] concerning changes in operations, likely due to the recent visit by LTG Sanchez. He instituted changes like "no interrogation would be accomplished until all background information had been checked out" and "interrogations had to be approved by [redacted] The former quickly proved to be unrealistic. Before [redacted] and I could respond, the later was intensely questioned by the interrogators and section leader as to why the approval was now above my (Interrogation Operations) level. The approval process was later delegated back down to the appropriate level sometime in October. Reporting: We were informed during MG Miller's visit that only a few of the 350+ Intelligence Information Reports we had sent were actually forwarded outside of theater. This gave the impression that the interrogation facilities were not doing their job in extracting and reporting information. MG Miller and others on his team had commented that there was nothing wrong with interrogation operations and reporting, the problem was somewhere up the intelligence distribution chain (likely C2). Since there was this misperception of the lack of reporting, both BDE and C2 began to ask for the actual notes from the interrogation. Interrogator notes are close hold working papers intended to document in detail to aid other interrogators who may conduct an interrogation of the detainee at a later date. They are not intended to be reports to be forwarded up the intelligence chain, much less to organizations outside the intelligence chain. Yet, they (C2 and LTG Sanchez) had been receiving these types of reports from other units (TF 121 and possibly 1AD) and wanted the same from us. We vehemently objected to releasing these reports saying this would lead to others without knowledge of interrogation operations questioning our interrogators, their methods, and the information they obtained. We were able to delay releasing these reports until 10 October when I was ordered by COL Pappas, through [redacted] that "this is a copy of the report. This is exactly how I want it to look." By mid-October we started the process of "cleaning up" (sanitizing them for release in a way that would shield the interrogation teams as much as we could) the interrogator notes and submitting them as Summary Interrogation Reports. Since there seemed to be an insatiable demand for data by C2 (wanting the interrogation notes soon after an interrogation) we were instructed to change our reporting priorities - interrogation notes, then intelligence reports. On the surface we complied, however, I told my section leaders that if we come across any information that is time sensitive, we will report that information first. At one point we were directed to write out each question and response in the Interrogation Notes. Obviously, this was met with much objection and did not last long. Since the JIDC quickly expanded and no one initially took the time to define duty positions and duty descriptions, there was constant confusion about who does what and how. Throughout this whole process I had the impression that the leadership from the BDE level on up did not know and understand the process and procedures of interrogation operations, which led to a confusing and unorganized, amateurish, and undisciplined organization. Mobile Interrogation Teams (MIT): We had concern over how MITs were utilized by maneuver units. By doctrine, they are to quickly identify, screen, and interrogate detainees who could provide valuable information to the supported maneuver commander. However, in personal conversations with some of the MITs, it became apparent that they were used to aid in filling out the capture information for the detainees. They did little to no screenings or interrogations. When questioned about the purpose of the operations they were supporting and the questions they were able to ask, they stated they did not know the purpose and only questioned detainees concerning CJTF-7 PIRs. It seemed that the maneuver units gave very broad instructions to round up any male from 16 - 60 years of age that had a cell phone, without any other verification that they were "bad guys". During a meeting with COL Pappas, [redacted] suggested that the JIDC provide MITs for specified operations as we would ultimately receive the detainees and this would aid us since we would already be familiar with the operation and the supported Commander's PIRs. Detention criteria/JIDC acceptance criteria: In my opinion less than 10% of the detainees had any real intelligence value. We told MG Miller, MG Fast, LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas (anyone that would listen) that there needed to be established criteria for the maneuver units and the Division cages on whom to look for and how to process and forward detainees of value to the JIDC. I felt some of the maneuver units' interrogators were interrogators in name only. The 4th ID folks were really bad, the 1 AD folks were OK and the 101st folks were so-so. On more than one occasion I have seen as many as three screening reports on one detainee where the three screeners commented "deceptive, needs to be interrogated by higher" (some were also labeled as having no intel value but were forwarded to the JIDC). 4th ID in particular, it appeared they would simply pass them off without conducting any questions, since after they would forward their detainees we would receive a list of questions to ask them. I responded "why don't your interrogators do their jobs?" OGA: [redacted] had what we refer to as ghost detainees that were "buried" or hidden in our facility. OGA had started in early September to come over to talk to some of our detainees with one of our interrogators presen[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

As the JIDC was forming and we began to use 1A of the "hare site", they gradually started bringing their own detainees to our facility. This was done despite the objections from me, [redacted] We explained, based on prior experience that OGA "does not play well with others", they did not live the same rules as we did and was notorious for receiving but not sharing information. Also, they did not seem to have full accountability for their detainees [redacted] both promised that [redacted] but that did not happen. We were over-ruled and [redacted] handled most of the dealings [redacted] himself primarily worked [redacted] who insisted on working only with [redacted] and did not go through the established process. [redacted] spent some of his time either at the MI LSA, or the 1A hard site (I suspect more time at the hard site than he should have). [redacted] seemed to have an affinity for OGA and special ops. [redacted] initially questioned and "broke" a detainee [redacted] who then followed up with more questioning. [redacted] role [redacted] was very limited. He was not present during the interrogation, but stated he heard slaps but was not sure if the slaps were done to the detainee or to the table in the room. I was not informed of any [redacted] Shortly after returning from leave on 11 December 2003, I heard that [redacted] ghosts died during an interrogation. Although I did not delve into details, I heard that it was suspected he died as a result of wounds inflicted during capture. Also, I heard that [redacted] was involved, but I do not know the extent of his involvement. Interrogations were to be scheduled through the JIDC Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and conducted by interrogation teams. However, I am aware of two occasions where unscheduled interrogations by unqualified personnel were conducted. The first was conducted by [redacted] According to [redacted] (the primary interrogator for the detainee), [redacted] was directed by BG FAST (through C2) to go in and interrogate using the fear up approach immediately. [redacted] woke [redacted] and an interpreter to assist in the interrogation. Against the advise of [redacted] insisted on the interrogation, knowing the detainee had just ended a 72-hour adjusted sleep schedule and was now resting and recuperating. The detainee collapsed during questioning. Afterwards, I was informed of the incident and found that both [redacted] and [redacted] /had [redacted] write a statement concerning the incident. The second incident also involved [redacted] A female detainee (not of interest to MI) claimed to have information concerning Saddam Hussein. [redacted] took his assistant, [redacted] (97E - not assigned as an interrogator), to facilitate questioning and report writing. Later, [redacted] became involved when he heard that the female detainee's family frequently visited the gates of AG to determine how she was doing. He began to 'task' her father to provide information saying things like "come back with some information and you can visit with your daughter". Although we disagreed with the whole situation, we insisted that if he was to continue with his unauthorized "interrogation" he would have to complete all required reports. COL PAPPAS was aware of these interrogations. As both our mission and detainee population quickly expanded, we did not have enough military interrogators to handle the workload. CACI contract interrogators started to arrive in mid-October. For the most part they seemed very professional and experienced, with the exception of [redacted] He was very limited in his skill set and seemed to use the "fear up" quickly during interrogation. I talked with his section leader about this observation and suggested he talk with [redacted] about it. [redacted] and possibly [redacted] would interview the incoming CACI personnel to determine their background and experience. Although I was never informed that we could reject any unqualified CACI personnel, I did know based on working with contractors in the past that we had an influence in accepting/rejecting the contractors. I trusted that the [redacted]

Army's hiring process had some built in quality control IAW the Statement of Work, which was resident with the on site manager. I had heard that CACI personnel were not to supervise military personnel or serve as team leaders, but in fact at least one of them [redacted] did so temporarily for about 2 or 3 weeks, at least until some of the 66th and 500th military personnel came on board. I do not know who approved the decision to make him a temporary supervisor, nor do I know if a waiver was requested or approved. I did not personally interview all of he CACI personnel as they arrived since I was too busy with other duties such as maintaining the database, managing interrogation operations, responding to email inquiries, and occasionally editing reports, etc. However, I did sit down and talk with a few as I had time available. All personnel (CACI, Titan and military) went through our "new guy" briefing and orientation, which entailed information on IROE, interrogation and reporting processes, and a tour of the facility. They were given a statement to sign acknowledging that they had received a briefing, read and understood the IROE. The signed copies of these statements were kept in a black 2½ - 3 inch binder in the ICE Operation section. **Interrogation Rule of Engagement:** From the time we arrived in Kuwait on 12 March 03 to the day we arrived in AG on 25 July 03, I never saw a document with the approved IROE from either V Corps or CJTF-7. During that time we relied on our past experiences with past interrogation facilities. When we move to AG to establish our fourth interrogation facility, we knew this facility was going to have high visibility and that other facilities were having problems. As a result, we began to outline our own IROE drawing upon our experiences with other facilities, issues identified at Camp Cropper, and procedures used by TF 121. In addition to the IROE, we drafted requests to use civilian clothes and modified grooming standards. We submitted these requests to CJTF-7 (through BN, BDE, and C2) and requested the approvals to be filed in writing. Only through [redacted] persistence did the IROE finally reach C2/JAG and LTG Sanchez. I never saw any signed copy of the IROE, but saw a message which said they had been approved. I can only assume the Civilian Clothes and Modified Grooming requests were denied since I never heard anything more about them. The IROE were constantly modified and each change was to be signed by a General Officer. All personnel had to acknowledge that they were aware of the changes. Again, signed copies of these statements were kept in a black 2½ - 3 inch binder in the ICE Operation section. All new personnel were trained in proper procedures; people knew the boundaries. The IROE were posted in several places and we were always talking about them. For certain approaches such as sleep deprivation (adjusted sleep schedule), we had to write up a schedule and submit a request with the interrogation plan. It would be reviewed by the JAG and sent to COL PAPPAS for approval, but LTG Sanchez would be informed. I do not know for sure but I felt that COL PAPPAS was informing the General. Other methods had to be approved by LTG Sanchez; I never saw any written approvals but was informed that it was done electronically. Each of these requests was forwarded up the chain for approval. For approved sleep deprivation the schedule was given to the MPs to implement, but I do not know how they handled it or who, if any one, in the MPs approved how they were to implement it [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Optimally, I would like to have constant interrogations conducted while a detainee was under the adjusted sleep schedule. However, it took too many resources (interrogators/linguists) away from other interrogations or one interrogation team would be as much sleep deprived as the detainee it would have been fruitless. The use of sleep deprivation was monitored; we did not want to harm the detainees. Beginning in mid-December we had Air Force doctors monitor the detainees. One instance for the use of a guard dog (in late December) entailed having the dog under control of the handler but present during the interrogation [redacted] was the interrogator. No direct reference was made to the dog, but it was felt that just the presence of the dog would be unsettling to the detainee, as we knew the detainees were typically afraid of dogs. I do not know who actually approved the procedure, but I had verbal notification from [redacted] who got it from COL Pappas, that it was approved. The written approval should be on file with the JAG. The MPs often used the dogs for random inspections. I did not see any maltreatment of detainees with the dogs.

Abuses: Some time in late September or early October, there was an incident involving the use of alcohol and an unauthorized interrogation of a female detainee. This was quickly dealt with. It involved an interrogator, two 97Bs and a Titan interpreter. The three soldiers were reduced in rank and given extra duty. I do not know exactly what happened to the Titan contractor, but I do know he no longer worked for us as an interpreter for interrogations. Although I was not involved with the incident, I am sure that [redacted] informed Titan that the interpreter was no longer welcomed and should be fired. Shortly afterwards, although we did not have any female detainees of MI interest, the procedures for dealing with female detainees were added - only females could interrogate female detainees. After I returned from leave 11 December I was informed of the incident with [redacted] in which she made a detainee strip and return to his holding area naked. [redacted] recommended an Article 15 for humiliating the detainee but was overruled by [redacted] was taken off interrogator rotation and given extra duty. I did not witness any physical abuse of detainees. I saw some "normal" pictures of AG which included detainees, but nothing of an untoward nature. I told my personnel that pictures were not to be taken. I was not aware of any exchanges of pictures among personnel. I am not aware of any videos made. My personnel never reported to me that they had observed any abuse, humiliation or use of guard dogs during interrogation. If I had been told or knew of any incidents I would have reported them. For example, in late December, [redacted] expressed concern that the one of the MPs may be "taking things too far", possibly abusing detainees. The MP was earlier shot in the chest by a detainee who obtained a gun smuggled in by one of the Iraqi guards. It was thought this incident was affecting his judgment when handling detainees. We brought these concerns up to [redacted] and possibly [redacted] who then talked with the MPs. I am not aware of the outcome as I as preparing to leave Iraq on Emergency Leave. Comment on the picture of the detainee on the ground surrounded by MI and MPs: I identified [redacted] 96B [redacted], 97E, [redacted] 96B; and [redacted] Titan Contractor. I was unable to identify the other individual in the picture who is said to be MI. Looking at the picture and noticing who is present and their state of dress, I am certain it is not an interrogation as reported by the press. 1. Night shift MPs are present 2. [redacted] is in shorts and flipflops (this also tells me that it occurred early in October when 325th lived near the facility and not in the NE compound. 3 [redacted] was never assigned as an interrogator, although he is a 97E. 4. Interrogations never occurred in the open areas in the prison. Always in the booths, the stairwell, or the detainees' cells. 5. I believe [redacted] was an interpreter for THT at this time.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statemenmt?

A. No.

//End of Statement//

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19TH day of MAY, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

USAPA V1.00

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 28 May 03

Subject: Telephonic Interview, [redacted]

Purpose of the interview was to clarify possibly conflicting statements concerning detainees being stripped naked and held in cells in the 1A area. MP [redacted] stated it was not uncommon to see people without clothing and that the whole nudity thing was an interrogation procedure used by MI. Statements by [redacted] and [redacted] reflected that detainees in 1A were often placed there for extended periods of time; statements by [redacted] and [redacted] tended to contradict this. [redacted] stated that [redacted] might have been the one who designated which detainees would be stripped and held naked. [redacted] contradicted the statement made by [redacted]

1730 – 1740, 27 May I conducted a telephonic interview of [redacted] A Co, 519th MI Bn, Fort Bragg, NC. A call was placed to his cell phone, [redacted] from my extension at Metro Park [redacted] I explained to [redacted] that I was following up on his previous interview and had just a couple of questions about intake, screening and placement of detainees awaiting interrogation.

[redacted] explained the detainees were dropped off/delivered by capturing unit or escorted by MPs from capturing unit. Initial screening was done by [redacted] and the screening section, mainly by reviewing capture tag and some limited questioning. This was mainly to determine MI potential and whether to put on MI Hold or into general prison population. Early on, all were moved to Ganci or "Tent City" as cell block 1A did not become operational and used by MI until early to mid-September. [redacted] indicated that they were under pressure from Bde and higher to use it earlier, but it was not really available or suitable. [redacted] said he had pushed for a FRAGO to force the issue if Bde really insisted, but one was never cut.

There was no MI written policy about mandatory clothing or stripping the detainees. However, if an interrogator wanted to temporarily strip a detainee as a psychological ploy to assist in interrogating him, it would have required a written request submitted with the interrogation plan. [redacted] does not recall ever processing or reviewing one during his tour of duty. Further, it would have to have been bucked up the line for approval (he believed it would go to COL Pappas for approval). [redacted] felt that it was mainly a MP call and that detainees might be stripped for security purposes, but that would be only for a specific inspection or shakedown. The MP preference was for detainees to be in jumpsuits, but [redacted] did not know if there was a formal, written policy to that effect.

He remembered one occasion where [redacted] found out about a detainee being kept either nude or in underwear and asked the MPs who stated that it was MP SOP to strip detainees of their civilian clothing when they came to 1A and give them jumpsuits. If there was no jumpsuit, then the detainee would stay in his skivvies. [redacted] told the MPs that was unacceptable and to get the detainee some clothing; if they did not have a jumpsuit, return his original civilian clothing. He reconfirmed his previous statements that he had not seen any naked detainees or detainees in women's underwear.

[redacted] also stated that at one time, exact date unrecalled, MG Fast had informed him that the MPs had asked for more jumpsuits in the supply system and received underwear instead. He did not know if they were men's or women's underwear.

I then mentioned t[redacted] that some mention had been made by others of detainees being kept nude in their cells in 1A for periods of time and wrapped in sheets or blankets when brought out for interrogation. He stated that he had not seen any of that, nor was it reported to him by any of the interrogators or interpreters.

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted]A/302nd MI BN

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned telephonically contacted [redacted] the 302nd MI BN, Wiesbaden, GM, to clarify details taken in a 13 May 2004 sworn statement and 31 May telephonic interview with [redacted] concerning his knowledge of abuse at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] was identified by [redacted] as one of his associates with whom he passed rumours of abuse.

[redacted] is an analyst assigned to A Company, 302nd MI BN, Weisbaden, GM. He was deployed to Abu Ghraib from 15 October 2003 to February 2004. For his first month there he was assigned to an interrogation team. His Team Chief was [redacted] and his interrogator was [redacted] His duty was to conduct analysis and develop questions for [redacted] to use in interrogations. On occasion he sat in on an interrogation. [redacted] visited Tier 1A only a few times. He never observed or heard of detainee abuse and/or nudity while at Abu Ghraib. After his first month [redacted] was reassigned to an ad-hoc guard force to escort detainees and ensure security and safety during interrogations. [redacted] and [redacted] were on the guard force and [redacted] was Sergeant of the Guard. [redacted] did not recall [redacted] speaking about or purporting knowledge of detainee abuse [redacted] did not recall hearing rumours or allegations of abuse until after the public disclosure of the abuse photos. If [redacted] had claimed knowledge of abuse [redacted] would not likely have believed him.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]

Lieutenant Colonel, USA

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME [redacted]	4. FILE NUMBER
Fort Huachuca MID, Fort Huachuca, AZ	2004/06/10	0836	
[redacted] MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN [redacted]		7. GRADE/STATUS Civilian

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Phoenix Consulting Group Inc., Huntsville, AL

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 7 - 21 Oct 03, I was at Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq as part of a five person Mobile Training Team (MTT) from Fort Huachuca, AZ. The mission of the team was to provide an overall assessment of interrogation operations, training and advice and assistance. My focus was the analytical portion of the operation. I spent most of my time in the analytical cell observing [redacted] operations and the interaction between interrogators and analysts. Upon our arrival at AG, we were greeted by [redacted]. We were also provided a tour of the facility. The team spent the first couple of days setting up, conducting an assessment of the operations and establishing a training schedule based on the assessment. The training lasted five days and focused on refining interrogation skills and techniques including questioning and elicitation techniques, cultural awareness, the TIGER TEAM concept, collection management and use of interpreters. I was the primary instructor for several analytically oriented blocks of instruction including requirements management, analytical support to interrogators and database management. The training was based on the TIGER TEAM concept. When we got there, the interrogators had already started to employ this technique as the analysts participated in the interrogations. The operations cell was working hard to get the administrative portion of the operation up to speed to include the uniform standards, convoy procedures overall standard operating procedures. [redacted] worked diligently and were very dedicated to establishing procedures. The operation was under a lot of pressure from the command in Baghdad to get results. Even though there was pressure to report, there appeared to be a general lack of communication and logistical support. The command in Baghdad did not seem to completely understand the operation. I did not have much contact with the interrogators as I spent a majority of my time in the analytical cell observing operations. In my opinion the analysts worked extremely hard to support interrogation operations. During my time at AG, I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I never witnessed nor heard of any MI person asking or insinuating that an MP should abuse a detainee. I never witnessed nor heard of any MP offering to abuse a detainee to assist interrogation operations. I also never witnessed nor heard of any dogs being used in interrogations. [redacted]

Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A: No.//End of Statement//

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of June

at the Fort Huachuca Military Intelligence Detachment

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CJTF7-TF-FAY 10 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted]A/302nd MI BN

1. (FOUO) On 9 June 2004, the undersigned telephonically contacted [redacted] at the 302nd MI BN, Wiesbaden, GM, to clarify details taken in a 13 May 2004 sworn statement and 31 May telephonic interview with [redacted] concerning his knowledge of abuse at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] was identified by [redacted] as one of his associates with whom he passed rumours of abuse.

[redacted] is an analyst assigned to A Company, 302nd MI BN, Weisbaden, GM. He was deployed to Abu Ghraib circa October 2003 to February 2004. For his first few months he was assigned to two interrogation teams. His Team Chiefs were [redacted] and [redacted] He sat in on one interrogation; in Tier 1A (Stairwell). He never observed or heard of detainee abuse and/or nudity while at Abu Ghraib. He belived that detainees may have been stripped when put into isolation but had no direct knowledge of this. After his first month [redacted] was reassigned to an ad-hoc guard force to escort detainees and ensure security and safety during interrogations. [redacted] were on the guard force and [redacted] was Sergeant of the Guard. [redacted] was in Tier 1A approximately once a week to pick up detainees for interrogation [redacted] did not recall [redacted] speaking about or purporting knowledge of detainee abuse. [redacted] did hear general rumours of abuse (unrecalled sources) and once heard of a detainee being raped by fellow detainees. [redacted] would address his soldiers about once a week and caution there were lots of rumours and unless one had facts not to spread them. [redacted] had claimed knowledge of abuse [redacted] would not likely have believed him.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
94th RRC, Devens, MA [redacted]	2004/05/29 [redacted]		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
325th Military Intelligence Battalion, East Windsor, CT

9
[redacted] _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am currently the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) of the 325th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), East Windsor, CT, having been assigned to that position on 21 Jan 03. The 325th MI BN deployed for Iraq on 7 Feb 03, and I was the CSM for the entire Iraq deployment. We (Headquarters and Headquarters Service Company (HHSC)) conducted a home station mobilization at East Windsor, CT, for a few days and then arrived at Fort Dix, NJ, on 14 or 15 Feb 03. We processed and trained at Fort Dix for approximately a month and then deployed to Kuwait in mid Mar 03. We stayed at Camp Virginia, KU, for approximately three to four weeks, where we were attached to the 205th MI Brigade. On approximately early to mid Apr 03, the battalion HHSC moved north to Balad Army Airfield, north of Baghdad, where the battalion headquarters remained until the 325th re-deployed in Nov 03. I was only at Abu Ghrayb (AG) on three occasions and all three visits were one-day trips. My first visit was on 21 Sep 03, the day after one of my soldiers was killed in a mortar attack on AG. I went to AG to get to the bottom of how the two troops were killed. When I got there I found soldiers staying in tents with no overhead cover, a sleeping stone's throw from the prisoners. The mortar round had penetrated the soft side of an ARFAB and detonated on contact with a table, creating an air-burst explosion that killed the troops. After the incident, the troops were moved inside buildings that afforded better protection. I toured a good portion of AG, but not the entire facility. I saw some jail cells, but I don't believe I toured the area known as the "hard site". Most of the prisoners I saw were in a fenced area surrounded with barbed wire. All the prisoners I saw that day were clothed in regular Arab clothes, and nothing about their clothing jumped out at me. I never saw any prisoner naked or dressed in women's clothing. I never saw any prisoner abuse. My second visit to AG was sometime in Oct 03 and was a site visit to check on my troops. I toured the area known as the "hard site" on one occasion to try to get an idea of the layout of the prison. During that visit, all the prisoners were dressed in regular garb and I did not see any naked prisoner or any wearing women's clothing. I did not speak to any of the Military Police (MP) or the MP leadership during that visit. I did not see or hear of any prisoner abuse or anything out of the ordinary. My third visit to AG was to attend a conference with the 205th BDE Commander, but the conference was eventually cancelled and I returned to Balad later the same day. While waiting for the Commander, I had a chance to talk to many of my 325th soldiers, but I did not tour the facility. On my three trips to AG, I had many discussions with my soldiers there. None of my soldiers ever reported or discussed anything out of the ordinary at AG. No one ever told me about any concerns about the treatment of prisoners.. I never saw, nor heard of, any prisoner abuse. I never saw, nor heard of, unauthorized photographs or videos of prisoners. I never saw, nor heard of, military working dogs being used in interrogations. Those times that I was at AG, I wasn't very impressed with the MPs I saw there. Looking at it from a senior NCO perspective, the MPs did not appear very professional. They appeared undisciplined, out of uniform, and didn't appear to have basic Army leadership. I remember thinking to myself "what were the junior leaders and company commander doing". [redacted] as ordered me to not discuss details of this inquiry with anyone other than those investigators I know to be directly involved in this inquiry. I have nothing further to add to this statement [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

10 EXHIBIT

11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1999 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE (PAPA V1.00)

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] ULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME · THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[redacted]

Arm G-7
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29th day of May, 2004
at DEVENS, MA 01434

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 [redacted] PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2004/05/13	1726 1744	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/302ND Military Intelligence, Wiesbaden, Germany APO AE 09096

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib the first week of November 2003. I was assigned to a Tiger Team as an Analyst. I worked with [redacted] (interrogator) and [redacted] When I first arrived we received some training on what we could do and not do. We were also told of some of the interrogations techniques that required the GENERAL's approval. I signed several forms but I do not remember if I signed the Interrogation Rules of Engagement. I might have. I wasn't absolutely sure of all the rules and thought that some of the rules did not apply to me because I was only an analyst and my duties were to escort detainees and sit in a booth with interrogators. One day, I saw a civilian [redacted] (a civilian working for CACI) grab a detainee off the Humvee and drop him to the ground. He then dragged the detainee into the interrogation booth. The entire time, the detainee had his hands cuffed. As the detainee tried to get up on his knees [redacted] would yank him very hard and make him fall again. [redacted] was an interrogator working with [redacted] and his supervisor was [redacted] I wrote a sworn statement to CID a week later. The CID agent was not concern about my report because he appeared to be focusing on another incident. [redacted] made a statement and everyone knew he had been called back and he was outcast by the other CACI employees. When [redacted] spoke to [redacted] about incidents, [redacted] made him feel like he was ranting or whining. If you saw something and reported it, it was your word against theirs. The discipline was a slap on the hand. When I reported it to CID, I felt that they could get it to the right authorities. There were stories before I even got there that some of the incident occurred in front of higher rank and nothing was said. The place was loosely run and interrogators had free reign for interrogations. We knew we couldn't touch them. No one ever explained to me what MPs could or could not do. I sat in on an interrogation with [redacted] where a detainee told him that a dog had bitten him on the leg. [redacted] reported it to [redacted] and wrote it in his report. I have identified the detainee on a photo marked #92 and #100 on file [redacted] Some of the detainees in the isolation cell did not wear clothes because they were mentally unstable. Our detainee was naked because he had peed all over his jumpsuit and he had it hanging on his cell to dry. Another naked detainee pooped all over himself, ate it and rubbed on the wall. He did this all on his own. I saw a pair of women's' underwear in one of the detainees cell but he was wearing a jumpsuit. I never witnessed or was aware of any photos or videos of detainees.

Q Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

//End of Statement////////////////////////////////////// [redacted]

Nothing

Lows [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13th day of MAY, 2004

at DARMSTADT, GERMANY

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[redacted]

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.
PRINCIPAL To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METROPARK SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/05/24[redacted]	[redacted] 1530	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B/141st Military Intelligence Battalion, Logan Utah

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib o/a 23 September 2003. We had just departed Camp Bucca where we were conducting interrogation operations. While at Camp Bucca, I conducted many interrogations, but my duties were part of a maintenance team working on life support issues. The interrogations conducted at Camp Bucca were all within the FM 34-54. There were none that went above the FM. The first days we arrived at Abu Ghraib, we were given the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROEs) and made to read and sign a form stating we understood the IROEs. There were no surprises on the IROEs. It was clear cut what we could and could not do with the right approval. I was placed on the screening team. I conducted only a few interrogations fo[redacted] He wanted to conduct a final interrogation on some females who we wanted to release. Before we released them, a final interrogation had to be conducted. I also conducted a Knowledgeability Brief on a detainee for the ICE. All the other interrogators were busy with their interrogations and had a backlog of detainees to interrogate. During my time at Abu Ghraib, I never saw or had any knowledge of any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainees, or the use of dogs during interrogations. The only time I knew anything about photos was after CID had already begun their investigation. An MP (I do not recall his name) told me that a female MP had some pictures of herself and another soldier. I asked him if he had talked to CID and he said no. I then went and spoke to [redacted] about the incident. He told me to go and tell CID. I went and told CID. I wasn't required to make a sworn Statement. The Warrant Officer didn't seem too concern about it. (all this was after CID had already begun their investigation). I have no knowledge of MI telling MPs to soften up or loosen up a detainee for interrogations. When we screened detainees, they were taken to two locations, they would either go to one compound for MI Holds or another compound. Once when I had to drop off a detainee to the hard site, I heard loud music. I saw an MP trying to get a detainee in the cell and the detainee was resisting, the MP hit the detainee once to try to get him in. He didn't hit him hard. I reported the incident [redacted] went and spoke to the MPs and then notified me that the MPs were having a hard time getting the detainee in the cell and there was nothing else done. I only went to the hard site on a handful of occasions but never at night. After a group of detainees had been released, one of the MPs taught the detainees Jingle Bells and recorded the detainees singing Jingle Bells for about 10 seconds. This was reported to CID during my initial questioning. [redacted]

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. No

//End of Statement//[redacted]

Nothing follows

[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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2. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. [redacted] LY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of MAY 2004

at: METRO PARK, SPRINGFIELD, VA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	[redacted] PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
[redacted]	

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VICTORY	2004/05/07[redacted]	2112 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
372nd Military Police Company

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib 1 October 2003. My platoon was responsible for escorting detainees from Abu Ghraib to the court house, the CSH and other detention facilities in downtown Baghdad. Several soldiers who had corrections officer experience were taken to work in the prison. [redacted] was selected to put a training environment plan due to his civilian background. 3rd platoon, my platoon, rotated escort duties and I volunteered to work in Camp Vigilant. In mid December, when [redacted] went to work as an escort, I was placed in the Hard Site and take over his shift with [redacted] I never observed any MI or MP abuse any detainees. I had heard of photos being taken of some detainee who had shit all over himself. I never saw the photos. [redacted] told me if anyone ever wanted me to do something to get it in writing because if not, no one is going to back me up. I never heard MPs state that MI had encourged them to abuse a detainee. Dogs were used to search for drugs, but I never heard of MI using dogs during interrogations. I never saw dogs being used inappropriate. Abu Ghraib is an isolated place and no one ever came by to check up on us. I saw the battalion commander and battalion sergeant major maybe two or three times. I only remember seeing my first sergeant and commander at my work area on Thanksgiving and Christmas [redacted] I saw maybe two times-nowhere near my work area. My platoon sergeant and platoon leader did not check up on us either. OGA did drop off "ghost" detainees. They were not accounted for or kept tracked off. They would just tell us to feed and treat them the same as the other detainees until they figured out whether they had information the military needed.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No!

//End of Statement//[redacted]

follows

[redacted]

10 EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 [redacted] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. [redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Metro Park, Alexandria, VA	[redacted]2004/05/25	13[redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
17323 West Mount Stephen Ave, Canyon Country, CA 91387

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was hired by the TITAN Corporation as a linguist/translator on 1 October 2003 and deployed to Iraq. I arrived in Abu Ghraib on 13 October 2003. This was my first assignment for TITAN. Upon my arrival in Abu Ghraib I initially was introduced to CW2 [redacted] who had responsibility for the linguists at Abu Ghraib. [redacted] handled linguist assignments and maintained a work schedule. Linguists were instructed to check a chart [redacted] created on a daily basis for scheduled assignments/interrogations. If we had no scheduled interrogation we would be "on call" to provide linguist support to the medics. [redacted] provided me a brief orientation of the facility and mission. He took me to see the wood site interrogation center and had me observe linguist support to screenings to familiarize myself with operations. I remember reading and signing a statement that I understood the "Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE)." I believe it was a two page document, not the one page slide I was shown in this interview. Other than being provided that document to review I received no additional instruction in approved interrogation procedures or proper handling of detainees. Nobody elaborated on the IROE concerning what could or could not be done. It was a "check the block" procedure with no real explanation. I understood that you could not physically abuse or even touch a detainee and it would clearly be abusive to beat, punch or kick a detainee. I was never briefed on use of humiliation techniques or dogs in interrogations. I thought the military interrogators would know what was right and wrong; I was only there to provide translation. I asked [redacted] assign me in the field as a screener and was told I would be in a "test period" for a few weeks to assess my abilities before any final assignment. Within one to two days of my arrival I was assigned to support interrogations on [redacted] (sic) team. I participated in just a few interrogations while on this team. Present during these interrogations was a CACI interrogator, [redacted] He was a big man of African decent. Within two weeks I was reassigned to a foreign fighter team led by [redacted] working the night shift. Also on this team were [redacted] and [redacted] Within one to two weeks of joining this team (I believe 17 or 18 December 2003 [redacted] told me that he, [redacted] and I would be working on a special project and I had fifteen minutes to pack for a week long trip. [redacted] and I traveled south of Basra via aircraft and helicopter to a ship to pick up "Project #2," an alleged Al-Qaida detainee whom we then escorted back to Abu Ghraib. The detainees name was [redacted] and I believe his [redacted] (Identified in Photo #213). [redacted] was assigned as the primary interrogator and [redacted] was the analyst with me providing translation. We had no other duties while working on "Project #2." We initiated interrogations the evening of our return and continued interrogations approximately once or twice a day. The interrogations were normal and nothing abusive was said or done to the detainee. [redacted] did not use dogs, deprive the detainee of sleep or order removal of his clothes. He generally tried to befriend the detainee and win his trust. While working on [redacted] team I conducted translations of several documents captured with this detainee in between the daily interrogations. I can't recall with any more detail the frequency or duration of interrogations but that should be documented in the detainee's file. Included in files were who interrogated a detainee and how often. After a week or two of interrogations, I'm not certain, [redacted] was reassigned. This resulted in an "idle" period where I had nothing to do other than continued document translation. About a week or two later [redacted] took over as the interrogator and we resumed interrogations. [redacted] didn't conduct the interrogations much differently than [redacted] never abused the detainee. He never made him remove clothing or wear women's underwear on his head. Most times, since it was cold, the detainee had a blanket during interrogations. [redacted] may have ordered the detainees hair and beard shaved. I never heard him give this order or heard him bragging about doing so but he commented on the detainee's hair one day and a few days later the detainee was shaven. [redacted] never employed physical abuse. He never touched the detainee or used dogs in interrogations and I never heard him tell any detainee that dogs would be let loose on him. The detainee once told me that dogs were used on him and other detainees but not specifically against him. I believe it may have occurred during routine searches but am not certain. He didn't tell me when or why, just that he was afraid of dogs. I do not remember if [redacted] was present when the detainee told me this but most likely he would have been. [redacted] would sometimes make the detainee stand in the corner or sit on the ground in the corner. Other than standing or sitting in the corner, I never observed [redacted] use stress positions on the detainee. During most interrogations the detainee sat in a chair. Routinely the detainee would complain of being tired and being made to stand for long periods while in his cell. His feet were swollen and on on[redacted]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

occasion he asked to see a doctor. I believe [redacted] asked a doctor what could be done for this detainee's pain. The doctors examined detainees routinely and on at least one occasion did provide this detainee some medication [redacted] were fully aware of these procedures and how this detainee and others were handled and treated. [redacted] never ordered the detainee to stand for long periods during the interrogations. One time, date unrecalled [redacted] L PAPPAS, and others visited and asked [redacted] r a status of our detainee. I am certain they were aware of this detainees status, condition and treatment. [redacted] may have ordered sleep deprivation as the detainee complained of being tired but I have no knowledge of this. I never heard him tell the MPs to give the detainee "a bad night." Once or twice I heard him tell the MPs he would get approval to adjust a detainee's sleep pattern and on one occasion I saw [redacted] with some paperwork which he told me was approval to use sleep deprivation which he was taking to the MPs. I believe [redacted] always used paperwork to adjust or initiate sleep deprivation [redacted] was no rougher than anyone else with the detainees and was generally easy-going. Starting sometime in January, when mortar attacks became more frequent [redacted] gan providing the detainee a flak vest during interrogations. The day of the 24 November 2003 shooting incident I was in the chow hall waiting to go on shift at 2200 hours [redacted] came in and alerted everyone of a shooting. He then directed all linguists to provide immediate assistance to the ensuing interrogations. I worked straight through until approximately 1445 the following day. There was lots of commotion and I did see some of the detainees without clothing. I observed one detainee who was stripped and taken upstairs to the shower room for interrogation by [redacted] and [redacted] believe but am not certain that they made him wear women's underwear. I heard the detainee crying "no." I also saw them toss water on the detainee. [redacted] did not conduct any interrogations that day. Most interrogations occurred in the hallway between Tier A and Tier B. I remember seeing the MPs with dogs in the cells. There was too much confusion and I couldn't go through the cell block so I am uncertain what they were being used for. I assume they were conducting searches. There were a few other occasions where I observed dogs being used. One day (unrecalled) I saw the MPs searching detainee cells with dogs. Another time in Camp Vigilant, I saw the MPs searching the detainee's tents. They moved the detainees to one side while they searched the other. I never observed dogs being used to frighten detainees. Sometime in late February or early March 2004 I was reassigned and worked with a [redacted] n a foreign fighter team. At this time I signed additional paperwork which I believe was an update to the IROE but I'm not certain. I remained on this team until my departure on 8 April 2004.

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement? [redacted]

A: No.

//END OF STATEMENT//

Nothing Follows

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of May 2004

at: Alexandria, VA

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT [redacted] USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted] ULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9th day of June, 19 04 at JIDC, BCCF, Iraq

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPPC V1.

CJTF7-TF Fay 20 June 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted]

1. On 3 June 2004, the undersigned interviewed [redacted] 97B, Tactical Human Intelligence Team Member; A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, Telephone Number: [redacted] Residence: [redacted] ETS: 3 October 2005; [redacted] The interview provided the following information:

a. Source arrived in AG, Iraq in late July 2003. His job for the first 10 days was to set up the life support area and operations. The team's mission was to interrogate detainees captured in a Coalition raid searching for members of the Fedayeen Saddam. The initial interrogations were largely unproductive. Coalition command kept pressing Source's unit to produce intelligence reporting. Source stated the vast majority of the detainees were not knowledgeable and useless.

b. Source's command were extremely hands-on with interrogation operations. [redacted] would frequently interrupt interrogations and provide input. Source liked COL Pappas professionally though Source acknowledged Pappas probably had knowledge of abuse by Other Government Agency (OGA) personnel through [redacted] and [redacted]

c. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) were well known by all interrogators on Source's team though Source does not recall whether He signed an acknowledgment statement to that affect. All interrogations that took place once normal operations began were run on a strict interrogation plan that was signed off by the chain of command. Source said originally, the interrogation plans were signed by His team senior interrogator though He did not recall who signed off on them at a higher level. The initial IROE did not have the approval authority spelled out though the subsequent IROE's were very specific; identifying approval authorities up to [redacted] Source also stated the requests to change phases were not always granted and that sleep deprivation and the interrogation schedules were always approved through His chain of command. Source said the policies and procedures followed at AG were very similar to those His unit followed while in Afghanistan.

d. Source neither saw nor heard of the Military Police (MP) in charge of the detainees abusing or mistreating the prisoners while He was there. Source stated the MPs did a cursory job of enforcing interrogation phases such as adjusted sleep and meal schedules. Source did not remember any guard dogs present, used, or requested. Source frequently was presented with nude or partially nude detainees, including some in female undergarments. When asked why, the MPs claimed they ran out of men's underwear. Source also said some detainees in isolation cells would voluntarily disrobe to their underwear due to the heat. When interrogations would take

place, the detainees would get dressed. There was never any reason for them to be standing in the hall naked.

e. Source was on emergency leave in the US for 12 days over the Thanksgiving Holiday in November 2003. Source departed AG in September 2003.

2. Source refused to execute a DA 2823 Sworn Statement.

3. Point of Contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at Conn [redacted]

[redacted]
15-6 Investigating Officer

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES:	Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/02 3. TIME 1000	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [redacted]	6. SSN [redacted]	7. GRADE/STATUS 03

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Co, 141 Bn, 300th MI Bde, Utah National Guard Logan , Utah

[redacted] , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to Abu Ghraib (AG) from 1 Oct 03 until 6 Feb 04. I was attached to the 323d MI Bn and had duties as the Headquarters Support Company Commander. My rater was [redacted] and my rater was COL Pappas. My duties consisted exclusively of the "care and feeding" for the Soldiers - administration, logistics, and life support for the MI Soldiers assigned at AG. I had no involvement with the operational side of the house. I visited the hard site and the wood site on only a couple of occasions; I had no official duties there [redacted]
I did hear about three soldiers receiving Article 15s for an unauthorized interrogation of a female detainee - this incident happened before my arrival and I did not have direct knowledge of it. Near the end of December 03 or the first part of January 04, I am not positive of the date but know that it coincided with the CID investigation, [redacted] reported to me that he had seen some unauthorized photos of detainees and was uncertain about reporting it, as he did not want to get anyone in trouble. I told him that he had to report it to CID, which he did. Other than the matters above, I did not observe, hear of, or have reported to me any instance of humiliation, abuse or maltreatment of detainees. I did not see or hear of any unauthorized photographs or videos. [redacted]
Q: Is there anything you would like to add? A: No.
//End of Statement//

Nothing

follows

[redacted]

11 INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted] PAGE 1 OF [redacted] PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

Not

used

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [redacted]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May 2004, 2004 at METRO PARK SPRINGFIELD, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

[redacted]

From: [redacted] MAJ DCS, G-2
Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 12:33 PM
To: [redacted] Mr HQ INSCOM
Subject: FW: SPC Cruz

AL,
Here is [redacted] info for his file.

[redacted]
-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted] CPT CJTF7-CHIEF ADMIN LAW
To: [redacted] DCS, G-2'
Sent: 4/30/2004 3:38 PM
Subject: [redacted]

I have contacted [redacted] civilian defense counsel, for [redacted] has stated that his client will invoke his right to remain silent.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 *(SSN)*.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
METRO PART, SPRINGFIELD, VA	2004/05/19	1506	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
		CIV

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
4058 Lucas Ave Las Vegas, NV 89120

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was hired by Titan in early October 03 to work as an Arabic language interpreter/translator. I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 11 or 12 October and left on January 19, 04. Immediately on arrival I was given a tour of the facility to include the interrogation areas, dining and sleeping areas and given an orientation on how the interrogation center functioned. I was informed of do's and don't in handling detainees - specifically to translate exactly what was said, no physical or verbal abuse or humiliation, to sit between the detainee and interrogator. I was instructed to report immediately if I saw or became aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. Hand gestures were allowed as part of the interpreter process as that is a part of Arab culture. My initial assignment was in screening for about 5 or 6 days and after they found that I was more capable, I was moved to interrogations. I mainly interrogated former Iraqi Intelligence Service personnel and General Officers who had previously worked with I never saw any physical abuse, shoving, hitting or pushing of detainees. I did not observe any humiliation such as being stripped and walked around naked or having to wear women's underwear. Most of the interrogations were done in the booth, in the cells, or upstairs room in the hard site. assigned me to work with and on various occasions. On one occasion as I was conducting an interrogation I observed one of the dogs being walked through the area, back and forth but repeatedly being stopped in front of one particular cell. There was a detainee in the cell but no interrogators at the time. While interrogating with the General was always kept in the hard site or in his cell. I never saw any abuse of him. I interviewed the Syrian on a couple of occasions after the shooting. was being very cooperative with us and informed us about discussions among the detainees in AG. I worked with OGA on one occasion to interrogate a former Al Qaeda. The interrogator only introduced himself as being from OGA and the interrogation lasted about 5 hours. There were no Army personnel present. During the interrogation, the detainee was made to kneel and told he could sit when he answered questions. I did not see any abuse by the OGA interrogator.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

//End of Statement//

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED

(Continued)

[redacted]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19th day of MAY, 2004

at Metro Park, Springfield, VA

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
94th RRC, Devens, MA [redacted]	2004/06/05 [redacted]	1445 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT/E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
6th Battalion, 98th Division (MIIT), Devens, MA

9. [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I have been asked to provide further information to clarify statements I made to investigator on 28 May 2004, regarding two incidents involving detainees at Abu Ghuraib (AG) Detention Facility, Iraq. As I previously stated, I witnessed two incidents and reported both those incidents to my supervisor, [redacted] was part of a Tiger Team from Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Facility with the mission to identify systemic problems at AG and recommend corrections and solutions based on the GTMO experience. The GTMO Tiger Team consisted of [redacted] Team Leader and MOS 351E) [redacted] US Marine Corps [redacted] (analyst, equivalent to 96B), and myself. I witnessed the first incident during my first interrogation at AG in early Oct 03. It took place in one of the wooded booths and I observed from behind the glass [redacted] was the lead interrogator, [redacted] was there as an analyst, and there was an Interpreter/Translator (I/T) whose name I can't recall, but he was known to be as the "crabby old bastard". During the interrogation, [redacted] had the detainee roll his orange jumpsuit down to his waist and insinuated that the detainee would be stripped further if the detainee did not cooperate. Shortly after this happened, the Interpreter put up his hand, looked away, and said that he was not comfortable with the situation, and then exited the booth. [redacted] then stopped the interrogation. I brought the situation to [redacted] attention, but she responded with words to the effect that SPC [redacted] knew what he was doing. After my shift, I met with the other members for our "daily" After Action Review meetings in the Operations area. Although they were intended to be daily they were not, but we did have one this particular night. I did not bring up the issue during the meeting because I am not an interrogator and I wasn't sure how to handle reporting it. I thought it would be best to bring it to [redacted] attention and let him handle it. After the meeting, we drove back to the Living Support Area (LSA). [redacted] bunk was right next to mine and they were next to the door. I asked him if he could step outside with me because I had something sensitive to tell him. We both stepped out into the stairway to the barracks, and I reported to him what I had seen, as I have stated above. At the time, the fact that the interpreter walked out bothered me because we had had problems at GTMO with interpreters disrupting interrogations by attempting to dictate the pace and method of interrogation approaches, so we talked about that. I did not present the incident in general or generic terms. I never used the term "cultural difference", and neither did [redacted] I specifically told him what [redacted] had done and that that was the reason why the Interpreter walked out. I didn't get much feedback from [redacted] during this conversation, other that he discussed the problem with an Interpreter walking out of an interrogation. He did not ask clarifying questions about SPC [redacted] rolling down the detainee's jumpsuit and never addressed that aspect of the incident specifically. He said he would "take care of it". By it, I took it to mean that he would report both the rolling of the jumpsuit and the interpreter walking out. Essentially that "it" referred to the whole incident, not just the interpreter. [redacted] and I never spoke about this incident again, and he never provided any feedback to me as to the what happened, or what would happen as a result of the report. As I mentioned in my first statement, [redacted] did come back to me sometime later and asked why I had reported the interrogator for walking out on the interrogation, saying that the interpreter was one of the better ones. However, he never asked or confronted me about why I had reported him for the incident. The second incident also occurred in early Oct 03. It occurred sometime before we were briefed on the new IROE that [redacted] had signed, which, I have been informed, was dated 12 Oct 03. I participated in what would have been my third or fourth interrogation. I would like to clarify a statement I made in my 28 May 2004 Sworn Statement, when I stated that "we were interviewing a detainee for the first time". To clarify, this was the first time that I had participated in an interrogation with this detainee [redacted] however, to my knowledge, had interrogated him previously. About two hours into this interrogation, it became evident that [redacted] was getting frustrated with the detainee because he wasn't cooperative and was not answering questions. About an hour and 45 minutes into the interrogation, [redacted] turned over to me and asked if I thought we should put the detainee in solitary. I told him that I did not think it was a very effective tactic and would harm any rapport with the detainee, but that he was the interrogator and it was his call. About 15 minutes later, [redacted] stopped the interrogation, departed the booth, and returned about five minutes later with a Military Policeman (MP). The MP was either [redacted] (he did not wear glasses). It was the same MP that later stated in [redacted]

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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DA FORM 2922, DEC 1999 DA FORM 2922, JUL 72 IS OBSOLETE USAPA V1.00

[redacted]

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

the Hard Site "I want to thank you guys, because up until a week or two ago, I was a good Christian". [redacted] entered the booth with the MP right on his heals. The MP jammed a bag over the detainee's head, grabbed the handcuffs restraining him, and said some thing like "come with me piggy" and he lead the detainee to solitary confinement in the Hard Site, but we did not follow from the booth to the Hard Site. Sometime between approximately 1200 and 1300 hours [redacted] and I went to lunch and the incident continued to bother me. About half an hour later [redacted] and I returned to Hard Site after finishing lunch. As we were finishing up lunch, [redacted] stated that he wanted to go see our guy, referring to the detainee in isolation. He did not say why, and I did not ask. We did not have an interpreter with us, but we did have the same interpreter who had participated in the earlier interrogation, and he was scheduled and available for us if we needed him. When we arrived at the detainee's cell, we found him lying on the floor, completely naked except for a hood that covered his head from his upper lip, whimpering, but there were no bruises or marks on him. The same MP who had escorted the detainee from the booth to the Hard Site met us at the cell door. He started yelling at the detainee words to the effect "you've been moving little piggy, you know you shouldn't move" and yanked the hood all the way back down over the detainee's head. I was shocked by what I saw, and it appeared to me that [redacted] was as well. We instructed the MPs to clothe the detainee, which they did. I quickly whispered to [redacted] and asked if he knew the MPs were going to strip the detainee, and he said that he did not know. I didn't even think to ask the MPs why they had done it. The MP made the statement "I want to thank you guys, because up until a week or two ago, I was a good Christian". After the detainee was clothed, [redacted] and I escorted him to the general population and released him without interrogating him again. I never saw this detainee again. The "striping incident" or the isolation technique were never reported in any "interrogator notes" or "interrogation plan" to my knowledge. After dropping off the detainee in general population, I parted way with [redacted] and went back to work at the JDIC Ops area to catch up on work. I remember mentioning to a couple of other people out of distress, but I can not recall with certainty who those individuals were. I tried to find [redacted] to report what I had seen, but I could not locate him. I did think about telling [redacted] I don't know what her title was or what her role, but I know she was an officer in charge of something at the JDIC. However, not knowing her specific role and due to previous encounters with her where she did not appear responsive to my requests and questions; I did not feel she was the right person to tell. I was thinking that because the incident involved the MPs and a not GTMO MI soldier, that such a report from the GTMO team should come from the GTMO team chief and I didn't want to supercede my chain of command. After we returned to the LSA later in the evening, I again pulled [redacted] to the side to speak with him in private in the LSA courtyard. I began the conversation with a general diatribe about [redacted]'s performance, techniques, preparation skills, and commitment. I then related to him the incident in the Hard Site earlier in the day and he responded "that's not right", "that's a problem", or words to that effect. He then stated "I'll talk to COL PAPPAS about it". I don't believe COL PAPPAS was at AG at the time and I don't think he arrived until about three days after this. This conversation did take place at the end of a long, tiring day, and [redacted] was sick at the time. In fact, a short time later he received "quarters" and was sick for about a month. However, regardless of his state of mind, there was no doubt in my mind at the time that he understood what I had reporting to him and that he had said he would talk to COL PAPPAS by name. I never discussed the incident further with [redacted] or COL PAPPAS, or anyone else. I never heard any feedback and [redacted] and the MPs never mentioned anything to me. In response to the investigating officer's question regarding if [redacted] was aware if any of his GTMO team members had responded to Nov 03 shooting incident at the Hard site, I would like add the following. [redacted] and myself returned to the LSA on the second day of responding to the shooting incident. We had been up an extended period of time and I collapsed on my cot. I was so tired I did not remove any of my gear, including my nine millimeter. [redacted] made the comment, [redacted] is dead." [redacted] asked, "Why's [redacted] head?" [redacted] responded, "We've been on duty for 48 hours Chief." There was some further discussion but I was not paying attention and was soon asleep. I have nothing further to add to this statement. [redacted]

//END OF STATEMENT//

[redacted]

Not used

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT

[redacted]

USED

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5th day of June, 2004 at Devens

[redacted]

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted]

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.

ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
94th RRC, Devens, MA [redacted]	2004/05/28 [redacted]	1454 [redacted]	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
[redacted]	[redacted]	SGT/E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
6th Battalion, 98th Division (IT), Ayers, MA

9. [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

[redacted] am currently a Sergeant assigned to the 6th Battalion (BN), 98th Division (Institutional Training), Ayer, MA, as an Intelligence Analyst (MOS 96B). I graduated from the Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, and was granted MOS 96B in Dec 02. I returned to my reserve unit to serve as an Instructor/Trainer, but was home only about a month when I volunteered for duty at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba. I returned to Huachuca 03 via the Readiness Processing Center at Fort Benning and attended a three to four week "Tiger Team Course" intended for 96Bs deploying to GTMO. The course provided a brief overview of interrogation operations and principles, a brief discussion of approved interrogation approaches, procedures for coordinating information acquired from interrogations, how to work hand and hand with interrogators, and a brief discussion of the Geneva Convention, but there were no practical interrogation exercises, for the analyst portion of the training. I then deployed to GTMO on 14 Feb, and remained there until early Oct 03. While at GTMO, I worked closely with interrogators and had some first hand knowledge of interrogation procedures and techniques. In early Oct 03, I was sent as part of a Tiger Team to Abu Ghraib (AG) in Iraq. MG MILLER, the GTMO Commander, had just returned to GTMO from a week-long assistance visit at AG, because it looked, statistically speaking, that there was little information coming out of AG. I was part of the follow-on team with the mission to identify systemic problems at AG and recommend corrections and solutions based on the GTMO experience. The GTMO Tiger Team consisted of [redacted] (Team Leader and MOS 351E) [redacted] (96B), US Marine Corps [redacted] analyst, equivalent to 96B), and myself. We arrived at AG via BIAP in early Oct 03 (I can not recall the exact date) and remained at AG until approximately 16 Dec 03. We were greeted at AG by [redacted] issued us ammunition for our 9MM pistols since we did not have any, and we were moved into the barracks. COL PAPPAS was at AG quite frequently, but I didn't have much contact with him. I did deal with [redacted] frequently. The entire GTMO team with the exception of [redacted], who was busy with [redacted] were briefed by [redacted] of the 519th MI BN [redacted] briefed the general operations at AG, the history of AG, and presented her slide which stated the Intelligence Rules of Engagement (IROE), of which she was quite proud. From a "professional interrogator perspective", I did not see anything terribly alarming, and assumed that some of the more "rough and tumble" techniques beyond those listed in FM 34-52 (those listed on the right-hand column of [redacted]) were occasionally approved because Iraq was a war zone, and GTMO was more of a garrison environment. Because I was the junior GTMO team member (I was a Specialist at the time) and because I did not want to come across a being a "know it all" from GTMO, I did not really question the advanced techniques listed on the slide. [redacted] did voice his concern over one of the exceptional techniques listed on the right-hand side of the slide, but [redacted] responded that these techniques were, when approved, used at AG an that such techniques were under "constant review". I was assigned to one of the preexisting "Former Regime Loyalists" section interrogation Tiger Teams. [redacted] 97E) was the team leader and [redacted] was the interrogator and I was to provide analyst support and observe how the Tiger team concept was working at AG. In late Nov 03, I was moved from the FRL section and worked with the GTMO detachment where I worked on Analyst Support Packages, and I continued in this capacity until I departed AG on 12 Dec 03. From my arrival at AG in early Oct 03 to late Nov 03, I logged in approximately fifty-seven interrogation booth hours. The first interrogation in which I participated was in early Oct 03. It took place in one of the wooded booths and I observed from behind the glass. [redacted] was the lead interrogator. [redacted] was there as an analyst, and there was an Interpreter/Translator (I/T) whose name I can't recall. He was known to me as the "crabby old bastard", and was an elderly "middle eastern" man with a horse-shoe balding pattern, long white hair, squat and compact, had a poc-marked nose (most notable facial feature), and always wore full Desert Combat Uniforms (DCUs). Although our team was concentrated on Former Regime Loyalists, this detainee in this interrogation was a "force protection" detainee who was supposedly involved in a mortar attack on AG. This was the attack in which [redacted] was injured, and it concerned me that he was going to participate in the interrogation of the very detainee who was suspected of injuring him. When I realized this, I asked him right before the interrogation began if he was OK with this and he said he didn't have a problem with it and continued into the interrogation booth. [redacted] had the detainee roll

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	[redacted]	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1999 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72 IS OBSOLETE (MAC V1.00)

[redacted]

9. STATEMENT (Continued).

his orange jumpsuit down to his waist and insinuated that he would be stripped further if the detainee did not cooperate. The interrogation ended rather quickly when the I/T objected to the tactic and refused to continue with the interrogation. The tactic seemed to be on the edge and I reported the incident, both the rolling down of the jumpsuit and the fact that the I/T had walked out on the interrogation, to [redacted] and he said he would "take care of it". I asked [redacted] about it and he responded that it was an operationally effective technique because that particular detainee was a hard case that they had been trying to break for awhile. I never discussed the incident with [redacted] brought it to [redacted] attention that such treatment would likely negate any progress that might have been made with the detainee thus far, but she responded with words to the effect that [redacted] knew what he was doing. [redacted] did come back to me sometime later and asked why I had reported the I/T for walking out on the interrogation, saying that the I/T was one of the better ones. However, he never asked or confronted me about why I had reported him for the incident. Also in early Oct 03, I participated in what would have been my third or fourth interrogation. We were interviewing a detainee for the first time; though this was not a screening or KB interview and [redacted] asked me if I thought we should place one of the detainees in solitary confinement for a few hours in the middle of the interrogation. I told him that I did not think it was a very effective tactic and would harm any rapport with the detainee, but that he was the interrogator and it was his call. [redacted] decided to place the detainee in solitary and an MP came to the both to escort him to Cell Block 1A. The MP jammed a rag over his head, grabbed the handcuffs restraining the detainee, and said some thing like "come with me piggy" and he lead the detainee to solitary. We went to lunch and the incident continued to bother me. [redacted] and I returned to 1A after lunch (we did not have an I/T with us) and entered the detainee's cell. We found him lying on the floor, completely naked except for a hood that covered his head from his upper lip, whimpering, but there were no bruises or marks on him. I was simply unprepared and horrified at what I saw. We instructed the MPs to clothe the detainee, which they did. I asked [redacted] if he knew the MPs were going to strip the detainee, and he said that he did not know. All I could think about was how disastrous the incident was. I didn't even think to ask the MPs why they had done it. The MP made the statement "I want to thank you guys, because up until a week or two ago, I was a good Christian". The statement was almost "TV-like", perhaps uttered for theatric effect, and I am not sure what the MP meant by it. From digital photographs shown to me this day, I believe the MP was either [redacted] Both look very similar and I only saw the MP one time, so I can not say with certainty which one it was. The MP did not wear glasses. After the detainee was clothed, we escorted him to the general population and release him without interrogating him again. The "striping incident" was never reported in any "interrogator notes" or "interrogation plan"; to my knowledge. This was not uncommon, and the general lack of interrogation notes was one of the GTMO Tiger Team findings. I reported this incident to [redacted] and he said that he would report the incident to COL PAPPAS. Sometime in mid-Oct 03, I had my first experience in the hard site. [redacted] and I were escorting a detainee from the central paddock and transferring him to solitary confinement. I do not know the reason or circumstances since interrogators made such decisions. [redacted] a Military Policeman (MP) on duty at the hard site, met us at the door to Cell Block 1A. [redacted] went into a "drill sergeant intimidation" role, bellowing at the detainee (the detainee likely didn't understand him anyway), but I did not observe any abuse or anything out of the ordinary in any of the area of the hard site that I observed on that visit. [redacted] did not remove the detainee's clothes. During one interrogation, a detainee walked unescorted and unrestrained from the Tango, were paddock holding area in the central AG courtyard to the interrogation. This struck me as strange, since at GTMO all detainees moving to interrogations would be restrained and escorted. This was the first interrogation during which the detainee could see me. Prior to this, and at all interrogations at GTMO, I had always been behind glass. In late Nov 03 there was a shooting incident in the hard site. At about 1730 hours [redacted] called a meeting in the dining facility, explained that over the past few days there had been some things brought into AG and it had culminated in a shooting incident at the hard site. He asked for volunteers to go down to the hard site. I volunteered along with [redacted] there were a number of others but I do not recall their names. We grabbed our battle rattle and weapons and arrived at the hard site about a half hour after the actual shooting. There was an MP captain and several MPs already on the scene and a group of several Iraqi Police (IPs). The IPs were lined up and were taken one by one to be searched and questioned about their possible involvement. The detainees were all secured in their cells. My responsibility was to guard the IPs and transport them from the holding area to be search. Some of the IPs were strip-searched and two were left only in their underwear and held in the hallway. Someone at the site said [redacted] was in charge of directing the interrogations, though I did not see him conduct one personally. I saw one interrogation in the hallway, but was concentrated on watching the IPs, so I did not see much of what else was occurring. There were working dogs present, but I did not see, nor hear of, working dogs being used in any interrogations. I heard the next day that [redacted] and the I/T [redacted] were working together, but I did not see them that night. I also found out the next day that [redacted] had been bitten by one of the dogs. I stayed throughout the night and finally departed at about dawn. I heard about the incident where a detainee supposedly died of congenital heart problems during an OGA interrogation at AG, but I did not believe it until I saw it on the news, about four months after my release from active duty. I also heard about an incident that involved [redacted] walking a naked detainee out of an interrogation, but I do not have any first hand knowledge of the incident. We never used stripping or nakedness as a technique at GTMO, nor did we use military working dogs. We never advised any personnel at AG to utilize any of these techniques. Sleep deprivation and management had been discontinued much earlier than the GTMO detachment visit to AG. There was one occasion at which my AG Tiger Team requested that a detainee be placed on Sleep management but my detachment had departed AG before the request was processed and I am not personally aware of any sleep management being employed at AG. I never gave a tour of AG facilities to incoming personnel, and, to the best of my knowledge, no one from the [redacted]

[redacted]

7. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

GTMO Team ever gave such a tour. While at AG, I never saw, nor heard of, any unauthorized photographs or videos of detainees. I saw, nor heard of, any working dogs being used in the course of interrogation operations. Other than the incidents described above, I am unaware of any detainee abuse. In early Dec 03, the original GTMO Tiger Team came back together and sat down to do a final assessment of AG interrogation operations. We had come together periodically to discuss observation and made recommendations to the AG Command, but this was the final discussion. [redacted] eventually briefed [redacted] but also briefed the AG Command before departing AG. [redacted] of the 519th MI BN was also present for this meeting and was knowledgeable of the findings and recommendations. During this meeting, we discussed the incidents types like the ones described above ; how they should be avoided and other recommendations but did not make reference to specific events. I was ordered by MG Fay this day not to discuss the inquiry or my role in it with anyone other than officials I know to be involved with the inquiry. I have nothing further to add to this statement [redacted] //END OF STATEMENT//